Citation Nr: 21007298 Decision Date: 02/09/21 Archive Date: 02/09/21 DOCKET NO. 08-25 156 DATE: February 9, 2021 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for hypertension is dismissed as moot. Entitlement to service connection for bilateral tinea pedis is granted. Entitlement to an initial 70 percent rating for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) for the period from September 13, 2005 to November 19, 2017 is granted subject to the laws and regulations controlling the award of monetary benefits. Entitlement to a total disability rating due to individual unemployability (TDIU) for the period from March 1, 2007 to November 19, 2017 is granted subject to the laws and regulations controlling the award of monetary benefits. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. A November 2020 rating decision granted service connection for hypertension. 2. The evidence is at least evenly balanced as to whether the Veteran’s bilateral tinea pedis had its onset in service. 3. For the period from September 13, 2005 to November 19, 2017, the Veteran’s PTSD symptomatology more nearly approximated occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas. 4. For the period from March 1, 2007 to November 19, 2017, the evidence is at least evenly balanced as to whether the Veteran’s service connected PTSD precludes him from securing and following a substantially gainful occupation. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Board lacks jurisdiction over the claim for service connection for hypertension because the claim has been granted and rendered moot. 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 20.202. 2. With reasonable doubt resolved in favor of the Veteran, the criteria for service connection for bilateral tinea pedis have been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1154, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304(d). 3. For the period from September 13, 2005 to November 19, 2017, the criteria for an initial 70 percent rating for PTSD have been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159, 3.321, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.7, 4.10, 4.130, diagnostic code (DC) 9411. 4. With reasonable doubt resolved in favor of the Veteran, for the period from March 1, 2007 to November 19, 2017, the criteria for a TDIU have been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.7, 4.16(a). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty from November 1964 to October 1970 and is a combat veteran with service in the Republic of Vietnam. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a July 2006 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Houston, Texas which, inter alia, granted an initial 30 percent rating for PTSD from September 13, 2005, and denied service connection for hypertension and bilateral foot fungus. In July 2007, the Veteran filed his notice of disagreement with, among other things, the 30 percent evaluation for PTSD, and the service connection denials for bilateral foot fungus and hypertension, was issued a statement of the case in June 2008, and in July 2008 perfected his appeal to the Board. In July 2014, the Veteran testified at a travel Board hearing before a Veterans Law Judge who is no longer with the Board. A copy of the transcript is of record. September 2014, the Board, among other things, reopened the claim for service connection for bilateral foot fungus, and remanded the Veteran’s claims for service connection for bilateral foot fungus, hypertension, and his claim for a higher initial rating for PTSD for additional post-service medical records, service treatment records, and VA examinations to determine the etiology of the Veteran’s bilateral foot fungus, and severity of the Veteran’s PTSD if necessary. In a January 2018 rating decision, the RO granted a 100 percent rating for the Veteran’s service connected PTSD from November 20, 2017. The RO also granted special monthly compensation pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s)(1) based on a 100 percent rating and additional disabilities combining to 60 percent or greater. The RO, among other things, denied a rating higher than 30 percent for PTSD prior to November 20, 2017, and denied service connection for bilateral foot fungus and hypertension secondary to PTSD, notifying the Veteran in a February 2018 supplemental statement of the case. The Veteran was informed in a February 2018 letter that the VLJ who conducted his July 2014 hearing was no longer with the Board, and was provided an opportunity for another Board hearing. In March 2018, the Veteran requested a local hearing before a hearing officer which was scheduled for January 10, 2019, but in December 2018 the Veteran canceled the hearing request. In December 2019, the Board denied an initial rating higher than 30 percent prior to November 20, 2017 for PTSD, and remanded the Veteran’s claims for service connection for bilateral foot fungus and hypertension for additional development, including VA examinations to determine the nature and etiology of the Veteran’s hypertension and bilateral foot fungus. The Veteran appealed the Board decision to the Court of Appeals for Veteran’s Claims (Court) which in October 2020 granted a Joint Motion for Partial Remand filed by the parties, vacating and remanding part of the Board’s December 2019 decision finding that the Board failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons or bases regarding the claim for an initial rating higher than 30 percent for PTSD, or address entitlement to a TDIU prior to November 20, 2017 as raised by the record. The RO denied the Veteran’s