Citation Nr: 22045458 Decision Date: 08/10/22 Archive Date: 08/10/22 DOCKET NO. 16-33 328 DATE: August 10, 2022 ORDER A 50 percent rating is granted for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) since May 21, 2014 (so not just since December 20, 2014). However, a rating higher than 50 percent for the PTSD at any point during the rating period on appeal so either prior to or since May 21, 2014, is denied. REMANDED Entitlement to service connection for hypertension is remanded. Entitlement to service connection for diabetes mellitus, type II (DMII), is remanded. Entitlement to service connection for a heart disability giving rise to shortness of breath and consequent triple bypass surgery is remanded. Entitlement to service connection for a left hand disability is remanded. Entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) is remanded. FINDING OF FACT Effectively since May 21, 2014 (rather than just since December 20, 2014), the severity, frequency, and duration of the Veteran's PTSD symptoms more closely approximated occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and productivity, but at no time under consideration did they more closely approximate occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas. CONCLUSION OF LAW Effectively since May 21, 2014 (and not just instead since December 20, 2014), the criteria are met for a 50 percent rating for the PTSD, but at no time before or since have the criteria been met for entitlement to any greater rating. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.3, 4.7, 4.126, 4.130, Diagnostic Code (DC/Code) 9411. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from January 1971 to January 1973, from September 1990 to June 1991, and from February 2003 to February 2004. This appeal to this Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) is from an October 2014 rating decision of a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO), which is the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ). In July 2019, in support of these claims, the Veteran testified at a hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. A transcript of the hearing is of record. The Veteran subsequently died in February 2021 and, as a result, later that same month the Board summarily dismissed this appeal. However, his surviving spouse, so widow, since has been substituted as the Appellant to process these claims to completion. As a threshold matter, the Board sees the Veteran's claim for service connection for shortness of breath (now characterized as a heart disability giving rise to that shortness of breath and consequent triple bypass surgery) was denied in a June 1994 rating decision. A rating decision in February 2005 denied a petition to reopen this claim because the Veteran had not submitted any new and material evidence. The claims for service connection for hypertension and DMII also were denied in that February 2005 rating decision, and a rating decision in May 2008 denied a petition to reopen these claims also because no new and material evidence had been submitted. A rating decision in March 2012 again denied a petition to reopen the claim for service connection for hypertension again, because there was no new and material evidence. Generally, decisions of the RO and this Board that are not appealed are final and binding determinations based on the evidence of record at the time the decision was issued. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104, 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 20.1100, 20.1103. However, at any time after VA issues a decision on a claim, if VA receives or associates with the claims file relevant official service department records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim, VA will reconsider the claim as opposed to first requiring new and material evidence to reopen it. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c); see also Vigil v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 63 (2008) (explaining that unit records provided to the RO by the U. S. Armed Services Center for Research of Unit Records (USASCRUR), later known as the Joint Services Records Research Center (JSRRC), constitute official service department records for purposes of new and material evidence, thus requiring de novo review or reconsideration, rather than review as a claim to reopen); Blubaugh v. McDonald, 773 F.3d 1310, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that, essentially, the purpose of § 3.156(c) is "to place a veteran in the position he would have been had the VA considered the relevant service department record before the disposition of [the] earlier claim"); but see also George v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 199 (2018) (further clarifying that the provisions of paragraph (c)(1) do not apply, however, to records that VA could not have obtained when it earlier decided the claim because the records did not exist at the time of the prior decision or because the claimant failed to provide sufficient information for VA to identify and obtain the service department records from an official source. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(2). Here, the Board sees that, through no fault of his own the Veteran's service treatment records (STRs) from his first period of service between January 1971 and January 1973 were not associated with his claims file until much more recently, in May 2014, so not until after all prior final and binding denials had occurred concerning his claims for shortness of breath, hypertension, and DMII. As such, new and material evidence is not needed to reopen these claims since official service department records (STRs) were received after those earlier, final, and binding denials of these claims. Therefore, the Board may immediately proceed to considering these claims on a de novo basis. Increased Ratings Disability ratings are determined by applying the criteria set forth in VA's Schedule for Rating Disabilities (Rating Schedule), which is based on the average impairment of earning capacity. Individual disabilities are assigned separate diagnostic codes. 