Citation Nr: 21064981 Decision Date: 10/22/21 Archive Date: 10/22/21 DOCKET NO. 17-07 007 DATE: October 22, 2021 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Although the Veteran has a current diagnosis of PTSD, the evidentiary record does not establish that he was engaged in combat with the enemy or that he was exposed to hostile military or terrorist activity while on active duty. 2. The occurrence of the Veteran's reported in-service stressful experiences have not been corroborated by service records, or other credible supporting evidence, and he has not provided sufficient information for VA to attempt to corroborate independently any such in-service stressor events. 3. The Veteran does not have PTSD under the appropriate Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) criteria. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for PTSD are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304(f). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from March 1990 to March 1995. The record shows he was scheduled for a June 2021 hearing before a Veterans Law Judge. He later submitted a July 2021 letter canceling the hearing. Therefore, his hearing request has been withdrawn. 38 C.F.R. § 20.704(e). Service Connection The Veteran seeks service connection for PTSD which he asserts is related to traumatic experiences during his military service. Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a Veteran must show: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service - the so-called "nexus" requirement. Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). However, there are particular requirements for establishing service connection for PTSD in 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) that are separate from those for establishing service connection generally. Arzio v. Shinseki, 602 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a); a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. If the evidence establishes that the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to that combat, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary and provided that the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); see also Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997). In order to grant service connection for PTSD to a non-combat veteran, there must be credible evidence to support the veteran's assertion that the stressful event occurred. A stressor need not be corroborated in every detail. Suozzi v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 307, 311 (1997). Moreover, a medical opinion diagnosing PTSD does not suffice to verify the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressors. Cohen, supra; Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395-396 (1996). However, if a stressor claimed by a veteran is related to fear of hostile military or terrorist activity and a VA psychiatrist or psychologist, or a psychiatrist or psychologist with whom VA has contracted, confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis of PTSD and that the veteran's symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). A diagnosis of PTSD must conform to the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM). 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a). The Board recognizes that the Veterans Benefits Administration is now required to apply concepts and principles set forth in the upon the to the recently updated Fifth Edition, (DSM-5). In various statements submitted with his claim, the Veteran has identified the primary events that he considers to be the precipitating causes of his PTSD. Specifically, he has described: (1) anxiety and a fear of flying after being shot at by drug smugglers during a flight; (2) the stress from his experiences at Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape (SERE) School; (3) the intensity level associated with his duties during "the Yugoslavia missile lock;" and (4) while inside the P-3 in Saudi Arabia he witnessed a crew member fall off the wing of a plane while the engines were running. See VA Form 21-4138s, Statement in Support of Claim, received in February 2014 and April 2014. Although the AOJ attempted to verify these stressors, the Veteran did not respond to a February 2015 VA letter, requesting more specific information as to the events experienced in-service that contributed to his PTSD. It was determined that information required to verify the events, as provided by the Veteran, was insufficient to send to the U.S. Army and Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC). See VA Form 21-0961 memorandum dated in March 2015. The Board also notes that post-service clinical records show a diagnosis of PTSD. See clinical records from CRP Behavioral Health, LLC. However, it is not clear how the diagnosis was made, as it appears, in large part, to be based upon a vague and general reference to symptoms without a specific discussion of the DSM criteria. Further to the extent the PTSD diagnosis is based on an unverified stressor, it may not be relied upon by the Board. See West v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70 (1994). See also Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389 (1996); (medical opinion diagnosing PTSD does not suffice to verify the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressors). See, e.g., Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458 (1993) (a diagnosis and purported relationship to service is only as good and credible as the history on which it is predicated). In other words, just because a physician or other health professional has accepted a veteran's description of his experiences as credible and diagnosed PTSD does not mean the Board is required to grant service connection for that disorder. See Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 614, 618 (1992); see also Menegassi v. Shinseki, 638 F.3d 1379, 1382 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (VA is not required to accept a doctor's diagnosis of PTSD due to personal assault as proof that the stressor occurred, as doctors typically rely on unverified stressor information provided by the patient). Also, the AOJ took appropriate actions to verify the Veteran's reported stressors but because he did not respond with the information requested, VA's attempts to verify his stressors were hindered. See Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991) (holding that the duty to assist is not a "one-way street," and that, if he desires help with his claim, he must cooperate with VA's efforts to assist him). The Veteran's failure to provide the requested information served only to deprive the Board of critical, clarifying medical evidence which might have helped support his claim. In short, the Board finds no credible supporting evidence that any of the reported in-service stressors occurred. Furthermore, as the medical evidence of record which diagnoses the presence of PTSD is based on unverified stressors, service connection for PTSD is not warranted. Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, and there is no reasonable doubt to be resolved. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). Thomas H. O'Shay Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board Bryant, Jeana R The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.