Citation Nr: 22017707 Decision Date: 03/25/22 Archive Date: 03/25/22 DOCKET NO. 10-29 262 DATE: March 25, 2022 ORDER The Appellant's period of active service from June 1967 to June 1969 was valid service for VA service-connected benefit purposes. FINDING OF FACT The Appellant manifested insanity - a prolonged deviation from his normal method of behavior due to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) - concurrently with the conduct leading to his discharge during his period of active service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The Appellant's character of discharge for the period from June 1967 to June 1969 was not a bar to VA benefits. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101, 5303; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1, 3.12, 3.156(c), 3.354; Gardner v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 415, 419 (2009); Beck v. West, 13 Vet. App. 535, 539 (2000). REASONS AND BASIS FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Marine Corps from June 1967 to June 1969, to include combat service in the Republic of Vietnam. The Appellant was ordered to receive a Bad Conduct Discharge (BCD) as the result of a Special Court Martial conviction for periods of being Absent without Leave (AWOL) or Unauthorized Absence (UA). This matter comes on appeal before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a January 2008 administrative decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office in St. Petersburg, Florida (RO). In that decision, the RO found the evidence showed that the discharge was due to willful and persistent misconduct; the same determination that was made in 1973, 2003, and 2007. In a December 2018 rating decision, the RO granted service connection for treatment purposes for PTSD and a back condition under 38 U.S.C. Chapter 17. The Veteran failed, without apparent cause, to appear for a scheduled hearing in November 2014. Therefore, his request for a Board hearing is considered as having been withdrawn. 38 C.F.R. § 20.704. In December 2020, the Board determined that the character of the Appellant's discharge is a bar of entitlement to VA benefits and denied the Appellant's claim. Thereafter, the Appellant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ("CAVC" or "the Court"). In November 2021, the CAVC issued an order that vacated the Board's decision and remanded the Appellant's claim in compliance with the Parties' Joint Motion for Remand (JMR). 1. Whether the character of the Appellant's discharge is a bar of entitlement to VA benefits. When a person is seeking VA benefits, it first must be shown that the service member, upon whose service such benefits are predicated, has attained the status of veteran. Holmes v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 38 (1997). A veteran is a person who served in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(d). The designation of the discharge as dishonorable by the service department is binding on VA as to character of discharge. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(a). A discharge or release from active service under conditions other than dishonorable is a prerequisite to entitlement to VA pension or compensation benefits. 38 U.S.C. § 101(18); 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(a). Service department findings (i.e., the Army, Navy, and Air Force) are binding and conclusive upon VA for purposes of establishing an individual's service. VA does not have authority to alter the findings of the service department. 38 C.F.R. § 3.203(a); Spencer v. West, 13. Vet. App. 376, 380 (2000); Venturella v. Gober, 11 Vet. App. 240, 241 (1997); Cahall v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 232, 237 (1994); Duro v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 530, 532 (1992); see Soria v. Brown, 118 F.3d 747, 749 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Manlincon v. West, 12 Vet. App. 238 (1999). VA has no authority to alter the claimant's discharge classification, and the claimant's recourse is with the service department. Harvey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 416 (1994), A dishonorable discharge, a statutory bar, or a regulatory bar deprives the claimant of all gratuitous VA benefits. Such a discharge, statutory bar, or regulatory bar is binding on VA as to the character of discharge unless an exception, such as insanity, applies. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12. Specifically, there are two types of character of discharge bars establishing entitlement for VA benefits: statutory bars found at 38 U.S.C. § 5303(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c) and regulatory bars listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d). As to the statutory bars, benefits are not payable where the former service member was discharged or released under one of the following conditions listed under 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c): (1) as a conscientious objector who refused to perform military duty, wear the uniform, or comply with lawful order of competent military authorities; (2) by reason of the sentence of a general court martial; (3) resignation by an officer for the good of the service; (4) as a deserter; (5) as an alien during periods of hostilities, where it is affirmatively shown that the former service member requested his or her release; and (6) by reason of discharge other than honorable conditions issued as a result of an AWOL for a continuous period of at least 180 days (the regulation provides certain exceptions to this condition). As to the exception to AWOL, a person discharged under conditions other than honorable on the basis of an AWOL period of at least 180 days is barred from receipt of VA benefits "unless such person demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary that there are compelling circumstances to warrant such prolonged, unauthorized absence." 