Citation Nr: 21042237 Decision Date: 07/12/21 Archive Date: 07/12/21 DOCKET NO. 17-04 472 DATE: July 12, 2021 ORDER As new and material evidence has been received, the petition to reopen the claims of entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability, a foot disability (claimed as blisters or blood poison), and residuals of a beating is granted to that extent only. Entitlement to service connection for a respiratory disability, to include chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), is denied. Entitlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus is denied. Entitlement to service connection for hypertension is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a cardiac/heart disability, to include coronary artery disease (CAD), is denied. Entitlement to service connection for right lower extremity peripheral vascular disease (PVD) is denied. Entitlement to service connection for left lower extremity PVD is denied. Entitlement to service connection for right lower extremity deep vein thrombosis (DVT) is denied. Entitlement to service connection for left lower extremity DVT is denied. Entitlement to service connection for an embolism is denied. Entitlement to service connection for cellulitis is denied. Entitlement to service connection right ulnar peripheral neuropathy is denied. Entitlement to service connection left ulnar peripheral neuropathy is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a right hip disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a left hip disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a right knee disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a left knee disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for a back/spine disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for left eye disability is denied. Entitlement to service connection for fractured facial bones is denied. REMANDED Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability is remanded. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Appellant's claim for service connection for adjustment disorder with depressed mood and passive dependent personality disorder, and for blisters on the feet were previously considered and denied in a May 1988 RO decision that was not appealed, and his claim for service connection for residuals of a beating was previously considered and denied in a December 2002 RO decision that was not appealed; but, additional evidence since submitted or otherwise obtained, when considered with the record as a whole, is neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of that last prior final and binding denials and raises a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claims. 2. The Appellant is less than credible as to a beating in service with residuals to the lower extremities, upper extremities, back/spine, left eye, facial bones, and cardiac system. 3. The earliest clinical evidence of the claimed disabilities is not until many years after separation from service. 4. The most probative (i.e., competent and credible) evidence is against a finding that the Appellant has a claimed disability causally related to service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Evidence received since the last final and binding denial of the claims of entitlement to service connection for acquired psychiatric disability, a foot disability (claimed as blisters or blood poison), and residuals of a beating (assault) is new and material; consequently, these claims are reopened. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104(a), 3.156, 3.160(d), 20.302, 20.1103 (2018). 2. The criteria are not met for service connection for a respiratory disability, diabetes mellitus, hypertension, a cardiac/heart disability, bilateral lower extremity PVD, bilateral lower extremity DVT, an embolism, cellulitis, bilateral ulnar peripheral neuropathy, bilateral hip disability, bilateral knee disability, back/spine disability, a left eye disability, and residuals of fractured facial bones. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101, 1110, 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.6, 3.102, 3.303, 3.304. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Appellant had basic training/boot camp from March to May 1971. He testified in support of some of his claims during a July 2016 hearing before a Decision Review Officer (DRO) at the local Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). A transcript of that hearing is of record. Service connection has not been granted for any disability for the appellant; therefore, he has not yet established "veteran" status. Before becoming entitled to status as a claimant for VA benefits, an appellant must first demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that he or she is a "veteran," or (2) "veteran" status for the person upon whose military service the claim for VA benefits is predicated. Laruan v. West, 11 Vet. App. 80, 84-86 (1998) (en banc). The term "veteran" means a person who served in the active military, naval, or air service and who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2). The term "active military, naval, or air service" includes (1) active duty (AD); (2) any period of active duty for training (ACDUTRA) during which the individual concerned was disabled or died from a disease or injury incurred or aggravated in the line of duty; and (3) any period of inactive duty training (INACDUTRA) during which the individual concerned was disabled or died from an injury incurred or aggravated in the line of duty or from an acute myocardial infarction, a cardiac arrest, or a cerebrovascular accident occurring during such training. 