38 U.S.C. § 1155; 38 C.F.R. § 4.1. The basis of disability evaluations is the ability of the body as a whole, or of the psyche, or of a system or organ of the body to function under the ordinary conditions of daily life including employment. 38 C.F.R. § 4.10. When evaluating the severity of a disability, it is essential the disability is considered in the context of its entire recorded history. 38 C.F.R. § 4.1; Peyton v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 282 (1991). Where entitlement to compensation already has been established and an increase in the disability rating is at issue, the present level of disability is of primary importance. Francisco v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 55, 58 (1994). But if the factual findings show distinct time periods when the service-connected disability exhibits symptoms that would warrant different ratings, then separate ratings may be assigned for separate periods of time based on the facts found. This practice is known as "staged" ratings and is employed for initial or established ratings. Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 119 (1999); Hart v. Mansfield, 21 Vet. App. 505 (2007). If the disability more closely approximates the criteria for the higher of two ratings, the higher rating will be assigned; otherwise, the lower rating is assigned. 38 C.F.R. § 4.7. In general, it is not expected that all cases will show all the findings specified; however, findings sufficiently characteristic to identify the disease and the disability therefrom and coordination of rating with impairment of function will be expected in all instances. 38 C.F.R. § 4.21. When, after careful consideration of all procurable and assembled data, a reasonable doubt arises regarding the degree of disability, this doubt will be resolved in the Veteran's favor. 38 C.F.R. § 4.3. The Veteran, and now the new substitute Appellant (his widow), argue that his PTSD deserved higher ratings meaning a rating higher than 0 percent (so a compensable rating) prior to December 20, 2014, and a rating higher than 50 percent since that date. So, the rating for this service-connected disability already has been "staged". Under the General Rating Formula for Mental Disorders (General Formula), the Board must conduct a "holistic analysis" that considers all associated symptoms, regardless of whether they are listed as criteria. Bankhead v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 10, 22 (2017); 38 C.F.R. § 4.130. The Board must determine whether unlisted symptoms are similar in severity, frequency, and duration to the listed symptoms associated with specific disability percentages. Then, the Board must determine whether the associated symptoms, both listed and unlisted, caused the level of impairment required for a higher disability rating. Vazquez-Claudio v. Shinseki, 713 F.3d 112, 114-118 (Fed. Cir. 2013). A noncompensable rating is assigned when a mental condition has been formally diagnosed, but symptoms are not severe enough to either require continuous medication, or to interfere with occupational and social functioning. A 10 percent rating is assigned when mild or transient symptoms which decrease work efficiency and ability to perform occupational tasks only during periods of occasional stress, or symptoms controlled by medication cause occupational and social impairment. A 30 percent rating is assigned when symptoms such as depressed mood, anxiety, suspiciousness, panic attacks (weekly or less often), chronic sleep impairment, or mild memory loss (such as forgetting names, directions, or recent events), cause occupational and social impairment with occasional decrease in work efficiency and intermittent periods of inability to perform occupational tasks (although generally functioning satisfactorily, with routine behavior, self-care, and normal conversation). A 50 percent rating is assigned when symptoms such as flattened affect; circumstantial, circumlocutory, or stereotyped speech; panic attacks more than once a week; difficulty in understanding complex commands; impairment of short and long-term memory (e.g., retention of only highly learned material, forgetting to complete tasks); impaired judgment; impaired abstract thinking; disturbances of motivation and mood; or difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships cause occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and productivity. A 70 percent rating is assigned when symptoms such as suicidal ideation; obsessional rituals which interfere with routine activities; intermittently illogical, obscure, or irrelevant speech; near-continuous panic or depression affecting the ability to function independently, appropriately and effectively; impaired impulse control (such as unprovoked irritability with periods of violence); spatial disorientation; neglect of personal appearance and hygiene; difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances (including work or a worklike setting); or inability to establish and maintain effective relationships cause occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood. A 100 percent rating is assigned for total occupational and social impairment, due to such symptoms as: gross impairment in thought processes or communication; persistent delusions or hallucinations; grossly inappropriate behavior; persistent danger of hurting self or others; intermittent inability to perform activities of daily living (including maintenance of minimal personal hygiene); disorientation to time or place; or memory loss for names of close relatives, own occupation or own name. 1. The higher 50 percent rating is warranted as of an earlier effective date, namely, as