38 U.S.C. § 5303(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c)(6). The Board notes that this provision is not applicable to the instant case as the Appellant was not discharged for being AWOL for a continuous period of at least 180 days. Rather, as discussed below, he was discharged due to conviction at Special Court Martial for two periods of AWOL (56 days and 111 days, respectively), and breaking restriction. As to the regulatory bars, a discharge or release because of one of the following offenses is considered to have been issued under dishonorable conditions: (1) acceptance of an undesirable discharge to escape trial by general courts-martial; (2) mutiny or spying; (3) an offense involving moral turpitude (including, generally, conviction of a felony); or (4) willful and persistent misconduct (this includes a discharge under "other than honorable conditions," if it is determined it was issued because of willful and persistent misconduct. A discharge because of a minor offense, however, will not be considered willful and persistent misconduct if service was otherwise honest, faithful and meritorious). 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d). An act is willful misconduct where it involves deliberate or intentional wrongdoing with knowledge of or wanton and reckless disregard of its probable consequences. Mere technical violation of police regulations or ordinances will not per se constitute willful misconduct. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(n). A discharge because of a minor offense is not considered willful and persistent misconduct if service was otherwise honest, faithful, and meritorious. However, offenses that would interfere with the appellant's military duties, and preclude their performance are not minor. Stringham v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 445 (1995); Cropper v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 450 (1991). Although 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d)(4) indicates that a discharge because of a minor offense will not be considered willful and persistent misconduct if service was otherwise honest, faithful, and meritorious, the CAVC has found that a period of AWOL does not constitute a minor offense. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d); Stringham v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 445, 448 (1995) (noting that "offenses that would interfere with [the] appellant's military duties, indeed preclude their performance," such as periods of AWOL, do not constitute minor offenses); Winter v. Principi, 4 Vet. App. 29 (1993) (holding that one AWOL offense where the appellant was AWOL 32 days out of his 176-day service time constituted a bar to the payment of VA benefits on the basis of willful and persistent misconduct). Furthermore, pursuant to UCMJ Article 86, AWOL in excess of 30 days is not viewed as a minor offense, but rather as a severe offense which is punishable by confinement of up to one year and the issuance a dishonorable or BCD. See, e.g., See Winter v. Principi, 4 Vet. App. 29, 32 (1993) ("The BVA correctly determined that the UCMJ views AWOL in excess of 30 days as a severe offense, punishable by confinement for up to one year and the issuance of either a bad conduct or dishonorable discharge.") (citation omitted); Cropper v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 450, 452, 453 (1994) (noting that offenses that preclude the performance of military duties, such as unauthorized absence and failure to go to the appointed place of duty, are by definition not minor offenses). In any event, a discharge or release from service under any of the above conditions specified in 38 C.F.R. § 3.12 is a statutory or regulatory bar to the payment of benefits unless it is found that the person was "insane" at the time of committing the offense causing such discharge or release or unless specifically provided by 38 U.S.C. § 5303(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(b). That is, a discharge under dishonorable conditions will not constitute a bar to benefits if the individual was insane at the time of the offense causing the discharge. 38 U.S.C. § 5303(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(b). Thus, "insanity" is a defense to all statutory and regulatory bars, while "compelling circumstances" is only a defense to the statutory bar involving an AWOL period of at least 180 days. The Appellant was given a BCD due to misconduct. The RO determined that his service was dishonorable for VA purposes due to willful and persistent misconduct. Consequently, here, there are two possible exceptions to the Appellant being barred from receiving VA benefits: if the appellant's misconduct was minor and his service was otherwise honest, faithful, and meritorious; or if the appellant is shown to have been "insane" at the time of the offense. 