claim for service connection for bilateral foot fungus, notifying the Veteran in a November 2020 supplemental statement of the case. In a November 2020 rating decision, the RO granted service connection for hypertension. Service Connection Service connection will be granted if the evidence demonstrates that current disability resulted from an injury suffered or disease contracted in active military, naval, or air service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Establishing service connection generally requires competent evidence of three things: (1) current disability; (2) in-service injury or disease; and (3) a relationship between the two. Saunders v. Wilkie, 886 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Consistent with this framework, service connection is warranted for a disease first diagnosed after service when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). When a veteran has engaged in combat with the enemy, satisfactory lay or other evidence “shall be accepted as sufficient proof of service connection” for certain diseases or injuries, even if “there is no official record of such incurrence or aggravation in such service.” 38 U.S.C. § 1154 (b). This statute does not eliminate the need for evidence of a nexus; it merely reduces, for veterans who have engaged in combat with the enemy, the burden of presenting evidence of incurrence or aggravation of an injury or disease in service. Collette v. Brown, 82 F.3d 389, 392 (Fed.Cir.1996) (“Section 1154(b) does not create a statutory presumption that a combat veteran’s alleged disease or injury is service-connected”). The Veteran’s DD-214 reflects that he is a recipient of the Navy Achievement with Combat “V”, and his personnel records indicate that he engaged in riverine assault operations in the Republic of Vietnam. Therefore, the evidence of record reflects that the Veteran is a combat Veteran. 1. Hypertension As previously noted, the claim for service connection for hypertension secondary to service connected PTSD was granted in a rating decision issued by the RO in November 2020. As a general matter, the grant of a claim of service connection constitutes an award of full benefits sought on an appeal of the denial of a service connection claim. Grantham v. Brown, 114 F.3d 1156 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (where an appealed claim for service connection is granted during the pendency of the appeal, a second Notice of Disagreement must thereafter be timely filed to initiate appellate review of “downstream” issues such as the compensation level assigned for the disability or the effective date of service connection). The Board may dismiss any appeal which fails to identify the specific determination with which the claimant disagrees. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d); 38 C.F.R. § 20.202(a). Here, as a result of the RO’s actions, there is no determination with which the Veteran disagrees with regard to service connection for hypertension, as a claim for the same benefit has been granted. Therefore, the Board lacks jurisdiction over this issue. 2. Bilateral foot fungus The Veteran testified that he was treated for foot fungus while in service at the Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force which is not noted in the service treatment records. His representative also testified that the fungus was diagnosed on that ship and treated at VA from the 1970s to the present time, but the VA records were identified as lost. The Veteran’s service treatment records do not reflect any treatment for, or complaints of bilateral foot fungus, and his September 1970 medical examination report upon discharge is normal. August 2007 VA treatment records reflect the Veteran was treated for bilateral foot tinea rash. In a July 2008 letter, the Veteran’s sister stated that the Veteran caught fungus on his feet while in service in Vietnam. In a separate July 2008 letter, the Veteran’s wife reported that the Veteran had a fungus infection to both feet and between his toes immediately after his return from active duty in Vietnam and has not been able to cure the infection. She testified that he visited many doctors inside VA and outside VA to treat his fungal infections as soon as he was discharged from service. In a July 2009 statement, the Veteran reported that he was treated for a foot fungus at VA in the 1970s and was also seen by Dr. C. M., but the files were destroyed about 17 years ago after the physician retired. In a July 2012 disability benefits questionnaire (DBQ) the examiner noted that the Veteran had a diagnosis of foot dermatophytosis, and reported that the Veteran stated he had the fungal infection in service. The Veteran stated he sought treatment in November 1970 and that the problem has been intermittent, but never completely resolved. The examiner opined that the Veteran’s fungal infection was less likely than not (less than a 50 percent probability) incurred in, or caused by the claimed in-service injury, event, or illness, stating that there are no records of a fungal infection in service or after service in the claims file, with the first note of treatment on December 8, 2005. In a January 2018 DBQ, the examining physician noted that the Veteran’s bilateral foot tinea pedis was less likely than not (less than a 50 percent probability) incurred in or caused by a claimed in-service injury, event, or illness. The physician stated that the Veteran had tinea pedis for many years and there was no information in the records that it was diagnosed or treated while in service. He noted that there were no records between service and 2005. The physician