Citation Nr: 21013353 Decision Date: 03/09/21 Archive Date: 03/09/21 DOCKET NO. 17-43 277 DATE: March 9, 2021 REMANDED Entitlement to an increased rating for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) with alcohol dependence and persistent depression, rated as 30 percent disabling prior to November 19, 2019 and 70 percent disabling thereafter, is remanded. Entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) is remanded. REASONS FOR REMAND These matters come before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a February 2014 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Atlanta, Georgia, that denied a rating in excess of 30 percent for PTSD with alcohol dependence and persistent depression [hereinafter “PTSD”]. The Veteran appeared at a hearing before the undersigned in April 2019. A transcript of the hearing is of record. In July 2019, the Board remanded the Veteran’s appeal for further development, which will be discussed as relevant below. Subsequent to the Board’s remand, the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ) issued a January 2021 rating decision that increased the rating assigned for PTSD to 70 percent, effective November 19, 2019, resulting in a staged rating during the applicable rating period for the Veteran’s appeal. 1. Entitlement to an increased rating for PTSD with alcohol dependence and persistent depression, rated as 30 percent disabling prior to November 19, 2019 and 70 percent disabling thereafter, is remanded. In July 2019, the Board remanded the Veteran’s appeal of the rating assigned for PTSD for a new examination due to his testimony regarding increased severity of his disability. Following the Board’s remand, the AOJ assigned a 70 percent rating for PTSD based on the date of the post-remand examination that confirmed an increase in the Veteran’s disability; however, the record suggests this increase occurred prior to the date of the post-remand examination. See Tatum v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 139, 145 (2010) (explaining its not the date of opinion but rather the information contained therein when determining an effective date). During the April 2019 hearing before the undersigned, the Veteran appeared to suggest the increase in his psychiatric impairment coincided with a fire that burned down his house, a fact which was also referenced by his November 2019 examiner, but the examiner’s report does not contain sufficient information to make an informed decision in this regard. As a result, the Board finds a retrospective opinion addressing the approximate date of onset of the Veteran’s increase in disability is necessary to ensure the decision on the Veteran’s appeal is fully informed. See Chotta v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 80 (2008). 2. Entitlement to TDIU is remanded. TDIU is an element of an increased rating appeal when unemployability has been raised by the record. See Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447 (2009). The record establishes the Veteran has not worked during the appeal period. The Veteran’s post-remand psychiatric examination noted several symptoms, to include difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances, including work or a work-like setting, that were not noted during his previous examinations; therefore, the Board finds the post-remand development has raised the issue of TDIU in the context of the Veteran’s appeal. The Board recognizes the Veteran is currently entitled to a 100 percent schedular rating, effective November 19, 2019; however, this does not resolve the issue of TDIU in the context of this appeal. First, the increased rating claim that led to the present appeal predates the effective date of the Veteran’s 100 percent schedular rating. Further, even after the effective date of the 100 percent rating, VA must address whether any of the Veteran’s service-connected disabilities standing alone warrants TDIU because he would also have other service-connected disabilities, separate and distinct, that result in a combined rating of 60 percent or more, raising an inferred claim of entitlement to special monthly compensation at the housebound rate. See Buie v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 242, 250 (2011); Bradley v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 280, 293 (2008). The AOJ should develop and adjudicate these issues in the first instance to ensure the Veteran is afforded due process in light of the additional development required for his appeal of the rating assigned for PTSD. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a); see also Disabled Am. Veterans v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 327 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The matters are REMANDED for the following action: 1. Obtain an addendum to the November 2019 psychiatric examination report addressing the approximate date of onset of the increase in psychiatric impairment noted in the initial examination report. The examiner is specifically asked to address the Veteran’s testimony that a fire that burned down his house played a role in his increased disability. The addendum must include a complete rationale for the opinion provided. If the November 2019 examiner is not available, the opinion may be obtained from another equally qualified examiner with the Veteran only being scheduled for a new examination if deemed necessary by the newly-selected examiner. 2. After completing the step above, readjudicate both the rating assigned for PTSD, to include the issue of entitlement to TDIU prior to the effective date of the Veteran’s 100 percent schedular rating as an element in accordance with Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447 (2009), as well as the issue of entitlement to special monthly compensation at the housebound rate in accordance with Buie v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 242 (2011) and Bradley v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 280 (2008). If any benefit sought on appeal remains denied, issue a supplemental statement of the case and return the matter to the Board. M. HYLAND Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board L. S. Kyle, Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.