38 U.S.C. § 5303(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(b). VA regulations provide that an insane person is one who (1) while not mentally defective or constitutionally psychopathic, except when a psychosis has been engrafted upon such basic condition, exhibits, due to disease, a more prolonged deviation from his or her normal method of behavior; (2) interferes with the peace of society; or (3) has so departed (become antisocial) from the accepted standards of the community, to which by birth and education he belongs, as to lack the adaptability to make further adjustment to the social customs of the community in which he resides. 38 C.F.R. § 3.354(a). For the defense of insanity, there must be competent evidence establishing the appellant was insane at the time of the offenses in question leading to the other than honorable discharge. Zang v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 246, 254 (1995). In Zang, the Court clarified that the phrase "due to disease" applies to all 3 separate components of 38 C.F.R. § 3.354 (a) and, thus, the applicable standard is: 1) due to disease, exhibits a more or less prolonged deviation from his or her normal method of behavior; 2) due to disease, interferes with the peace of society; OR 3) due to disease, has so departed (become antisocial) from the accepted standards of the community to which by birth and education he or she belongs as to lack the adaptability to make further adjustment to the social customs of the community in which he or she resides. Significantly, the burden is on the Appellant to submit competent evidence of insanity. Stringham v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 445, 449 (1995). A servicemember need not show that insanity caused the misconduct that led to discharge, but he/she must show medical evidence confirming insanity existed during the misconduct in question. Gardner v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 415, 419 (2009). Stated another way, "[m]ental illness is not identical to 'insanity,' and there need be no causal connection between the insanity and the misconduct. The acts leading to the discharge and the insanity must, however, be concurrent." Beck v. West, 13 Vet. App. 535, 539 (2000). The Board observes that the issue of whether a servicemember knew right from wrong and was able to discern the effects of his/her behavior is not germane to a determination of whether such servicemember was insane during service as defined by 38 C.F.R. § 3.354(a). Gardner, 22 Vet. App. at 420. In May 1997, VA General Counsel discussed the intended parameters of the types of behavior, which were defined as insanity under 38 C.F.R. § 3.354(a). It was indicated that behavior involving a minor episode or episodes of disorderly conduct or eccentricity does not fall within the definition of insanity in that regulation. It was further indicated that a determination of the extent to which an individual's behavior must deviate from his or her normal method of behavior could be best resolved by adjudicative personnel on a case-by-case basis in light of the authorities defining the scope of the term insanity. VAOPGCPREC 20-97 (May 22, 1997). A person seeking VA benefits must first establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the service member, upon whose service such benefits are predicated, has attained the status of appellant. Holmes v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 38, 40 (1997). Factual Background The Appellant entered the United States Marine Corps in June 1967. From November 1967 to June 1968, he served as a rifleman in the Republic of Vietnam. During his Vietnam service, he participated in nine offensive operations, including security, search and destroy, and combat operations. The Appellant's service records show that he was convicted at Special Court Martial and sentenced to be discharged in June 1969 with a Bad Conduct Discharge. The service records indicate the following misconduct: In February 1969, the Appellant was charged with two counts of violation of Article 86 (absent without leave) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), for being AWOL from August 6, 1968 to October 3, 1968 (totalling 56 days) and from October 10, 1968 to January 29, 1969 (totalling 111 days), and one count of violation of Article 134 (breaking restriction), UCMJ for breaking restriction imposed on him by his commander. The Appellant's chain of command recommended that he face a Special Court Martial empowered to issue a BCD. In March 1969, the Appellant met with a defense attorney and was informed of his rights under the UCMJ. In March 1969, the Appellant was tried at a Special Court Martial. The Appellant, upon the advice of counsel, pled guilty to the offenses. He was convicted and sentenced to be reduced to the grade of pay grade, E-1, to be confined at hard labor for three months, to forfeit $73.00 per month for three months, and to be discharged with a BCD. On two occasions, most recently in March 2008, the Appellant sought an upgrade to his discharge with the NBCNR. The NBCNR determined that the Appellant's discharge was proper as issued, that no change was warranted, and denial of his requests was proper. Analysis Turning to an analysis of the evidence, the weight of the evidence otherwise supports a finding that the Appellant's discharge occurred as the result of willful and persistent misconduct. The Appellant's command attempted numerous rehabilitative efforts to assist the Appellant in dealing with his misconduct, to include