Citation Nr: 21032607 Decision Date: 05/27/21 Archive Date: 05/27/21 DOCKET NO. 14-34 288A DATE: May 27, 2021 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)and major depressive disorder (MDD), is denied. FINDING OF FACT The evidence of record does not contain credible supporting evidence of an in-service stressor in relation to the Veteran's PTSD; his MDD did not have its onset in service and is not otherwise related to service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD and MDD, are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304(f), 4.125(a). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Army from September 1979 to November 1980. This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an August 2012 rating decision issued by a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ). In June 2018, the Veteran testified before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. In July 2018 and July 2020, the Board remanded the appeal for further development. A claim of service connection for PTSD may encompass claims for service connection for all diagnosed psychiatric disorders. Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 5 (2009). Accordingly, the Board has recharacterized the issue for an acquired psychiatric disorder as reflected on the title page. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD and MDD, is denied. The Veteran asserts his psychiatric disorder had its onset during service due to an incident that occurred at Fort Drum, New York in 1980, specifically, witnessing the deaths and/or serious injuries of fellow servicemen when a tank directly behind him swerved off an icy bridge after he suddenly stopped his vehicle. See January 2011 VA Form 21-0781 and June 2018 Board Hearing Transcript at 4-6. Service connection generally may be granted if the evidence demonstrates that a current disability resulted from an injury or disease incurred or aggravated during active military service. 38 U.S.C. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Establishing service connection generally requires medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of (1) a current disability; (2) an in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F. 3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table). Service connection requirements for PTSD are more specific than general service connection requirements. Establishing service connection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125 (a); (2) a link, established by medical evidence, between a Veteran's current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and (3) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.304(f), 4.125(a); Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 139 (1997); 80 Fed. Reg. 53, 14308 (March 19, 2015). The Board concedes current diagnoses of PTSD and MDD. See March 2012 VA treatment record and May 2012 VA examination report. Thus, element one for both psychiatric disorders is met. Regarding element two for MDD, in-service incurrence of a disease or injury, the Veteran's service treatment records (STRs) are silent for complaints, treatment, or diagnoses of depression or other psychiatric disorders. The Board acknowledges the Veteran's recent assertion that his psychiatric disorder had its onset during service, however, although he is competent to attest to symptomatology like being stressed, he is not competent to attribute such symptoms to a clinical diagnosis, i.e. MDD, during service. Psychiatric conditions are not capable of lay observation because they are medically complex and require medical expertise to diagnose. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Woehlaert v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 456 (2007). The Veteran has not shown to have such expertise, and post-service evidence shows the first report of depressive symptoms almost three decades after service in 2010. Moreover, the Veteran specifically noted the onset date of his depression as occurring in 2010 on his claim for benefits, consistent with the record, and the Board affords this statement and the Veteran's unremarkable service treatment records more probative value than his more recent testimony as to in-service psychiatric symptoms. See December 2010 VA Form 21-526, Part II.A. (Veteran indicates that his psychiatric disorder began in June 2010). Additionally, as indicated below, the Veteran's stressor event has not been corroborated. Finally, with regard to the Veteran's statement regarding increased alcohol use during service as a source of his psychiatric disorder, 38 C.F.R. § 3.301 bars the granting of service connection when a disability was incurred or aggravated by in-service substance abuse. Thus, element two for MDD is not met and the claim fails on this basis alone. Furthermore, absent any evidence of an in-service disease, injury or event, remand for a nexus opinion is not necessary. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4). As to element two for PTSD, a link between the Veteran's current symptoms and his in-service stressor, the May 2012 VA examiner indicated his PTSD is caused by or a result of the above cited traumatic experience during active service. Thus, element two is met for PTSD. Regarding element three, credible evidence supporting the in-service stressor, the Veteran's service personnel records and command chronology of the Veteran's unit have been obtained and do not show any reports of the claimed incident. Indeed, his service personnel records demonstrate he underwent basic training in Fort Knox, Kentucky in the fall of 1979 and departed for Fort Stewart, Georgia in December 1979, where he was stationed until his discharge from service in November 1980. The Board affords more probative value to this contemporaneous evidence than it does to the Veteran's more recent assertions of having been stationed at Fort Drum in 1980. Additionally, no lay statements from fellow servicemen or contemporaneous evidence has been submitted to verify the Veteran's reports regarding the bridge stressor. Moreover, VA has made multiple requests to the U. S. Army Combat Readiness/Safety Center, the United States Crime Records Center, and the Jefferson County Medical Examiner, in an attempt to verify the Veteran's claimed stressor using information he provided surrounding the traumatic incident. However, even after multiple attempts and additional information from the Veteran, the RO was unable to obtain the necessary information to corroborate the claimed in-service stressor and made a formal finding of lack of availability of any such evidence, noting any further efforts to verify the stressor would be futile. See March 2021 Final Attempt Letter. The Veteran has been appropriately informed that the claimed in-service stressor is unable to be verified and has been afforded the opportunity several times to provide supplemental documentation or lay testimony that might corroborate his account. To date however, no such evidence has been received. Accordingly, the Board finds that, absent credible supporting evidence of the in-service stressor, the requirements for service connection for PTSD are therefore not met. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). In sum, the Veteran's MDD was not incurred in or otherwise related to service and there is a lack of credible supporting evidence to verify the claimed in-service stressor for his PTSD. The Board has considered the applicability of the benefit of the doubt doctrine. However, the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claims. As such, that doctrine is not applicable and service connection is not warranted for an acquired psychiatric disorder, including PTSD and MDD. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). S. BUSH Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board Asante, Ruby The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.