Citation Nr: 22016609 Decision Date: 03/22/22 Archive Date: 03/22/22 DOCKET NO. 11-12 071A DATE: March 22, 2022 ORDER Service connection for acquired psychiatric disorders, diagnosed as major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, schizoaffective disorder, cocaine dependence, schizophrenia (paranoid), and moderate stimulant use disorder in sustained remission (previously claimed as a loss of memory, isolation, depression, paranoia, hyper arousal, anxiety, inability to cope, and emotional instability), hereinafter referred to as acquired psychiatric disorders not including posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), is denied. Service connection for PTSD is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. A psychiatric disorder was not noted on the March 1976 service entrance examination. 2. A psychiatric disorder did not clearly and unmistakably pre-exist service, including any alleged psychiatric disorders associated with childhood abuse. 3. The Veteran did not experience an in-service psychological injury, disease, or event. 4. The Veteran did not experience an in-service PTSD stressor in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. A psychiatric disorder did not clearly and unmistakably pre-exist service, including any alleged psychiatric disorders associated with childhood abuse. 38 U.S.C. § 1111; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304. 2. The criteria for service connection for acquired psychiatric disorders have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5103, 5103A, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303. 3. The criteria for service connection for PTSD have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5103, 5103A, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304, 4.125. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Army from March 1976 to March 1979, and in the National Guard from April 1980 to March 1982. These matters are on appeal from the November 2009 Rating Decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Atlanta, Georgia. The Veteran filed a notice of disagreement in March 2010. A statement of the case was issued in May 2016. The Veteran filed a substantive appeal (VA Form 9) in May 2016, requesting a hearing before the Board. The Veteran testified at a Board videoconference hearing from Atlanta, Georgia, in September 2017 before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge in Washington, D.C. In September 2017, prior to the hearing transcript being associated with the record, the Board remanded the issues in order to schedule a Board videoconference hearing; however, as the Board had already held the requested hearing, the case was returned to the Board. In a January 2019 Board decision, the Board denied service connection for PTSD, finding that the record did not contain a sufficient, verified PTSD stressor, and denied service connection for acquired psychiatric disorders not including PTSD, finding that there was no in-service event associated with the acquired psychiatric disorders. In rendering these dispositions, the Board relied, in part, on the findings and opinion contained in a February 2018 VA examination report. The Veteran appealed the Board's January 2019 denials to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). In an Order dated in August 2019, the Court adopted the August 2019 Joint Motion for Partial Remand (JMPR) filed by the parties. The parties agreed that the February 2018 VA examination was inadequate and that the Board erred in relying on the February 2018 VA examination in rendering the denials of service connection for both issues. Upon the instant matter being returned to the Board, in a May 2020 decision, the Board explained that, in terms of the PTSD issue, the parties to the JMPR agreed that the February 2018 VA examination was inadequate as it did not contain an opinion about whether the PTSD was etiologically related to one of two claimed in-service stressors alone (the VA examiner had found that two in service stressors and two non service stressors (childhood abuse and Hurricane Katrina) had contributed to the PTSD diagnosis, but that the PTSD was not related to service). See February 2018 VA Examination. However, for the reasons discussed below, the Board finds that, in the February 2018 VA examination, the VA examiner inaccurately assumed that two stressors occurred during service: being the target of in-service death threats by fellow servicemembers and witnessing a fellow servicemember break his neck and die. The February 2018 VA examiner also inaccurately assumed that a pre service non service-related stressor event occurred, namely, pre-service childhood abuse; the Board is placing no reliance on this assumption because of the attachment of the presumption of soundness at service entrance. As there was in fact no in-service injury, disease, or event (found by the Board in this decision by the weight of the lay and medical evidence), per the detailed discussion below, remand for a new VA examination is not warranted. In terms of the acquired psychiatric disorders, the Board explained, the parties to the JMPR agreed that the February 2018 VA examination did not contain a separate, specific opinion pertaining to service connection for the acquired psychiatric disorders; rather, it only contained an opinion about service connection for PTSD. The JMPR suggested that the Board ensure that a new examination be provided. For reasons that will be discussed in detail in the Duties to Notify and Assist section below, the Board found that remand for a new VA examination was unnecessary (because the weight of the lay and medical evidence showed that the suggested in-service event in fact did not happen), and the Board addressed the issues on appeal on the merits. The Board again denied service connection for PTSD and/or any other previously diagnosed acquired psychiatric disorder. The Veteran again appealed the service connection denials to the Court. In an Order dated in March 2021, the Court adopted a March 2021 Joint Motion for Remand (JMR) filed by the parties. Per the JMR, the parties agreed that 1) the Board should have addressed a January 5, 1981 Beth Israel Hospital mental health treatment record, as said treatment occurred during a period parallel to the time in which the Veteran was in the National Guard; and 2) the Board should have sent the Veteran a fair process letter, pursuant to Smith v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 332, 338 (2020), to give notice prior to the Board's findings that the alleged in service stressors did not in fact occur. Upon the instant matter again being returned to the Board, multiple adequate fair process letters were sent to the Veteran and representative that notified the Veteran and representative that the evidence showed that the alleged in service stressors did not in fact occur, that the Board planned to make such findings, and that and provided the Veteran the opportunity to submit additional evidence and argument to support a finding that the alleged in-service stressors happened. The Veteran's representative indicated having read the fair process letter in the electronic claims file. In addition, fair process letters were mailed to the Veteran and representative, and additional time was provided for a response. In February 2022, the attorney representative responded to the fair process letters and submitted additional evidence. Further, in the instant decision the Board specifically addresses the January 5, 1981 Beth Israel Hospital mental health treatment record discussed in the March 2021 JMR. As such, the Board finds the duties to notify and assist have been met, the Veteran has been provided fair process, and the case is ripe for Board de novo adjudication. See Forcier v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 414 (2006). Duties to Notify and Assist The Board finds that the duties to notify and assist the Veteran in this case have been fulfilled. The Court issued a decision in Miller v. Wilkie, 32 Vet. App. 249 (2020), that held that when a VA examiner fails to address the veteran's lay evidence, and the Board fails to find the veteran not credible or not competent to offer that lay evidence, the proper remedy is for VA to obtain a new examination. The instant case is distinguished from Miller because the September 2017 Board remand directives pertained to scheduling a hearing, not a VA examination, and the relevant VA examinations of record were obtained by the RO rather than the Board. In the August 2019 JMPR, the parties did not challenge the Board's fact finding in the January 2019 Board Decision of a lack of an in-service injury, disease, or event. Rather, the parties agreed that the January 2019 Board Decision should be vacated because the Board relied on the February 2018 VA examination that indicated that a pre-service event occurred (childhood abuse) and for examination inadequacy, not any inadequacy of reasons and bases in the Board decision. As the parties generally agreed to