of May 21, 2014 (rather than just since December 20, 2014) For this initial period at issue, the Veteran contended, and the appellant contends that his PTSD was more severe than contemplated by the existing 0 percent (i.e., noncompensable) rating. The Veteran initially underwent a VA PTSD examination in October 2014. The examiner indicated that, while the Veteran had a diagnosis of PTSD, it was not severe enough to interfere with his occupational or social activities and, further, he was not prescribed medication for treatment of the condition. Concerning his social activities, the Veteran stated that he got along well with his children and grandchildren, that his marriage was good, and that he attended church and got along with others there. He additionally indicated that he had friends that he would gather with. He specified that he had trouble sleeping, nightmares, but slept 12 hours per day. He denied any hallucinations and, while he reported having panic attacks twice weekly, the examiner explained that the symptoms described by the Veteran were not consistent with panic attacks. The Veteran denied anxiety symptoms and said that, about three to four times per week, he was irritable and isolated. Although he reported having suicidal ideation five to six times during the six months immediately prior to that examination, he denied any plan or intent. However, precedent cases have clarified that mere contemplation of suicide is sufficient in this circumstance. Bankhead v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 10, 19 (2017). In November 2014, the Veteran submitted several buddy statements from family members. In the statement from the Appellant, she indicated that on multiple occasions the Veteran had chased her out of the house with a gun while experiencing anger. The Veteran's son also recalled that his father grabbed multiple guns and proceeded to point them at family members, claiming "they were the enemy." The Veteran's daughter also recollected an instance growing up when he pulled a gun on two of her friends. Each of these letters also discussed his alcoholism and erratic and angry behavior. Overall, then, for this initial period at issue, the Board concludes the Veteran's PTSD was manifested by symptoms most closely associated with a higher 50 percent rating including as examples by what amount to impaired judgement, impaired abstract thinking, disturbances in mood, and difficulty establishing effective relationships. He also as mentioned indicated passive suicidal ideation during his October 2014 VA examination, a symptom associated with an even higher 70 percent rating. The evidence supports that he had trouble with anger outbursts, but which the Board finds more closely approximate the symptoms contemplated by a 50 percent rating rather than the 0 percent rating currently assigned for this initial period or an even greater 70 percent rating. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.126. To reiterate, the Veteran expressed suicidal ideation, which is akin to danger of self-harm, which is contemplated by an even still greater 100 percent rating. Bankhead, 29 Vet. App. 19. However, the severity, frequency, and duration of his suicidal ideation did not rise to the level contemplated by the 100 percent disability rating or even a 70 percent disability rating since it was not persistent. In his treatment records he conversely most times denied any thoughts, intent, or plan involving self-harm (so even contemplation of that), and during his October 2014 VA examination he indicated that he had no history of suicide attempt and no plan or intent to commit suicide. Thus, when resolving all reasonable doubt in the Appellant-widow's favor concerning the severity of the Veteran's PTSD, holistically, the evidence of record establishes entitlement to the higher 50 percent rating for this mental disorder as of an earlier effective date namely, as of May 21, 2014 (rather than just since December 20, 2014). 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.3 4.7. The Federal Circuit Court has explained that there need only be an "approximate" (meaning nearly equal) balance of evidence, for versus against the claim, to warrant invoking the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine or rule, not an exact balance of evidence. See Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (en banc). And this is the situation here, at the very least, so this claim is being granted to this extent. 2. Entitlement to a rating higher than 50 percent for the PTSD either prior to or since May 21, 2014 It is not shown the Veteran had deficiencies in most areas to warrant an even higher 70 percent rating either prior to or since May 21, 2014 or the total occupational and social impairment required for an even greater 100 percent rating. On December 20, 2014, the Veteran underwent an additional VA mental status examination, and the results of that evaluation were the reason the RO increased his rating from 0 to 50 percent as of that date. However, the higher U. S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court/CAVC) has explained that when evidence is created is irrelevant compared to when a Veteran is experiencing symptoms warranting a certain rating. See McGrath v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 28 (2000). See also Swain v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 219, 223-24 (2015) (holding that assigning the effective date of an increased rating is not a mechanical exercise of just applying the date of the VA or other examination that warranted the increase). In Swain, the CAVC observed that, in many cases, VA adjudicators assign increased ratings from the date the VA or private examination occurred when the report is the basis of the awarded increase. However, the CAVC repeatedly grants Joint Motions for Remand (JMRs), Joint Motions for Partial Remands (JMPRs), and issues Memorandum