counseling. The rehabilitative efforts failed and the Appellant, despite being counselled on the possible adverse consequences of continued misconduct, broke restriction and went AWOL on a second occasion. The Appellant's repeated violations of the UCMJ is consistent with a finding that the Appellant's misconduct was both willful and persistent. He continued engaging in misconduct despite knowing that those actions could result in discharge from service and after receiving counseling. The Appellant was not discharged because of a minor offense, but he was instead discharged as a result of a clear pattern of serious misconduct that fundamentally interfered with his service duties and resulted in his separation from service for misconduct. The Appellant has not specifically argued that his in-service misconduct was neither willful nor persistent. The definition of willful misconduct is an act involving conscious wrongdoing or known prohibited action. It involves deliberate or intentional wrongdoing with knowledge of or wanton and reckless disregard of the probable consequences. 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(n). Rather, in a September 2007 correspondence, the Appellant asserted that his misconduct was due to several factors. The appellant stated: I was in the hospital for about six weeks when one night a doctor and a male nurse came into my room and told me that I was going back to Vietnam in the morning to do my recovery over there I told them that I could not walk without crutches. They told me that I would go in handcuffs and leg irons if necessary but I was going back. I told them that I have not had any leave to see my family. They told me the only way I would get leave will be to go over the hill. I got really upset and scared thinking that I was not going to see my family. I knew that the condition that I was in I would have gotten killed and would have never got to see my family I started to think that the Marine Corps did not want to help me. They just wanted to get me out of their way. I did not understand why they were sending me back to Vietnam while I was still in this condition. I was scared and started to wonder if they had done this to all of the boys that came back from Vietnam. The pressure of this ordeal made me think all I could do is run. That is when I went UA. They would call my mother's house and ask if I was ready to come back I said no. I was scared and have not had enough time. I was not able to be around people especially people with authority. After I thought about it for a while, I called the chaplain and went back to the base and turned myself in. In a September 2007 correspondence, the Appellant stated: At the time I was court-martialed, I was under emotional stress due to the fact the Marine Corps was harassing me and threatening to send me back to Vietnam of which I was stressed out due to the many combat operations I was involved in and my father had a heart attack I was in the process of trying to get a hardship discharge but the paperwork and a letter from then Congressman B.S. was destroyed in a fire in my mother's home. These problems further complicated in that I was in a non-pay status prior to any disciplinary action or going AWOL. I requested medical attention while in the brig on January 3, 1969 I didn't receive a reply until April 1969 on the point was I was in severe pain prior to and at time of court martial so that was the way I responded to my court counsel who said would get me out of the Marine Corps by pleading guilty to all charges. Despite the Appellant's contentions, the nature of the underlying in-service misconduct is determinative to the issue on appeal. The Appellant's misconduct resulted in his absence for approximately seven months and confinement for three months out of a two-year period of service, and he continued to engage in misconduct despite being disciplined on several occasions. The Board finds that the Appellant's conduct, which shows the Appellant going AWOL on two occasions and breaking restriction, occurred despite the illegality of such behavior. The Board also finds, as did the Appellants chain of command, that the Appellant's in-service misconduct was not minor, but it instead fundamentally interfered with his service duties. Insanity The Appellant has asserted that he had psychiatric impairment in service which caused or contributed to his misconduct. In his August 2010 letter, the Appellant asserts that: During this time, my family, financial and physical problems overcame me. I was a good Marine. I had shortly prior to the offences been promoted. These issues of stress were thrown upon me after having just returned from extremely heavy combat. I was young, and I just couldn't handle it. At that time in my life I couldn't see a problem with PTSD. I had never heard of it until recently. I met another Vietnam Veteran and he made me realize I had that problem. The Appellant's service treatment records contain one medical note indicating possible psychiatric symptomology: A January 1969 Prisoner's Special Request Chit notes that the Appellant reported that he "would like to see the doctor about my back and nerves." Additionally, during Special Court Martial proceedings, a transcript reflects the following testimony from questioning by Defense Counsel: Q. Do you want a Bad Conduct Disharge? A. No, sir, I don't' want a bad conduct discharge. Q. What has been the problem since August? A. I just