Citation Nr: 22045477 Decision Date: 08/11/22 Archive Date: 08/11/22 DOCKET NO. 11-03 719 DATE: August 11, 2022 ORDER For the entire period on appeal beginning August 24, 2009, a 70 percent rating, but no higher, for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), is granted. Entitlement to individual unemployability (TDIU) is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The severity, frequency, and duration of the Veteran's PTSD symptoms have been productive of occupational and social impairment in most areas, but did not more closely approximate total social and occupational impairment. 2. The evidence of record does not demonstrate that the Veteran's service-connected disability render him unable to secure or follow substantially gainful employment. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. For the entire period on appeal beginning August 24, 2009, the criteria for a rating of 70 percent, but no higher, for PTSD are met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.1, 4.3, 4.7, 4.21, 4.126, 4.130, Diagnostic Code (DC) 9411. 2. The criteria for a TDIU are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.340, 3.341, 4.16, 4.18. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty from June 1979 to March 1993. These matters come before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from rating decisions dated May 2010 and July 2015 by a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). In May 2018, the Board denied the issues for entitlement to a rating in excess of 30 percent for PTSD and entitlement to a TDIU. The Veteran timely appealed the Board's decision to the U.S. Court of Veterans Appeal (Court), resulting in an April 2019 Joint Motion for Remand (JMR) by the Parties to the JMR (the Veteran and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs). A Court Order remanded the matter for compliance with the instructions in the JMR. In June 2021, the Board again denied the issues on appeal. The Veteran again appealed the Board's decision to the Court, resulting in a July 2017 JMR. A Court Order remanded the matter for compliance with the instructions in the JMR. Rating for PTSD Disability Laws and Analysis Per his January 5, 2017 Appellate Brief, the Veteran seeks a disability rating higher than 30 percent for his service-connected PTSD, which is evaluated under DC 9411, 38 C.F.R. § 4.130. Disability ratings are determined by applying the criteria set forth in VA's Schedule for Rating Disabilities. The percentage ratings are based on the average impairment of earning capacity and individual disabilities are assigned separate diagnostic codes. 38 U.S.C. § 1155; 38 C.F.R. § 4.1. If two evaluations are potentially applicable, the higher evaluation will be assigned if the disability picture more nearly approximates the criteria required for that evaluation; otherwise, the lower rating will be assigned. 38 C.F.R. § 4.7. Any reasonable doubt regarding a degree of disability will be resolved in favor of the veteran. 38 C.F.R. § 4.3. Under the General Formula for Mental Disorders (General Formula), the Board must conduct a "holistic analysis" that considers all associated symptoms, regardless of whether they are listed as criteria. Bankhead v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 10, 22 (2017); 38 C.F.R. § 4.130. The Board must determine whether unlisted symptoms are similar in severity, frequency, and duration to the listed symptoms associated with specific disability percentages. Then, the Board must determine whether the associated symptoms, both listed and unlisted, caused the level of impairment required for a higher disability rating. Vazquez-Claudio v. Shinseki, 713 F.3d 112, 114-118 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Under Diagnostic Code 9411, a rating of 30 percent is warranted if there is occupational and social impairment with occasional decrease in work efficiency and intermittent periods of inability to perform occupational tasks (although generally functioning satisfactorily, with routine behavior, self-care, and conversation normal), due to such symptoms as: depressed mood, anxiety, suspiciousness, panic attacks (weekly or less often), chronic sleep impairment, or mild memory loss (such as forgetting names, directions, recent events). 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, Diagnostic Code 9411. A 50 percent rating is assigned for occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and productivity due to such symptoms as: flattened affect; circumstantial, circumlocutory, or stereotyped, speech; panic attacks more than once a week; difficulty in understanding complex commands; impairment of short and long term memory (e.g., retention of only highly learned material, forgetting to complete tasks); impaired judgment; impaired abstract thinking; disturbances of motivation and mood; and difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships. 38 C.F.R. § 4.130 A 70 percent disability rating is assigned for occupational and social impairment, with deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood, due to such symptoms as: suicidal ideation; obsessional rituals which interfere with routine activities; speech that is intermittently illogical, obscure, or irrelevant; near-continuous panic or depression affecting the ability to function independently, appropriately, and effectively; impaired impulse control (such as unprovoked irritability with periods of violence); spatial disorientation; neglect of personal appearance and hygiene; difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances (including work or a work-like setting); and inability to establish and maintain effective relationships. 