Citation Nr: 21023561 Decision Date: 04/21/21 Archive Date: 04/21/21 DOCKET NO. 16-06 769 DATE: April 21, 2021 ORDER Service connection for a psychiatric disorder, including posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), is denied. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran does not have a diagnosis of PTSD linked to a verified stressor, and a psychiatric disorder did not have onset during active service or within one year thereafter, and was not caused by active service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, including PTSD, are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304(f) (2020). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from March 1981 to October 1984 and from January 1988 to January 1992. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans Appeals (Board) on appeal from a December 2014 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). In correspondence received in May 2019 it seems as though the Veteran essentially indicated that he no longer desired a Board hearing on this matter. Nonetheless, it appears as though he was scheduled for a hearing in June 2019. He did not appear. Thus, no additional action in this regard is warranted. Regarding the claim of PTSD, a claim for service connection for a disability encompasses all relevant symptoms, regardless of how that symptomatology is diagnosed. Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 4-5 (2009). VA records indicate that the Veteran’s current psychiatric diagnoses include adjustment disorder and major depression. As such, the Board has recharacterized the Veteran’s claim as entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD. Duties to Notify and Assist Neither the Veteran nor his representative has raised any issues with the duty to notify or duty to assist. See Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that “the Board’s obligation to read filings in a liberal manner does not require the Board... to search the record and address procedural arguments when the veteran fails to raise them before the Board”); Dickens v. McDonald, 814 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (applying Scott to a duty to assist argument). VA treatment records, including those requested by the Veteran from the Pueblo VA clinic, are associated with the record. In a February 2012 VA treatment record the Veteran indicated that he saw a therapist in 1985. To the extent the Veteran may have been referencing a private medical provider, the Board observes that in April 2014 and December 2014 the RO provided the Veteran with VA Form 21-4142, Authorization and Consent to Release Information (VA Form 21-4142), for any treatment records he wished to have VA obtain for him. No VA Form 21-4142 authorizing VA to obtain records from any private medical provider has been returned by the Veteran. In July 2014 the RO informed the Veteran that there was insufficient information to allow for meaningful research of the Veteran’s stressors by the Joint Service Records Research Center (JSSRC). The July 2014 (and December 2014) correspondence requested that the Veteran provide further details of his stressors. In December 2014 correspondence the Veteran indicated that he could not provide any additional information concerning the names, times, and the dates of the incidents in question. No additional action in this regard is warranted. Laws and regulations Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2020). To establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a Veteran must show: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service- the so-called “nexus” requirement. Holton v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Service connection may be granted for any disease initially diagnosed after discharge when all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (2020). For PTSD, service connection requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125 (a); a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f). When the evidence does not establish that a Veteran is a combat veteran, his assertions of service stressors are not sufficient to establish the occurrence of such events. Rather, his reported service stressors must be established by official service record or other credible supporting evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f) (2); Pentecost v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 124 (2002); Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389 (1996). In addition, service connection for certain chronic diseases may be established on a presumptive basis by showing that the condition manifested to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year from the date of separation from service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1131, 1137 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a) (2020); Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 258, 271-72 (2015). Although the disease need not be diagnosed within the presumption period, it must be shown, by acceptable lay or medical evidence, that there were characteristic manifestations of the disease to the required degree during that time. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(a). For the showing of chronic disease in service, there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time. If chronicity in service is not established, a showing of continuity of symptoms after discharge may support the claim. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(b), 3.309 (2020); Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Analysis The Veteran asserts (in an April 2014 stressor statement) that he has PTSD as a result of seeing and retrieving dead bodies following various accidents during service. He also has indicated that he was involved in “bombing” Qaddafi in the 1980s. The Veteran’s current psychiatric disorders are acknowledged. VA records beginning in February 2011 reflect psychiatric diagnoses including depressive disorder, OCD, panic disorder, and adjustment disorder. The Veteran does not have a diagnosis of PTSD. As for service treatment records (STRs), the Veteran’s service entrance examinations (March 1981 and July 1987) did not note any psychiatric disability. A March 1981 STR noted that the Veteran was brought to the ER due to dizziness, vomiting, and passing out; the Veteran admitted to emotional stress due to divorce proceedings. The Veteran was evaluated for otitis media with no refence to any counseling or mental health services. The Veteran’s service separation examinations (October 1984 and December 1991) indicated that the Veteran’s psychiatric system was clinically evaluated as normal; the Veteran specifically denied that he had or ever had depression, excessive worry, or nervous trouble on the corresponding Medical History Reports. As noted, VA records beginning in February 2011 reflect treatment for psychiatric diagnoses including depressive disorder, OCD, panic disorder, and adjustment disorder. However, the reports do not contain any competent opinion attributing the Veteran’s disorders to service or any event of service. A review of the record fails to show that the Veteran has a diagnosis of PTSD or any confirmed stressor so as to result in PTSD, or that any other psychiatric disorder is in any way related to service. Rather, the record shows a psychiatric disorder was not present during active service and was not caused by active service. A psychiatric disorder or treatment for a psychiatric disorder is not noted in the Veteran’s STRs. Further, there is no competent medical opinion linking any psychiatric disability to service. Additionally, a psychiatric diagnosis was not made until nearly 20 years after service discharge, and this is a factor that weighs against a finding that it is otherwise related to service. See Mense v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 354, 356 (1991) (holding that VA did not err in denying service connection when the veteran failed to provide evidence which demonstrated continuity of symptomatology, and failed to account for the lengthy time period for which there is no clinical documentation of disorder). The Veteran’s assertion that he has PTSD related to service has been considered. The Veteran has not alleged that he engaged in combat. Additionally, none of the Veteran’s alleged stressors, including seeing and retrieving dead bodies following various accidents during service or being involved in “bombing” Qaddafi in the 1980s have been verified. The Veteran’s military occupation specialty was aviation supply storekeeper; thus being involved in the alleged 1980 “bombing” is inconsistent with the circumstances of his service and not credible. Moreover, the Veteran is not competent to relate any current psychiatric disorder to service or any event of service. As a lay person, the Veteran lacks the medical training and expertise to provide a complex medical opinion such as the diagnosis or the etiology of a psychiatric disorder. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“sometimes the layperson will be competent to identify the condition where the condition is simple, for example a broken leg, and sometimes not, for example, a form of cancer”). As noted, the Veteran specifically denied that he had any psychiatric problems at the time of his discharge from service. Further, while respiratory, musculosketal, skin and auditory conditions were noted, the Veteran did not note any psychiatric complaints at a comprehensive March 1992 VA general medical examination undertaken shortly following his discharge from service in January 1992. Based on the foregoing, the Board does not find that the Veteran’s lay statements are sufficient to establish continuity of symptomatology for a psychiatric disorder. The Board acknowledges that the Veteran was not provided a VA examination for his claimed psychiatric disorder. A VA examination is required when there is (1) competent evidence of a current disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability, (2) evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service, or establishing certain diseases manifesting during an applicable presumptive period for which the claimant qualifies, and (3) an indication that the disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability may be associated with the veteran’s service or with another service-connected disability, but (4) there is insufficient competent medical evidence on file for the Secretary to make a decision on the claim. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006). See also 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (d)(2), 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (c)(4)(i). The evidence of record, however, does not indicate that any of the Veteran’s psychiatric disorders “may be” associated with active service. Furthermore, other than the claimed PTSD, the Veteran does not even assert that he has a psychiatric disorder that is caused or related to service. In sum, service connection for a psychiatric disorder, including PTSD, is not warranted. As the preponderance of evidence is unfavorable to the claim, service connection is not warranted, and the benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application. See generally Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). (Continued on the next page) The appeal is denied. C. CRAWFORD Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans’ Appeals Attorney for the Board David Nelson The Board’s decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.