Citation Nr: 22045281 Decision Date: 08/10/22 Archive Date: 08/10/22 DOCKET NO. 19-19 007 DATE: August 10, 2022 ORDER Entitlement to an earlier effective date prior to February 23, 2012, for service connection for PTSD based on clear and unmistakable error in an April 2010 rating decision is denied. FINDING OF FACT 1. The April 2010 rating decision denying service connection for PTSD became final. 2. There was no mistake of law or fact in the April 2010 rating decision denying service connection for PTSD that manifestly changed the outcome of the decision. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for revision of an April 2010 rating decision denying service connection for PTSD based on clear and unmistakable error are not met. 38 U.S.C. § 5109A; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 3.105 (a), 3.156. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from June 1990 to June 1993, and from May 1994 to February 2008. This matter is on appeal to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a January 2018 rating decision. An October 2020 Board decision denied the Veteran's motion for revision of an April 2010 rating decision based on clear and unmistakable error (CUE). The Veteran appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). Pursuant to a January 2022 Joint Motion for Remand wherein the parties agreed the Board erred in addressing whether VA treatment records noting the Veteran was combat eligible received within the appeal period of the April 2010 rating decision constituted new and material evidence pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (b), the October 2020 decision was vacated and returned to the Board. The Board notes that the Veteran obtained new representation as of May 2022. The Veteran's representative filed a request for a 60-day extension to submit additional argument or evidence, which was granted in a letter dated May 16, 2022. The Veteran contends that VA treatment records associated with the file within the appeal period of the April 2010 rating decision rendered the decision non-final and pending until his grant of service connection in a July 2013 rating decision, warranting an earlier effective date. By way of background, the Veteran filed for service connection for "fear of people around me getting hurt" in February 2009. In an April 2009 VA examination, the Veteran's combat service medals were noted, and it was indicated that he had combat experience in Afghanistan and Uzebekistan from 2004 to 2005. The examiner found that the Veteran did not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of a mental disorder under the DSM-IV criteria. In a January 2010 rating decision, service connection for a parent-child relational problem (claimed as fear of someone around you getting hurt) was denied, but service connection for PTSD was deferred pending VCAA notification. The decision stated that review of service treatment records (STRs) was negative for psychiatric treatment or diagnosis, and review of the DD-214 was negative for evidence of combat service or medals which indicate combat. Finally, review of the post-service treatment records from Dr. N. was negative for psychiatric treatment or diagnosis. On April 1, 2010, a VA memorandum contained a formal finding of a lack of information required to verify stressors in connection with the Veteran's PTSD claim. The memorandum stated that on April 1, 2010, treatment records from VAMC Hampton and Washington were reviewed, showing no diagnosis of PTSD, and the information related to a combat-related stressor was "too vague to research." A rating decision was issued on April 2, 2010, denying service connection for PTSD. It was again stated that the STRs, DD-214, and treatment records from Dr. N. were negative for evidence of combat or PTSD treatment or diagnosis. The decision also stated that a VA Form 21-0791 Statement in Support of Claim for Service Connection for PTSD was mailed to the Veteran; however, no response was received and, thus, VA was unable to verify an in-service stressor. The decision stated that the evidence did not show a confirmed diagnosis of PTSD, nor was the evidence sufficient to confirm that he engaged in combat or that there was a link between his current symptoms and in-service stressor. Notably, VA treatment records were not listed as evidence considered. On February 4, 2011, within a year of the issuance of the April 2010 decision, VA treatment records from Washington VAMC stated that the Veteran was combat eligible. In February 2012, the Veteran submitted a VA Form 21-0781 detailing his in-service stressors. In November 2012, a VA memorandum observed that the Veteran's DD-214 showed that the Veteran served in Afghanistan and received the Afghanistan Campaign Medal. Therefore, an in-service stressor was conceded. In a February 2013 VA examination, the Veteran was diagnosed with PTSD. In a July 2013 rating decision, service connection was granted effective February 23, 2012, the date of receipt of the VA Form 21-0781, construed as a claim to reopen. A decision of the Regional Office (RO) becomes final if the appellant does not express disagreement or submit new and material evidence within one year. 