38 U.S.C. § 101(24); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6. This Appellant had no AD service, instead ACDUTRA. Certain presumptions are generally available to claimants to assist in substantiating various elements of a claim for service connection. The presumption of soundness (38 U.S.C. § 1111; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b)) applies to "every veteran." Therefore, establishing "veteran" status is a prerequisite. Smith v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 40, 45-46 (2010). The presumption of aggravation (38 U.S.C. § 1153; 38 C.F.R. § 3.306(a)) and the presumption of service connection for specific chronic diseases (38 U.S.C. §§ 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309), including arthritis, can never apply to periods of ACDUTRA and INACDUTRA. Moreover, the Appellant did not have the required 90 days of continuous service. New and Material Evidence Claims for service connection for adjustment disorder with depressed mood and passive dependent personality disorder, and for blisters on the feet were previously considered and denied in a May 1988 RO decision that was not appealed, so that earlier determination is final and binding based on the evidence then of record. A claim for service connection for residuals of a beating was denied in a December 2002 RO decision; the Appellant filed a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) and clarified that the claims were for service connection for fractures of a facial bone, a left eye injury, and schizoaffective disorder (claimed as residuals of a beating). The RO denied these claims in a March 2004 RO decision that was not appealed, so it became final and binding based on the evidence then of record. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1103. A claim that has been previously considered, denied, and not appealed therefore, is final and binding, will be reopened if new and material evidence is presented. 38 U.S.C. § 5108. New evidence means evidence not previously submitted to agency decision makers. Material evidence means evidence that relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. New and material evidence can be neither cumulative nor redundant of the evidence of record at the time of the last prior final denial of the claim sought to be reopened and must raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (2018); see also Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110, 117-120 (2010). Since the final denials, the Appellant submitted an October 2013 written statement from his sibling (D.R.R.), he testified at a July 2016 DRO hearing, and Social Security Administration (SSA) records have been added to the file. Given the "low" threshold espoused in Shade v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 110 (2010), the Board finds that new and material evidence has been received to reopen the previously denied claims. The Board may proceed to readjudicating the claims as the RO already has reopened and readjudicated them. See Hickson v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 394 (2010). The Board also finds that the Appellant's claim for service connection for schizoaffective disorder with anxiety should be characterized more generally as a claim for service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder. In a precent case, Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App (2009), the Court held that an appellant's diagnoses arising from the same symptoms for which he is seeking benefits do not relate to entirely separate claims not yet filed by the appellant. Rather, these diagnoses should be considered to determine the nature of the appellant's current condition relative to the claim he did submit.) Service Connection In general, establishing service connection requires medical evidence or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of the following: (1) a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a relevant disease or an injury; and (3) a nexus between the disease or injury in service and the present disability. See Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Appellant contends that while in service, he was beaten by three or four other service-members who kicked and beat him with their fists in the chest, the head, and "any part of the body'". He testified that after the beating, he was able to get up and walk, but that he was bleeding from an eye and the nose. He further testified that he was ordered by his sergeant not to go to sickbay or to the doctor. He testified that he did not have "a whole lot of bruises" and those that he did have, did not take long to go away. He testified that approximately the next day after the beating, he was ordered to see his captain, kept in a room for two or three days, and then discharged from the service. He contends that after he got out, he saw a psychiatrist, but that the records are destroyed, and that he did not see a doctor for a "good while" for some complaints because he (and his family) could not afford it. The claims file includes an October 2013 statement by the Appellant's sibling (D.R. R.). D.R.R. stated that after the Appellant separated from service, their mother noticed a "couple of places on [the Appellant's] face and asked him what had happened. With tears in [the Appellant's] eyes, [he] showed us the inside of his nose. The gristle in his nose was badly moved to the left side of his face. Then [he] told our mother and me what had happened." D.R.R. went on to state the names of the sergeant who alleged ordered the Appellant to be beaten, the name of the other Marine recruit who was beaten by the four others, the name of the