Citation Nr: 21014515 Decision Date: 03/12/21 Archive Date: 03/12/21 DOCKET NO. 18-17 988 DATE: March 12, 2021 ORDER Service connection for PTSD is granted. Service connection for tinnitus is granted. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran’s PTSD had its onset in service. 2. The Veteran’s tinnitus had its onset in service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for service connection for PTSD have been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. 2. The criteria for service connection for tinnitus have been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1154(a), 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Marine Corps from August 1979 to August 1983, including service at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The Veteran presented sworn testimony at a hearing before the undersigned in February 2021. The Board notes, the Veteran has claims for entitlement to service connection for multiple psychiatric disorders, include major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder. At the February 2021 Board hearing, the Veteran requested to characterize the claim broadly as one of entitlement to service connection for acquired psychiatric disorder. See Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009). Service Connection Establishing service connection generally requires medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) an in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed.Cir.2009); Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff’d per curiam, 78 F. 3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table). Determinations as to service connection will be based on review of the entire evidence of record, to include all pertinent medical and lay evidence, with due consideration to VA’s policy to administer the law under a broad and liberal interpretation consistent with the facts in each individual case. 38 U.S.C. § 1154 (a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). “Service connection” basically means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred coincident with active service in the Armed Forces; or, if preexisting such service, was aggravated therein. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (a); see Flynn v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 500, 503 (1994) (noting that, in the context of service-connected disability compensation, “the element of cause and effect has been totally by-passed in favor of a simple temporal relationship between the incurrence of the disability and the period of active duty”). In making all determinations, the Board must fully consider the lay assertions of record. A layperson is competent to report on the onset and continuity of his current symptomatology. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 470 (1994) (a Veteran is competent to report on that of which he or she has personal knowledge). Lay evidence can also be competent and sufficient evidence of a diagnosis or to establish etiology if (1) the layperson is competent to identify the medical condition; (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis; or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007). When considering whether lay evidence is competent, the Board must determine, on a case by case basis, whether the Veteran’s particular disability is the type of disability for which lay evidence may be competent. Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428 (2011); see also Jandreau, 492 F.3d at 1376-77. 1. Entitlement to service connection for acquired psychiatric disorder. The Veteran asserts that he is entitled to service connection for a psychiatric disorder that had its onset during service. See February 2021 H’rg Tr. at 4. Specifically, the Veteran stated that his PTSD is related to a motor vehicle accident (MVA) during service. Id. The Veteran has a current diagnosis of PTSD. See February 2011 Suicide Risk Assessment. The Board notes the Veteran’s post service treatment records show treatment for multiple psychiatric disabilities including anxiety, depression and PTSD. See December 2009 Treatment Plan; February 2011 Suicide Risk Assessment; March 2017 Mental Health Evaluation. The Veteran testified, that during service he was in a truck that ran off a bridge, flipped and fell 10 feet and his diagnosed PTSD is the result of the trauma related to his motor vehicle accident. See February 2021 Hr’g Tr; see also February 2012 Third Party Correspondence; March 2012 VA Memorandum. He testified that since service he is easily agitated, fearful to cross bridges and has reoccurring nightmares of going off of the bridge. Id at 3, 4. The Veteran is competent to report psychiatric symptoms that began in service and the Board finds the Veteran’s statements credible. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (a)(2); Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 368 (2005); Layno. The Veteran’s post service treatment records for his PTSD consistently show the Veteran has discussed his motor vehicle accident during service and recurrent nightmares, anger and irritability as a result of the MVA. See December 2009 Mental Health Initial Evaluation Consult; June 2010 Mental Health Medication Management Note; September 2017 Initial Psychiatric Consultation. Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that service connection for PTSD is warranted. This represents a full grant of the benefits sought with regard to this claim, as the Veteran testified at the February 2021 Board hearing, that the grant of any psychiatric disability would satisfy this claim. See February 2021 Hr’g Tr. at 4, 5. 2. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. The competent and credible evidence of record shows that the Veteran’s tinnitus began during service and have been recurrent since that time. The Veteran competently and credibly testified that he first experiencing tinnitus while being near loud gunfire and that it has been recurrent since that time. See February 2021 Hr’g Tr. at 6, 7. The Veteran is competent to report the onset and continuation of his tinnitus symptoms and the Board finds his reports credible. See Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370, 374 (2002); see also Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Board notes that the December 2011 VA examiner conceded noise exposure based on his MOS of heavy vehicle operator. The Board acknowledges the December 2011 VA examiner opined that the Veteran’s current tinnitus was not related to service; however, because the evidence shows that the Veteran’s tinnitus had their onset in service, service connection is warranted. See Flynn v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 500, 503 (1994). STEVEN D. REISS Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board Jacquelynn M. Jordan, Associate Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.