vacate the January 2019 Board Decision in the August 2019 JMPR, in the instant decision the Board will provide de novo findings regarding the alleged in service events, including weighing lay and medical evidence and making explicit credibility determinations toward those findings. As discussed in the introduction, in a fair process letter first sent in November 2021, pursuant to Smith, the Board notified the Veteran and representative of the proposed de novo findings regarding credibility of the alleged in-service events. In February 2022, the Veteran and representative submitted additional evidence and argument in response to the November 2021 fair process letter. For these reasons, the Board finds the duties to notify and assist have been satisfied, and the instant matter is ripe for adjudication. Legal Authority for Service Connection Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. § 1131; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). Service connection generally requires (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in service disease or injury and the current disability. A veteran will be considered to have been in sound condition when examined, accepted, and enrolled for service, except as to defects, infirmities, or disorders noted at entrance into service, or where clear and unmistakable evidence demonstrates that an injury or disease existed prior thereto and was not aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C. § 1111. Only such conditions as are recorded in examination reports are to be considered as noted. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b). Where such defects, infirmities or disorders are not noted when examined, accepted, and enrolled for service, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1111 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.304, in order to rebut the presumption of soundness on entry into service, VA must show by clear and unmistakable evidence both that the disease or injury existed prior to service and that the disease or injury was not aggravated by service. See Wagner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2004); VAOPGCPREC 3-03. Service connection for PTSD requires the following three elements: (1) a current medical diagnosis of PTSD (presumed to include the adequacy of the PTSD symptomatology and the sufficiency of a claimed in-service stressor in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a)), (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in service stressor(s) actually occurred, and (3) medical evidence of a causal relationship between current symptomatology and the specific claimed in-service stressor(s). See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). In adjudicating a claim for service connection for PTSD, the Board is required to evaluate evidence based on places, types, and circumstances of service, as shown by the veteran's military records and all pertinent medical and lay evidence. Hayes v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 60, 66 (1993); See also 38 U.S.C. § 1154(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f), PTSD stressors are listed as follows: (1) a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder during service and the claimed stressor is related to that service, (2) if the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and that the alleged stressor is related to combat, (3) if the stressor is related to the veteran's fear of hostile military or terrorist activity, (4) if the veteran was a prisoner-of-war under the provisions of § 3.1(y) of this part and the claimed stressor is related to that prisoner-of-war experience, or (5) if the PTSD is based on in-service personal assault. In the instant case, the Veteran was not diagnosed with PTSD during service, did not engage in combat, was not a prisoner of war, did not claim that an in-service personal assault occurred, and none of the reported events relate to a fear of hostile military or terrorist activity. "Fear of hostile military or terrorist activity" means that a veteran experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or circumstance that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of the veteran or others, such as from an actual or potential improvised explosive device; vehicle imbedded explosive device; incoming artillery, rocket, or mortar fire; grenade; small arms fire, including suspected sniper fire; or attack upon friendly military aircraft, and the veteran's response to the event or circumstance involved a psychological or psycho physiological state of fear, helplessness, or horror. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f), a veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor if: (1) a stressor claimed by a veteran is related to his or her fear of hostile military or terrorist activity; (2) the claimed stressor is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran's service; and (3) a VA psychiatrist or psychologist, or a psychiatrist or psychologist with whom VA has contracted, confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder and that the veteran's symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM-5), a PTSD stressor is established when the veteran was exposed to death, threatened death, actual or threatened serious injury, or actual or threatened sexual violence, in the following ways: (1) direct exposure, (2) witnessing the trauma, (3) learning that a relative or close friend was exposed to trauma, or (4) indirect exposure to aversive details of the trauma, usually in the course of his professional duties. Active military, naval, or air service includes any period of Active Duty for Training (ACDUTRA) during which the individual concerned was disabled or died from a disease or injury incurred in or aggravated in the line of duty, or any period of Inactive Duty for Training (INACDUTRA) during which the individual concerned was disabled or died from injury incurred in or aggravated in the line of duty. 38 U.S.C. § 101(21), (24); 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(a), (d); Biggins v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 474, 477-78 (1991). ACDUTRA is, generally, full-time duty in the Armed Forces performed by reserves for training purposes. 38 C.F.R. § 3.6(c)(1). Accordingly, service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in, or aggravated, while performing ACDUTRA, or from injury incurred or aggravated while performing INACDUTRA 1. Service Connection for Acquired Psychiatric Disorders is Denied 2. Service Connection for PTSD is Denied The Veteran has over time progressively proffered several explanations of what he considers psychological events and PTSD stressors. Some of the events are alleged to have happened during service, while others are reported to have occurred after service. While the Veteran has also reported pre-service events and psychological symptoms, this Board decision will not place probative value on any evidence of events or symptoms reported to have occurred prior to service; rather, because no preexisting psychological disorders were noted at service entrance, the Veteran is presumed to have been psychologically sound upon entering service, and this case is one for direct service connection rather than aggravation by service. 38 U.S.C. § 1111; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304; Wagner, 370 F.3d 1089. After a review of all the evidence of record, lay and medical, the Board finds that the weight of the evidence persuasively favors a finding that the Veteran did not experience an in-service psychological injury, disease, or event, including no in service PTSD stressor event in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The Board will specifically discuss each of the claimed in-service events below. A. Reports of Pre-Service Childhood Abuse and Problems During a treatment session about 10 years after service, the Veteran first reported that he experienced pre-service childhood abuse. See October 1991 VA Treatment Records. The Veteran did not report any such history at service entrance in March 1976, so no such pre-service history was "noted" at service entrance to be considered preexisting service (38 C.F.R. § 3.304). See March 1976 Service Entrance Examination; March 1976 Report of Medical History. The Veteran did not report any of several pre-service events when he entered service, including family dysfunction, an incident of aspirin poisoning, depression because his girlfriend had an abortion, abuse of a girlfriend, and an overdose by sleeping pills. Because a pre-service psychiatric disorder was "not noted" on the March 1976 service entrance examination, the presumption of soundness at service entrance attaches and can only be overcome by clear and unmistakable evidence that a disorder preexisted service and was not aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C. § 1111; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304. Upon review of service treatment records, there are no complaints of, or treatment for, any psychological symptoms, and no reports of stressor or psychological events, either before service or during service. During the July 1988 hospital evaluation several years after service, the Veteran first reported a history of childhood abuse, claiming that he was taken from his biological parents at the age of three, but there was no indication of a pre existing psychiatric disorder. Post-service treatment records show the Veteran claimed that at the age of two he was removed from his biological parents due to abuse and was placed into foster care. See August 1991 VA Treatment Records, July 1988 Private Treatment Records, June 1995 VA Treatment Records. While the record reflects that starting in 1988 the Veteran reported pre-service childhood abuse, at the January 2020 private examination, the Veteran reported that he had "little recollection of any abuse toward him by his parents," learned about his parents' abuse from his older siblings, and "was never diagnosed with any psychiatric problems nor required mental health treatment prior to entering the military." Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that the presumption of soundness at service entrance has not been rebutted because the evidence of record does not clearly and unmistakably show that an acquired psychiatric disorder based on child abuse pre-existed service. As the presumption of soundness is not rebutted, the Veteran is presumed to have been psychologically sound at service entrance, no findings regarding pre-service child abuse or symptoms will be made or relied upon in this case by the Board or any VA examiner, and, notwithstanding the contention regarding aggravation during service, the case converts to one for direct service connection (without regard to any question of preexisting child abuse or symptoms), and is not a case of aggravation by service. See Wagner, 370 F.3d at 1096. As the Board is finding as a matter of law the presumption of soundness at service entrance is not rebutted, there will be no further discussion, findings, or reliance on reported pre-service childhood abuse, by the Board directly or indirectly based on examiners' statements or opinions regarding pre-service childhood abuse, even though there are statements already in the record regarding pre-service childhood abuse. The legal effect of failure to rebut the presumption of soundness at service separation is that the case reverts to one of direct service connection, notwithstanding misplaced legal arguments suggesting this is an aggravation case. 38 U.S.C. § 1111; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304; Wagner, 370 F.3d at 1096. B. Allegations of Service Events The Board's analysis in this section of the instant decision applies in relevant part to each of the claimed in-service events separately analyzed herein, and should be read accordingly. The general findings of fact in this section should be added to the Board's further analysis of each specific claimed event that is separately analyzed below. A composite review of the record shows that at different times during the various claims for compensation, the Veteran has alleged the following in-service events to date: being injured in a forest fire at Ft. Dix in 1976 (specifically claiming that his arm was singed), anxiety associated with the U.S. submarine blockade of the Panama Canal when tensions were escalated in the summer of 1977, being "tricked" into killing civilians in Nicaragua, in-service racist death threats made by fellow servicemembers, witnessing a fellow servicemember being severely injured in a multi-vehicle accident at Ft. Benning between September 1978 and February 1979, and witnessing a fellow trainee soldier being injured in boot camp at Ft. Dix in 1976, with the Veteran believing the soldier to be dead. The Board notes the first time of record that the Veteran asserts each of these series of alleged events. See August 1991 VA Treatment Records (in-service racial threats); April 1992 VA Treatment Records (reporting the Army "lied" to him, which caused him to kill innocent civilians); July 2009 VA Treatment Records (a blockade); April 2010 Statement in Support of Claim (accident at Ft. Benning); April 2010 Statement in Support of Claim (a fire at Ft. Dix); April 2010 Statement in Support of Claim (a servicemember's injury at Ft. Dix). The Board notes that, since the issuance of the May 2020 Board decision, VA received a lay Supporting Statement from the Veteran in February 2020. Review of the lay statement does not indicate that the Veteran has reported or alleged any new in service events. Rather, the Veteran once again discussed the previously asserted forest fire, Panama Canal, racist death threats, motor vehicle accident, and boot camp falling accident. For each of the alleged in-service events, the weight of the lay and medical evidence shows no complaints or reports of these events or psychological symptoms of any kind, including no reports of symptoms that would be contemporaneous to the alleged in-service events. The service treatment records are but one piece of evidence that shows no complaints or reports of these events or psychological symptoms of any kind, including no reports of symptoms that would be contemporaneous to the alleged in-service events. See Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (upholding Board's finding that a veteran was not credible because recent lay evidence about a wound in service was internally inconsistent with the veteran's contemporaneous lay statements that he had not received any wounds in service). Neither service treatment records nor service personnel records in this case show any reports of stressors or psychological events during service, or even obliquely support that such alleged events or symptoms occurred. The absence of contemporaneous evidence of in-service events or symptoms in this case where both the service medical records and the service personnel records are complete, and the Veteran sought treatment for other symptoms or disorders, there is a foundation to rely on the absence of evidence, which is one factor, but only one factor among others, that the Board has considered below when analyzing whether each of the alleged in-service events happened. Barr v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 303 (2007) ("Board may not reject as not credible any uncorroborated statements merely because the contemporaneous medical evidence is silent as to complaints or treatment for the relevant condition or symptoms" in service and after service); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331,1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (the lack of contemporaneous medical records is one fact the Board can consider and weigh against the other evidence, although the lack of such medical records does not, in and of itself, render the lay evidence not credible); Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (the passage of many years between discharge from active service and the medical complaint of a claimed disability is one factor to consider as evidence against a claim of service connection). The evidence shows instead that the Veteran experienced post-service psychological events or physical events with psychological implications, namely, a January 1981 break-up with a girlfriend resulting domestic violence (see January 1981 Private Treatment Records), a motor vehicle accident in August 1983 (see August 1983 Private Treatment Records), an assault in September 1984 (see September 1984 Private Treatment Records), and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (see February 2018 VA examination report). As discussed in the introduction, the Veteran received mental health treatment in January 1981 at Beth Israel Hospital, which was during a period in which the Veteran was serving in the National Guard. Per the hospital record, the Veteran was referred for evaluation of suicidal ideation after having taken 25 Sominex pills in 24 hours due to an inability to sleep. According to the Veteran, he was feeling remorseful, guilty, and depressed after hitting his (now ex) girlfriend for leaving him. The Veteran conveyed taking the pills not because he was suicidal, but because he was unable to sleep due to the feelings of guilt and depression. At the conclusion of the evaluation the Veteran was diagnosed with an acute depressive reaction related to this relationship-ending event. There is no indication in the psychological history or clinician's observations that this event occurred during a period of ACDUTRA or INACDUTRA, that the medical examiner attributed the Veteran's actions/psychological reactions to an in-service event (including Reserve service), or that there was a chronic, rather than acute, acquired psychiatric disorder at the time of this 1981 post-service hospitalization for post-service physical and psychological event. The history reported by the Veteran during treatment for psychological symptoms of this acute episode a history that makes no mention of in-service events or Reserve