Citation Nr: 21014587 Decision Date: 03/15/21 Archive Date: 03/15/21 DOCKET NO. 20-28 006 DATE: March 15, 2021 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is granted. FINDING OF FACT Resolving all reasonable doubt in favor of the Veteran, the Veteran has a diagnosis of PTSD that is related to a corroborated in-service stressor. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for entitlement to service connection for PTSD have been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5103, 5103A, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from July 1999 to October 2004. 1. Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) Service connection may be established for disability caused by disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. In order to establish service connection for a claimed disability, there must be (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) evidence, generally medical, of a causal relationship between the claimed in service disease or injury and the current disability. Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247 (1999). Service connection may also be established for any disease initially diagnosed after service, when the evidence establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C. § 1113(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d); Cosman v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 503 (1992). The disease entity for which service connection is sought must be chronic rather than acute and transitory in nature. For the showing of chronic disease in service, a combination of manifestations must exist sufficient to identify the disease entity and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word chronic. Furthermore, service incurrence will be presumed for certain chronic diseases if manifest to a compensable degree within the year after active service. 38 U.S.C. § 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. There are additional criteria for establishing service connection for PTSD. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Arzio v. Shinseki, 602 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Establishing service connection for PTSD requires (1) a diagnosis of PTSD; (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred; and (3) medical evidence of a causal nexus between current symptomatology and the specific claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The Board recognizes that absent objective evidence that the Veteran engaged in combat with the enemy, lay statements, alone, are not sufficient to establish the occurrence of an in-service stressor. Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997); Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389 (1996); Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163 (1996). Rather, in those cases, the record must contain service records or other corroborative evidence that substantiates the Veteran’s testimony or statements as to the occurrence of a claimed stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304; West v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70 (1994); Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91 (1993). However, corroboration of every detail of a claimed stressor, including the Veteran’s personal participation, is not required. Rather, a Veteran only needs to offer independent evidence of a stressful event that is sufficient to imply personal exposure. Pentecost v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 124 (2002); Suozzi v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 307 (1997). Regarding the presence of an in-service stressor, the Veteran has stated that curing basic training and AIT, he became close to R.A., a fellow soldier. After graduation, while on leave, the Veteran stated that R.A. was shot with a shot gun at home in Texas. Corroborative evidence has been supplied in the form of information from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), which shows that Private First Class R.A, from San Antonio Texas, died on November [REDACTED], 1999, as the result of a non-hostile incident. Additional corroborative evidence has been supplied by the Veteran’s service separation form, which shows that the Veteran entered active duty on July 22, 1999. That information is consistent with the Veteran’s claimed timeline of events. The Board finds that the Veteran’s report of an in-service stressor, coupled with the corroborating evidence found in the information from NARA and the Veteran’s service separation form, satisfies the requirement of an in-service stressor. The remaining question is whether the Veteran has PTSD as a result of the in-service corroborated stressor. On VA examination in December 2019, the examiner found that the Veteran had a confirmed diagnosis of PTSD. After performing an examination, the examiner opined that the Veteran’s PTSD was at least as likely as not related to service. The examiner specified that the Veteran’s PTSD was a result of learning about his friend’s violent death, and the claimed stressor was adequate to support the diagnosis of PTSD. Additionally, in a July 2020 PTSD Disability Benefits Questionnaire, a private examiner diagnosed PTSD and opined that it was more likely than not that the PTSD was due to service experiences, to include the experience of R.A. being shot with a shot gun while on leave. The Board finds that the Veteran’s claimed in-service stressor has been verified with corroborating evidence. As the evidence of record shows a corroborated in-service stressor, a current diagnosis of PTSD due to the corroborated stressor, and satisfactory evidence of a link between the two, the Board finds that it is at least as likely as not that PTSD is the result of an event in service. Resolving reasonable doubt in favor of the Veteran, the Board finds that service connection for PTSD is warranted and the claim is granted. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. Harvey P. Roberts Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board S. Layton, Counsel The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.