Citation Nr: 21063015 Decision Date: 10/12/21 Archive Date: 10/12/21 DOCKET NO. 18-27 177 DATE: October 12, 2021 ORDER The character of the Veteran's discharge from active military service for the period from April 11, 1997 to September 11, 2007 is a bar to the receipt of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) benefits; the appeal is denied. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of right hand fracture is denied. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of left index finger partial amputation is denied. REMANDED Entitlement to service connection for left ear hearing loss is remanded. Entitlement to service connection for neck condition is remanded. Entitlement to service connection for right shoulder condition is remanded. Entitlement to service connection for back condition is remanded. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran had two periods of active duty; from July 9, 1993 to April 11, 1997, he served in the United States Army and received an honorable discharge; and from August 11, 1997, through September 11, 2007, for which he received a discharge under other than honorable (OTH) conditions. 2. On August 9, 2007, the Veteran was charged with violation of Article 86 (AWOL), under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), for being AWOL from December 3, 2000 to July 8, 2007. The Veteran submitted a request for discharge in lieu of facing a court martial, which was subsequently approved by the General Court Martial Convening Authority, who directed that the Veteran receive an under OTH conditions discharge. He was discharged on September 11, 2007. 3. The Veteran was AWOL for a period of 2,770 days. 4. Compelling circumstances did not warrant the Veteran's prolonged unauthorized absence. 5. There has been no removal of any statutory bar to VA benefits via an upgrade to the Veteran's character of discharge or evidence showing that the Veteran was insane at the time of his offense. 6. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran's residuals of right hand fracture began during his period of honorable active service, or is otherwise related to an in-service injury or disease. 7. The preponderance of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran's residuals of left index finger partial amputation began during his period of honorable active service, or is otherwise related to an in-service injury or disease. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The character of the Veteran's discharge from service for the period from April 11, 1997 to September 11, 2007, is a bar to his receipt of VA benefits. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(2), 5103, 5103A, 5303; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(d), 3.12, 3.159, 3.354. 2. The criteria for service connection for residuals of right hand fracture are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303. 3. The criteria for service connection for residuals of left index finger partial amputation are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty from July 9, 1993 to April 10, 1997 and from April 11, 1997 to September 11, 2007. The Veteran received an honorable discharge for his first period of service. He was discharged from his second period of service in lieu of court martial for being Absent without Leave (AWOL) for 2770 days and given an under OTH conditions discharge. This appeal comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a July 2016 administrative decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). In April 2021, the Veteran testified at a Board hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. A copy of the hearing transcript is associated with the claims file. 1. Whether the character of the Veteran's discharge from active military service for the period from April 11, 1997 to September 11, 2007 is a bar to the receipt of Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) benefits. The Veteran seeks recognition as a "Veteran" for VA compensation and benefits purposes for his period of service from April 1997 to September 2007. Character of Discharge For VA purposes, a veteran is a person discharged or released from active service under conditions other than dishonorable. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(d). That is a threshold question to be answered in every claim for VA benefits concerning the adequacy of a claimant's service for purposes of establishing basic eligibility. Applicable laws and regulations provide that most VA benefits are not payable unless the period of service upon which the claim is based was terminated by discharge or release under conditions other than dishonorable. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(2), 101(18), 5303; 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(a). The designation of the discharge as dishonorable by the service department is binding on VA as to character of discharge. 38. C.F.R. § 3.12(a). Service department findings (i.e., the Army, Navy, and Air Force) are binding and conclusive upon VA for purposes of establishing an individual's service. VA does not have authority to alter the findings of the service department. 