Citation Nr: 21067909 Decision Date: 11/08/21 Archive Date: 11/08/21 DOCKET NO. 08-19 172 DATE: November 8, 2021 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include schizoaffective disorder, is denied. FINDING OF FACT There is no medical nexus between the Veteran's psychiatric disabilities and active service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from February 1989 to November 1989. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a May 2007 rating decision issued by a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). . The Veteran initially requested a hearing before the Board in his June 2008 VA Form 9 substantive appeal; however, he subsequently withdrew his request for a Board hearing in a September 2011 statement. The Veteran requested another Board hearing through his attorney in June 2021. The Veteran and his attorney were notified in August 2021 that a hearing was scheduled for September 24, 2021. Neither the Veteran nor his attorney attended the hearing, and did not provide good cause explanation for their absence or request to reschedule the hearing; therefore, the Veteran's hearing request is withdrawn. 38 C.F.R. § 20.702(d). The issue on appeal was previously denied by the Board in August 2017. The Veteran appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) which, in a January 2019 Memorandum Decision set aside the Board's August 2017 decision that denied entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, and remanded the claim for action consistent with its decision. This matter was previously before the Board and remanded for further development in August 2019. That development having been completed, the case has been returned to the Board for appellate review. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder Service Connection Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Establishing service connection generally requires (1) competent evidence of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) competent evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Veteran contends that he has a current diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder due to an in-service stressor. Specifically, the Veteran claims that he was treated poorly by his superiors during basic training, and that he was physically assaulted by fellow service members. See October 2006 Correspondence. As to the Veteran's schizoaffective disorder, the first element of entitlement to service connection (a current disability) has been met. The Veteran was afforded a VA examination in June 2016 where the VA examiner stated, "[the Veteran] currently does not meet criteria for a diagnosis of Schizoaffective Disorder; however, the diagnosis has been present in his records since about 2001." See June 2016 VA examination. The Veteran's original claim for disability was received in October 2006. There is evidence of record from the Veteran's correctional facility that lists a current diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder in August 2006. The requirement of a current disability is satisfied when a claimant has a disability at the time a claim for VA disability compensation is filed or at any point during the pendency of that claim (even if the disorder later resolves). McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007). The second element, an in-service injury, event, or illness, has been satisfied. The Veteran submitted lay evidence regarding harsh treatment from superiors and being suffocated with a blanket and beaten by his fellow soldiers. See October 2006 Correspondence. The Board finds these statements competent and credible, and accepts these statements as evidence of an in-service event, thereby satisfying the second requirement for service connection. The third element, a nexus between the claimed in-service event and the present disability, must be resolved. The Veteran was provided a VA examination in June 2016. The examiner issued an opinion based on an in-person examination, a thorough review of the claims file, and an interview with the patient. The examiner opined that it was less likely as not that the Veteran's claimed schizoaffective disorder had its onset during service, was manifested to a compensable degree within one year of service, or was casually related to service, including on the basis of continuity of symptomatology. The rationale was that most the Veteran's psychiatric symptoms document the origin to the Veteran's incarceration. It was noted that any auditory hallucinations that the Veteran may have experienced began no earlier than 1991. This is clearly after the Veteran was separated from service in November 1989. In accordance with the August 2019 Board remand directives, the Veteran's personnel records were obtained in an effort to gain more insight as to why the Veteran was discharged from service, and whether any psychiatric problems may have began in service and played a role in the Veteran's discharge. The reason for the Veteran's separation was noted as "Unsatisfactory Performance". See DD-214. The additional personnel records that were obtained do not lend any additional information as to the specific reason(s) for the Veteran's unsatisfactory performance. The record simply states that the Veteran was discharged without personal notice per NGR 600-200, and a notice was mailed to his last known address. This is noted as a General discharge per AGTX Order 223-6 para 4. There is no evidence to suggest the Veteran had a psychiatric disability that contributed to his discharge. The Board finds that the weight of the competent medical evidence weighs against a finding of a medical nexus between the current psychiatric disability and active service. In this regard, the Board reiterates that the Veteran himself identified being placed in solitary confinement as the source of his psychiatric symptoms when he was first incarcerated in 1992. See September 2002 Competency Evaluation. Subsequent medical evaluations find the Veteran's psychiatric disability inconsistent, or not present at all. The timing of the insanity evaluation with the Veteran's date of confinement of November 2002 tend to suggest the insanity issue was part of his criminal defense. In fact, the impetus of the court order for the psychiatric evaluation for the defendant Veteran's competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the crime of which he was convicted was a motion by the Veteran's attorney. See August 2002 Court Documents. Regardless, the Board assigns more probative value to the opinion of the June 2016 VA examiner. The Board finds this opinion to be factually accurate, fully articulated, and containing sound reasoning. A medical opinion that is factually accurate, fully articulated, and based on sound reasoning carries significant weight. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 304 (2008); see also Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 124 (2007). The Board acknowledges the Veteran's belief, and his wife's belief that his psychiatric disability was related to active service. However, those statements alone do not establish a medical nexus. Indeed, while the Veteran is competent to provide evidence regarding matters that can be perceived by the senses, he is not shown to be competent to render medical opinions on questions of etiology. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007) (lay testimony is competent to establish the presence of observable symptomatology). As such, as a lay person, he is without the appropriate medical training and expertise to offer an opinion on a medical matter, including the diagnosis, etiology, or causation of a specific disability. The question of diagnosis and causation, in this case, involves complex medical issues that the Veteran, nor his wife, is competent to address. Jandreau, 492 F.3d 1372. For these reasons, the claim must be denied. Because the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. Cynthia M. Bruce Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board R. Nelson, Associate Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.