Citation Nr: 21010005 Decision Date: 02/23/21 Archive Date: 02/23/21 DOCKET NO. 16-13 261 DATE: February 23, 2021 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, anxiety, factitious disorder, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, substance abuse disorder, personality disorder, not otherwise specified (NOS), with narcissistic and antisocial features, and to include as due to military sexual trauma (MST), is denied. FINDING OF FACT 1. The Veteran's psychiatric disorder, variously diagnosed, did not have its onset in service and is not otherwise related to service. A psychosis, such as schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, was not manifested within one year of service discharge. 2. Personality disorder, NOS, with narcissistic and antisocial features is not a disease or injury within the meaning of applicable legislation for disability compensation purposes. 3. The preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that the Veteran’s claimed in-service stressors actually occurred. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, anxiety, factitious disorder, schizophrenia, and substance abuse disorder, and personality disorder, NOS, with narcissistic and antisocial features, and to include as due to MST, have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1131, 1137, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 3.307, 3.309, 3.384, 4.9, 4.125. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty in the Marines from October 1972 to April 1973 and in the Army from January 1974 to January 1977. The Veteran testified at a Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge in August 2019. A transcript of the Board hearing has been associated with the claims file. The matter was previously remanded in a June 2020 Board decision in order to obtain outstanding records. Additional records were obtained and associated with the claims file thereafter. There has been substantial compliance with the remand directives and the matter is again before the Board. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998). The Veteran has alleged that he was sexually assaulted on a nightly basis over the course of several weeks by a drill sergeant in a Marine Corps barracks bathroom during his training in 1973. He has attributed this MST to causing PTSD and a wide range of severe psychiatric symptoms. Additionally, the Veteran has reported experiencing trauma resulting from alleged witnessing his sergeant being beheaded during war games exercises in 1975. Lastly, the Veteran has alleged that he was assaulted by a fellow serviceman who struck him over the head with a bottle in 1975. Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a veteran must show: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Additionally, where a veteran served 90 days or more of active service, and certain chronic diseases, such as schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, which are psychoses, become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year after the date of separation from such service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease during the period of service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 1131, 1137; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a), 3.384. Service connection for PTSD specifically requires the presence of three particular elements: (1) a current medical diagnosis of PTSD; (2) medical evidence of a causal nexus between current symptomatology and a claimed in-service stressor; and (3) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). For the purposes of establishing service connection for PTSD, medical evidence diagnosing PTSD must be in accordance with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5th Edition (DSM-5) as the source of criteria for the diagnosis of claimed psychiatric disorders. Regarding the in-service stressor element of a claim of service connection for PTSD, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has held that credible supporting evidence means that the Veteran's testimony cannot, by itself, as a matter of law, establish the occurrence of a non-combat stressor; nor can credible supporting evidence of the actual occurrence of an in-service stressor consist solely of after-the-fact medical nexus evidence. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3); see also Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 395-96 (1996); Patton v. West, 12 Vet. App. 272, 277 (1999). Instead, the record must contain service records or other independent credible evidence corroborating the Veteran's testimony as to the alleged stressor. See Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1996). Those service records that are available must support and not contradict the Veteran's lay testimony concerning stressors. Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 283, 289 (1994). The Board has carefully reviewed the evidence of record and finds that the preponderance of the evidence is against an award of service connection for a psychiatric disorder, variously diagnosed. The reasons follow. The Veteran was discharged from the Marines in April 1973 following less than six months in service after it was discovered that he had not disclosed a prior arrest and drug charge at enlistment. After disclosure, the Veteran expressed a desire to stay in the Marines; however, he was discharged upon the recommendation of multiple superiors who cited the Veteran’s belligerency, negative attitude, and resistance to authority. Separation examinations findings in April 1973 show that the Veteran denied a history of psychiatric symptoms, including depression or excessive worry, frequent trouble sleeping, or nervous trouble of any sort. He reported that he was in good health and received a normal psychiatric clinical evaluation. The Veteran entered the Army in January 1974. At entry, he again denied a history of psychiatric symptoms, reported good health, denied drug use, and received a normal psychiatric clinical evaluation. The Veteran’s service treatment records from 1973 to 1977 do not show treatment for or diagnoses of psychiatric issues. On separation examination in October 1976, the Veteran reported experiencing a history of depression and excessive worry in the Report of Medical History. However, notes only state that the Veteran’s depressive symptoms were attributed to personal problems without further explanation. He stated that he was in fair health and received a normal psychiatric clinical evaluation. Thereafter, the record does not document treatment for mental health issues for more than 30 years following discharge from service. In January 2001, the Veteran filed a claim for service connection for “sleeping disorder/PTSD.” He claimed he was treated for this during his second period of service from June 1974 to January 1977. In other words, he did not attribute PTSD to his first period of service. In December 2001, VA wrote to the Veteran and asked him for more information about the stressful events that he felt had led to the onset of his condition. It also asked the Veteran to report for his VA examination when scheduled. In June 2010, the Veteran sought mental health treatment at a Dallas VA medical center (VAMC) seeking entry into a 28-day substance abuse treatment program. The Veteran stated that he had recently lost his job, was homeless as a result, and wanted help relating to his abuse of crack cocaine. He stated that he had been sober from 1995 through 2001, when he relapsed following the death of his wife. He presented with symptoms consistent with polysubstance abuse and bereavement. The Veteran indicated that he was currently on probation stemming from a 2007 drug-related offense. The examiner documented that the Veteran seemed motivated to participate in substance abuse treatment to end his homelessness. A mental status examination showed that the Veteran endorsed depressive symptoms but related them to being unemployed and homeless. He denied any previous mental health treatment or history of psychiatric hospitalization. It was also noted that he appeared to have poor coping skills relating to multiple family deaths over the years. He became tearful describing these deaths and voiced anger about his sister and niece dying from HIV/AIDS-related illnesses. Subsequent records note the death of the Veteran’s wife in 2001, his mother in 2009, and his sister in 2010. The June 2010 records reflect that the Veteran denied experiencing an MST in the past and that he denied any history of suicide attempts. No issues relating to the Veteran’s time in service were raised. The Veteran’s reports at this time are highly probative, as he made these statement while seeking medical treatment, which statements tend to be exceptionally trustworthy. Rucker v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 67, 73 (1997) (statements made to physicians for purposes of diagnosis and treatment are exceptionally trustworthy because the declarant has a strong motive to tell the truth in order to receive proper care). The Veteran filed a request to reopen the claim for service connection for PTSD in October 2010 and then sought inpatient rehabilitation and MST-related treatment, as well as outpatient therapy, at multiple VA facilities over the course of several years beginning in November 2010. As a preliminary matter, due to a lack of substantive proof relating to the Veteran’s allegations from his time in service, many of the findings and opinions rendered relating to the Veteran’s current condition since 2010 are based on the Veteran’s own reports and allegations of events that occurred approximately 35 to 40 years prior. While the Veteran is competent to report his observed symptoms, the Veteran’s credibility has been significantly diminished as a result of recurrent inconsistencies in his reporting of events dating back to the Veteran’s entry into service. For example, the Veteran was discharged from the Marines, in part, based on his failure to report his criminal history. During examination in July 2011, the Veteran denied any history of trouble since his drug-related arrest at age 16, failing to report that he was currently on probation for a 2007 drug charge. His reports of symptomology and suicide attempts have fluctuated greatly during the relevant period. He denied any history of suicide attempts in July 2010, and then subsequently reporting a history of one to four prior suicide attempts on separate occasions, including reported attempts in 1978, 1987, 1990, 1997, 2005, and 2007. Additionally, the Veteran’s reports of his substance abuse and periods of sobriety have been inconsistent. In 2011, he indicated a long history of polysubstance abuse beginning around age 13, including alcohol use and smoking cocaine. In 2014, the Veteran reported that he began drinking when he was in service at age 17 and that he did not begin