Citation Nr: 21011896 Decision Date: 03/03/21 Archive Date: 03/03/21 DOCKET NO. 10-44 836 DATE: March 3, 2021 ISSUE Entitlement to Special Monthly Compensation (SMC) under 38 U.S.C. § 1114 (s). ORDER Entitlement to SMC under 38 U.S.C. § 1114 (s) is denied. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran does not have a single service-connected disability rated as 100 percent and additional service-connected disability independently ratable at 60 percent, and is not permanently housebound by reason of service-connected disabilities. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for entitlement to SMC under 38 U.S.C. § 1114 (s) have not been met. 38 U.S.C. § 1114 (s) (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.350 (i) (2019). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from October 1959 to January 1962, with additional service in the National Guard. The Board found that the issue on appeal was raised by the record in an October 2020 remand. See Buie v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 242, 250-51 (2010); Bradley v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 280, 294 (2008). There has been substantial compliance with the remand directives, and the issue is properly before the Board for further appellate action. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 271 (1998).  As a separate threshold matter, the Board observes that a posttraumatic headaches issue is in a separately docketed appeals stream and will be addressed separately by the Board at a later time. Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) and implementing regulations impose obligations on VA to provide claimants with notice and assistance. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2019). The Veteran in this case has not referred to any deficiencies in either the duties to notify or assist; therefore, the Board may proceed to the merits of the claim. See Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015, cert. denied, U.S.C. Oct. 3, 2016) (holding that “the Board’s obligation to read filings in a liberal manner does not require the Board.to search the record and address procedural arguments when the [appellant] fails to raise them before the Board”); Dickens v. McDonald, 814 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (applying Scott to an appellant’s failure to raise a duty to assist argument before the Board). The Board has reviewed all of the evidence in the Veteran’s claims file. Although the Board has an obligation to provide adequate reasons and bases supporting this decision, there is no requirement that the evidence submitted by the Veteran or obtained on his behalf be discussed in detail. Rather, the Board’s analysis below will focus specifically on what evidence is needed to substantiate the claim and what the evidence in the claims file shows, or fails to show, with respect to the claim. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000) and Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122, 128-130 (2000). In order to qualify for SMC at the § 1114(s) level, the Veteran must have a single service-connected disability rated 100 percent and either: (1) has an additional service-connected disability or disabilities ratable at 60 percent, separate and distinct from the 100 percent service-connected disability, and involving different anatomical segments or bodily systems; or (2) is permanently housebound by reason of a service-connected disability or disabilities. Permanently housebound means the Veteran is substantially confined, as a direct result of a service-connected disability or disabilities, to his dwelling or the immediate premises (or, if institutionalized, to the ward or clinical areas), and it is reasonably certain that the service-connected disability or disabilities and resultant confinement will continue throughout his lifetime. 38 U.S.C. § 1114 (s); 38 C.F.R. § 3.350 (i); Buie, 24 Vet. App. 242, 250; AB v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 35, 38 (1993); see also Bradley, 22 Vet. App. 280. A housebound in fact determination requires a Veteran’s inability to leave his /her place of residence and immediate premises in order to earn any income. However, it does not require a total inability to leave the place of residence and immediate premises for all circumstances. Leaving home for medical purposes cannot, by itself, serve as the basis for finding that a Veteran is not substantially confined for purposes of SMC housebound benefits. Howell v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 535, 540 (2006). The limitations must be the result of the Veteran’s service-connected disabilities. Non-medical indicators of housebound status may include but are not limited to an inability to walk substantial distances or leaving the home with assistance only occasionally for appointments; grocery shopping, or church, or an inability to mow one’s lawn. The Veteran is service connected for mild traumatic head injury rated as 40 percent disabling, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at 30 percent, posttraumatic headaches associated with mild traumatic head injury at 30 percent, and lumbar spine degenerative disc disease at 20 percent. He has combined ratings of 40 percent from March 19, 2009, 70 percent from July 30, 2009, and 80 percent from July 23, 2012. He is also in receipt from a TDIU from July 30, 2009. As such, the Veteran does not have a single service-connected disability rated as 100 percent and additional service-connected disability independently ratable at 60 percent. In response to the Board’s remand, the Veteran submitted a December 2020 examination for housebound status or permanent need for regular aid and attendance in which his diagnoses were listed as Alzheimer’s disease, hypertension, and dementia. The examiner noted that the Veteran required nursing home care due to dementia with behavioral problems and high risk of frequent falls. The examiner stated that the Veteran had difficulty walking, atopic gait, and muscle weakness due to Alzheimer’s with late onset. The Board finds that there is no determination by any examiner that the Veteran’s housebound status is the direct result of his service-connected disabilities. As such, as of the date of this decision, the Board finds that the Veteran is not permanently housebound by reason of service-connected disabilities, using the definition of the statute. In sum, and in consideration of the evidence, the Board finds that the Veteran does not have a single service-connected disability rated as 100 percent and additional service-connected disability or disabilities independently ratable at 60 percent, and he is not shown by the facts to be substantially confined as a direct result of service-connected disabilities to his dwelling and the immediate premises. As such, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for SMC, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine is not applicable, and therefore SMC is not warranted. MICHAEL A. PAPPAS Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board R.M.K., Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.