Decisions that vacate and remand Board decisions under Swain, particularly when the examination report or other evidence of record, including lay evidence, suggests the increase in severity of the disability began prior to the date of the examination. Here, though, there already has been recognition of this in this Board granting the higher 50 percent rating as of May 21, 2014, rather than just since that December 20, 2014, VA mental status evaluation. During that evaluation, the Veteran reported continuing to sleep poorly with nightmares and drinking alcohol excessively. He endorsed a depressed mood, suspiciousness, chronic sleep impairment, mild memory loss, difficulty understanding complex commands, and impaired judgement. The examiner indicated the Veteran's poor judgement was due to his alcohol abuse. He did not endorse having any suicidal ideation. A November 2015 VA psychiatric treatment record shows the Veteran complained of trouble sleeping and visual hallucinations, but denied any suicidal or homicidal ideation, had clear speech, and was alert and oriented in all spheres (meaning to time, place, person, and situation). He also denied suicidal ideation according to a December 2015 VA treatment record. In January 2016 the Veteran underwent another VA PTSD examination. He endorsed such symptoms as reexperiencing the trauma, cue avoidance, hyperarousal, and negative alterations in cognitions. The examiner explained that the Veteran also had a diagnosis of depression, separate from his PTSD diagnosis, and that some symptoms were able to be differentiated between the two disorders, including, importantly, his suicidal ideation. Thus, that symptom cannot be reason to increase (even further) the rating for his PTSD. See Mittleider v. West, 11 Vet. App. 181 (1998). However, symptoms that conversely could not be differentiated included sleep disturbance, attention and concentration problems, irritability and anger, reduced interest and participation in activities, feelings of detachment, and social withdrawal. That said, he continued to report good relationships with his children and grandchildren, whom he babysat after school. He reported limited activity outside of the house, however, he attributed that to his physical limitations rather than owing to his PTSD. The examiner observed that the Veteran's affect was blunted and dysphoric, but there was no evidence of mental content symptomatology, perceptual disturbance, or gross cognitive confusion. The Veteran indicated he hallucinated right before falling asleep, which the examiner described as hypnagogic hallucinations. The Veteran denied having "any history of suicidal or homicidal ideation" during subsequent April 2016 and April 2017 VA appointments. During the July 2019 hearing before this Board, the Appellant, testifying as a witness, expounded that the Veteran was "always angry" and that he often would lay in bed all day, only getting up to eat and then returning to bed. The Veteran testified that he believed his PTSD impacted his work prior to retirement because he would get suspended because of his attitude. Overall, the VA treatment records, the multiple VA examinations, and the Veteran's and Appellant-widow's testimony tend to illustrate that his PTSD was manifested by symptoms most commensurate with a 50 percent rating including especially disturbances in motivation and mood, impaired memory, and difficulty in maintaining effective social relationships. He also had some symptoms commonly associated with a higher 70 percent rating including passive suicidal ideation and unprovoked irritability. As well, he had symptoms that are not listed with a specific rating, such as blunted affect, dysphoric mood, and hypnagogic hallucinations. But ultimately, the Board finds that the severity, frequency, and duration of the Veteran's symptoms (listed and unlisted) most closely approximated those contemplated by a 50 percent rating, which are less severe, less frequent, and shorter in duration than those contemplated by a 70 percent rating. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.126. He acknowledged that his symptoms were not present daily, rather, occurred occasionally. Further, blunted affect and dysphoric mood are similar to flattened affect, which is contemplated by the assigned 50 percent rating. The Board finds the level of impairment caused by the Veteran's symptoms most closely approximated the level associated with this 50 percent rating for the entire period on appeal. He experienced occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and productivity. He routinely reported good relationships with his wife, children, and grandchildren. Further, VA examiners consistently observed that he was well-groomed and acted appropriately. Accordingly, the most probative evidence of record persuasively weighs against this claim for a rating even higher than 50 percent for the Veteran's PTSD. And, as the most probative evidence of record persuasively weighs against this claim, the benefit-of-the-doubt rule does not apply since the evidence for versus against this claim (at least as concerning this point) is not in relative, i.e., approximate balance. See Lynch, 21 F.4th at 776, Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001). REASONS FOR REMAND 3. Entitlement to service connection for hypertension and DMII is remanded. The evidence of record shows that the Veteran was diagnosed with DMII in December 1999 and hypertension in May 2000. Both of these diagnoses were rendered between periods of active service. A record from October 2003 shows that the Veteran was found to be incapable of serving in a combat environment, and the recommendation was that the Veteran be found unfit for reasonable performance of his duties because of his DMII and hypertension. At the July 2019 hearing, the Veteran testified that he was medically evacuated from Iraq and hospitalized in Germany for three weeks and then an additional two and a half weeks in the United States due to his hypertension and DMII. He additionally testified that after his hospitalization, he was prescribed medicine for both his blood pressure (hypertension) and DMII for the first time while on active duty. The Board finds that a record review and opinion as to aggravation of preexisting conditions is warranted to determine if the Veteran's hypertension and DMII were aggravated by his period of service between February 2003 and June 2004. 