using crack cocaine until he was in his 30s. He has reported being clean from drugs and alcohol from 1996 to 2005 but also reported relapses following his wife’s death in 2001. Mental health providers have also noted the Veteran’s credibility issues in treatment notes and evaluations. The Veteran was assessed with malingering in November 2010 and a treating source suggested that the Veteran’s behavior indicated ulterior motivating factors: The patient’s narrative regarding his report of MST (rape on a nightly basis), the many contradictions that have emerged in his interviews with various clinicians (never suicidal vs 1 suicidal attempt, drinking at age 13 vs starting at 17, drinking because of stress due to his wife's death vs drinking due to MST, previously denying any history of abuse/broadcasting it now with great tenacitry [sic]), his inappropriately ingratiating manner with me, and his history of prior antisocial behavior (drug conviction), and his recent minimization of substance abuse as a problem lead me to suspect that the patient is not being sincere and that issues of secondary gain predominate at present. Additionally, a September 2013 discharge summary documented the Veteran’s history of inconsistent behavior throughout his VA treatment history. This report stated that the Veteran gave conflicting information during separate admissions for polysubstance detox at a Baltimore VA hospital in 2011, and that he changed his story from one admission to another with many noted discrepancies. In Baltimore, he was assessed with depression and PTSD. Similar discrepancies were also noted across the Veteran’s multiple admissions in late 2010, when the Veteran was assessed with factitious disorder and a personality disorder. Although malingering was ruled out during the Veteran’s September 2013 treatment, as the Veteran received a valid diagnosis of sleep apnea, it was noted that prior treatment notes indicated that the Veteran’s inconsistencies in reporting corroborated suspicions of malingering. For these reasons, credible supporting evidence in order to verify the Veteran’s reported in-service stressors are of particular importance, and statements and opinions based solely on the Veteran’s self-reporting are of no probative value. The preponderance of the evidence is against a determination that the Veteran’s reported in-service stressors actually occurred. The Veteran has been found to not meet DSM criteria for PTSD on multiple evaluations. However, there are assessments of PTSD, consistent with DSM criteria, included in the record. To the extent these diagnoses rely on the Veteran’s self-reporting of stressors that occurred in service, they do not provide credible support that the claimed in-service stressors of PTSD actually occurred. Rather, it is more likely that the Veteran’s symptoms of PTSD are attributable to bereavement and polysubstance abuse issues as documented in his mid-2010 treatment records. The preponderance of the evidence is against the in-service occurrence of the Veteran’s alleged MST. The Veteran’s service treatment records do not contain evidence in support of this incident. The Veteran denied any psychiatric symptoms upon discharge from the Marines and received a normal psychological evaluation. He expressed a desire to stay in the Marines in a statement shortly prior to his discharge. During a 2012 examination, the Veteran reported that the alleged MST occurred on a nightly basis for a month and a half beginning in April 1973, although the Veteran was discharged on April 17, 1973. On multiple, separate occasions, the Veteran reported that the MST took place over three to four weeks. Although the Veteran originally denied any history of trauma or MST upon seeking treatment in 2010, he began aggressively reporting this allegation upon filing for reopening of the within claim later that year. In 2011, when confronted about his behavior following his November 2010 inpatient admission, which was described as belligerent, argumentative, and threatening towards others, the Veteran indicated that he could get his mind off the MST incident and that he had never told anyone about it and hoped that the report “would stay in this room.” Treatment notes state, “[h]owever, on the contrary, patient has discussed it with every provider he has seen, and the detailed information is in his chart.” This is consistent with reports of the Veteran’s tenacious broadcasting of the MST in 2010. Statements from the Veteran’s various family members, fellow servicemen, and even a former boss, indicate that the Veteran has reported the allegation widely and do not support his intermittent desires to keep his allegations quiet. These findings are consistent with the inconsistencies noted above, along with the reports of suspected malingering, and support the above-referenced concerns of secondary gain as a primary motive. A July 2011 VA examiner assessed the Veteran’s condition as meeting the criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD. However, she attributed the Veteran’s symptoms not to the Veteran’s reports of MST, but instead to fear of hostile military and terrorist activity. This finding was against the Veteran’s own reporting on examination and seemed to be based on the false premise that the Veteran faced combat, which he did not. The Veteran’s report did not suggest fear of hostile military or terrorist activity and, instead, attributed his symptoms solely to his alleged history of MST. The Court has held that opinions based on inaccurate factual premises are not entitled to probative value, as is the case here. Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458, 461 (1993). Similarly, a May 2013 VA examination assessed the Veteran with PTSD and stated that the diagnosis was at least as likely as not due to a fear of hostile military or terrorist activity during employment. The examiner continued that the Veteran’s reported MST may have contributed to the diagnosis but that it is impossible to determine separately the degree to which either stressor caused the symptoms. The examiner repeatedly referred to the Veteran as “her” and seemed to base his findings on the false premise that the Veteran faced combat or alleged fear of hostile military or terrorist activities, which he did not. Accordingly, these opinions are not probative. Id. The same examiner was asked to provide a clarifying opinion later in the same month in order to address conflicting medical evidence in light of the earlier opinion. In this instance, the examiner acknowledged reviewing the claims folder, identified the Veteran appropriately and stated that it was less likely than not that any event involving sexual contact or assault during his service in the Marine Corps resulted in PTSD due to MST. The examiner stated that, despite the Veteran’s reports of MST, he did not show signs of either PTSD or depression during his subsequent Army enlistment, except as detailed in a “buddy letter” in the claims folder. The Board notes that the buddy letter’s assertions were also based entirely on the Veteran’s self-reporting. The examiner further provided support for his conclusion by noting the Veteran’s lack of documented psychiatric symptomology in the Army and the Veteran’s willingness to serve in the military following his separation from the Marines. This opinion is more probative than the examiner’s prior assessment, as it acknowledges objective findings from the Veteran’s service treatment record without solely relying on the Veteran’s discredited reporting. In October 2013, the Veteran began to report an incident in which he witnessed the decapitation of a fellow marine during service. In 2014, the Veteran submitted statements to VA alleging that he was riding in an armored personal carrier during a war games exercise between 1975 to 1976, alongside his sergeant, when the sergeant stuck his head out the top of the vehicle and had his head decapitated, with the body falling back into the vehicle next to the Veteran. During a 2014 psychological evaluation, the Veteran recalled that the sergeant’s head had to be “retrieved.” He also reported the name of the deceased sergeant as “Sgt. Rogers” and indicated to a 2015 counselor that Sgt. Rogers was a friend and mentor. To substantiate the Veteran’s report, a March 1975 Accident Report was received, which documented the death of a soldier with a Private First Class (PFC) rank during field training exercises at Fort Hood on March 16, 1975, caused by a head injury from a tree branch while in a moving vehicle. While this report substantiates a death from hitting a tree limb, it is inconsistent with a decapitation and highlights other discrepancies of the Veteran’s alleged stressor. Importantly, the report identifies the deceased not by the name Rogers, but as “PFC Fergus.” The report indicates that the PFC died of a cerebral hemorrhage more than four hours after the incident took place. First aid was rendered and the PFC was air evacuated to the hospital. Such official findings are not consistent with a report of decapitation and “retrieval” of the PFC’s head. The report does not confirm the presence of the Veteran at the time of the incident. The report further describes the actions of a person who was also standing in the back of the vehicle with PFC Fergus in the performance of “Rigger (Machine Gunner)” activities, who had ducked down to avoid the tree branch and noticed the PFC’s head injury when he stood back up. This is inconsistent with the Veteran’s reports of witnessing a headless body fall into the vehicle that he was in. In late 2013, the Veteran first recalled that it was a Marine who he had witnessed be decapitated, when the reported incident occurred while the Veteran was in the Army. Additionally, the serviceman’s PFC ranking is not consistent with the Veteran’s report of the deceased veteran being a sergeant. In a 2016 statement, the Veteran stated that this incident impacted him for the rest of his life. However, the Veteran did not reveal this story prior to 2013 and never provided an explanation as to why such an incident would not have been recounted earlier, given his various treatments over the preceding three years. Additionally, the Veteran did not address this issue during his hearing when discussing the cause of his PTSD. Given the Veteran’s credibility concerns, credible supporting evidence is required to verify the Veteran’s alleged stressor. However, the supporting documentation discussed above departs significantly from the Veteran’s reporting of his alleged in-service stressor and suggests that he was not a witness to the March 1975 incident at Fort Hood. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence is against a finding that the reported stressor occurred as reported. In December 2014, the Veteran received a private psychological evaluation, resulting in the examiner concluding that the Veteran suffers from PTSD relating to MST and, to a lesser extent, relating to witnessing the beheading of the Veteran’s squad leader while out on maneuvers in Texas. However, the examiner was noted to have reviewed only portions of the evidence of record and he failed to acknowledge or address any of the contradictory findings noted above, instead appearing to rely entirely on the Veteran’s self-reporting regarding the reported stressors in making his conclusions. Therefore, this opinion is not probative. Similarly, an April 2015 letter from a treating social worker found the Veteran to meet the criteria of PTSD with symptomology dating to his reported MST and witnessing the death of his “friend/mentor,” which has caused profound suffering, both mental and physical, for the Veteran, since service. The social worker noted that he had only treated the Veteran since 2014. His assessment is also based entirely on the Veteran’s reporting and does not suggest that the social worker reviewed the claims file. As such, the report was based on false premises, did not consider any of the contradictory evidence addressed herein, including the fact that the Veteran entirely misidentified the deceased person who the social worker described as a friend/mentor, and is not probative. Finally, the Veteran has at times reported a third potential stressor as the cause of PTSD, an incident in which he was allegedly struck over the head with a wine bottle by a fellow serviceman, causing a large scar that required several stitches. A letter from the Veteran’s attorney in April 2014 specifically states that the Veteran was “assaulted by Specialist-4 Wortham, on October 24, 1975” in Fort Hood, Texas. However, again in this instance, the evidence of record contradicts the Veteran’s reporting and goes against a finding that the alleged stressor occurred. For example, the Veteran’s service treatment records are absent of documentation of any head injury, inconsistent with the allegation that the Veteran required stitches due to being hit over the head with a bottle. On separation examination in 1976, the Veteran specifically denied a history of head injury and periods of unconsciousness. To support his contention, the Veteran submitted a Military Police Report that describes an assault perpetrated by a soldier named Wortham in June 1975. The Board notes that this is not the date of the incident previously alleged by the Veteran. The report contains a detailed accounting of the assault and those involved, including multiple witness statements. The Veteran is not mentioned in the report, as the victim or otherwise, and there is nothing to suggest his presence or that he suffered an injury. These findings are probative evidence against the occurrence of the Veteran’s reported stressor. Additionally, disabilities relating to a head injury and scar, that appear to be related to the allegation at issue, have previously been raised by the Veteran and are currently found to be nonservice-connected. For all the reasons stated above, the preponderance of the evidence is against the occurrence of the Veteran’s alleged in-service stressors relating to his claim for service connection for PTSD. As noted above, the Veteran has submitted multiple lay statements from friends, family, and associates in support of his claim. Each one is premised on the occurrence of one of the above alleged stressors, based solely on the Veteran’s discredited self-reporting without any first-hand accounts as to the events that have been alleged, and which are heavily contradicted by the objective findings of record. Although a buddy statement was submitted from a fellow Army veteran indicated that the Veteran had reported his MST to him during service in the 1970s and that he had been sworn to secrecy, this is contradicted by the Veteran’s steadfast insistence that he had never revealed the alleged incident to anyone prior to 2010, even after pursuing this claim and openly reporting the incident to family and healthcare providers. The Veteran’s sister also submitted a statement alleging that she received a phone call from the Veteran in the 1970s and that the Veteran was upset about the death of a fellow serviceman. However, the statement provided virtually no specifics relating to the Veteran’s alleged stressor and does not overcome the various significant inconsistencies in the Veteran’s story as they relate to the documents of record purported to correspond with the alleged stressor, which include misidentifying the alleged victim who was reported to be a friend and mischaracterizing the incident as a beheading. As such, these statements of the Veteran’s prior concurrent reports are of little probative value. As to evaluation of any psychiatric disorder besides PTSD, the preponderance of the evidence is against a nexus between a current psychiatric disability and an in-service disease or injury. Regarding the depressive symptoms reported by the Veteran before separation in 1976, these were explained only as “personal problems” and did not otherwise indicate any attribution to service. The Veteran went decades without additional complaints or treatment for psychiatric issues following service. When the Veteran sought treatment in mid-2010 relating to his polysubstance abuse, he specifically denied a history of trauma and MST, and instead, his symptoms were attributed to stressors including homelessness, unemployment, and bereavement issues. The Veteran