service events is of high probative value because a patient would be expected to report an accurate medical (psychological) history in order to receive efficacious treatment. The next report of post-service psychiatric symptoms of record is in July 1988, which is six years after service separation, after the post-service motor vehicle accident in 1983 and after the post-service assault in 1984 had already happened to the Veteran. When reporting those post-service events during initial treatment after service, and prior to claiming compensation from VA in August 1991, notably, the Veteran did not mention any history of in-service events or any in-service psychological symptoms that he later alleges occurred. Instead, the Veteran's own reports of events and symptoms during initial psychological treatment in 1988, and prior to filing a VA compensation claim in August 1991, are only of post-service events and symptoms. The history reported by the Veteran during treatment for psychological symptoms in July 1988 a history that makes no mention of in-service events or Reserve service events is of high probative value because a patient would be expected to report an accurate medical (psychological) history in order to receive efficacious treatment. The evidence shows that, over six years after service, in July 1988, the Veteran was admitted to a psychiatric hospital, reporting post-service symptoms and post service problems he had been experiencing, while not reporting any active or Reserve service event. In July 1988, the Veteran reported homicidal ideation with a plan as he wanted to kill his former (post-service) civilian employers because his employment was terminated two years prior, and he was engaged in litigation against the employer. See July 1988 Private Treatment Records. See Mense v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 354, 356 (1991) (affirming Board's denial of service connection where veteran failed to account for lengthy time period between service and initial symptoms of disability). The credible evidence shows post-service events, with post-service onset of symptoms, which did not take place during a period of ACDUTRA or INACDUTRA, and that when seeking treatment for these post-service events in 1981, 1988, and again on August 15, 1991, the Veteran did not mention any of the in-service events, stressors, or psychological feelings that he only later came up with piecemeal once he began pursuing VA compensation. See generally, January 5, 1981 Private Treatment Record (reported feelings of guilt and depression following a domestic violence incident); July 1988 Private Treatment Records (reported homicidal ideation with a plan intending to harm a post-service employer, post-service cocaine use, and a recent post service divorce); August 1988 Private Treatment Records (reported anger associated with his "home life"); August 1991 VA Treatment Records (reported issues of childhood abuse, his divorce, and difficulty forming relationships); August 1991 Statement in Support of Claim (reported racially motivated in-service "incidents" conducted by fellow servicemembers); September 1991 VA Treatment Records (reported being homeless and having an altercation with another homeless person); October 1991 VA Treatment Records (reports having PTSD related to service but offered no explanation); October 1991 VA Treatment Records (reported childhood abuse again); November 1991 VA Treatment Records (reported childhood abuse, behavioral problems living in the shelter, and the need for employment); December 1991 VA Treatment Records (reported post-service use of cocaine); January 1992 VA Treatment Records (reports many post-service psychiatric symptoms and drug use with no specific reference to an in-service event); February 1992 VA Treatment Records (reports anger and drug use with specific reference to an in-service event). See also Pond v. West, 12 Vet. App. 341, 346 (1999) (upholding Board's weighing of evidence to find that the post-service medical records, which were negative for complaints or treatment for cervical spine injury, were more probative than the appellant's testimony of continuous post-service symptom of neck pain after his jeep accident); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 512 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (upholding Board finding that lay evidence about a shell fragment wound to the leg in service was internally inconsistent with the veteran's other lay statements, including the veteran's other statement that he had not received any wounds in service, and, therefore, was not credible). The record does not reflect a good reason for the Veteran not mentioning any of the now alleged in-service events or psychological feelings when giving treatment histories from January 5, 1981 until August 22, 1991. The Veteran by this time was far removed from service, and was seeking treatment for psychological symptoms, so was being asked repeatedly about psychological events in the past as well as past and current feelings. For this unexcused reason, the Board finds the rule applies that these specific statements and histories made for treatment purposeshistories that omit any reference to in-service events or feelingsare of more probative value than later statements by the Veteran when he began VA to compensate for his post-service onset of psychiatric symptoms that the evidence shows were due to non-service-related factors or events, including post-service drug abuse, stressful events, and personality disorder. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) (statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment are an exception to the rule against hearsay, which supports the proposition that statements reporting medical history for treatment purposes are probative); Harvey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 390, 394 (1994) (Board decision properly assigned more probative value to a private hospital record that included lay history that was made for treatment purposes than to subsequent statements made for compensation purposes); Curry v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 59 (1994) (noting that contemporaneous evidence has greater probative value than history as reported by the veteran, and affirming Board decision that cited from MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (3rd ed.1984) for the proposition that "memory hinges on recency" and that earlier statements are generally more trustworthy than later ones). It was not until the Veteran filed a claim for service connection (compensation) for psychiatric disorder on August 22, 1991, including the same date contemporaneous purported treatment entry that segues into the same day claim for compensation on August 22, 1991 (Statement in Support of Claim), that the Veteran alleged the first of the current series of piecemeal allegations of in-service events, to which he later added as the claims for compensation were denied or as he submitted new claims for compensation for psychiatric disorders. See August 1991 VA Treatment Records (in-service racial threats); April 1992 VA Treatment Records (reporting the Army "lied" to him, which caused him to kill innocent civilians); June 1992 Rating Decision (denied service connection for PTSD); August 2006 Rating Decision (denied reopening service connection for PTSD). Just one week prior to this claim for service connection, on August 15, 1991, the Veteran had yet again reported a psychological history that did not include any in-service event or feelings, and only mentioned post-service problems, events, and symptoms. After being denied service connection in 1992, and after being denied reopening of service connection in 2006, the Veteran came up with an additional in-service event of a blockade. See July 2009 VA Treatment Records (a blockade). A November 2009 Rating Decision denied reopening service connection for PTSD. Following this second denial of reopening of service connection in November 2009, the Veteran came up with three more alleged in-service events that he had never before mentioned during any psychological treatment or when filing previous claims or during examination. See April 2010 Statement in Support of Claim (accident at Ft. Benning); April 2010 Statement in Support of Claim (a fire at Ft. Dix); April 2010 Statement in Support of Claim (a servicemember's injury at Ft. Dix). The Board has not discounted the history of any of these in-service events because the Veteran was the source of the history; rather, the histories are discounted because they are outweighed by the other, more contemporaneous lay and medical evidence of record, including histories made for treatment purposes that did not mention any service events, and including an absence of evidence where the foundation to rely on that absence has been laid. It is for these reasons, and not because of the alleged in-service events and symptoms are asserted by the Veteran, that the histories serially added during compensation claims are being found by the Board