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104 (a), 3.105 (b), 3.156 (b), 3.160 (d). Considering the issue of finality, the Board observes that VA treatment records appear to have been added to the claims file prior to the expiration of the appeal period. Pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (b), when new and material evidence is received within the one-year appeal period, the RO should readjudicate the claim. New evidence is defined as existing evidence not previously submitted to agency decision makers. Material evidence is defined as existing evidence that, by itself or when considered with previous evidence of record, relates to an unestablished fact necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 (a). Here, the Board finds that the evidence was not new and material. The April 1, 2010, memorandum indicates that VA reviewed VA treatment records that contained the "combat eligible" notation. While it fails to state so explicitly, it indicates that records were reviewed, and any combat-related information was too vague to research. Although the April 2, 2010, rating decision did not list the VA treatment records as evidence considered, and it is unclear exactly when the records became available, the file shows that the records were available to VA, and in fact considered, prior to the issuance of the decision. Moreover, the April 2009 VA examination, which was listed as evidence reviewed, also contains the Veteran's combat information. While the February 2011 VA treatment records may have been new in that they contained records not created at the time of the April 2010 decision, they did not contain material information that VA did not have access to prior to their creation. Because the Veteran did not appeal the April 2010 decision, and the relevant provisions under 38 C.F.R. § 3.156 are inapplicable, the decision became final. Once a rating decision is final, it may not be revised except based on CUE. 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (c); 38 C.F.R. § 3.105 (a). CUE is a collateral attack on an otherwise final rating decision by an RO. Smith v. Brown, 35 F.3d 1516, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994). As such, there is a presumption of validity that attaches to a final decision, and when such a decision is collaterally attacked, the presumption becomes even stronger. Fugo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 40, 44 (1993). To establish CUE in a prior decision, the following requirements must be met: (1) either the facts known at the time of the decision being attacked on the basis of CUE were not before the adjudicator or the law then in effect was incorrectly applied; (2) an error occurred based on the record and the law that existed at the time; and (3) had the error not been made, the outcome would have been manifestly different. See, e.g., Bouton v. Peake, 23 Vet. App. 70, 71 (2008) (internal citation omitted); Damrel v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 242, 245 (1994) (quoting Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313-14 (1992) (en banc)). CUE is a very specific and rare kind of error of fact or law that, when called to the attention of later reviewers, compels the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the error. Thus, even where the premise of error is accepted, if it is not absolutely clear that a different result would have ensued, the error complained of cannot be clear and unmistakable. Fugo, 6 Vet. App. at 43-44. A determination of CUE must be based on the record and the law that existed at the time of the prior adjudication. Baldwin v. West, 13 Vet. App. 1 (1999); Caffrey v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 377 (1994). Regarding any contentions that VA failed in its duty to assist, a failure in the duty to assist cannot constitute CUE. See Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Livesay v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 165 (2001). Service connection for PTSD has unique evidentiary requirements. It generally requires: (1) medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125 (a) (in 2010, the DSM-IV); (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in service stressor actually occurred; and (3) medical evidence of a link between current symptomatology and the claimed in service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f) (2010). Concerning the requirement that there be credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred, section 3.304 (f) sets forth circumstances that are exceptions to this rule, including if the veteran engaged in combat. If the evidence establishes that the veteran engaged in combat with the enemy, the claimed stressor is related to that combat, and the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the veteran's service, the VA allows the veteran to establish the occurrence of the claimed stressor through the veteran's "lay testimony alone" when there is no clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f)(2). The ordinary meaning of the phrase "engaged in combat with the enemy," as used in 38 U.S.C. § 1154 (b), requires that a veteran have participated in events constituting an actual fight or encounter with a military foe or hostile unit or instrumentality. The issue of whether any particular set of circumstances constitutes engagement in combat with the enemy for purposes of section 1154 (b) must be resolved on a case-by-case basis. See VAOPGCPREC 12 99 (October 18, 1999). The evidence at the time of the April 2010 rating decision did not show a clear and unmistakable diagnosis of PTSD in accordance with the DSM-IV. The private treatment records, STRs, VA treatment records, and April 2009 VA examination do not contain a diagnosis of PTSD. Without a confirmed DSM-IV diagnosis until February 2013, service connection could not be granted prior. The April 2010 rating decision does erroneously state that the Veteran's DD-214 showed no evidence of combat. This is a mistake of fact. However, the mistake did not manifestly change the outcome of the decision, as service connection would not have been granted absent the error. Even had combat been confirmed in April 2010, as stated above, a diagnosis of PTSD had not yet been established. The Board is sympathetic to the Veteran's position. While VA must render a decision which grants every benefit that can be supported in law, 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (a), it is bound by the laws and regulations that apply to veterans claims. 38 U.S.C. § 7104 (c); 38 C.F.R. § 20.105. It is emphasized again that CUE is a rare kind of error, and applying the stringent standard, the evidence does not meet it in this case. As such, the Board must deny the motion to revise the April 2010 decision based on CUE. L.M. BARNARD Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board A. Carroll, Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.