also reported that there was no documentation to indicate a complaint of fungus while in service, or for many years after service, thus the Veteran’s opinion was discounted as subjective. In a November 2020 DBQ, the examining nurse practitioner (NP) opined that the Veteran’s bilateral tinea pedis was less likely than not (less than a 50 percent probability) incurred in or caused by contaminated waters during service in Vietnam. The NP noted that neither the Veteran’s enlistment examination nor separation examination reflected any tinea pedis condition, and the claims file does not indicate tinea pedis in service treatment records or post-service medical records. The NP reported that there was insufficient evidence to render direct service connection for bilateral feet tinea pedis since it was likely sustained after service. She concluded that a nexus has not been established due to a lack of documented symptoms, medical reports, or relevant evidence. The Veteran reported that he started to have pain and itchiness between the toes of both feet during service in 1969. Based on the Veteran’s consistent statements of suffering from, and being treated for, foot fungus while in service in Vietnam and by applying 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b), the Board concludes that the Veteran sustained his foot fungus during combat operations. See Reeves v. Shinseki, 682 F.3d 988, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The remaining issue is whether the current tinea pedis is related to the in-service injury. The evidence is at least evenly balanced as to whether the Veteran’s tinea pedis had its onset in service. While the July 2012 examiner, January 2018 physician and November 2020 NP opined that the Veteran’s bilateral tinea pedis was less likely than not (less than a 50 percent probability) incurred in or caused by service, they primarily based their opinions on a lack of treatment records during service or for many years thereafter which is an impermissible basis upon which to find that the Veteran’s tinea pedis is not related to service. Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F. 3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Additionally, none of the opinions take into account the Veteran’s credible statements that he was treated for a foot fungus on the Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force during service, which was not included in his service treatment records, and treated after service at VA, but that those records are unavailable. See Dalton v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 23 (2007) (examination inadequate where the examiner did not comment on the Veteran’s report of in-service injury and relied on lack of evidence in service medical records to provide negative opinion). Therefore, the July 2012, January 2018 and November 2020 opinions are inadequate and afforded no probative weight. The Veteran has competently and consistently maintained that he initially developed foot fungus during service and sought treatment for it during service, and has stated that he has suffered from foot fungus since service. Additionally, the fact that the claimed cause of the Veteran’s tinea pedis is established by his statements does not prevent him from also invoking the section 1154(b) presumption to show that he incurred the disability itself while in service. Reeves, 682 F.3d at 999. The application of 38 U.S.C. § 1154 (b) as explained in Reeves along with the Veteran’s lay testimony provides a sufficient basis to conclude that his current tinea pedis is related to the foot fungus he suffered in service. As there is competent and credible lay evidence of tinea pedis continuing since service, a remand for a new medical opinion could be construed as obtaining additional evidence for the sole purpose of denying a claim, which is impermissible. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (c). As the reasonable doubt created by this relative equipoise in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the Veteran, entitlement to service connection for tinea pedis is warranted. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. Ratings Disability ratings are determined by applying the criteria set forth in the VA’s Schedule for Rating Disabilities, which is based on the average impairment of earning capacity. Individual disabilities are assigned separate diagnostic codes. 38 U.S.C. § 1155; 38 C.F.R. § 4.1. The basis of disability evaluations is the ability of the body as a whole, or of the psyche, or of a system or organ of the body to function under the ordinary conditions of daily life including employment. 38 C.F.R. § 4.10. In determining the severity of a disability, the Board is required to consider the potential application of various other provisions of the regulations governing VA benefits, whether or not they were raised by the Veteran, as well as the entire history of the Veteran’s disability. 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.2; Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 589, 595 (1991). If the disability more closely approximates the criteria for the higher of two ratings, the higher rating will be assigned; otherwise, the lower rating is assigned. 38 C.F.R. § 4.7. It is not expected that all cases will show all the findings specified; however, findings sufficiently characteristic to identify the disease and the disability therefrom and coordination of rating with impairment of function will be expected in all instances. 