Citation Nr: 21032072 Decision Date: 05/25/21 Archive Date: 05/25/21 DOCKET NO. 19-10 495 DATE: May 25, 2021 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death is denied. Entitlement to Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1318 is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran died in August 2016 from atherosclerotic and hypertensive cardiovascular disease. 2. Atherosclerotic and hypertensive cardiovascular disease did not originate in service or until decades thereafter, and was otherwise not etiologically related to service; the Veteran's death was not otherwise etiologically related to service or to a service-connected disorder. 3. The Veteran was not a former prisoner of war, and at the time of his death, he had not been rated totally disabled for 10 continuous years immediately preceding his death, and was not rated totally disabled continuously since discharge and for at least 5 years immediately preceding death. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1310, 5103A, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.312. 2. The criteria for entitlement to DIC benefits pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1318 are not met. 38 U.S.C. § 1318; 38 C.F.R. § 3.22. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran had active service from June 1971 to June 1973. The Veteran died in August 2016. The Appellant is the Veteran's surviving spouse. The Appellant testified before the undersigned at a Board hearing in April 2020; a transcript is of record. 1. Entitlement to service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death is denied. VA death benefits are payable to the surviving spouse of a veteran if the veteran died from a service-connected disability. 38 U.S.C. § 1310; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.5, 3.312. To establish service connection for the cause of a veteran's death, the evidence must show that a disability incurred in or aggravated by active military service was the principal or contributory cause of death. 38 C.F.R. § 3.312. For a disability to constitute the principal cause of death, it must be one of the immediate or underlying causes of death or must be etiologically related to the cause of death. For a disability to be a contributory cause of death, it must have contributed substantially or materially to cause death; combined to cause death; or aided or lent assistance to the production of death. It is not sufficient to show that a service-connected disability casually shared in producing death; rather, it must be shown that there was a causal connection between the service-connected disability and the veteran's death. 38 C.F.R. § 3.312 (b), (c). Generally, service connection may be established for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. To establish service connection for a disability, there must be (1) a current disability; (2) an in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the current disability and the disease or injury incurred in or aggravated during service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Veteran's death certificate lists his cause of death as atherosclerotic and hypertensive cardiovascular disease. He was not service connected for any disorder at the time of his death. At her Board hearing, the Appellant contended that the Veteran told her that he had hypertension in service and that he told her had had symptoms related to hypertension. The Board notes that service treatment records do not show complaints or treatment for hypertension or related symptoms during service. A March 1974 separation examination noted the heart as normal and blood pressure was 128/78. The medical evidence of record does not contain evidence of treatment for hypertension or heart disease until many years after service. The record does not reflect that the Veteran had service that would otherwise afford him presumptive service connection due to exposure to herbicide agents, and neither the Veteran nor the Appellant have alleged such service. The Board notes that the Veteran was competent to state that he suffered symptoms observable to a layperson, such as swelling, however, the record does not show that either he or the Appellant possess the medical expertise to attribute those symptoms to a particular etiology. The record itself provides no support for the Appellant's contentions as to onset. The limited service treatment records do not show hypertension and the Appellant has not proposed any link to service other than an in-service onset, as told to her by the Veteran many years later. Indeed, the only argument the Appellant has made is that his death was generally related to service, and that he told her that he had high blood pressure in service. The Appellant herself stated that she began seeing the Veteran in 1994, so she would not have any direct observation of symptoms or complaints in service or in the years following. The Board acknowledges that a VA medical nexus opinion addressing the etiology of the Veteran's cardiovascular conditions has not been obtained. The Board finds that the record does not show credible evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service, nor does it show evidence sufficient to indicate that the disability or alleged symptoms may be associated with the Veteran's service. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 83 (2006). Thus, a medical opinion is not warranted. Given the above, the Board finds that the competent medical evidence of record is against a finding that the Veteran's cardiovascular conditions began during service, or are otherwise related to service. Thus, his death is not related to service. Because the evidence in this case is not approximately balanced with respect to the merits of the claim, the benefit of the doubt doctrine does not apply. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). Accordingly, service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death is not warranted. 2. Entitlement to Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1318 is denied. The Appellant is claiming entitlement to DIC benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1318. DIC benefits are payable to a surviving spouse where it is shown that the Veteran's death was not the result of willful misconduct, and he or she was continuously rated totally disabled for the 10 years immediately preceding death, was rated as totally disabling continuously since release from active duty and for at least 5 years immediately preceding death, or was a former prisoner of war who died after September 30, 1999, and the disability was continuously rated totally disabling for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding death. 38 U.S.C. § 1318; 38 C.F.R. § 3.22. At the time of the Veteran's death, he was not service connected for any disability. Accordingly, the Veteran was not rated as totally disabled for a continuous 10-year period prior to his death, or continuously rated totally disabled from the date of his discharge from active duty and for at least 5 years immediately preceding death. In addition, there is no evidence showing the Veteran was a former prisoner of war. Service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death is denied above. In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that entitlement to DIC benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1318 is not warranted in this case. The law is dispositive, and the claim is denied. Thomas H. O'Shay Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board J. Baker, Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.