Appellant's commander, that the Appellant's mother took him to the doctor, who informed D.R.R. and the mother that the Appellant was suffering from a posttraumatic disorder, and that the Appellant was put on medication. D.R.R. stated that the "visible signs from this beating while he was in Basic Training are still there". The Board finds it of questionable credibility that D.R.R. would remember such specific details (to include the name of the sergeant, the name of the commander, and the name of another alleged victim) more than four decades after a conversation with the Appellant. In addition, if the Appellant's nose was deformed, it seems reasonable that this would have been noted by some medical provider, or reported by the Appellant, prior to separation. Moreover, although D.R.R. stated that the Appellant was diagnosed with a posttraumatic condition in 1971, none of the subsequent clinical records note this diagnosis (i.e., PTSD) in the next several decades. For example, a November 1997 and a September 1998 Virginia Department of Social Services record both note that the Appellant suffers from schizophrenia, and a December 2013 SSA record notes that the Appellant has mood disorders. The Appellant's service treatment records (STRs) are entirely unremarkable for the claimed disabilities, but note that he was treated for cellulitis, and blisters on the buttocks. On April 29, 1971, the Appellant signed a statement that he had not suffered any injuries or illness during his period of duty, except as listed; he listed cellulitis and blisters on the buttocks. He was found physically qualified for separation and separated five days later. The Appellant now contends that he was discharged from service to "cover-up" that his sergeant ordered him to be beaten until someone confessed as to whom had a cigarette in the latrine/head. An April 28, 1971 Marine Corps record reflects the following about the Appellant: [He] is a totally undisciplined recruit. He openly states that he has no desire to complete Recruit Training and will expend no effort to that end. He has attempted to take unauthorized absences [on] two separate occasions and and[sic] at one time his rifle so that it could not be found. After his return, he flately [sic] stated he would not return to training and would rather go to the Brig. He has little to offer the Marine Corps as he will make no attempt to constructively expand effort. He is additionally hampered by a lack of formal education as he completed on the seventh grade and this is evidence by his low test scores. The private scored 60, 80, 20, 5, 5, 20 and 0 per cent on exams as compared to the overall average of 80 per cent for the remainder of the platoon. Based on his MENTAL INAPTITUTE and INABIITY TO EXPEND EFFORT CONTRCUTIVELY, it would be in the best interest of the Marine Corps to separate this recruit. An April 29, 1971 Administrative note reflects that he was referred to the Depot Aptitude Board and recommended for discharge for unsuitability due to mental inaptitude. He was separated from service on May 4, 1971. Post service, the Appellant has an extensive criminal history (e.g., assault (1972, 1979) and habitual offender (1988, 1989, 1989, 1992)) and mental health problems (e.g., Social Security Administration (SSA) records note a primary diagnosis of affective disorders and a secondary diagnosis of borderline intellectual functioning (1999, 2010), and VA records note that he suffers from hallucinations and/or delusions. Records also note that he had been employed as a construction worker, but was last employed in 1990 or 1991, and that he was incarcerated for seven years. He has reported having black outs since he was a little boy. He has given a less than credible history of his service, to include stating that he served for two years of active duty and four years of reserve duty (see July 2010 Psychological Assessment for SSA purposes), that he served from 1971 to 1973 (see January 1988 VA Form 21-526), and that he was discharged with a 70 percent disability rating (see correspondence). When evaluating a claim for service connection, the lapse of time between service separation and the earliest documentation of current disability is a factor for consideration. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Board finds that the STRs and military personnel records, which are contemporaneous to service, are more credible than the Appellant's statements made years after service and which were made for compensation purposes. See Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App.24, 25 (1991) (finding that, while the Board may not ignore an Appellant's testimony simply because he or she is an interested party and stands to gain monetary benefits, personal interest may affect the credibility of the evidence); see also Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 510-511 (1995) (credibility can be generally evaluated by a showing of interest, bias, or inconsistent statements, and the demeanor of the witness, facial plausibility of the testimony, and the consistency of the testimony.) 1. Entitlement to service connection for a respiratory disability, to include COPD The Appellant alleges that the military gave him cigarettes, he began smoking in service, and that his smoking led to his COPD and bronchitis. His service treatment records (STRs) are unremarkable for COPD or respiratory complaints. Several decades after service, clinical records reflect a diagnosis of severe COPD, tobacco use disorder, and that the Appellant was encouraged to stop smoking (see, e.g., 2002 VA records). They also reflect that he had smoked for many decades (e.g., a November 2002 record reflects he smoked for 30 years, a July 2003 record reflects he smoked for 40 years). Precedent opinions of VA's General Counsel have discussed the cause-and-effect correlation between chronic smoking and the eventual development of certain disorders including COPD. See VAOPGCPREC 2-93 (Jan. 13, 1993) and VAOPGCPREC 19-97 (May 13, 1997). And. indeed, for a claim, as here, filed on or after June 9, 1998, there is an express prohibition against granting service connection for any disability resulting from injury or disease attributable to chronic smoking. 