38 C.F.R. § 4.130. A 100 percent disability rating is assigned total occupational and social impairment, due to such symptoms as: gross impairment in thought processes or communication; persistent delusions or hallucinations; grossly inappropriate behavior; persistent danger of hurting self or others; intermittent inability to perform activities of daily living (including maintenance of minimal personal hygiene); disorientation to time or place; and memory loss for names of close relatives, or for the veteran's own occupation or name. 38 C.F.R. § 4.130 In applying the above criteria, when it is not possible to separate the effects of the service-connected disability from a nonservice-connected disability, such signs and symptoms shall be attributed to the service-connected disability. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.102 ; Mittleider v. West, 11 Vet. App. 181 (1998), citing Mitchem v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 136, 140 (1996) (the Board is precluded from differentiating between symptomatology attributed to a nonservice-connected disability and a service-connected disability in the absence of medical evidence which does so). In determining the level of impairment under 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, a rating specialist is not restricted to the symptoms provided under the diagnostic code, and should consider all symptoms which affect occupational and social impairment, including those identified in the DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM 5). See Mauerhan v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 436 (2002). If the evidence demonstrates that a claimant suffers symptoms or effects that cause an occupational or social impairment equivalent to those listed in that diagnostic code, the appropriate, equivalent rating is assigned. See id. Upon review of the record, the Board finds a rating a 70 percent is warranted for the Veteran's service-connected PTSD disability. A review of the record shows the Veteran was admitted for suicidal ideation in August of 2016 and May 2019 with periodic suicidal thoughts. See Durham VAMC and Salem VMAC records. During a December 2019 PTSD Disability Benefits Questionnaire (DBQ), the Veteran was noted to have a history of suicidal ideation. In an August 2016 VA psychiatry note, the Veteran's thought content was noted to include suicidal ideation "with plan to drive off a bridge." The Board notes that, in some cases, the mere presence of suicidal ideation (ranging from passive thoughts of one's own death to active thoughts of engaging in suicide-related behavior), may cause occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas. Bankhead v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 10 (2017). Additionally, the record shows the Veteran has remained married, but there have been multiple periods of separation. Additionally, the record shows varying levels of social interactions with others; including keeping to himself at work. See December 2019 PTSD. He has also reported irritability and anger which have "significantly interfered with family and socially over time." See May 2019 DBQ. There is also evidence of periods of violence as noted in an April 2020 VA mental health note. At that time, it was indicated that there were domestic violence charges the prior year. For these reasons, the Board finds that the evidence demonstrates social and occupational impairment with deficiencies in most areas, including work, family relations, judgment, thinking, and mood. Accordingly, the Board finds that a 70 percent rating for PTSD is warranted for the entire rating period on appeal. The Board next finds that a rating in excess of 70 percent for PTSD is not warranted for the entire rating period on appeal. The record shows the Veteran has been employed by American Hardwood Industries for more than 20 years. See July 2022 supervisor letter. The Veteran works three (3) to four (4) overnight shifts a week. See November 2019 VA Mental Health Progress Note. At his April 2020 VA Mental Health Follow-Up, the Veteran reported sharing caretaking responsibilities of his mother with his siblings. The Veteran also reported going back and forth from his home is Waynesboro, VA to his mother in North Carolina. Accordingly, the evidence does not support a finding of total occupational impairment. For the above reasons, the Board finds that a 70 percent rating, but no higher, for PTSD is warranted for the entire rating period on appeal. TDIU Laws and Analysis TDIU may be assigned when a Veteran is unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-connected disabilities, provided that the Veteran meets the schedular requirements. If there is only one service connected disability, this disability should be rated at 60 percent or more, if there are two or more disabilities, at least one should be rated at 40 percent or more with sufficient additional service connected disability to bring the combination to 70 percent or more. In determining whether unemployability exists, consideration may be given to the Veteran's level of education, special training, and previous work experience, but it may not be given to her age or to any impairment caused by nonservice-connected disabilities. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.341, 4.16, 4.19. Substantially gainful employment is "that which is ordinarily followed by the non-disabled to earn their livelihood with earnings common to the particular occupation in the community where the Veteran resides." Moore v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 356 (1991) (quoting the VA Adjudication Procedure Manual M21-1, pt. VI, para. 50-55(8) [now para. 7.55b (7)]). It also suggests "a living wage." Ferraro v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 326 (1991). The Court further defined "substantially gainful employment" as "an occupation that provides an annual income that exceeds the poverty threshold for one person, irrespective of the number of hours or days that the Veteran actually works and without regard to the Veteran's earned annual income." Faust v. West, 13 Vet. App. 342 (2000). The ability to work sporadically or obtain marginal employment is not substantially gainful employment. See Moore, 1 Vet. App. at 358 ; 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (a) ("marginal employment shall not be considered substantially gainful employment"). Marginal employment may also be held to exist, on a facts-found basis, when earned annual income exceeds the poverty threshold. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (a). The ultimate question of whether a Veteran is capable of substantial gainful employment is not a medical one; that determination is for the adjudicator. See Geib v. Shinseki, 733 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Floore v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 376, 381 (2013). As such, the focus of the examiner is not on whether the Veteran is unemployable due to his/her service-connected disabilities but the functional impairment caused solely by service-connected disabilities. Marginal employment may also be held to exist, on a facts-found basis including, but not limited to, employment in a "protected environment" such as a family business or sheltered workshop, when earned annual income exceeds the poverty threshold. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (a). In Cantrell v. Shulkin, 28 Vet. App. 382 (2017), the Court addressed this method of establishing marginal employment which required the Court to review the meaning of employment in a protected work environment. The Court found that the plain language of § 4.16(a) does not expressly define employment in a protected environment and that the non-exhaustive list of examples of what may constitute employment in a protected environment, i.e.: a family business or sheltered workshop fails to resolve this uncertainty. The Court also determined that it was unable to defer to the Secretary's definition, finding instead that the Secretary had refused to proffer any definition of employment in a protected environment for the Court to analyze. Absent an articulated standard for employment in a protected environment, the Court concluded that it was unable to effectively review the Board's decision. The Board recognizes that "protected environment" has not been defined by regulation. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary offers several definitions of the word "protect," but one that appears to be applicable in this inquiry is "to save from contingent financial loss." See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (online) (2017). One definition of "contingent" is "likely but not certain to happen: possible." Id. Thus, within the context of awarding a TDIU, a protected work environment exists when one's employment is not based on merit alone, but rather is established to save the individual from likely financial loss. In other words, a protected environment is an employment environment that would not exist but for the willingness of the employer to hire and pay the employee for altruistic reasons. . Pursuant to the decision above, the Veteran is in receipt of a 70 percent rating for his posttraumatic stress disorder for the entire rating period on appeal. The Veteran meets the schedular criteria for TDIU under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (a). The record shows the Veteran has been employed by American Hardwood Industries for more than 20 years. See July 2022 supervisor letter. In a June 2017 TDIU application, the Veteran reported earning $32,000. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the 2017 poverty threshold for a single person under the age of 65 was $12,752 and a household of two people was $16,493. The current thresholds for 2021 are $14,097 and $18,145, respectively. Therefore, based on the Veteran's reported income earning, the Board finds that the Veteran is substantially gainfully employed and TDIU is not applicable. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16. In the Veteran's April 2022 Rule 33 Summary of Issues, the Veteran states that his employment is in a protected environment. However, as stated above, the Veteran has been employed by the same employer for over 20 years. See supervisor letter. The Veteran is currently employed in boiler maintenance working the graveyard shift three (3) to four (4) times a week. See November 2019 VA Mental Health Progress Note. The Veteran reported working three (3) nights a week. See October 2017 VA Mental Health Progress Note. The nature of such work is separated from other co-workers by its function and time of day rather than as an environment created specially for the Veteran. Further, during the December 2019 VA examination, the Veteran reported that in about 2013-2014, his company let him go, but subsequently asked him to return. This demonstrates to the Board that the Veteran's employment was based on merit, and not based on altruistic reasons. For these reasons, the Board finds that the Veteran's workplace environment cannot be considered "protected." For the above reasons, the Board finds that the weight of the evidence demonstrates that the criteria for TDIU have not been met. As the weight of the evidence is against this claim, the benefit of the doubt rule is not for application, and the Board must deny the claim. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. Romina A. Casadei Acting Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board MELNYK, H The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.