indicated no psychiatric issues relating to service. As stated, the Veteran’s reports at that time are highly probative relative to the inconsistences reflected throughout the longitudinal record, as he made these statements while seeking medical treatment, which statements tend to be exceptionally trustworthy. Rucker, 10 Vet. App. 67, 73 (1997). Within a few months thereafter, the Veteran filed his claim, began reporting the alleged MST, and all future treatment was largely framed around this allegation. However, despite reporting depressive/anxious symptoms on one occasion during service, the Veteran received only normal psychological clinical evaluations during service and did not seek treatment for psychiatric symptoms. He was not diagnosed with any psychiatric disorder. Following discharge, the record does not show recurrent mental health complaints or treatment for more than 30 years. When the Veteran was first asked about whether he had experienced an MST, he denied such experience. The Veteran’s reports of polysubstance abuse have been inconsistent, as discussed above, but he has indicated on multiple occasions that it began around the age of 13 with drinking and the use of cocaine. The Veteran was arrested on drug charges at age 16 prior to his entry into service. Furthermore, the Veteran reported having no disciplinary issues in the Army and he denied drug use on concurrent reports of medical history during service. Thereafter, he reported multiple periods of extended sobriety, including from 1996 to 2005, when relapsing, which he attributed to the death of his wife in 2001. These findings indicate that the Veteran’s polysubstance abuse did not arise during service, nor were aggravated therein. When he sought treatment in mid-2010, he attributed his problems to drug use, unemployment, and homelessness, and treatment notes stated that he further suffered from bereavement issues due to multiple recent deaths, including those of his wife, mother, and sister. This evidence suggests intercurrent stressors that are responsible for the Veteran’s current psychiatric disabilities. The May 2013 VA examiner discussed above provided an additional opinion indicating that the Veteran’s currently diagnosed depression is less likely than not a continuation of the depression he endorsed on his Army exit examination, citing the many years hiatus between his discharge and documented treatment, and the identified stress or trigger at the time of discharge being dissimilar to later triggers or circumstances of episodes of depression. This assessment is probative, as the rationale provided is consistent with objective findings from the longitudinal record which demonstrate the Veteran’s reported psychiatric issues relate to bereavement and recent substance abuse when seeking treatment in 2010, and that previously unreported stressors emerging thereafter are not supported by the Veteran’s service treatment records. A December 2012 VA examiner diagnosed the Veteran with major depressive disorder and stated that it was at least as likely as not a result of the Veteran’s MST. However, the examiner did not provide support for this occurrence other than the Veteran’s own reporting that has been determined to be less than credible and is not consistent with the credible evidence. Accordingly, this opinion is not probative. See Reonal, 5 Vet. App. 458 (1993). The evidence shows that the Veteran has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, which are psychoses, and are considered chronic diseases. 38 U.S.C. § 1101; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.309(a), 3.384. In order for presumptive service connection to be warranted, the chronic disease must have manifested within one year of service discharge. However, these diagnoses are first documented in the record in 2012, which is more than 30 years following service discharge. Thus, service connection on a presumptive basis involving a chronic disease is not warranted. To the extent that the Veteran was diagnosed with an unspecified personality disorder, the Board notes that a diagnosis of a personality disorder is not eligible for VA compensation, as personality disorders are not diseases for VA compensation purposes, i.e., they are not a condition that may be service connected. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(c), 4.9 (2017); Beno v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 439, 441 (1992). Thus, service connection based on the diagnosed personality disorder may not be granted. As demonstrated herein, the credible evidence of record heavily contradicts the Veteran’s allegations of in-service stressors and does not demonstrate a nexus between the Veteran’s current psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, depression, anxiety, factitious disorder, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, substance abuse disorder, personality disorder, NOS, with narcissistic and antisocial features, and to include as due to MST, and an in-service disease, injury, or occurrence. For all the reasons discussed above, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection. Accordingly, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application, and the Veteran’s claim for service connection is denied. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. A. P. SIMPSON Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board G. Wonderling, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.