38 U.S.C. § 1103; 38 C.F.R. § 3.300. There is no probative evidence that the Appellant has COPD or any other respiratory disability that is as likely as not causally related to his service. Moreover, the Appellant's own assertion is that it is from smoking cigarettes, which, as explained, precludes service connection. 2. Entitlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus The Appellant's STRs are unremarkable for diagnosis of diabetes, elevated glucose/sugar in the urine, or a clinical indication of diabetes. Several decades after separation from service, a 2001 VA clinical record to establish the Appellant as a new patient at that facility is unremarkable for a diagnosis of diabetes; although, it notes that his mother died from diabetes at age 38. Another record in 2002 reflects that his mothers, brothers, and sister all had diabetes. A July 2002 VA clinical record reflects that the Appellant is "unaware of the fact that he has diabetes, even though he as taking Metformin at one time." A September 2008 record reflects that the Appellant was not sure how long he has had diabetes. There is no probative evidence that the Appellant has diabetes which is as likely as not causally related to service. The Appellant has not been shown to have the experience, training, or education necessary to give a probative opinion regarding the origins of his diabetes, including in terms of whether related or attributable to anything that occurred during his time in the military. This determination is beyond his lay competence. See Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 435 (2011); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See also King v. Shinseki, 700 F.3d 1339, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (indicating lay evidence must demonstrate some competence and affirming the Court's conclusion that the Board did not improperly discount the weight of a lay opinion in finding a medical expert's opinion more probative on the issue of medical causation). 3. Entitlement to service connection for hypertension The Appellant's STRs are unremarkable for hypertension; the earliest evidence of hypertension is more than two decades after separation from service. There is no probative evidence that the Appellant has hypertension which is as likely as not causally related to service. 4. Entitlement to service connection for CAD The Appellant has been diagnosed with CAD (see 2008 and 2009 VA clinical records). He contends that he has a heart disability related to allegedly having been beaten in the chest in service. He has not been shown to be competent to provide such an etiology opinion. There is no probative evidence of record that CAD may be related to being struck in the chest. Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary states CAD is atherosclerosis of the coronary arteries. Atherosclerosis is a common form of arteriosclerosis with formation of deposits of yellowish plaques containing cholesterol, lipid material, and lipophages in the intima and inner media of the large and medium-sized arteries. Both genetically determined and avoidable risk factors contribute to the arthrosclerosis; they include hypercholesterolemia, hypertension, smoking, diabetes, and low levels of high-density lipoproteins (see Dorland's). The record reflects that the Appellant's brother and sister both have CAD, and at the time of his diagnosis, the Appellant had a history of smoking, diabetes, and hypertension, all noted to be risk factors. The Appellant's STRs are unremarkable for CAD, and there is no probative evidence that it is as likely as not casually related to service. 5. and 6. Entitlement to service connection for right and left lower extremity PVD VA clinical records note a diagnosis of PVD in July 2008, more than three decades after separation from service. The Appellant contends that he has bilateral PVD due to smoking. As noted above, there is an express VA prohibition against granting service connection for any disability resulting from injury or disease attributable to chronic smoking. 38 U.S.C. § 1103; 38 C.F.R. § 3.300. In addition, the Appellant's STRs are unremarkable for PVD, and there is no probative evidence that he has had PVD during the pendency of his claim which is as likely as not casually related to service. He has not been shown to be competent to provide an etiology linking his PVD to service. 7. and 8. Entitlement to service connection for right and left lower extremity DVT Thrombosis is the formation/development of thrombus (i.e., a stationary blood clot along the wall of a blood vessel). VA clinical records reflect a diagnosis of deep vein thrombosis in the right lower extremity in December 2008, more than three decades after separation from service. The Appellant's STRs are unremarkable for DVT, and there is no probative evidence that he has had DVT during the pendency of his claim which is as likely as not casually related to service. He has not been shown to be competent to provide an etiology linking his DVT to service. 