Citation Nr: 21011685 Decision Date: 03/02/21 Archive Date: 03/02/21 DOCKET NO. 17-13 950A DATE: March 2, 2021 ORDER Entitlement to payment or reimbursement for emergency medical services received from July 27, 2015 to August 6, 2015 at Florida Hospital, Tampa is dismissed FINDING OF FACT The Veteran died in May 2018; accrued benefits are not payable on this medical reimbursement claim as a matter of law. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for dismissal of the claim of entitlement to payment or reimbursement for emergency medical services received from July 27, 2015 to August 6, 2015 at Florida Hospital, Tampa have been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5121(a), 5121A; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1000, 3.1010. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Sadly, the Veteran died in April 2018 while his appeal seeking medical reimbursement was pending. In February 2019, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) dismissed the appeal, noting the pending substitution by the appellant and noted accrued benefits for such were not payable for the issue at hand. Thereafter, substitution was granted to the Appellant, the Veteran’s widow, for the administrative appeal, and the matter was returned to the Board. As noted in the prior decision, a claimant can be found eligible for substitution or accrued benefits only for claims for periodic monetary benefits, and not for claims for personal benefits administered through the Veterans Health Administration. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5121(a), 5121A; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1000, 3.1010. Subject to minor exceptions not relevant here, the statute qualifies accrued benefits as those “due and unpaid” “periodic monetary benefits” arising under all “laws administered by the Secretary to which an individual was entitled at death under existing ratings or decisions or those based on evidence in the file at the date of death.” 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a); see Nolan v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 340, 348 (2006) (explaining that “periodic monetary benefits” include retroactive awards of disability compensation benefits because “even though the actual payment of retroactive benefits is made in a one-time lump-sum payment... the benefits that the claimant had been entitled to receive during his or her lifetime would have been paid monthly”). However, nonrecurring reimbursements, such as the benefit sought in this case, are not payable to a substitute. See Pappalardo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 63 (1993) (one-time payment for assistance for specially adapted housing does not qualify as “periodic monetary benefit” and is not payable as accrued benefit after veteran’s death). Analyzing 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a), the key word is periodic. Unless a payment is one that a veteran would have received in regular intervals during his or her lifetime, a substituted claimant may not recover that benefit. While the Board is sympathetic to the claim, it is bound by the statutory scheme created by Congress and is not permitted to award payments other than as authorized by Congress. Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 429, 432-33 (1992); citing Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 426 (1990) (“[N]o equities, no matter how compelling, can create a right to payment out of the United States Treasury which has not been provided for by Congress.”). Because of the limitation under the law on payment, there is no relief that can be afforded by the Board on this claim, and any question of law or fact regarding whether the benefit sought had been appropriately denied below during the Veteran’s life is now moot. 38 U.S.C. § 7104 (providing that the Board decides actual “questions in a matter”); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994). Accordingly, dismissal of the appeal is ordered. Evan M. Deichert Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board T. C. KING, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.