Citation Nr: 21068747 Decision Date: 11/12/21 Archive Date: 11/12/21 DOCKET NO. 15-30 350 DATE: November 12, 2021 ORDER Effective dates earlier than April 12, 2002, and December 5, 2012, for the distinct awards of special monthly compensation (SMC) based on housebound status is denied. REMANDED Entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual employability (TDIU) due to service-connected disabilities is remanded. FINDING OF FACT Prior to April 12, 2002, and December 5, 2012, the Veteran was not permanently housebound by reason of his service-connected disabilities, and his service-connected disabilities did not meet the schedular requirements for an award of statutory housebound special monthly compensation prior to those dates. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for effective dates earlier than April 12, 2002, and December 5, 2012, for the grants of SMC based upon housebound status have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1114 (s), 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.350. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Army from January 1971 to July 1975, including foreign service in the Republic of Vietnam. For his meritorious service, he was awarded (among other decorations) the Vietnam Service and Campaign Medals. The Veteran died in March 2016. The appellant has been recognized as a properly substituted claimant. See 38 U.S.C. § 5121A; see also March 2018 VA memorandum. This appeal has a prolonged and complicated procedural history. Most recently, this appeal was remanded by the Board in June 2021 to ascertain whether the grants contained therein served as a basis upon which to award earlier effective dates. In a September 2021 Supplemental Statement of the Case (SSOC), the Regional Office (RO) found that they did not. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 271 (1998). Also in June 2021, the Board remanded three appeals seeking entitlement to service connection for right hip, left hip, and xerosis disabilities. Service connection was subsequently awarded in a September 2021 rating decision, and the appellant has not expressed dissatisfaction with these awards as assigned. As this constitutes complete grants of the service connection claims, these matters are no longer before the Board. See Grantham v. Brown, 114 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1997). As repeatedly raised by her representative, a September 2016 letter informed the appellant that her claim for accrued benefits could not be approved because VA did not owe the Veteran any money at the time of his death. The appellant attempted to submit a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) to this letter in November 2016, and her representative now contends that a Statement of the Case (SOC) be issued. The Board fundamentally disagrees with this request, as the September 2016 letter does not constitute an adjudicatory determination but rather a factual assessment of the Veteran's benefit status at the time of his death. It is apparent from even a cursory review of the record that the Veteran was not owed any money at the time of his death, and that the appellant has since been paid all accrued benefits awarded since his passing. Thus, an SOC is not needed in this instance. Earlier Effective Dates Historically, a February 2013 rating decision awarded the Veteran SMC at the housebound rate from April 12, 2002, to August 1, 2002, and from December 5, 2012 forward. Both the Veteran and the appellant clearly expressed their dissatisfaction with the effective date of both awards, such that the Board's previous characterization of the matter on appeal as entitlement to an earlier effective date than December 5, 2012, only, was too limited in scope. See, e.g., June 2013 NOD; August 2015 VA Form 9. Herein, the Board will thus contemplate whether an earlier effective date is warranted for both periods during which the Veteran was in receipt of SMC benefits at the housebound rate. Under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s), SMC based on housebound status is payable where a veteran has a single service-connected disability rated as 100 percent disabling and either additional service-connected disability or disabilities independently ratable at 60 percent, separate and distinct from the 100 percent service-connected disability and involving different anatomical segments or bodily systems or is otherwise "permanently housebound" by reason of such disability or disabilities. One is permanently housebound when substantially confined to his or her dwelling and the immediate premises or, if institutionalized, to the ward or clinical area, and it is reasonably certain that the disability or disabilities and resultant confinement will continue throughout his or her lifetime. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.351(d). A single service-connected disability that is rated less than 100 percent but nonetheless supports a TDIU rating is sufficient to satisfy the criteria for statutory housebound status. See Bradley v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 280, 293 (2008). The record does not establish that earlier effective dates are warranted for the Veteran's distinct awards of SMC based on housebound status. Rather, the February 2013 rating decision first granted this benefit from April 12, 2002, to August 1, 2002, reflecting the total period during which the Veteran was in receipt of a TDIU based on a single service-connected disability (specifically, PTSD) and an additional service-connected disability independently rated at 60 percent or more (specifically, coronary artery disease (CAD)). Prior to April 12, 2002, the Veteran did not meet the schedular percentage requirements described above to warrant SMC based upon statutory housebound criteria, nor was he actually permanently housebound due to his service-connected disabilities. Instead, VA treatment records contemporaneous to the April 12, 2002, effective date show that while the Veteran was functionally impaired at that time, he was not confined to his immediate premises as a result thereof and instead maintained his freedom of movement and action. The same analysis serves as the basis to deny an earlier effective date than December 5, 2012, for the award of SMC at the housebound rate, as this corresponds with the period during which the Veteran was in receipt of a 100 percent rating for his PTSD and an additional service-connected disability independently rated at 60 percent or more (specifically, CAD). Again, there is no evidence contemporaneous to the December 2012 effective date which shows that the Veteran was rendered housebound due to his service-connected disabilities. See generally VA and private treatment records. Notably, neither the appellant nor her representative have offered specific argument or evidence in support of this appeal. Accordingly, the claim seeking earlier effective dates than April 12, 2002, and December 5, 2012, for the distinct awards of SMC at the housebound rate must be denied. Of final note, the appellant has not raised any other issues, nor have any other issues been reasonably raised by the record, for the Board's consideration. See Doucette v. Shulkin, 28 Vet. App. 366, 369-370 (2017) (confirming that the Board is not required to address issues unless they are specifically raised by the claimant or reasonably raised by the evidence of record). REASONS FOR REMAND Historically, the Veteran's claim seeking entitlement to a TDIU was denied in a December 2013 rating decision. He submitted a timely Notice of Disagreement in January 2014; however, an SOC has not yet been issued with respect to this matter. See Manlincon v. West, 12 Vet. App. 238 (1999). A remand for this purpose is required. (Continued on next page) The matter is REMANDED for the following action: Readjudicate the Veteran's entitlement to a TDIU If the benefit sought remains denied, issue an SSOC to the appellant and her representative and provide an appropriate period for response. Evan M. Deichert Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board K. Kovarovic, Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.