9. Entitlement to service connection for an embolism An embolism is the sudden blocking of an artery by a clot or foreign material which is brought to its site of lodgment by the blood current. (See Dorland's). VA clinical records note a diagnosis of multiple pulmonary emboli in December 2008; this is more than 36 years after separation from service. The Appellant's STRs are unremarkable for an embolism, and there is no probative evidence that he had an embolism during the pendency of his claim which was as likely as not casually related to service. He has not been shown to be competent to provide a diagnosis for the condition during the pendency of the claim or to provide a competent opinion linking it to service. 10. Entitlement to service connection for cellulitis of the right and left foot A March 1971 STR reflects that the Appellant complained of a blister, which was treated by cleaning and dressing. He was diagnosed with cellulitis and admitted to the ward. A next day STR reflects an admitting diagnosis of cellulitis of the left foot. He was noted to have pain and swelling of the anterior left ankle for two days. He was given light duty for three days and medication. An April 1971 record for separation purposes reflects his statement that while in service, he had suffered cellulitis which had been treated. Cellulitis is an acute disability (see Dorland's). There is no probative evidence that the Appellant had cellulitis for the next three decades. A March 2009 VA clinical record reflects that the Appellant was assessed with early cellulitis of the right leg. He reported pains in the right leg, and swelling for one month. Not only was the cellulitis diagnosed in 2009 diagnosed as "early" cellulitis, but it was not the same lower extremity as the cellulitis treated in service (i.e., the in-service diagnosis was for the left lower extremity; the 2009 diagnosis was for the right lower extremity). A July 2015 VA clinical record reflects that the Appellant "fell over a week ago and cut his medial right lower leg. He has noticed yellow drained from the wound every day"; it does not reflect a diagnosis of cellulitis; however, even if he had such a condition, the evidence does not support that it would be in anyway related to service, to include the cellulitis which was treated in service. A cornerstone of service connection is a current disability (either a probative diagnosis or symptoms which reaches the level of functional impairment of earning capacity). See Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223, 225 (1992); see also Saunders v. Wilkie 886 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). As noted above, cellulitis is acute. There is no clinical evidence of a cellulitis during the pendency of the Appellant's claim. Even assuming that he has had cellulitis during this claim, there is no probative evidence that it is as likely as not casually related to service; he has not been shown to provide a competent etiology linking it to service. 11. and 12. Entitlement to service connection right and left ulnar peripheral neuropathy The Appellant indicated at the July 2016 DRO hearing that he had problems with his arms after the alleged beating in service, but that he "never paid a whole lot of attention to the stuff" and that he did not seek any treatment because he could not afford to see a doctor. The Board finds that he is less than credible as to continuity of symptoms since service. In addition, he has not been shown to be competent to provide an etiology linking a current disability to service. The earliest clinical evidence of an ulnar nerve complaint is in 2008, more than 35 years after separation from service. A September 2008 VA clinical record reflects that the Appellant "underwent cardiac surgery several weeks ago. He states that since that time, after he woke up from his surgery, he has had numbness and tingling along the ulnar aspect of his forearm and hand, extending down to the small digit and the ring finger as well." Importantly, the record also reflects that the Appellant "denies any symptoms like this prior to the surgery" and "denies any history of trauma or injury ot this elbow or arm." Another September 2008 VA clinical record reflects that the Appellant stated that "since [emphasis added] his CABG, he has been having numbness and tingling along the ulnar nerve distribution of the left arm distal to the elbow and hand" and "he states that the right hand is starting [emphasis added] to feel the same way." The Appellant's STRs are unremarkable for complaints of the upper extremities, and there is no probative evidence that he has had an ulnar nerve or upper extremity nerve disability which is as likely as not casually related to service. To the contrary, the evidence supports a much later onset of symptoms unrelated to service. 13., 14., 15., and 16. Entitlement to service connection for right and left hip disabilities and right and left knee disabilities. The Appellant contends that he has disabilities due to the alleged beating in service. His STRs are unremarkable for complaints of, treatment for, or diagnosis of, the hips and/or knees. As noted above, when separating from service, his only complaints were of having had blisters and cellulitis in service. Post service, the Appellant was employed in construction. More than two decades after separation from service, a 1997 Augusta Medical Center record reflects that the Appellant had a fracture of the left tibia/fibula, after he tripped over a stump that day. He was given a cast and a cane. A May 2001 VA clinical record reflects that the Appellant reported that he has been using a cane since 1996 following a left leg fracture. A September 2001 VA clinical record notes a right medial malleolus fracture in