38 C.F.R. § 3.203(a); Spencer v. West, 13. Vet. App. 376, 380 (2000); Venturella v. Gober, 11 Vet. App. 240, 241 (1997); Cahall v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 232, 237 (1994); Duro v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 530, 532 (1992); see Soria v. Brown, 118 F.3d 747, 749 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Manlincon v. West, 12 Vet. App. 238 (1999). VA has no authority to alter the claimant's discharge classification, and the claimant's recourse is with the service department. Harvey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 416 (1994), A dishonorable discharge, a statutory bar, or a regulatory bar deprives the claimant of all gratuitous VA benefits. Such a discharge, statutory bar, or regulatory bar is binding on VA as to the character of discharge unless an exception, such as insanity, applies. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12. Specifically, there are two types of character of discharge bars establishing entitlement for VA benefits: statutory bars found at 38 U.S.C. § 5303(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c) and regulatory bars listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d). As to the statutory bars, benefits are not payable where the former service member was discharged or released under one of the following conditions listed under 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c): (1) as a conscientious objector who refused to perform military duty, wear the uniform, or comply with lawful order of competent military authorities; (2) by reason of the sentence of a general court martial; (3) resignation by an officer for the good of the service; (4) as a deserter; (5) as an alien during periods of hostilities, where it is affirmatively shown that the former service member requested his or her release; and (6) by reason of discharge other than honorable conditions issued as a result of an AWOL for a continuous period of at least 180 days (the regulation provides certain exceptions to this condition). As to the exception to AWOL, a person discharged under conditions other than honorable on the basis of an AWOL period of at least 180 days is barred from receipt of VA benefits "unless such person demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary that there are compelling circumstances to warrant such prolonged, unauthorized absence." 38 U.S.C. § 5303(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c)(6). The Board notes that this provision is applicable to the instant case as the Veteran was AWOL for a period of at least 180 days. The provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d) state that a discharge or release because of one of the following offenses is considered to have been issued under dishonorable conditions: (1) acceptance of undesirable discharge in lieu of trial by general court-marital; (2) mutiny or spying; (3) offenses involving moral turpitude (this includes, generally, conviction of a felony); (4) willful and persistent misconduct; and (5) homosexual acts involving aggravated circumstances and other facts affecting the performance of duty. The Board notes that this provision is not applicable to the instant case. Additionally, the Board further notes that the Veteran accepted an undesirable discharge pursuant to a special court martial and not a general court martial. A discharge or release from service under one of the conditions specified in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 is a bar to the payment of VA benefits unless it is found that the person was insane at the time of committing the offense. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(b). Specifically, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5303(b), "if it is established to the satisfaction of the Secretary that, at the time of the commission of an offense leading to a person's court-martial, discharge or resignation, that person was insane, such person shall not be precluded from benefits under laws administered by the Secretary based upon the period of service from which such person was separated." 38 U.S.C. § 5303(b). An insane person is one who, while not mentally defective or constitutionally psychopathic, except when a psychosis has been engrafted upon such basic condition, exhibits, due to disease, a more or less prolonged deviation from his normal method of behavior; or who interferes with the peace of society; or who has so departed (become antisocial) from the accepted standards of the community to which by birth and education he belongs as to lack the adaptability to make further adjustment to the social customs of the community in which he resides. 38 C.F.R. § 3.354(a). When a rating agency is concerned with determining whether a veteran was insane at the time he committed an offense leading to his court-martial, discharge or resignation, it will base its decision on all the evidence procurable relating to the period involved, and apply the definition in 38 C.F.R. § 3.354(a). 38 C.F.R. § 3.354(b). When the question is whether an individual was insane at the time of an offense leading to his court-martial or discharge, the rating agency will base its decision on all the evidence procurable relating to the period involved and apply the definition of paragraph (a). 