4. Entitlement to service connection for a heart condition giving rise to shortness of breath and consequent triple bypass surgery and for a left hand disability is remanded. Because a decision on the remanded issue of hypertension could significantly impact a decision on the issues of a heart condition and a left hand disability, the issues are inextricably intertwined. More specifically, if the Veteran's hypertension is found to have been aggravated by his service, an opinion as to whether the Veteran's heart condition giving rise to his triple bypass surgery and shortness of breath is secondary to, meaning caused or aggravated by, his hypertension is warranted. The Board recognizes that the appellant's claim for service connection for a heart condition is premised on exposure to herbicide agents, however the record at this point does not support that the Veteran was exposed to herbicide agents. The Board is required to consider all potential theories of entitlement to VA benefits that are either raised by the claimant or reasonably raised by the record, including the issue of service connection on a direct or secondary basis, rather than presumptive. Yancy v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 484, 493-94 (2016). Concerning the Veteran's left hand disability, a November 2015 VA treatment record shows that he was diagnosed with left hand paralysis that started after his triple bypass surgery. While the appellant's claim for a left hand disability is based on direct service connection, as the Veteran testified at the July 2019 hearing that he believed it was related to a fall during his period of service from January 1971 to January 1973, the Board will also develop this claim on a secondary basis. Because there is the possiblity of the Veteran's left hand disabiltiy having been secondary to his heart disability, this claim is also inextricably intertwined and must be remanded. A remand of the claims for service connection for a heart condition giving rise to a triple bypass and shortness of breath, and a left hand condition, as secondary to a heart condition is required. 5. Entitlement to a TDIU At the July 2019 hearing, the Veteran testified that his PTSD caused him occupational impairment because his "attitude" resulted in multiple suspensions from work, prior to ending employment around the age of 62. He also testified that most of the reason he stopped working was due to his PTSD symptoms. Accordingly, the Board finds that the issue of entitlement to a TDIU has been raised by the record. Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447 (2009). That said, the Board also finds this issue of entitlement to a TDIU (prior to the Veteran's passing) is "inextricably intertwined" with the other claims being remanded for further development because the grant of service connection for any of the other claimed disabilities has the potential to increase the Veteran's combined disability rating to meet the schedular criteria for a TDIU. See generally 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). And, even if they do not, there still would need to be consideration of this possible TDIU entitlement, regardless, under the special provisions of § 4.16(b). See Snider v. McDonough, 35 Vet. App. 1 (2021), citing Ray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 58, 66 (2019). Further in this regard, VA should attempt to obtain the Veteran's historical employment information. Accordingly, these remaining claims are REMANDED for the following action: 1. Request that the Appellant-widow complete and submit a TDIU application (VA Form 21-8940) with the Veteran's prior employment information, to the best of her ability, and to provide any other relevant evidence or information needed to fully develop this derivative TDIU claim. 2. Have an appropriate clinician conduct a file review and provide an opinion regarding whether the Veteran's hypertension and DMII, which onset between periods of active service (so they existed prior to the period of service from February 2003 to June 2004), at least as likely as not increased in severity during service? If so, was the increase in severity (worsening) clearly and unmistakably (undebatable) due to the natural progression of these diseases? 3. If the Veteran's hypertension and DM II are determined to have worsened during or by his service beyond their natural progression, i.e., were aggravated by his service, have an appropriate clinician also provide an opinion concerning whether the Veteran's heart disability giving rise to his shortness of breath and consequent triple bypass surgery was either caused OR aggravated by his hypertension and/or DM II. 4. Have an appropriate clinician conduct a file review and provide still additional comment on whether the Veteran's left-hand condition was as likely as not related to a fall off a truck during his period of service from January 1971 to January 1973? Additionally, if the Veteran's heart condition is determined to be secondary to his hypertension and/or DM II, have an appropriate clinician conduct a file review and provide an opinion concerning whether the Veteran's left-hand disability was either caused OR aggravated by his heart disability giving rise to the triple bypass surgery. KEITH W. ALLEN Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board K. Pak The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.