to be not credible. It is the completeness and accuracy of that medical (psychological) history that is important rather than the source of the history. See, e.g., Kowalski v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 171 (2005) (holding that VA cannot reject a medical opinion simply because it is based on a history supplied by a veteran, but the strength of the opinion depends rather upon the accuracy of the facts asserted by the veteran). i. Ft. Dix Forest Fire The weight of the lay and medical evidence in this case is against finding that the Veteran was injured in a 1976 Ft. Dix forest fire. The Veteran reports that he experienced a psychiatric event when his unit was caught in a forest fire at Ft. Dix. See April 2010 Statement in Support of Claim. There are no service treatment records that reflect complaints of, or treatment for, injuries related to a burn on the arm or residual respiratory symptoms or disorders related to a fire. A search of Defense Personnel Records indicates that VA was unable to verify that a forest fire occurred at Ft. Dix in 1976. See July 2010 Request for Information. A fire injury is not documented in service treatment records, even though an injury such as a burn or respiratory distress would have been reported and treated by military medical examiners had it occurred. Fire injuries are also the type of event that would have been recorded in military histories had they occurred, and VA was unable to verify the fire occurred after a diligent search through service personnel records. See Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 440 (2011) (Lance, J., concurring) (the silence in a medical record can be weighed against lay testimony if the alleged injury, disease, or related symptoms would ordinarily have been recorded in the medical record being evaluated by the factfinder). The Board finds that the Veteran is not credible in reporting the claimed Ft. Dix forest fire as a psychiatric event or PTSD stressor. The Veteran first asserted in an April 2010 Statement in Support of Claim there was a fire at Ft. Dix. In addition to silent contemporaneous medical and lay and personnel records, the Veteran had multiple post service opportunities, including procedural filings and during psychiatric treatments, to report this alleged in-service event when psychological histories were specifically being elicited from him for treatment purposes. On multiple treatment occasions when providing a psychological history, the Veteran he did not mention this alleged in-service event at any of the various psychological hospitalizations or treatments beginning in 1981, or when first pursuing psychiatric disorder and PTSD claims in 1991 and 1992. When the Veteran finally reported this claimed event, it was several years after filing the original claim for service connection and after being denied service connection and told why, when his other stories of service events had been rejected. See June 1992 Rating Decision (denied service connection for PTSD); August 2006 Rating Decision (denied reopening service connection for PTSD); November 2009 Rating Decision (denied reopening service connection for PTSD). The Board finds that the Veteran is not credible in reporting this event in 2010 and afterwards because there is a lack of medical and lay contemporaneous records, including service personnel records, multiple lost opportunities to report the event, and this event was first reported many years after service separation after being denied service connection on various occasions based on other alleged but noncredible reports of in-service events. See Cromer v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 215 (2005) (upholding Board's denial of service connection and finding that a veteran's recent post service account of in-service events was not credible because the veteran had previously given other histories and theories that did not mention the alleged in service event, and first "came up with the story" years after service and in connection with the compensation claim). Based on the foregoing, the weight of the evidence is against finding a psychiatric event or PTSD stressor occurred because of injuries occurring from a forest fire at Ft. Dix. The Board notes that, since the issuance of the May 2020 Board decision, the Veteran's representative submitted a New York Times article discussing a forest fire state of emergency for southern and central New Jersey that occurred in April 1976, while the Veteran was in boot camp at Ft. Dix. The representative also submitted an article entitled Section 5.4.7: Risk Assessment Wildfire that discusses the risk of wildfires in Burlington County, New Jersey, where Ft. Dix is located. Per the article, a large wildfire occurred in Burlington County in late March/early-April 1977. Turning first to the March/April 1977 wildfire, in a corresponding February 2022 brief, the representative argues that this 1977 forest fire may have, in fact, been the forest fire to which the Veteran has referred during the course of this appeal. Per the attorney representative, the Veteran had informed the firm on varying occasions that the fire could have occurred in 1976 or 1977. This contention that the Veteran might have somehow meant 1977 when he reported the fire occurred in 1976 is inconsistent with the Veteran's own clear previous assertion that the Ft. Dix fire occurred in 1976, and is inconsistent with the recent representations in a February 2022 Supporting Statement by the Veteran that the attorney representative submitted with this February 2022 brief. In the February 2022 Supporting Statement, the Veteran again specifically stated that the forest fire occurred in 1976 during basic training. Nonetheless, service personnel records reflect that the Veteran was stationed at Ft. Stewart in Georgia in April 1977; therefore, the Veteran was not in fact in or near the Burlington County fire in 1977. As such, even assuming there was a forest fire at Ft. Dix in April 1977, the Veteran was states away from the fire at that time. For these reasons, the Board does not find that this newly submitted evidence of a 1977 forest wildfire supports the inconsistently alleged story of a forest-fire-related psychological stressor. As to the New York Times article, while the article does indicate that four major forest fires and 21 smaller forest fires were raging across the southern and central parts of New Jersey in April 1976, which was during the time the Veteran was at boot camp at Ft. Dix, the article does not state that the fires occurred in Burlington County, where Ft. Dix is located. As discussed above, a search of Defense Personnel Records indicates that VA was unable to verify that a forest fire occurred at Ft. Dix in 1976. Significantly, per the above, along with the New York Times article the representative submitted an article entitled Section 5.4.7: Risk Assessment Wildfire that discusses the risk of wildfires in Burlington County, shows the occurrence of fires in Burlington County in 1977, rather than 1976. This article provides an extensive history of wildfires occurring throughout New Jersey, and in particular, Burlington County. While the article references a March to April 1977 wildfire that threated Burlington County, no mention is made in the report of any forest fire threat to Burlington County in April 1976. Between the Section 5.4.7: Risk Assessment Wildfire article and the Defense Personnel Records Information System (DPRIS) being unable to verify a forest fire at Ft. Dix in April 1976, the Board finds the weight of evidence is persuasively against a finding that the any of the forest fires referenced in the April 1976 New York Times article occurred at or near Ft. Dix in Burlington County, New Jersey. ii. Panama Canal Tension The Board finds that the Veteran did not in fact experience psychological symptoms while serving near the Panama Canal in the summer of 1977. There are no documented psychological symptoms in the service treatment records. It was not until over 10 years after service separation, in May 1992, that the Veteran first asserted that the PTSD was vaguely related to Panama service, and even at that time, the Veteran did not provide any specific explanation of the claimed event. It was not until many years later, in July 2006, that the Veteran claimed to have experienced psychological symptoms in service related to tensions in the Canal Zone in Panama. In August 2010, the Veteran explained this experience further, claiming that he had feelings of worry during the events in 1977 surrounding negotiations for the return of the Panama Canal and what the Veteran describes as a blockade of the canal. The described incident involved an American ship and there were no enemies or terrorists involved during this period or this episode. The Veteran testified at the Board hearing in 2017 that tensions were high in Panama in the summer of 1977 between the people of Panama and U.S. military when the U.S. sent submarines to blockade the Canal, and, as a result, the Veteran