38 C.F.R. § 3.354(b). Mental illness is not identical to "insanity." Beck v. West, 13 Vet. App. 535, 539 (2000). The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has held that the insanity need only exist at the time of the commission of the offense leading to the person's discharge, and that there is no requirement of a causal connection between the insanity and the misconduct. Struck v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 145 (1996). There still must be competent evidence, though, establishing the Appellant was insane at the time of the offenses in question leading to the other than honorable discharge. Zang v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 246, 254 (1995). In addition, the Court held that "a determination of whether a person is insane is, in effect, a determination of whether the person's actions were intentional, and, thus, the result of willful misconduct." Id. at 254. The Court further indicated such a determination is not warranted when the record does not reflect a Veteran suffered from insanity due to disease or that he or she did not know or understand the nature or consequences of his or her acts, or that what he or she was doing was wrong. Id. Significantly, the burden is on the Appellant to submit competent medical evidence that the Veteran was insane at the time of the offenses. Stringham v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 445, 449 (1995). In May 1997, VA General Counsel discussed the intended parameters of the types of behavior, which were defined as insanity under 38 C.F.R. § 3.354(a). It was indicated that behavior involving a minor episode or episodes of disorderly conduct or eccentricity does not fall within the definition of insanity in that regulation. It was further indicated that a determination of the extent to which an individual's behavior must deviate from his or her normal method of behavior could be best resolved by adjudicative personnel on a case-by-case basis in light of the authorities defining the scope of the term insanity. VAOPGCPREC 20-97 (May 22, 1997). Health care and disability benefits may not be furnished for any disability incurred or aggravated during a period of service terminated by a bad conduct discharge or when one of the bars listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c) applies. 38 C.F.R. § 3.360(b). As is relevant here, the statutory bars to benefits included in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c) include by reason of a discharge under other than honorable conditions issued as a result of an absence without official leave, also known as AWOL, for a continuous period of at least 180 days. The Board has reviewed all the evidence in the Veteran's claims file. Although the Board has an obligation to provide adequate reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no requirement that the evidence submitted by the Veteran or obtained on his behalf be discussed in detail. Rather, the Board's analysis below will focus specifically on what evidence is needed to substantiate the claim and what the evidence in the claims file shows, or fails to show, with respect to the claim. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) and Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122, 128-30 (2000). Factual Background Turning to the evidence of record, the Veteran's service personnel records show that he was discharged in September 2007 with an under OTH discharge. The service records indicate that the Veteran had the following misconduct: In August 2007, the Veteran was charged with being AWOL, from December 3, 2000 to August 7, 2007, for a total of 2,770 days, in violation of Article 86, UCMJ. The Veteran's commander recommended trial by Special Court Martial. In October 2007, the Veteran met with legal counsel, acknowledged his rights under the UCMJ, and voluntarily submitted a request for discharge in lieu of standing trial at court-martial. In October 2007, the Special Court Martial Convening Authority approved the Veteran's voluntary request, and he was discharged with an OTH characterization of service. There is no evidence that the Veteran has filed a request to upgrade his character of discharge, with the Army Discharge Review Board or Board of Correction of Military Records. Analysis The Board finds that the Veteran was discharged under other than honorable conditions as a result of being AWOL for more than 180 days, and is, therefore, statutorily barred from receiving VA benefits. As outlined, however, an exception is outlined in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c)(6) that states that "[t]his bar to benefit entitlement does not apply if there are compelling circumstances to warrant the prolonged unauthorized absence." The regulation outlines various factors to be considered in determining whether there are compelling circumstances to warrant the prolonged unauthorized absence. Upon review of the facts of this case and with consideration to the outlined factors, the Board finds that compelling circumstances did not warrant the Veteran's prolonged unauthorized absence. As to the factor outlined in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (c)(6)(i), regarding length of service exclusive of the period of AWOL, the Veteran's DD 214 reflects that, absent his period of AWOL, that he served for a total of 7 years, 7 months and 27 days of total active service. The DD 214 also reflects that the Appellant had served as an infantryman, was awarded the expert infantryman badge, and attained the rank of Sergeant. Overall, there is evidence indicating that the Veteran's service, exclusive of the period of AWOL, was of quality and length that it can be characterized as honest, faithful and meritorious and of benefit to the Nation. As to the factor