can't hack it anymore, sir. Q. How come? A. It just gets the better of me, sir and I have to get away. It just gets me down. Q. Have you had any help along this line, such as a psychiatrist, a Chaplain, or anyone like that? A. No, sir, I talked to one Chaplain. Q. Do you think that your personality has been changed since you came back to the states? A. Yes, sir. I do. Q. In what respect? A. I just have a different outlook sir. I can't think straight anymore, sir. They get me cornered and I just have to get out the best I can. Q. Where do you go when you are over the hill? A. Here in Pensacola. Q. Where is your home? A. In Pensacola. Q. During the time you were UA both times that you were UA, rather, did you leave the State? A. No, sir. I stayed right here around home. Q. You were UA right here in Pensacola? October, November, December and most of January? A. Yes, sir. Q. What finally prompted you to come on back? A. I knew that one day I would have to face up to it, so I just came back. Q. So you figured it was time to face the music? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you think that you might be helped at all if you were to get some counseling or a psychiatric consultation on your personality problems? A. I don't know, sir. Q. Would you be willing to have such help if it were offered? A. Yes, sir. I would. When cross-examined by the Prosecution, the Appellant provided the following testimony: Q. You said you don't necessarily want a BCD. Do you want to stay in the Marine Corps? A. No, sir. Q. You don't want to stay in? A. No, sir. Q. If this court lets you go back to duty, are you going to go UA again? A. I don't know, sir. Until I get there, it's hard to say. Q. What do you think this court ought to do with you if you can't promise them you will go back to duty? A. I don't know, sir. Q. Don't you know what you are going don't you know that you are going to be more trouble to everybody concerned if you can't tell this court that you will go back to duty? A. All I know is, I've tried it three or four times and I just can't hack it, it gets the best of me. I started to drink and I didn't drink before I came into the service. Q. What is the matter with MAD, do you like MAD? Is there anything bad about the detachment that you don't particularly like? A. No, sir. Q. Just the service in general? A. Just the service in general. I can't cope with that kind of like. The Appellant's Counsel argued that the record established that the Appellant had coped very well with his service until he did eight months in Vietnam, and that he hadn't been able to adjust since. It was argued that, at the very least, the Appellant should have been given a psychiatric interview and evaluation as "[a]pparently it seems that what we have here is a breakdown in personality as well as attendant breakdown in discipline that one would expect in a situation of that sort." Several years after his discharge, the Appellant has sought mental health treatment for PTSD. In an April 2007 memorandum, a VA social worker diagnosed the Appellant with PTSD and opined as follows: (the appellant) was presented to me for evaluation of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result of his military service in Vietnam. I have also been asked to evaluate the circumstances under which he was court-martialed and discharged from the Marine Corps with a bad conduct discharge. It is clear that (the appellant) suffers from PTSD as a result of his service in Vietnam. There is no doubt in my mind that the reason (the appellant) went UA (unauthorized absence) in the manner and length of time he did was a direct result of the psychological impact his combat experience had on him. In November 2019, VA obtained a VA psychiatric opinion in order to determine if he was insane, by VA regulations, at the time of the commission of the offenses underlying his discharge. After a thorough review of the Appellant's records, the examiner concluded that the Appellant was not insane at the time of his in-service misconduct underlying his discharge. The VA examiner opined that it was less likely than not that the Appellant engaged in his misconduct as a result of insanity. The VA examiner also opined that there was no evidence that the Appellant's misconduct was the result of a psychiatric disorder, that a psychiatric disability at that time caused a prolonged deviation from normal behaviors, and that a psychiatric disability caused the Appellant to depart from accepted standards of his community. Specifically, the November 2019 VA examiner opined that Regarding the first question of "whether the appellant was insane" at the time of the AWOL offenses in Aug 1968-Jan 1969, there is simply no evidence in the record to support his insanity claim. In fact, he currently states that he made a decision to go AWOL to "avoid returning to combat." His reported thought process indicates that he made a willful decision to go AWOL for a specific reason to avoid harm. This indicated that his decision was based on a rational, perceived threat rather than a psychotic belief system. There is no indication that the (appellant's) behavior at the time of his offenses resulted from any disease which placed the appellant's mental capacity beyond his control. Per the November 2021 CAVC JMR, the Parties' agreed that the Board erred when it failed to ensure that the VA obtain an adequate medical opinion addressing the issue of whether the Appellant met the