July. A November 2001 VA record reflects a "recent" fracture of the right ankle, and the history of a rod in the left leg. A November 2002 VA record notes a past surgical history of the left knee. These records are entirely unremarkable for complaints since service or an injury in service. A 2007 record notes mild degenerative changes of the left lower extremity. Subsequent records note degenerative joint disease of the knees and right hip. In 2013, the Appellant's sibling (D.R.R.) provided a statement that in May 1971, D.R.R. had seen the "visible" signs of the alleged beating; however, D.R.R. did not state that the Appellant was walking abnormally, and did not specifically state that he had any visible bruises or other marks on his hips or knees. D.R.R. stated that their mother noticed a couple of places on the Appellant's face, and that D.R.R. noticed an abnormality of the nose. Assuming arguendo that D.R.R.'s statement is credible, it seems entirely reasonable that if the Appellant had a serious complaint or injury of the hips and knees, D.R. R. would have noticed it and mentioned it in the 2013 statement. There is no probative evidence that the Appellant has a lower extremity disability which is as likely as not causally related to service. 17. Entitlement to service connection for a back/spine disability The Appellant has been diagnosed with degenerative joint disease of the spine, and osteopenia, and has asserted that he has disk bulges. He contends that he has a back disability due to the alleged beating in service. The Appellant's STRs are unremarkable for complaints of, treatment for, or a diagnosis of, a spine disability. The earliest clinical evidence of back complaints is an Augusta Medical Center record from 1997, more than 25 years after separation from service. An April 2001 record reflects that the Appellant reported "severe lower back pain after rupturing disks some years back." A May 2001 record reflects that the Appellant has had low back pain off and on for 10 years when he was a roofer and hurt his back when lifting a trailer full of shingles at his job. It was noted that his pain had gotten worse since December 2000. An April 2002 record reflects that the Appellant has "back pain that began in the '90's". Based on the foregoing, any contention as to continuity of symptoms since service is less than credible. There is no probative evidence that it is as likely as not that the Appellant has a back or spine disability causally related to service. 18. Entitlement to service connection for left eye disability. The Appellant has been diagnosed with traumatic optic neuropathy of the left eye, optic atrophy, myopia, presbyopia, and mild cataracts bilaterally. Congenital or developmental defects, e.g., refractive errors of the eyes, are not diseases or injuries within the meaning of applicable legislation and, thus, are not disabilities for which service connection may be granted. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c); see also 38 C.F.R. § 4.9; Beno v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 439 (1992). Refractive errors are defined to include astigmatism, myopia, hyperopia, and presbyopia. The Appellant's STRs are unremarkable for eye complaints, treatment, or diagnosis of a disability, and as noted above, his only complaints upon separation were that he had had cellulitis and blisters. It seems entirely reasonable that if he had vision complaints, he would have reported it. The earliest clinical evidence of a vision problem is not for more than a decade after separation from service. A 1988 VA Form 10-1000 notes an "Applanation Tonometry with Corneal Anesthesia" in January 1988, and a finding of left eye total blindness. In 1993 correspondence, the Appellant indicated that he had had been told by a doctor that he possibly had a tumor on his brain, and indicated that this was the reason or loss of sight in his left eye. A March 2003 VA clinical record reflects that the Appellant reported a sudden loss of vision in the 1970s related to an infection of the bones of his face. He also reported that he had acute loss of vision approximately 25 years earlier and it had not changed since; approximately 25 years prior to 2003 would be 1978. An August 2003 August Eye Associates record reflects that the cause of the Appellant's optic atrophy cannot be determined, but that the Appellant reported that he had lost the visual acuity in his left eye in the late 1970s and had been told it was due to an infection in the bones of his face. The late 1970s would not correspond to his service (which was in 1971) and an infection of the bone would not necessarily equate with a physical beating. In November 2008, the Appellant reported an altercation in 1971 which caused trauma to the eye. In January 2012, he reported the injury occurred in 1982. In 2013, the Appellant's sibling (D.R.R.) provided a statement that in May 1971, D.R.R. had seen the "visible" signs of the alleged beating; however, D.R.R. did not state that the Appellant was having difficulty with vision, or that he had a possible fracture of a bone around the eye, or that he had a swollen or bloodied eye. Assuming arguendo that D.R.R.'s statement is credible, it seems entirely reasonable that if the Appellant had a serious complaint regarding his vision, D.R. R. would have noticed it and mentioned it in the 2013 statement. There is no probative evidence that it is as likely as not that the Appellant has an eye disability causally related to service. 