outlined in 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(c)(6)(ii), regarding reasons for going AWOL, as outlined in detail above, the Veteran asserts that he went AWOL as a result of needing to provide support to his spouse. The Veteran's spouse was suffering from a mental health condition and moved in with her parents while the Veteran served overseas. The Veteran reports that he received a Red Cross message requesting that he return to provide support to his spouse. Upon his return, on authorized leave, the Veteran attempted to report to Fort Bragg for assignment. He was denied and then went and remained AWOL for such an extended period of time after the emergency leave precipitating the period of AWOL, that such emergency family problems cannot be mitigating circumstances. There is also no evidence of what steps the Veteran has undertaken, after his leave expired, to resolve the situation and return to duty. With respect to the provision that "[t]he reasons for going AWOL should be evaluated in terms of the person's age, cultural background, educational level and judgmental maturity," the Veteran was 25 years old at the time of his period of AWOL. Regarding cultural background, STRs referenced that he was born in the U.S., that his race was "Caucasian." It is unclear to the Board what, if any, impact either of these factors had on the Veteran's reasons for going AWOL. The Veteran has not raised any specific argument on this point. As to education level, he completed eleventh grade of high school. As to judgmental maturity, the evidence of record shows that he had significant judgmental maturity present during the relevant period. The Veteran was married with three children, maintained a household, served as a member of the 3d Infantry Division (Old Guard), earned a promotion to sergeant, and attended a leadership course. With respect to the provision regarding "[h]ardship or suffering incurred during overseas service," the Veteran asserts that he endured hardship due to being separated from his spouse and was denied a hardship discharge. He decided to go AWOL based on these reasons. The Board notes that the Veteran was serving overseas in the Republic of Korea, and had been authorized leave, at the time of his misconduct. There is no objective evidence of any harsh or dangerous living conditions or physical conditions. Nonetheless, the Board has carefully and sympathetically considered this hardship "in evaluating the [Veteran's] state of mind at the time the prolonged AWOL period began," discussed in more detail below. As to the factor outlined in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c)(6)(iii), regarding whether a valid legal defense exists for the absence which would have precluded a conviction for AWOL, this does not appear to be present in this case. In this regard, the Board notes that the Veteran requested discharge for the good of the service and acknowledged that he may be discharged under other than honorable conditions. That the Veteran requested this discharge rather than face administrative proceedings strongly suggests that he did not have a valid legal defense which would have precluded a conviction for being AWOL. Overall, the Board has considered the outlined factors in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (c)(6)(i)-(iii). The Board has also considered the Veteran's reasons for going AWOL based on "how the situation appeared" to the Veteran. The Board acknowledges that some of the outlined factors in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 (c)(6)(i)-(iii) weigh in favor of finding compelling circumstances for the Veteran's period of prolonged AWOL, as discussed above. The Board finds, however, that, for the reasons outlined below, the overall evidence weighs against finding that there were compelling circumstances to warrant the Veteran's period of prolonged AWOL. In this regard, the Board overall does not find that the reasons reported for going on prolonged AWOL presented compelling circumstances. The Veteran asserts that he went AWOL to support his spouse who suffered from depression. He also felt that he was not receiving proper support from his chain of command, which had denied a hardship discharge prior to his assignment to Korea, and relied on information and advice from a third-party source, which contributed to his decision to not return to duty after the expiration of his approved leave or to request additional leave. These assertions, if taken as true, do not present compelling circumstances to warrant the prolonged AWOL period. The Veteran's spouse was living with her parents, and had ongoing support, sufficient to allow her to pursue a parttime job, to attend medical appointments, and to provide support to others in her family. At the time of his entering AWOL status, the Veteran had less than ten months of required service in Korea prior to his return to a stateside assignment. Additionally, there is insufficient evidence to determine whether the circumstances warranted the Veteran remaining absent for such a prolonged period. While the Veteran's spouse had ongoing issues with depression, this does not appear to rise to the level of compelling circumstances to warrant being AWOL for approximately five years. Additionally, during the period of approved leave, the Veteran had pursued employment, and secured an employment offer, indicating that he did not plan to return to the