definition of insanity, under 38 C.F.R. § 3.354(a), at the time of the misconduct which led to his discharge. Specifically, the Board's May 2015 remand directives ordered a new VA examination and stated that "[i]n rendering an opinion, the examiner is particularly requested to address the statement provided by LCSW L.R. in April 2007 (to the effect that the Appellant likely suffered from PTSD)." The clinical social worker who authored the April 2007 letter found that it was "clear that [Appellant] was suffering from PTSD at the time of his" unauthorized absences." However, the 2019 VA examiner failed to address the April 2007 letter as directed by the Board's 2015 remand directives so that examination is inadequate. Also noted in the JMR is the basic premise, discussed in Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 437 (2011), that "[a] remand is meant to entail a critical examination of the justification for the decision." The record establishes that the Appellant served as a rifleman in the Republic of Vietnam wherein he participated in nine offensive operations, including security, search and destroy, and combat operations. There is no dispute that, up to this point, the Appellant had meritorious service with no behavioral or disciplinary problems. The Appellant's behavioral and disciplinary problems began when he returned from Vietnam for medical treatment. In January 1969, the Appellant reported that he "would like to see the doctor about my back and nerves." This was not accomplished. At his Special Court Martial proceeding, the Appellant described going UA due to an inability to cope and using alcohol for the first time to cope with these symptoms. He described difficulty with authority figures. His Defense Counsel argued that a psychiatric examination was warranted "to account for his breakdown in personality as well as attendant breakdown in discipline" that occurred since his return from Vietnam. However, no extensive psychiatric examination was obtained. As an initial matter, the Board finds that, following his service in Vietnam, the Veteran demonstrated a more or less prolonged deviation from his normal behavior. Interestingly, when asked at the Special Court Martial whether he would change his conduct and return to duty without further UA, the Appellant could not provide a definitive answer but rather stated "[a]ll I know is, I've tried it three or four times and I just can't hack it, it gets the best of me. I started to drink and I didn't drink before I came into the service." As noted in Beck, VA's definition of insanity is "broad," and there need not be a causal connection between the "insanity" and the misconduct. Beck, 13 Vet. App. at 539 (citing Zang). The Board also observes that PTSD was not recognized as a diagnosis by the American Psychiatric Association until January 1980. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 236 (3rd ed. 1980); Fletcher v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 394, 395 (1991); VAOPGPREC 26-97 (July 16, 1997). In this context, the Board reviews the legal standard for "insanity" - due to disease, exhibits a more or less prolonged deviation from his or her normal method of behavior. The fact that the Appellant deviated in a prolonged manner from his normal behavior is established. Thus, the issue in dispute is whether that behavioral deviation was due to disease. The VA social worker opined that "[i]t is clear that (the appellant) suffers from PTSD as a result of his service in Vietnam. There is no doubt in my mind that the reason (the appellant) went UA (unauthorized absence) in the manner and length of time he did was a direct result of the psychological impact his combat experience had on him." This opinion has some factual support based on the evidentiary record cited above the misconduct occurred after return from combat service and, during service, the Appellant described problems with his "nerves," alcohol use beginning in service, difficulty coping and difficulty with authority figures. On the other than hand, the negative VA opinion concluded that there was "no evidence" to support the insanity claim but rather the Appellant demonstrated a rational thought process of going UA due to a perceived threat returning to combat - rather than a "psychotic" belief system and that the offenses were based on any disease which placed the Appellant's mental capacity beyond his control. After a critical re-review of this record particularly a greater scrutinization of the Appellant's Special Courts Martial testimony, the Board finds that the Appellant manifested insanity - a prolonged deviation from his normal method of behavior due to PTSD - concurrently with the conduct leading to his discharge during his active service. The Appellant had no behavioral or disciplinary problems prior to his combat service in Vietnam, but experienced a prolonged deviation from his normal method of behavior which is attributed to PTSD manifested at that time. Based on the definition of insanity as interpreted by Zang, Beck and Gardner, the Board concludes that the Appellant met the definition of insanity which is a defense to the willful misconduct bar. As such, the Appellant's period of active service from June 1967 to June 1969 was valid service for VA service-connected benefit purposes. T. MAINELLI Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board Michael J. O'Connor, Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.