experienced psychological symptoms because he was worried about riots and protests breaking out. See September 2017 Board videoconference hearing. A fellow servicemember wrote that, while they were stationed in Panama in the summer of 1977, the unit was on alert status for 2.5 weeks. See October 2010 Third Party Correspondence. The Veteran's representative contends that the Veteran's concerns about riots and protests were well founded because there had been riots in Panama about the Canal Zone in 1964 (13 years prior) and in the summer of 1977 the two countries were negotiating a treaty about the Canal Zone. See November 2017 Third Party Correspondence. These events did not involve enemy or terrorist activity or actual threats of death or bodily harm. In the most recent February 2020 Supporting Statement, the Veteran stated that, "I witnessed the atomic submarine blockade in the Panama Canal and felt threated by LaGuardia Nationals. I remember the nations were walking around with submachine guns, which caused me to feel uneasy." This was similar to testimony offered at the September 2017 Board videoconference hearing. It was not until May 1992 that the Veteran asserted that he experienced any psychological feelings about his service in Panama. On prior occasions when seeking treatment for psychological symptoms, from January 1981 until April 1992, the Veteran did not mention any psychiatric symptoms associated with service in the Panama Canal. He did not mention any such symptoms when he filed a previous claim for service connection for PTSD (which was denied in a June 1992 rating decision) or when he reported many post-service episodes and events for the purpose of treatment, including cocaine abuse, assault, separation and divorce from his wife, domestic violence, job stresses and being fired from a job, and homicidal ideation toward a former post-service employer. See generally, January 1981 Private Treatment Records (Break-up with a girlfriend resulting domestic violence); July 1988 Private Treatment Records (Reported homicidal ideation with a plan intending to harm a post-service employer, cocaine use, and a recent divorce); August 1988 Private Treatment Records (Reported anger associated with his "home life"); August 1991 VA Treatment Records (Reported issues of childhood abuse, his divorce, and difficulty forming relationships); August 1991 Statement in Support of Claim (Reported racially motivated in-service "incidents" conducted by fellow servicemembers); September 1991 VA Treatment Records (Reported being homeless person and having an altercation with another homeless person); October 1991 VA Treatment Records (Reports having PTSD related to service but offered no explanation); October 1991 VA Treatment Records (Reported childhood abuse again); November 1991 VA Treatment Records (Reported childhood abuse, behavioral problems living in the shelter, and the need for employment); December 1991 VA Treatment Records (Reported using cocaine); January 1992 VA Treatment Records (Reports many psychiatric symptoms and drug use with no specific reference to an in service event); February 1992 VA Treatment Records (Reports anger and drug use with specific reference to an in-service event). The Board finds that the Veteran is not credible in recently reporting the claimed event and his feelings while he was in the Canal Zone of Panama. While psychiatric symptoms are generally based on subjective reporting, the claimed symptoms, as asserted by the Veteran in this case years after service, as associated with the Panama blockade, are not facially plausible. There was peace between the U.S. and Panama at that time, and the blockade involved the U.S. Navy, not an enemy or terrorist force. The Veteran's historical evidence regarding the 1964 riots shows only a remote history of past events, but does not lend plausibility to the claimed event in 1977, because the riots occurred 13 years prior. There is no mention by the Veteran in lay or medical evidence about this event until May 1992, 10 years after service separation, and after presenting various other psychiatric histories beginning in 1981 describing psychological events and symptoms without a mention of this alleged event, and an August 1991 claim for service connection for psychiatric disorder that did not mention or claim this event. Moreover, even though the Veteran reported this event in May 1992 so that it could be considered in the original claim for service connection in June 1992, the Veteran's claimed symptoms have supposedly existed since service separation but did not file a claim for the instant issues until 1991, despite filing multiple claims for compensation previously. See May 1979 Rating Decision (service connection for warts, verrucae vulgaris, and chondromalacia in both knees); September 1979 Rating Decision (claim for increase rating for the verrucae vulgaris and both knees); June 1987 Rating Decision (claim for increase rating for both knees); November 1990 Rating Decision (claim for increase rating for both knees). Based on the foregoing, the Board finds that the weight of the lay and medical evidence is against finding that the Veteran experienced psychiatric symptoms associated with service in the Panama Canal blockade because there were no enemies or terrorists involved with a U.S. naval blockade, the first specific report of the Panama Canal blockade event was 28 years after service separation in August 2010, and the Veteran had multiple opportunities to report the event but he did not report it. iii Death of Civilians in Nicaragua An April 1992 VA treatment record is the first assertion of record that while the Veteran served in Nicaragua he was directed by U.S. Army officers to kill civilians. The Veteran explained that the officers "lied" to him, ordering him to attack guerillas in a nearby farmhouse when, in fact, there were no guerillas, only civilians. The Veteran claims that this event caused him to experience psychiatric symptoms. The service personnel records and service treatment records do not indicate that the Veteran served in Nicaragua. Aside from this one isolated VA treatment record in April 1992, there is no other evidence of record related to this claimed event during the numerous other occasions for treatment and examination, and during the filing and support of various compensation claims. For these and other reasons stated in this decision, the Board finds that the Veteran is not credible in reporting this claimed event. In addition to there being no support in the service medical or service personnel records, the Veteran did not mention this claimed event in any procedural documents or in any examinations prior to April 1992, conducted by VA or private examiners, including when he was presenting psychological histories beginning in 1981, and filing claims for VA compensation for psychiatric disorders beginning on August 22, 1991. Thus, the Board finds that the weight of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran experienced psychiatric symptoms related to claimed civilian deaths when he alleges he was in Nicaragua. iv. Racially Motivated Death Threats from Fellow Servicemembers The weight of the lay and medical evidence is against finding that the Veteran experienced psychological symptoms related to alleged racist death threats in service. The Veteran first claimed on a VA compensation claim on August 22, 1991 that he experienced racially motivated death threats from fellow servicemembers, and that he reported this to the Inspector General (IG) in service. According to August 2010 Congressional documents, the Inspector General's Office conducted a diligent search but found no Army IG records to corroborate that the Veteran reported any alleged threats. The IG noted that complaints against non senior officials, in which all allegations were found unsubstantiated, have been destroyed by mandate. Even if the Board were to find that the Veteran made a report to the IG during service, this record leads to the finding that the claim was unsubstantiated, and there is no other indicia or oblique references to this alleged event in contemporaneous service personnel or service records to suggest its occurrence. Additionally, as with other alleged in-service events and symptoms, the Veteran also first came up with this alleged event years after service and after many prior treatment opportunities to report such alleged in-service event or psychological symptoms. The Board finds that the Veteran is not credible in his August 1991 claim and intermittently subsequent assertions that any racial death threats alleged to have occurred during service caused him psychological symptoms. Even after he was safely removed from service, the Veteran did not report to anyone, VA or during private psychological treatment, for almost nine years after service when claiming disability compensation in August 1991. The first story of the racial death threats is on August 22, 1991, when the Veteran wrote that this occurred in order to make a VA compensation claim, and