military. Overall, for the reasons outlined above, the Board finds that compelling circumstances did not warrant the Veteran's prolonged unauthorized absence. The Board also notes that 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(b) provides, essentially, that if a Veteran was insane at the time of committing an offense causing discharge under that regulation (as relevant here, based on being AWOL for a continuous period of at least 180 days), this would not be a bar to VA benefits. Insanity has a specific definition for VA purposes, as outlined in 38 C.F.R. § 3.354. This definition provides that an insane person is one who exhibits due to disease: a more or less prolonged deviation from his normal method of behavior; or who interferes with the peace of society; or who has so departed (become antisocial) from the accepted standards of the community to which by birth and education he belongs as to lack the adaptability to make further adjustment to the social customs of the community in which he resides. See also Zang v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 246 (1995) (holding that the phrase "due to disease" applies to all three circumstances in 38 C.F.R. § 3.354(a)). The Appellant has not presented any argument that any of the three circumstances in the regulation were applicable to the Appellant at the time he was AWOL, and the Board finds that the evidence does not otherwise indicate that any of the three circumstances are applicable. The Board finds that the Veteran's September 2007 discharge under other than honorable conditions resulted from a period of prolonged AWOL, which was not due to compelling circumstances; and the Veteran was not insane for VA purposes at the time he committed the offenses resulting in his discharge. Therefore, the Board concludes that VA benefits are not payable based on the Veteran's period of service from April 11, 1997 to September 11, 2007. The character of discharge for that period of service is a bar to benefits based on a continuous period of AWOL for over 180 days. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c)(6). The Board finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that the Veteran's character of service qualifies for entitlement to VA benefits. Therefore, the underlying claims for benefits remain denied as the character of the Veteran's service is a bar to VA benefits. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Service Connection Service connection may be granted directly as a result of disease or injury incurred in service based on nexus using a three-element test: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(a), (d); Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Service connection may be granted on a presumptive basis: (i) where a chronic disease or injury is shown in service and subsequent manifestations of the same disease or injury is shown at a later date unless clearly attributable to an intercurrent cause under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a); or (ii) where a condition is noted in service but is not chronic or where chronicity may be legitimately question and there are continuity of symptomatology but only for specific chronic diseases listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a); or (iii) with certain chronic diseases listed in 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a) by showing that the disorder manifested itself to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year from the date of separation from service. When all the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in relative equipoise, with the veteran prevailing in either event, or whether a preponderance of the evidence is against a claim, in which case, the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. 2. Entitlement to service connection for residuals right hand fracture. 3. Entitlement to service connection for residuals left index finger partial amputation. The Veteran seeks entitlement to service connection for right hand and left index finger disabilities. A December 1998 treatment note indicates that the Veteran suffered a left index finger partial amputation due to a gunshot wound (GSW). A September 1999 Statement of Medical Examination and Duty Status indicates that the Veteran suffered a right-hand fracture on September 26, 1999. Reports of Medical History and service treatment records prior to December 1998 do not reflect bone, joint, or other deformity. The earliest clinical evidence of left index finger partial amputation and right hand fracture disabilities are in 1998 and 1999, respectively. The evidence clearly reflects that the Veteran's right hand fracture and left finger amputation occurred well into the period of service which has been determined to be dishonorable for VA purposes; thus, service connection for residuals of right hand fracture and residuals of left index finger partial amputation is barred. In cases such as this, where the law is dispositive, the claim should be denied because of the absence of legal merit. Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426 (1994). The character of the Veteran's discharge for his period of service from April 11, 1997 to September 11, 2007 is a bar to VA benefits. