Citation Nr: 22044800 Decision Date: 08/08/22 Archive Date: 08/08/22 DOCKET NO. 16-17 432 DATE: August 8, 2022 ORDER Service connection for a psychiatric disorder diagnosed as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is granted. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran has been diagnosed with PTSD based on a combat-related in-service stressor. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for PTSD are met. 38 U.S.C. § 1101, 5103, 5103A, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.159, 3.303, 3.304. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from September 1971 to December 1975. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a June 2014 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). In August 2019, the Veteran was scheduled to appear for a Board hearing. However, he failed to appear and did not provide good cause or request that it be rescheduled. Thus, the Board deemed his hearing request withdrawn in May 2021. 38 C.F.R. § 20.704. Also in May 2021, the Board remanded the appeal and recharacterized the Veteran's claim as one for service connection for a psychiatric disability pursuant to Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App.1 (2009). The Veteran contends that he has PTSD as a result of his military service such that service connection for PTSD is warranted. Following a review of the record, the Board agrees. As an initial matter, the Board finds that the Veteran engaged in enemy combat during service. The Veteran has competently reported engagement in gunfire with the enemy in support of troops in Vietnam while he was serving aboard the USS Basilone. See December 2013 Statement in Support of Claim for Service Connection for PTSD. Personnel records confirm that the Veteran served in the "waters of the Vietnam combat zone" and was entitled to "combat zone Hostile Fire Pay." See July 1972 Service Personnel Record Administrative Remarks. Although the Veteran did not receive a medal or decoration indicative of combat, in such situations, the Board must make a combat determination on a case by case basis. VAOPGCPREC 12-99 (October 18, 1999) (combat determination should be made on a case by case basis where there is no medal specifically indicating combat service). In addition, in determining whether a Veteran engaged in combat, all of the evidence of record must be considered. Gaines v. West, 11 Vet. App. 353, 359 (1998) (evidence submitted to support a claim that a veteran engaged in combat my include the veteran's own statements and an almost unlimited variety of other types of evidence); Sizemore v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 264 (2004) (receiving enemy fire or firing on an enemy can constitute participation in combat). Given the Veteran's lay statements and the other evidence of record, the Board finds that he engaged in combat with the enemy. Thus, the combat rules will be applied to the Veteran's claim. Next, establishing entitlement to service connection for PTSD requires (1) medical evidence diagnosing PTSD; (2) a link, established by medical evidence, between a Veteran's present symptoms and an in-service stressor; and (3) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Of note, and as is relevant here, in cases of combat service, a Veteran's stressor may be verified by lay evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(2). In this case, the clinical evidence shows treatment of the Veteran for diagnoses of PTSD based on his reported in-service stressor. For example, during October 2013 mental health treatment, the Veteran recalled firing at the North Vietnamese in the jungle around the ship from a locked gun-mount in order to support the ground troops and reported recurrent dreams and nightmares related to the incident, as well increased startle response and an inability to concentrate whenever he thought of the incident. At that time, chronic PTSD was diagnosed by a VA psychiatrist. In February 2013, the Veteran had similar reports of nightmares, sleep problems, and intrusive recollections of trauma during service and, again, PTSD (along with bipolar disorder) was diagnosed by the VA psychiatrist with noted stressors of multiple sclerosis and intrusive recollection of fire-fight when on tour of duty in Vietnam on the USS Basilone. Thereafter, clinical records show a continuing diagnosis of PTSD made by a VA psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner, a diagnosis of rule out PTSD by a VA psychologist, as well as a notation by VA psychologists that the Veteran "is being treated for PTSD." See, e.g., June 2015, September 2015, December 2015, January 2016, and March 2016 VA treatment notes. The Board finds that the foregoing determinations are probative, as the record indicates that the VA psychiatrist and nurse practitioner considered the Veteran's relevant medical history as well as clinical findings from evaluations in rendering a diagnosis. Although the providers did not specifically list each of the diagnostic criterion for PTSD under the DSM-5, the Board notes that a clear diagnosis of PTSD made by a mental health professional "must be presumed (unless evidence shows to the contrary) to have been made in accordance with the applicable DSM criteria as to both the adequacy of the symptomatology and the sufficiency of the stressor." Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 140 (1997). The Board also notes that the diagnosis is consistent with service treatment records, which show that the Veteran reported depression and excessive worry on his separation examination in December 1975, as well as his reports during his early mental health treatment of "bad dreams" about the military. See December 1975 Report of Medical History and November 2012 VA treatment note. Moreover, it is significant that the record does not support the existence of any nonservice-related stressors upon which the PTSD diagnosis could be based, and the VA psychiatrist considered the Veteran's diagnosis of multiple sclerosis as well as the Veteran's in-service stressor in finding that the Veteran had PTSD related to his service-related stressor. Consequently, the Board finds that the PTSD diagnosis is credible and was based on the Veteran's established in-service stressor. The Board is cognizant that a June 2014 VA examiner found that a diagnosis of PTSD was not warranted, and that a diagnosis of rule out PTSD was also continued throughout the record. However, in May 2021, the Board found the June 2014 VA examination to be inadequate. In this regard, the Board observes that, in attributing the Veteran's psychiatric problems to his multiple sclerosis and concern over his wife's then-recent health issues, the examiner failed to address the Veteran's report of psychiatric treatment 20 years prior, which preceded both his MS diagnosis and his wife's ALS diagnosis. Regardless, even if the June 2014 examination was deemed adequate and recognizing the "r/o PTSD" diagnosis, after considering the probative weight of the opinions of the VA psychiatrist and VA nurse practitioner, the Board finds that the evidence is at least evenly balanced as to whether the Veteran has a current diagnosis of PTSD under the DSM-5 criteria that is related to his established in-service stressor. In this regard, in Lynch v. McDonough, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) held that, under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b), the benefit-of-the-doubt principle may be triggered where the evidence of record is nearly equal. 21 F.4th 776, 781 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). The Federal Circuit further explained that this interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) "necessarily includes scenarios where the evidence is not in equipoise but nevertheless is in approximate balance." Id. The Board finds Lynch to be applicable in the instant case as the evidence of record is in approximate balance, but not equipoise. Resolving all reasonable doubt in the Veteran's favor, the Board concludes that a current diagnosis of PTSD related to an in-service stressor has been established. Thus, entitlement to service connection for PTSD is warranted. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303. MARTIN B. PETERS Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board A. Fagan The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.