also for the first time mentioned this alleged event to VA treatment providers. He did not mention this event just one week prior during VA treatment, on August 15, 1991, when giving a history and describing psychiatric events and symptoms. This alleged event and feelings associated with it also did not come up during psychological treatment in 1988, when the Veteran only reported post-service events and problems and feelings. This first mention of a racial incident during service was nine years after service separation, after the having sought treatment on multiple occasions since service without mentioning this episode, after having described various post-service incidents and feelings or psychological symptoms, while not mentioning this later claimed in-service event. Even if the Veteran filed a complaint with the IG, the fact that no complaint was found, coupled with the service department statement that unsubstantiated reports are not retained, tends to weigh against now finding that the described event occurred. In addition, there is no record of the Veteran reporting the threats in any other capacity in which they would be recorded in service personnel records or service treatment records, or to suggest the Veteran was psychologically affected by this event. The Veteran has not been consistent in reporting this event since it was first alleged. While it was the first alleged in-service event, reported when filing a VA compensation claim on August 22, 1991, there are various subsequent claims and psychological histories that do not mention this event. At the Board hearing, the Veteran insisted that this was one of two in-service events; however, this testimony is outweighed by the other lay and medical evidence, previously referenced in this decision, that shows multiple occasions where this alleged event was not even mentioned when other specific, post-service psychiatric events and feelings were reported for treatment purposes. In the newly submitted February 2022 Supporting Statement, the Veteran expanded on the information provided at the Board hearing; however, the Board does not find that this additional evidence outweighs the other, more probative and more contemporary lay and medical evidence discussed above. Per the February 2022 lay statement, the Veteran wrote that he was transferred from the Second Battalion 19th to the Second Battalion 34th due to these purported racial death threats. The service personnel records, however, reflect that while in the 19th the Veteran serviced as a rifleman, and in the 34th the Veteran served as an assistant gunner. As such, when considering all the evidence of record, the Board finds it more likely that the Veteran changed units due to a change in assigned responsibilities, rather than unsubstantiated racial death threats. While the Veteran has asserted that such symptoms supposedly existed since the event in service, he also did not file a claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, or even obliquely mention the occurrence of this in-service event or symptoms to anyone, including private psychology providers when giving histories of psychological past and current feelings. The Veteran did not mention this event in any of the previous claims for compensation when he was specifically claiming disability for events that happened during service, and was completing a VA claim form that elicits specific details about dates of service, including as to what types of disabilities compensation is being requested, and dates that in-service events occurred. Had this alleged in-service event occurred, and had the Veteran been bothered by it during and ever since service as he later asserts at the Board hearing, it would have taken seconds to add this psychological disorder to the list of claimed disorders for which he was seeking compensationat any of the multiple occasions when compensation for other disorders was being claimed. See May 1979 Rating Decision (verrucae vulgaris, and both knees); September 1979 Rating Decision (verrucae vulgaris and both knees); June 1987 Rating Decision (both knees); November 1990 Rating Decision (both knees). The Veteran would not have been required to state with any specificity or medical knowledge what the psychological disorder was, and the most general lay description would have created a claim for compensation, or just a general report of any psychological symptom would have been liberally construed as a claim for service connection. See Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1(2009) (recognizing that a veteran is not capable of correlating psychiatric symptoms to a specific psychiatric diagnosis). For these reasons, the Board finds that the weight of the lay and medical evidence is persuasively against finding that the Veteran experienced psychiatric symptoms associated with the claimed racially motivated death threats from fellow servicemembers. v. Ft. Benning Car Accident The weight of the lay and medical evidence is against finding that the Veteran witnessed a fellow servicemember get injured in a multi-vehicle accident at Ft. Benning between September 1978 and February 1979. See April 2010 Statement in Support of Claim. The only record of an in-service multi-vehicle accident that occurred at Ft. Benning in that timeframe involved minor, short-term injuries that were not severe or fatal in nature. See May 1977 Military Personnel Records; October 2010 Third Party Correspondence. In the recent February 2022 Supporting Statement submitted by the Veteran, the Veteran wrote that the fellow servicemember who was injured was his best friend, Anthony, from New York; however, despite this being the Veteran's best friend, the Veteran stated that he could no longer remember Anthony's last name. The Board finds it unlikely that the Veteran would be unable to remember the full name of his "best friend" who purportedly was severely injured in a horrific motor vehicle accident. This new detail suffers the same fate as the larger story of such accident having occurred; it is not credible because it is unconvincing in its own right, and was also made recently pursuant to compensation, and is inconsistent to multiple prior psychological histories and statements that make no mention of such injury of a best friend. As analyzed elsewhere in this decision, this alleged in-service event was not mentioned during psychological treatment beginning in 1981 when presenting histories, within the various claims for compensation (service connection) for psychiatric disorders including PTSD, and was not mentioned or claimed until after many years, several compensation claims, and several denials of previous compensation claims. For these reasons, the weight of the evidence shows that the Veteran did not witness a fellow servicemember get injured in a multi-vehicle accident at Ft. Benning between September 1978 and February 1979. vi. Servicemember Injured at Ft. Dix For reasons stated above that are generally applicable to all alleged in-service events, and as analyzed here, the weight of the lay and medical evidence is against this assertion that the Veteran witnessed a fellow trainee soldier get injured in a fall at boot camp at Ft. Dix (who the Veteran believed may have died from the fall) between March 1976 to June 1976. See April 2010 Statement in Support of Claim. This assertion is vague as the Veteran did not provide specific or corroborative details such as to who was alleged to have been injured and possibly died and details as to where such injury is alleged to have occurred. The statement only indicates that the servicemember may have died. In the newly received February 2020 Supporting Statement, the Veteran merely clarified that the soldier purportedly fell from a 60 foot-tall obstacle course during basic training. No identifying information as to the wounded soldier was provided. There is also no evidence in the service treatment records that the Veteran experienced psychological symptoms in service, including surrounding this alleged event. See Gardin v. Shinseki, 613 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (upholding Board finding that vague and inconsistent lay statements were not credible because they were in direct contradiction to the more credible, competent, reliable, and clearly documented medical evidence). The Board finds that the Veteran is not credible in reporting this event. The Veteran's account of the event is relatively vague, there is no evidence of record about this event until April 2010, 28 years after service separation, and the Veteran had multiple post-service opportunities, including procedural filings and psychiatric treatment records, to report this event, but he did not make even oblique mention of it. When the Veteran finally reported this claimed event, it was many years after the original claim for service connection was adjudicated in June 1992, after many denials of service connection on several occasions, and after having unsuccessfully proffered various other alleged in-service events that he came up