Citation Nr: 21011324 Decision Date: 03/01/21 Archive Date: 03/01/21 DOCKET NO. 15-31 060A DATE: March 1, 2021 ORDER The appeal seeking entitlement to a total disability rating based upon individual unemployability (TDIU), having been rendered moot, is dismissed. FINDING OF FACT The claim of entitlement to a TDIU is rendered moot in light of the award of a total schedular disability rating for bipolar disorder and anxiety disorder (hereinafter referred to as an “acquired psychiatric disability”) for the entire period on appeal. CONCLUSION OF LAW The matter of the Veteran’s entitlement to a TDIU has been rendered moot by the award of a total (100 percent) schedular rating for an acquired psychiatric disability for the entire appeal period, leaving no question of law or fact to decide regarding that issue. 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104, 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.340, 3.341, 4.14, 4.16. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran, who is the appellant in this case, served on active duty from June 1990 to November 1991. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a February 2015 rating decision of a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). By way of procedural background, this matter was previously before the Board in July 2020, at which time the Board granted service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, denied entitlement to nonservice-connected pension, and remanded entitlement to a TDIU pending the assignment of a disability rating for the Veteran’s acquired psychiatric disability. In an August 2020 rating decision, the RO assigned a 100 percent disability rating for the Veteran’s acquired psychiatric disability, effective August 28, 2013. In a September 2020 Supplemental Statement of the Case (SSOC), the RO determined that the issue of entitlement to a TDIU was rendered moot. The matter has since returned to the Board for further appellate consideration. In a September 2016 VA Form 9, the Veteran requested a videoconference hearing before the Board. However, in Correspondence received July 2017, the Veteran withdrew his hearing request. In December 2020 Third Party Correspondence, the Veteran’s representative indicated his intent to withdraw his representation of the Veteran before the RO and the Board. In Correspondence dated February 2021, the Veteran’s representative stated that he withdrew from representing the Veteran in all matters currently pending before the VA. This matter was re-certified to the Board in October 2020. See October 2020 BVA Letter. 38 C.F.R. § 20.6(a) governs withdrawal of representation after (re-)certification of a legacy appeal to the Board. Under 38 C.F.R. § 20.6(a)(2), a representative may not withdraw services as representative in the appeal unless good cause is shown on motion. Good cause for such purposes is the extended illness or incapacitation of an agent admitted to practice before the Department of Veterans Affairs, an attorney-at-law, or other individual representative; failure of the appellant to cooperate with proper preparation and presentation of the appeal; or other factors which make the continuation of representation impossible, impractical, or unethical. Here, neither the December 2020 Third Party Correspondence (the notice of intent to withdraw representation) nor the February 2021 Correspondence (the notice of withdrawal of representation) contain any reasons for the withdrawal of representation. To the extent the Veteran’s representative’s correspondence can be construed as a motion to withdraw representation, the Board finds that the motion must be denied for lack of good cause. The Board has limited the discussion below to the relevant evidence required to support its finding of fact and conclusion of law, as well as to the specific contentions regarding the case as raised directly by the appellant and those reasonably raised by the record. See Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet. App. 545, 552 (2008); Dickens v. McDonald, 814 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 1. Entitlement to a TDIU As to the Veteran’s claim for a TDIU, this benefit contemplates a schedular rating less than total for the disability or disabilities on which the TDIU would be based. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). A TDIU is considered a lesser benefit than a 100 percent schedular rating, and the grant of a 100 percent rating generally renders moot the issue of entitlement to a TDIU for the period when the 100 percent rating is in effect. An exception to this is that a separate award at the housebound rate or a TDIU predicated on a single disability (perhaps not ratable at the schedular 100 percent level) when considered with another disability separately rated at 60 percent or more may warrant payment of special monthly compensation (SMC) under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s). Bradley v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 280 (2008). Here, the Veteran is currently in receipt of a 100 percent schedular rating for an acquired psychiatric disability for the entire period on appeal. The Veteran does not have any other service-connected disabilities. Thus, the issue of entitlement to SMC is not raised by the record, and accordingly, entitlement to a TDIU is rendered moot. Finally, neither the Veteran nor his representative have raised any other issues, nor have any other issues been reasonably raised by the record. See Doucette v. Shulkin, 28 Vet. App. 366, 69-70 (2017) (confirming that the Board is not required to address issues unless they are specifically raised by the claimant or reasonably raised by the evidence of record). S. B. MAYS Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board C. M. Gill, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.