19. Entitlement to service connection for fractured facial bones The Appellant contends that he has fractured facial bones due to an alleged assault in service. The Board has considered the 2013 statement by the Appellant's brother (D.R.R.) that when he saw the Appellant in May 1971, the Appellant's "gristle" in his nose was "badly moved to the left side of his face". The Board finds that by "gristle", D. R.R. was referring to cartilage, which is not a bone. The Board has also considered the Appellant's testimony at the July 2016 DRO hearing, that when he was beaten, someone "busted" his eye. A layperson is competent to report a condition that is readily apparent through the senses. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994). However, the Appellant has not asserted which specific facial bones are broken, and the Board finds, that if he is alleging a small closed fracture, he may not be competent to diagnosis such. In addition, the Board notes that the Appellant did not report a fractured facial bone when separating from service, although he reported two other conditions. Moreover, there is no evidence that he ever sought treatment for a fractured facial bone for several decades after separation from service. The earliest allegation of a broken facial bone is not for many years after separation from service. Despite his allegation, there are no clinical records noting a fractured facial bone, or residuals of such at any time, to include during the pendency of the Appellant's claim. Given the lack of STRs noting a fracture, the Appellant's lack of noting a fracture upon separation, and the lack of a current diagnosis (or symptoms) of residuals of a fractured facial bone during this claim, the Board finds that service connection is not warranted. Conclusion The Appellant's STRs and military personnel records do not support his contentions, and there are no clinical records in the decade after separation from service supporting his contentions. The lapse of time between service separation and the earliest documentation of current disability is a factor for consideration in deciding a service connection claim. See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000). See also Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 231, 239 (2012). In Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit Court) recognized lay evidence as potentially competent to support the presence of a claimed disability, even where not corroborated by contemporaneous medical evidence such as actual treatment records. In other words, the mere absence of evidence does not necessarily equate to unfavorable evidence. There are a line of precedent cases supporting this proposition. See, e.g., Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 231, 239 (2012); Buczynski v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 221, 224 (2011). See also Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (cautioning that negative evidence, meaning actual evidence weighing against a party, must not be equated with the absence of substantive evidence). The Federal Circuit Court also has held however that, while the absence of contemporaneous records does not, in and of itself, render lay testimony not credible, the Board may weigh the absence of contemporaneous records when assessing the credibility of lay evidence. See Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1336 ("Nor do we hold that the Board cannot weigh the absence of contemporaneous medical evidence against the lay evidence of record."). Moreover, although the Board cannot reject a claimant's statements merely because he is an interested party, the claimant's interest may affect the credibility of his testimony when considered in light of other factors. See Cartright v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 24, 25 (1991); accord Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1337 (holding that "the Board, as fact finder, is obligated to, and fully justified in, determining whether lay evidence is credible in and of itself, i.e., because of possible bias...."). Given the lack of supporting STRs, the lack of clinical records supporting his contentions, the post-service evidence that he was employed in manual labor, the evidence of post-service (intercurrent) trauma to the back, left upper extremity, and lower extremities, and the Appellant's history of hallucinations and falsehoods about his length of service, the Board finds that his contentions as to continuity of symptoms since service is less than credible. Therefore, any opinion based on an unsupported and less than credible history would also lack probative value. In addition, there is no clinical opinion based on a review of pertinent clinical records and with adequate rationale that supports that it is as likely as not that the Appellant has a claimed condition due to service. The Appellant has not been shown to have the experience, training, or education necessary to give a probative opinion regarding the origins of any of his claimed disabilities to service, especially given that he only served approximately five weeks, that he has a family history of some of the disabilities, and he had post-service incidents of trauma. For these reasons and bases, service connection is not warranted. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the claims, the benefit of the doubt rule is not applicable. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 54-56 (1990). REASONS FOR REMAND 20. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability An April 29, 1971 Marine Corps Medical Detachment Neuropsychiatric Section record reflects that the Appellant "suffers from no physical or mental disability which warrants his discharge by reason of physical disability." An April 30, 1971 STR notes "no mental disorder". He separated from service due to unsuitability on May 4, 1971. In January 1988, after separation from his wife, the Appellant sought treatment and was admitted as an inpatient at the Salem Virginia VAMC for his mental health from January 14, 1988 to March 18, 1988. (VA Forms 10-7131 and responses reflect that there are no 1987 and 1988 outpatient records.) All in-patient records should be obtained, if possible. The Appellant has been diagnosed with adjustment disorder with depressed mood, passive dependent personality disorder (1988), schizophrenia (1997, 1998), depression with psychotic features (1999), and major depressive disorder, single episode (2010). An April 2011 VA clinical record reflects that the Appellant wanted an evaluation for PTSD and claimed that he had nightmares since a beating in boot camp. A November 2012 psychiatry record reflects a diagnosis of paranoid type schizophrenia, and depression. An April 2016 VA record reflects that the Appellant "wants a letter from PCP stating that he has PTSD" but that there was no documented diagnosis of PTSD. The clinical records reflect that the Appellant reported that his father (who had a history of cutting himself and had psychiatric disorders) physically abused him. The Appellant also reported that he left home at age 12 to work in a pool hall and stayed with the store owners. He also reported that all three of his brothers are alcoholics. The Appellant has reported that one of his brother's is deceased; he has reported that it was by suicide, but also reported that the brother was shot while drinking. November 2003 correspondence from Valley Community Services Board (psychiatrist Dr. J. Krag) reflects that he was sending "all the notes that [he] had" to the Appellant; only one record/correspondence (from July 1999) is associated with the claims file. Dr. Krag stated that he did not see anything in his records regarding the alleged beating, although he remembered the Appellant telling him about it. Nonetheless, VA should attempt to obtain the notes as they may provide evidence of the onset of mental health symptoms. A September 2013 letter from VA psychiatrist (Dr. A. Sulaman) reflects that the Appellant had been treated for the last four years for schizophrenia, and that it is "highly probable that his current condition is the direct results of his condition in the military services." Dr. Sulaman did not provide an adequate rationale, reflect that he was aware of the Appellant's clinical history, or describe the "condition" in service. Although the opinion of Dr. Sulaman is not sufficient upon which to base service connection is does meet the threshold for VA to obtain an examination and opinion. McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 81 (2006). After all available pertinent private and VA mental health records are associated with the claims file, the Appellant should be afforded an examination to determine whether it is as likely as not that he has an acquired psychiatric disability causally related to service. Accordingly, this remaining claim is REMANDED for the following action: 1. Ask the Appellant to complete a VA Form 21-4142 for all clinical records related to his mental health from Valley Community Services Board (psychiatrist Dr. J. Krag). If he provides this necessary authorization, obtain these additional records. Document all requests for these records, as well as all responses, in the claims file and appropriately notify him and his representative if unable to obtain these additional records. 2. Obtain the Appellant's VA in-patient records from January 14, 1988 through March 18, 1988 from the Salem VAMC. 3. Thereafter, schedule the Appellant for an examination with an appropriate clinician. The clinician should provide an opinion as to whether it is as likely as not (50 percent or greater probability) the Appellant has an acquired psychiatric disability because of his service. To assist in making this important determination, the clinician should consider the pertinent evidence of record including especially: a) an April 29, 1971 Marine Corps Medical Detachment Neuropsychiatric Section record which reflects that the Appellant "suffers from no physical or mental disability which warrants his discharge by reason of physical disability"; b) an April 30, 1971 STR which notes "no mental disorder"; c) the military personnel records noting that he was separated from service due to lack of effort and unsuitability; d) the 1988 VA clinical records which reflect that the Appellant complained of depression after separation from his wife (e.g., VA Forms 10-7131); e) the diagnoses of adjustment disorder with depressed mood, passive dependent personality disorder (1988), schizophrenia (1997, 1998), depression with psychotic features (1999), and major depressive disorder, single episode (2010); f) the Appellant's family history of an abusive father with psychiatric disorders and three alcoholic brothers, and the Appellant's report of having left home at age 12 to work in a pool hall, and leaving school after seventh grade; g) November 2003 correspondence from Valley Community Services Board (psychiatrist Dr. J. Krag); h) a September 2013 letter from VA psychiatrist (Dr. A. Sulaman); and i) that the Board has found the Appellant to be less than credible as to his allegations of a serious assault in service with chronic residuals. Rationale for the opinion is essential, regardless of whether favorable or unfavorable to the claim, preferably citing to evidence in the file supporting conclusions and/or accepted medical authority. KEITH W. ALLEN Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board T. Wishard The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.