38 C.F.R. § 4.21. In deciding this appeal, the Board has considered whether separate ratings for different periods of time, based on the facts found, are warranted, a practice of assigning ratings referred to as “staged” ratings. See Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 119 (1999). 3. PTSD The Veteran contends that his service connected PTSD warrants higher than a 30 percent rating for the period from September 13, 2005 to November 19, 2017. The criteria for rating PTSD are found at 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, DC 9411. PTSD is rated under the General Rating Formula for Mental Disorders. Under this formula, a 50 percent evaluation is warranted where there is occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and productivity due to such symptoms as flattened affect; circumstantial, circumlocutory, or stereotyped speech; panic attacks more than once a week; difficulty in understanding complex commands, impairment of short- and long-term memory; impaired judgment; impaired abstract thinking; disturbance of motivation and mood; and difficultly in establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships. A 70 percent evaluation is warranted where there is occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood, due to such symptoms as: suicidal ideation; obsessional rituals which interfere with routine activities; speech intermittently illogical, obscure, or irrelevant; near-continuous panic or depression affecting the ability to function independently, appropriately and effectively; impaired impulse control (such as unprovoked irritability with periods of violence); spatial disorientation; neglect of personal appearance and hygiene; difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances (including work or a work like setting); and inability to establish and maintain effective relationships. Symptoms listed in the VA’s general rating formula for mental disorders serve as examples of the type and degree of the symptoms, or their effects, that would justify a particular rating, and are not intended to constitute an exhaustive list. See Mauerhan v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 436, 442-44 (2002). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) has emphasized that the list of symptoms under a given rating is a non-exhaustive list, as indicated by the words “such as” that precede each list of symptoms. Vazquez-Claudio v. Shinseki, 713 F.3d 112, 115 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In Vazquez-Claudio, the Federal Circuit held “that a veteran may only qualify for a given disability rating under § 4.130 by demonstrating the particular symptoms associated with that percentage or others of similar severity, frequency, and duration.” Id. at 117. Other language in the decision indicates that the phrase “others of similar severity, frequency, and duration,” can be thought of as symptoms of like kind to those listed in the regulation for a given disability rating. Id. at 116. When evaluating a mental disorder, the frequency, severity, duration of psychiatric symptoms, length of remissions, and the Veteran’s capacity for adjustment during periods of remission must be considered. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.126 (a). In addition, the evaluation must be based on all the evidence of record that bears on occupational and social impairment, not solely on the examiner’s assessment of the level of disability at the moment of the examination. Id. Further, when evaluating the level of disability from a mental disorder, the extent of social impairment is considered, but the rating cannot be assigned solely on the basis of social impairment. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.126 (b). November 2005 VA psychotherapy notes reflect the Veteran reported flashbacks, hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response, irritability, and that he is uncomfortable around other people. A January 2006 VA examination report indicated that the Veteran reported flashbacks of combat, rats invading his boat C-30, killing innocent Vietnamese, drowning servicemen, a prisoner of war being killed on his boat, and bodies of servicemen in booby-traps. He stated that the flashbacks are constant, but more intense during times of war and conflicts. The Veteran reported trouble sleeping for the past 37 years, social isolation, temper outbursts, poor concentration, lack of trust of others, and occasional panic attacks. He stated that he does chores around the house and attends church, but does not have any social life. The Veteran reported having been married for 38 years to the same woman, and described his married life as “stressful” and “a struggle”. He stated that he gets along well with his 3 children. The examining psychiatrist noted that the Veteran was alert and oriented to time, place, and person with appropriate hygiene and appearance, and indicated that while the Veteran described panic attacks, he was really describing angry outbursts. The Veteran denied any history of delusions, but did have occasional hallucinations hearing the voices asking him to do things he would not do. He reported having rituals like checking on doors and locks, but did not have any impaired judgment or impaired abstract thinking. He had mild memory problems such as forgetting names, directions, and recent events, but not suicidal or homicidal ideation. The psychiatrist noted that the Veteran has difficulty establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships, does not have any difficulty with simple or complex commands, and does not pose a threat of persistent danger or injury to self or others. April 2006 VA mental health treatment notes reflect the Veteran is in a good mood, and has a