Citation Nr: 21012441 Decision Date: 03/04/21 Archive Date: 03/04/21 DOCKET NO. 14-29 961 DATE: March 4, 2021 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for PTSD is denied. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran’s PTSD did not onset in service, nor is it etiologically related thereto. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for PTSD have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5103(a), 5103A; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159, 3.303, 3.304, 3.309, 4.125. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served in the U.S. Marine Corps from March 1974 to June 1977. This appeal was remanded by the Board in August 2020. The Board is now satisfied there was substantial compliance with this Remand. See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998); Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141, 146-47 (1999). Specifically, a new VA opinion was obtained, which the Board finds adequate for adjudication purposes. After the required development was completed, this issue was readjudicated and the Veteran was sent a supplemental statement of the case in December 2020. Accordingly, the Board finds that the Remand directives were substantially complied with and, thus, there is no Stegall violation in this case. Entitlement to service connection for PTSD The Veteran seeks service connection for PTSD. He argues, through counsel, that his PTSD clearly and unmistakably existed prior to service, and was aggravated in basic training. To establish service connection for PTSD, the evidence of record must include a medical diagnosis of PTSD in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125 (a), a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f). Lay testimony may corroborate an in-service stressor if the stressor is related to fear of hostile military or terrorist activity. Id. A grant of service connection for another psychiatric disorder may result in a higher rating under 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, if there are symptoms attributable to the newly service-connected psychiatric disorder that are not compensated under the already service-connected psychiatric disorder. See Mittleider v. West, 11 Vet. App. 181, 182 (1998). Although the restriction on pyramiding prevents a veteran from being compensated twice for the same symptoms, the ban does not preclude a claimant from being service-connected for disabilities with overlapping symptoms. See Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 38 C.F.R. § 4.14. As the Federal Circuit explained in Collaro, a disability compensation claim consists of five different elements, including service connection and disability rating. 136 F.3d at 1308. Thus, the issue of whether to grant service connection is separate from the determination of how to rate a service connected disability. Id.; see also Esteban v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 259 (1994) (addressing a veteran’s entitlement to separate ratings). Here, however, the Board determines that service connection is not warranted for PTSD in addition to depression. Independently of his depression, the Veteran’s PTSD cannot be linked to a corroborated in-service stressor. As an initial matter, the Board notes that a Veteran is presumed to have been in sound condition when examined, accepted, and enrolled for service except as to defects, infirmities, or disabilities noted at the time of examination, acceptance, enrollment, or where clear and unmistakable evidence demonstrates that the injury or disease existed before acceptance and enrollment and was not aggravated by such service. 38 U.S.C. § 1111, 1132; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (b). Here, the Board observes that while there is no evidence in the service treatment records of a psychiatric disorder upon entrance into service, there is some evidence in the record to suggest that the Veteran’s PTSD may have preceded his active duty service. Nevertheless, there is no actual medical evidence from prior to service that would constitute clear and unmistakable evidence of PTSD disorder. Of note, the October 2020 C&P examiner indicated that the Veteran’s PTSD was less likely related to an in-service event, as it stemmed from sexual assault that occurred outside of service. Nevertheless, it appears that to the extent the examiners’ findings may indicate the Veteran’s psychiatric disorders preexisted service, these findings were largely based upon statements from the Veteran, and not based upon any medical documentation that was reviewed. Thus, the Board will accept that there was no psychiatric disability prior to service. Next, despite several negative PTSD screens prior, the Board concedes a current medical diagnosis of PTSD under the DSM-V. However, the Veteran’s in-service treatment records, including his separation exam of March 1993, do not reflect treatment for PTSD during active duty. More importantly, the evidence does not show corroborated in-service stressors. Lay testimony alone is insufficient to establish that a stressor occurred; it must be corroborated by “credible supporting evidence.” See Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 142 (1997). Since the Veteran does not attest to being deployed, the Veteran is not a “combat veteran” under § 3.304(f)(2), nor could he have experienced fear of hostile military activity under § 3.304(f)(3). Therefore, his lay statements must be corroborated. Here, the Veteran reports that the blast from the shotgun used in training aggravated his childhood PTSD. However, the relevant inquiry in this matter is not whether a pre-existing condition worsened in service, but whether the Veteran’s current PTSD is linked to a corroborated in-service stressor. While the Veteran narrates hearing of his father’s death while in service, and while this event is corroborated by the Veteran’s family’s credible buddy statements, the medical evidence does not show that this event resulted in PTSD. Moreover, the evidence does not show continuous symptoms of PTSD, regardless of a diagnosis. A December 2005 screen found that the Veteran did not have PTSD. The first evidence of a PTSD diagnosis is a medical record from December 2009, over thirty years after the Veteran’s separation. Therefore, there is no way for the Board to conclude that he has experienced continuous symptoms since service based purely on the medical evidence of record. Notably, in addition to waiting decades to submit his claim, the Veteran himself, in records dated December 2016, and April 2017, attributed his PTSD symptoms to his childhood trauma rather than an in-service shotgun blast. Therefore, service connection for PTSD based on the Veteran’s reaction to a shotgun blast during basic training is not warranted, based on continuous symptoms found in evidence or based on the Veteran’s own statements. Finally, even if an in-service stressor could be corroborated, the medical evidence does not establish a link between any in-service event and the Veteran’s current PTSD symptoms. Indeed, the Veteran’s October 2020 C&P examiner opined that the Veteran’s PTSD was more likely linked to an assault that occurred outside of service. The examiner noted several accounts of childhood sexual abuse, from the Veteran himself and in the claims file. The Veteran, in a December 2016 note, recounts sexual abuse by his mother’s boyfriend at age 14, as well as witnessing a murder by gunshot shortly after. Finally, the Veteran reports, in a March 2020 statement, the rigors of boot camp, and hearing of his father’s death, which, it is asserted, triggered the onset of his current PTSD. The October 2020 C&P examiner reviewed this evidence, was aware of these events, and clearly opined that the Veteran’s sexual abuse, which did not occur in service, was the stressor upon which his PTSD diagnosis was based. Accordingly, the Veteran’s current PTSD could not be linked to a corroborated in-service stressor. In arriving at these conclusions, the Board has considered the statements made by the Veteran and his family members relating his current PTSD to his active service. Specifically, the Veteran reports that he had PTSD from his childhood traumas, which were aggravated by his in-service training. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that “[l]ay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional.” Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Here, in addition to applying an inapplicable analysis, the Veteran is not competent to provide testimony regarding the etiology of psychiatric disorders, to include PTSD. See Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1377, n.4. Because such disorders are not diagnosed by unique and readily identifiable features, they do not involve a simple identification that a layperson is competent to make. Therefore, the Veteran’s contentions linking his disorders to service are found to lack competency. While the Veteran’s service connection for depression does not render his PTSD claim moot, the preponderating medical evidence indicates that his PTSD more likely onset due to non-service-connected stressor. Considering the above discussion, the Board concludes that the weight of the evidence is against the claims for service connection and there is no doubt to be otherwise resolved. Accordingly, service connection for PTSD is denied.   The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303. B.T. KNOPE Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board Z. Maskatia