Citation Nr: 21077164 Decision Date: 12/28/21 Archive Date: 12/28/21 DOCKET NO. 17-19 213 DATE: December 28, 2021 ORDER Entitlement to an initial compensable evaluation for hypertension is dismissed. Entitlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Service connection for hypertension was severed effective July 1, 2017. 2. There is no competent evidence indicating that diabetes mellitus is caused or aggravated by medications prescribed for service-connected major depressive disorder. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The claim of entitlement to an initial compensable evaluation for hypertension is dismissed. 38 U.S.C. § 7104; 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(1). 2. The criteria for service connection for diabetes mellitus are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.310. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served honorably in the U.S. Army and National Guard, with periods of active duty from November 1990 to April 1991 and March 2001 to September 2001. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from May 2012 and September 2013 rating decisions of a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ). In September 2021, the Veteran withdrew his pending request for a Board hearing, and the case is ready for appellate review. 1. Entitlement to an initial compensable evaluation for hypertension is dismissed. The pending claim for an increased evaluation for hypertension is dismissed because a retroactive increase or additional benefit will not be awarded after basic entitlement has been terminated, such as by severance of service connection. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(1); see also for persuasive value only Andrion v. Shinseki, No. 10-2854, LEXIS 461, at *24-25 (Vet. App. Mar. 13, 2012) ("it should be self-evident to any claimant that a pending appeal seeking higher disability rating for a service-connected disorder is implicitly denied whenever an intervening final Board decision severs service connection for that disorder and concludes that it was clear and unmistakable error to award benefits for the disorder in the first place.") During the pendency of the appeal, an April 2017 rating decision severed service connection for hypertension effective July 1, 2017 and the Veteran did not appeal that decision. Entitlement to a retroactive increase for hypertension is prohibited as a matter of law and the claim is dismissed. 2. Entitlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus as secondary to service-connected major depressive disorder is denied. The Veteran alleges that diabetes mellitus is caused or aggravated by medication prescribed to treat his service-connected major depressive disorder. See June 2014 notice of disagreement. As this is the only theory of service connection raised by the Veteran or the record, the Board will limit its analysis to this theory. Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet. App. 545, 552-56 (2008). A disability that is proximately due to or the result of a service-connected disease or injury shall be service-connected. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310. Establishing service connection on a secondary basis requires evidence sufficient to show (1) that a current disability exists and (2) that the current disability was either (a) proximately caused by or (b) proximately aggravated by a service-connected disability. Allen v. Brown , 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995) (en banc). At the outset, diabetes mellitus has been diagnosed during the appeal period, therefore there is a current disability. See Holton, 557 F.3d at 1366; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). VA treatment records show that diabetes mellitus was diagnosed in October 2009. Service connection is in effect for major depressive disorder. However, there is no competent evidence that shows a nexus between the currently diagnosed diabetes mellitus and the medication prescribed for the major depressive disorder. VA has not obtained a medical opinion in this case but none is required. Such development is necessary in a secondary service connection claim if the information and evidence of record does not contain sufficient competent medical evidence to decide the claim, but (1) contains competent evidence of diagnosed disability or recurrent symptoms of disability, (2) establishes that the Veteran has a service-connected disability, and (3) indicates that the claimed disability may be associated with another service-connected disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4); McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 83-86 (2006) (noting that the third element establishes a low threshold and requires only that the evidence "indicates" that there "may" be a nexus, including credible lay evidence of continuity of symptomatology). A mere conclusory generalized lay statement that a service-connected disability caused the claimant's current condition is insufficient to require an examination under McLendon. Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F.3d 1274, 1278-79 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (rejecting appellant's argument that his "conclusory generalized statement that his service illness caused his present medical problems was enough to entitle him to a medical examination under the standard of [38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d)(2)(B).]"). Here, the only evidence of a relationship between diabetes mellitus and the medications prescribed for his major depressive disorder is the Veteran's conclusory generalized lay statements, which does not trigger VA's duty to obtain an examination. As a lay person, the Veteran is not competent to assert that diabetes mellitus is caused or aggravated by medication used to treat his psychiatric condition because he lacks the medical training required to reach such a conclusion. There is no indication in the file that a medical professional has reached the same conclusion. Ultimately, there is no competent evidence indicating a causal relationship between diabetes mellitus and the service-connected disability and the claim is denied. In reaching this decision the Board considered the doctrine of reasonable doubt, however, as the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claim, the doctrine is not for application. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). LAURA E. COLLINS Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board C. Smith, Counsel. The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.