better relationship with his wife. He reported that he likes to stay to himself, but gets along well with his kids. He stated he likes to garden and is able to sleep, but still has nightmares and flashbacks which are not as bad as they were before. The Veteran reported problems with anger stating that he “will blow up” for no reason at all. A July 2012 DBQ reflected that the Veteran’s PTSD symptoms were not severe enough to interfere with occupation and social functioning, or to require continuous medication. The Veteran reported living with his wife of 45 years and stated their relationship has improved since he started using medication, and he described an “ok” relationship with his children. He stated that he does not have any friends and is a loner. He denied thoughts of suicide or homicide, but reported difficulty maintaining focus. The Veteran reported having intrusive thoughts daily, and nightmares 2 to 3 times per month. Additional symptoms included anxiety, and chronic sleep impairment. In a February 2013 statement, the Veteran reported that he suffers from panic attacks several times a month, poor sleep due to nightmares, and arguments with his wife, thus he contends that a higher rating than 30 percent is warranted for his PTSD. The evidence of record indicates that during the period from September 13, 2005 to November 19, 2017, the Veteran’s PTSD symptoms have included panic attacks, poor concentration, lack of trust of others, flashbacks, hypervigilance, chronic sleep impairment, and “anger outbursts”. While the January 2006 psychiatrist noted that the Veteran did not have suicidal or homicidal ideation, and the Veteran denied a history of delusions, the psychiatrist noted mild memory loss, and occasional hallucinations, as well as rituals such as checking doors and locks. Additionally, the Veteran reported that while he has an “ok” relationship with his children, he does not have any friends and is a “loner”. The evidence is thus at least evenly balanced as to whether the Veteran’s PTSD symptomatology more closely approximates occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas as contemplated by a 70 percent rating under DC 9411. Accordingly, entitlement to an initial rating of 70 percent for PTSD is warranted. As this was the rating specifically requested by the Veteran’s representative, discussion with regard to whether an initial rating higher than 70 percent is warranted for the Veteran’s PTSD is unnecessary. The Board notes that the Court has held, that on a claim for a higher initial or increased rating, a claimant will generally be presumed to be seeking the maximum benefit allowed by law and regulation, and thus, such claim remains in controversy where less than the maximum available benefit is awarded. See AB v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 35, 38 (1993). In so holding, however, the Court cited the case of Hamilton v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 528 (1993) for the proposition that a claimant may limit a claim or appeal to the issue of entitlement to a particular disability rating which is less than the maximum disability rating allowed by law. See AB, 6 Vet. App. at 39. To do so, the Court indicated that a claimant would have to clearly express an intent to limit the appeal to entitlement to a specific disability rating for the service-connected condition. See id. Here, in the representative’s January 2021 brief, which is the most recent communication, the representative specifically and unequivocally asserted that the Veteran was entitled to a 70 percent rating for his service connected PTSD. As the Board is granting the specific relief requested, it need not address whether an initial rating higher than 70 percent is warranted. 4. TDIU The issue of entitlement to a TDIU is a potential part of an initial rating claim when such claim is expressly raised by the Veteran, or reasonably raised by the record. Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447, 453 (2009). In both September 2012 and November 2017, the Veteran submitted a VA Form 21-8940 which indicated that his PTSD prevented him from securing or following any substantially gainful occupation. Given the evidence of unemployability due to PTSD, the issue of entitlement to a TDIU was raised as part and parcel of the claim for a higher initial rating for PTSD. A TDIU is provided where the combined schedular evaluation for service-connected disabilities is less than total, or 100 percent. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (a). VA will grant a total rating for compensation purposes based on unemployability when the evidence shows that the veteran is precluded from obtaining or maintaining any gainful employment by reason of his or her service-connected disabilities. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.340, 3.341, 4.16. Under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (a), if there is only one such disability, it must be rated at 60 percent or more to qualify for benefits based on individual unemployability. If there are two or more such disabilities, there shall be at least one disability rated at 40 percent or more, and sufficient additional disability to bring the combined rating to 70 percent. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (a). In Ray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 58, 73 (2019), the Court defined the term “unable to secure and follow a substantially gainful occupation” as having two components: one economic and one noneconomic. The economic component means an occupation earning more than marginal income (outside of a protected environment) as determined by the U.S. Department of Commerce as the poverty threshold for one person. The non-economic component includes consideration of the following: the Veteran’s history, education, skill, and training; whether the veteran has the physical ability to perform the type of activities required by the occupation at issue; and whether the veteran has the mental ability to perform the activities required by the occupation at issue. The sole fact that a veteran is unemployed or has difficulty obtaining employment is not enough. See Van Hoose, 4 Vet. App. at 363. “A high rating in itself is a recognition that the impairment makes it difficult to obtain or keep employment.” Id. The ultimate question, however, is “whether the veteran is capable of performing the physical and mental acts required by employment, not whether the veteran can find employment.” Id. In light of the decision herein, for the period from March 1, 2007 to November 20, 2017, the Veteran is service connected for PTSD, rated 70 percent disabling from September 13, 2005 to November 19, 2017; bilateral hearing loss rated noncompensable from November 8, 2005 and 50 percent disabling from July 17, 2017; right hand disability, rated 10 percent disabling from November 8, 2005; tinnitus, rated 10 percent disabling from November 8, 2005; hypertension, rated noncompensable from November 8, 2005 to October 25, 2020; and erectile dysfunction, rated noncompensable from February 24, 2011. Therefore, as the Veteran has a combined rating of at least 70 percent with one disability rated at least 40 percent disabling, he is eligible for consideration for a TDIU on a schedular basis for the period from March 1, 2007 to November 20, 2017. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (a). Nonetheless, to grant TDIU it must be found that the Veteran is unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation because of his service-connected disability. In a January 2021 brief, the Veteran’s representative stated that the Veteran was forced to retire from his post-service job as a chemical worker on March 1, 2007 due to his PTSD. She stated that the Veteran underwent extensive treatment for PTSD during the forced retirement period and that there is ample evidence the symptoms prevented the Veteran from obtaining and sustaining substantially gainful employment during the forced retirement period. The Veteran’s VA 21-8940 reflects that the Veteran completed 4 years of high school, most recently worked as a process operator, and became too disabled to work March 25, 2006. In a separate VA 21-8940, the Veteran indicated that he last worked full time March 1, 2007 and worked as a transfer clerk for 37 years. The Board notes that there is a discrepancy as to when the Veteran most recently worked. While the Veteran’s initial VA 21-8940 reflects the Veteran became too disabled to work March 25, 2006, the Veteran has most recently indicated that he last worked full time March 1, 2007 and his representative also reported the Veteran was forced to retire March 1, 2007. Additionally, medical treatment records furnished by the Social Security Administration reflect that the Veteran sought disability as of March 2007. Therefore, the evidence demonstrates that the initial VA 21-8940 erroneously reflected March 25, 2006 as the last date of unemployment, and the Veteran most recently worked March 1, 2007. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that for the period from March 1, 2007 to November 19, 2017, the Veteran’s service connected PTSD precludes him from securing and following substantially gainful employment for which the Veteran would otherwise be qualified. The Veteran’s work history has involved working as a process operator, chemical worker, and transfer clerk, but his PTSD precludes him from dealing with the stresses of work due to his noted anger outbursts, hypervigilance, poor concentration, and lack of trust of others which could be severely impact his ability to adequately perform his duties. Additionally, the Veteran has competently and credibly reported that he suffers from chronic sleep impairment, as well as panic attacks due to his PTSD. It is reasonable to conclude that these additional symptoms would preclude the Veteran from being able to perform the requisite duties required for a position of a man of his education and experience as his sleep impairment would impact his judgement and focus, potentially placing either himself or co-workers in a perilous situation. Therefore, the preponderance of the evidence thus reflects that for the period from March 1, 2007 to November 19, 2017, the Veteran’s service connected PTSD renders him unable to secure or follow substantially gainful employment. Accordingly, entitlement to a TDIU is warranted for the period from March 1, 2007 to November 19, 2017. As implicitly indicated by the parties to the joint motion, the issue of entitlement to a TDIU from November 19, 2017 is moot because the Veteran is in receipt of special monthly compensation pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s)(1) from that date. See Buie v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 242 (2010); Bradley v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 280 (2008) (a 100 percent schedular rating does not necessarily render the issue of entitlement to a TDIU moot, as the TDIU could in certain circumstances render the Veteran eligible for special monthly compensation benefits pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s)). Jonathan Hager Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board R. Maddox, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.