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12. Thus, the claim is denied because of the absence of legal merit. Accordingly, the Board must deny the Veteran's claims of entitlement to service connection for residuals of right hand fracture and residuals of left index finger partial amputation. REASONS FOR REMAND 1. Entitlement to service connection for left ear hearing loss is remanded. 2. Entitlement to service connection for neck condition is remanded. 3. Entitlement to service connection for right shoulder condition is remanded. 4. Entitlement to service connection for back condition is remanded. The AOJ received the Veteran's STRs in January 2016. These records appear incomplete. They do not contain periodic or separation examinations and have limited treatment records. VA has a heightened duty to assist the Veteran in developing his claim in light of the potentially incomplete STRs. See O'Hare v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 365 (1991). In this case, the AOJ did not pursue additional records or make any formal finding regarding the unavailability of additional or complete STRs, which are relevant to the issues on appeal. Regarding the claim for service connection for a left ear hearing loss disability, the July 2016 VA examiner opined that the etiology of the Veteran's left ear hearing loss could not be determined without resorting to mere speculation and noted that audiological information was not available for review. As such, this examination report is not sufficient for adjudication purposes. Regarding the claims for service connection for neck, right shoulder and back disabilities, the Veteran claimed that these conditions were caused by his service as an infantryman, as well as his service as a paratrooper. The AOJ denied these claims on the lack of medical evidence of injuries, as well as a lack of evidence that the Veteran performed airborne training during his period of honorable service. However, the current evidence of record suggests that the Veteran attended airborne training during his period of honorable service from July 9, 1993 to April 11, 1997. The Veteran enlisted in July 1993 for a period of four years. He also enlisted to serve as an infantryman and airborne training, with assignment to the 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg. Typically, an individual must complete an "airborne physical examination" prior to attending airborne training. This examination is not contained in the available STRs. The Veteran also attended the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) in August 1998. In his PLDC academic report, his MOS is noted as 11B1P, which indicates that he is an infantryman, in the rank of E4 or below, and was airborne qualified (P is an MOS qualifier indicating airborne qualification). Additionally, the Veteran's noncommissioned officer evaluation report (NCOER) for the period from September 1998 to August 1999 indicates that he was airborne qualified, with additional duties as advanced airborne training and jumpmaster, which requires a minimum of 12 airborne operations, i.e., jumps, to attend the training to become certified as a jumpmaster. See https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/ARTB/Student-Information/content/pdf/Airborne%20Ranger%20PE%20Checklist.pdf. Therefore, the Board finds the remand is necessary so that additional efforts should be undertaken to obtain complete medical and personnel records for the period prior to April 10, 1997. Additionally, in his April 2021 Board testimony, the Veteran indicated that he has a "family doctor," and received treatment for his claimed conditions. These records have not been obtained or associated with the claims file. A remand is required to allow VA to obtain authorization and request these records. Following completion of the remand directives, the RO should re-evaluate the claims, and conduct further development, to include new medical examinations as needed. The matters are REMANDED for the following action: 1. Ask the Veteran to complete a VA Form 21-4142 for private treatment records from any identified civilian medical provider. Make two requests for the authorized records from said physicians unless it is clear after the first request that a second request would be futile. 2. Contact the Veteran and afford him an opportunity to provide any STRs and MPRs in his possession, to include copies of any graduation certificates for airborne training course, his jump log, or other such documents. 3. Ensure that appropriate STR requests from all potential record custodians for the Veteran's active duty STRs from July 9, 1993 to April 11, 1997 to March 1972 have been made and are clearly documented in the evidence. Make as many requests as necessary until it is clear that further search efforts would be futile. Document all search efforts. 4. If it becomes apparent that active duty STRs from July 9, 1993 to April 11, 1997 no longer exist or additional search efforts would be futile, prepare a Formal Finding of Unavailability documenting all search actions and responses received with notice to the Veteran and his representative. Allow the Veteran and his representative an opportunity to respond. 5. Review any newly generated records and responses from the Veteran to determine if they are relevant to any of the claimed disabilities. If so, obtain appropriate VA examination(s) and medical opinion(s) based upon review of the newly received evidence. D. JOHNSON Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board Michael J. O'Connor, Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.