with this one. See June 1992 Rating Decision (denied the claim for service connection for PTSD); August 2006 Rating Decision (denied reopening service connection for PTSD); November 2009 Rating Decision (denied reopening service connection for PTSD). C. Post-Service Experiences Based on the foregoing, a preponderance of the lay and medical evidence is against finding that the Veteran experienced an in-service psychological event or an in service PTSD stressor in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); thus, both claims must be denied. See Bardwell v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 36, 40 (2010) (holding that, where the evidence has failed to establish an in-service injury, disease, or event, the claim is to be denied). The Board has considered all evidence of record when making these findings (with the exception in this case of not relying on evidence of pre-service child abuse, including an inadequate examination opinion relying on this assumption, because of the matter of law finding herein that the Veteran was psychiatrically sound at service entrance). The Board has not discounted the Veteran's stories of in-service events and feelings because they are from the Veteran or because they are lay evidence, but has weighed each allegation of an in-service event against all other evidence, lay and medical, to determine if it was credible. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) ("Decisions of the Board shall be based on the entire record in the proceeding and upon consideration of all evidence and material of record"); 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) ("Secretary shall consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a case"); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (each claimed disorder for service connection "must be considered on the basis of the places, types and circumstances of his service as shown by service records, the official history of each organization in which he served, his medical records and all pertinent medical and lay evidence"). The conclusion that none of alleged in-service events occurred, or that there was no psychological impact during or since service, are findings of fact that the Board has made based on a careful weighing of both lay and medical evidence of record. Elkins v. Gober, 229 F.3d 1369, 1377 (2000) (emphasizing that fact-finding in veterans cases is to be done by the Board). The Board's findings of credibility are findings of fact the Board made based on weighing the alleged in-service events against the other lay and medical evidence of record. See Smith v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 235, 237 (1991) ("Credibility is determined by the fact finder . . . Determination of credibility is a function for the BVA."); Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the Board is entitled to discount the credibility of evidence in light of its own inherent characteristics and its relationship to other items of evidence). As there are in fact no in-service stressors or psychological events, as the Board now finds after weighing all the evidence, the Board does not reach the questions of current disability or nexus, including the precise etiology of any post-service psychiatric diagnoses. After service the Veteran was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder based on post-service incidents and symptoms that began years after service, including cocaine abuse, drug charges, assault and related legal problems, separation and divorce from his wife, domestic violence, job stresses and being fired from a job, unemployment, homicidal ideation toward a former employer, and homelessness. In addition to the record evidence of various post-service events and psychological diagnoses, during the February 2018 VA examination, the Veteran reported that the effects of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 contributed to the acquired psychiatric disorders and the PTSD. This stressor event is not an in-service event as it occurred in 2005, approximately 23 years after service separation. After service the Veteran was diagnosed with cocaine use disorder. VA compensation shall not be paid if the claimed disability or death was the result of the person's own willful misconduct or abuse of alcohol or drugs. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 105, 1110; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(n), 3.301(c). With respect to alcohol and drug abuse, Section 8052 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 8052, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-351, prohibits, effective for claims filed after October 31, 1990, payment of compensation for a disability that is a result of an appellant's own alcohol or drug abuse. Moreover, § 8052 also amended 38 U.S.C. § 105(a) to provide that, with respect to claims filed after October 31, 1990, an injury or disease incurred during active service will not be deemed to have been incurred in the line of duty if the injury or disease was a result of the person's own willful misconduct, including abuse of alcohol or drugs. See also VAOPGPREC 2-97. After service the Veteran was diagnosed with anti-social personality disorder and borderline personality disorder. Personality disorders are not disabilities for which service connection may be granted, unless they were aggravated by superimposed injury during service. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(c), 4.9; VAOPGCPREC 82-90. In this case, as analyzed above, the weight of the evidence of record is against finding a superimposed psychological injury occurred during service, or that there were even any psychological symptoms during service. The Board only notes the multiple post-service events and diagnoses to distinguish the diagnoses and onset from service, and to show consistency with the findings in this decision that, after weighing all the lay and medical evidence, there is in fact no in-service psychological injury or disease or event. As the question of nexus is not reached, because there is no in-service injury, disease, or event to which a current diagnosis could be related by competent opinion, the question of any causation of psychological disorder by post-service events is also not reached, and is not necessary to decide this case. For the reasons given, the weight of the evidence is against finding that the Veteran experienced an in-service psychiatric event or PTSD stressor, and the Board has found that the Veteran is not credible in reporting the claimed in-service events. As the Board has found as fact that there is no in-service illness, injury, or event, the claim must be denied on the merits. As the Board has found as fact that there is no in-service illness, injury, or event, VA is not required to provide a VA examination. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159 (c)(4), 3.326(a); Bardwell v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 36 (2010) (where the Board makes a finding that lay evidence regarding an in-service event or injury is not credible, a VA examination and nexus opinion are not required); McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 81 (2006) (holding that the duty to assist requires VA to develop evidence necessary to substantiate a claim, including when there is a lack of sufficient evidence to decide the claim); Waters v. Shinseki, 601 F. 3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (the duty to provide an examination is not limitless). In this case, there is sufficient evidence of record already to decide the claim because the weight of the lay and medical evidence of record, which is sufficient to decide the element of whether in-service injury, disease, or events occurred, is determinative of the outcome of this case. Further evidence, including medical evidence of current diagnosis and nexus opinions, is no longer probative because there is, as a matter of fact, no in service injury, disease, or event to which current psychiatric disability could be related. Consequently, the January 2020 private medical opinion by Dr. Teller is of no probative value because it inaccurately assumes the occurrence of in-service events, contrary to the weight of the evidence and the Board's findings of fact in this case. There is no further duty to provide a VA examination or nexus opinion because there is no in-service injury, disease, or event to which a medical opinion could relate a current psychiatric disorder. Any opinion that purported to do so would be of no probative value because it would be based on inaccurate factual assumptions as to the occurrence of in-service events. See Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458 (1993) (noting that where the Board correctly assessed that the veteran's lay evidence of an injury in service was not credible, a medical opinion based on that inaccurate history was of no probative value). J. PARKER Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board E. Blowers, Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.