Citation Nr: 21009303 Decision Date: 02/22/21 Archive Date: 02/22/21 DOCKET NO. 13-29 086 DATE: February 22, 2021 ORDER Entitlement to an effective date prior to February 23, 2011, for the 100 percent evaluation for service-connected coronary artery disease, status post coronary artery bypass graft, status post angioplasty is dismissed. Entitlement to an effective date prior to February 23, 2011, for special monthly compensation (SMC) based on housebound status, is dismissed. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran passed away in October 2016. 2. The Board was notified in December 2017 that the Veteran’s surviving spouse and approved substitute appellant passed away. CONCLUSION OF LAW Due to the death of the Veteran and his surviving spouse (substitute appellant), the Board has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of any of the issues on appeal at this time. 38 U.S.C. § 7104 (a); 38 C.F.R. § 20.1302. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from November 1961 through June 1968 and from October 1968 through September 1975. The Veteran died in October 2016, during the pendency of his appeal. In December 2016, the Veteran’s surviving spouse (appellant) was approved a substitute claimant for her late husband’s claims that remained pending at the time of his death. The Board was notified of the Appellant’s death in December 2017. 1. Entitlement to an effective date prior to February 23, 2011, for the 100 percent evaluation for service-connected coronary artery disease, status post coronary artery bypass graft, status post angioplasty. 2. Entitlement to an effective date prior to February 23, 2011, for special monthly compensation (SMC) based on housebound status. Unfortunately, the Appellant died during the pendency of the appeal. As a matter of law, appellants’ claims do not survive their deaths. Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1243-44 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Smith v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 330, 333-34 (1997); Landicho v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 42, 47 (1994). This appeal on the merits has become moot by virtue of the death of the Appellant and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 38 U.S.C. § 7104 (a); 38 C.F.R. § 20.1302. In reaching this determination, the Board intimates no opinion as to the merits of this appeal or to any derivative claim brought by a survivor of the Veteran. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1106. The Board’s dismissal of this appeal does not affect the right of an eligible person to file a request to be substituted as the appellant for purposes of processing the claim to completion. To date, a request for substitution following the death of the appellant in December 2017 has not been made. Such request must be filed not later than one year after the date of the claimant’s death. 38 U.S.C. § 5121A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.1010 (b). A person eligible for substitution includes “a living person who would be eligible to receive accrued benefits due to the claimant under section 5121(a) of this title.” 38 U.S.C. § 5121A; 38 C.F.R. § 3.1010 (a). An eligible party seeking substitution in an appeal that has been dismissed by the Board due to the death of the claimant should file a request for substitution with the VA office from which the claim originated. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1010 (b). The Board additionally notes that, when a substitute appellant dies while an appeal of a claim is pending before the Board, another member of the same joint class or a member of the next preferred subordinate category listed in § 3.1000(a)(1) through (5) may substitute for the deceased substitute, only if the person requesting the successive substitution files the request for substitution no later than one year after the date of the substitute appellant’s death. The Board recognizes the request for a hearing which was received in January 2021, however, the Board is unable to act on this request as the representative that submitted the hearing request is not shown to represent the estate of the Veteran or Appellant. Tiffany Dawson Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board J. Dorsey-Kwansa, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.