Citation Nr: 22046263 Decision Date: 08/16/22 Archive Date: 08/16/22 DOCKET NO. 20-00 253A DATE: August 16, 2022 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is denied. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, diagnosed as an adjustment disorder with mixed disturbances of emotions and conduct ("adjustment disorder"), is granted, subject to the laws and regulations governing the award of monetary benefits [the RO should reference the discussion at page 9, below, when implementing this award]. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The weight of the most probative evidence is against a finding that the Veteran has a valid diagnosis of PTSD. 2. The evidence is in approximate balance that the Veteran's current adjustment disorder is etiologically related to active service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for PTSD have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304(f). 2. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for an adjustment disorder have been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303(a). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty from July 1982 to July 1986. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). The Veteran testified before the undersigned during a February 2022 Board hearing and a transcript of that proceeding is of record. Preliminary Matters Initially, the Veteran filed and VA adjudicated multiple prior service connection claims for PTSD only. Historically and during the present appeal, the Veteran, the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ), and the Board (see October 2005 decision) consistently phrased the claim and appellate issue narrowly as entitlement to service connection for PTSD only, or a petition to reopen previously denied service connection claims for PTSD only. However, the Board has broadened the service connection claim on appeal to include an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include an adjustment disorder. See Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1, 5 (2009). Since the legal criteria and dispositions for the non-PTSD and the PTSD components of the claim differ, the Board has bifurcated the appeal into two separate issues. Regarding the non-PTSD component of the claim, there were no prior, final denials. Therefore, the Board has phrased this appellate issue as entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include an adjustment disorder. This case is distinguishable from Velez v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 199 (2009) (holding that the Board did not err in requiring the veteran to submit new and material evidence to reopen his claim for a psychiatric disability claimed as a nervous condition; the Court concluded that the veteran's service connection claim for a psychiatric condition then on appeal constituted the same claim as a previously, finally denied service connection claim for a psychiatric disability claimed as a "stress disorder," in part because the prior, final RO decision explicitly considered whether the Veteran had any diagnosed psychiatric condition that could be related to service). Here, unlike in Velez, the multiple prior, final AOJ and Board denials narrowly adjudicated the issue of entitlement to service connection for PTSD only. Since those prior denials did not encompass the issue of entitlement to service connection for a non-PTSD psychiatric disability, this constitutes a new claim; thus, new and material evidence is not required. Regarding the PTSD component of the claim, there were multiple prior, final AOJ and Board adjudications of this issue, as noted above. Most recently, in a June 2012 rating decision, the AOJ continued a prior, March 2012 rating decision's denial of a petition to reopen the issue of entitlement to service connection for PTSD. In the June 2012 rating decision, the AOJ found that the Veteran's newly received statement did not show a diagnosis of PTSD due to a verified in-service stressor (in pertinent part). The AOJ notified the Veteran of the June 2012 rating decision on June 28, 2012, and he did not file a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) within one year of that notice. Additional evidence was received within that one-year appeal period; however, it was either duplicative of evidence that was previously of record or not material because it did not raise a reasonable possibility of substantiating the claim. Therefore, the pending claims exception does not apply, and the June 2012 rating decision became final. 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b). However, the AOJ obtained and the Veteran submitted several additional service department records after the June 2012 rating decision. Under the service records exception, any time after VA issues a decision on a claim, if VA receives or associates with the claims file "relevant" official service department records that existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA first decided the claim, VA will reconsider the claim de novo. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1). In this context, "relevant" means the new service records must address a factual issue that was dispositive against the veteran in the prior VA adjudication, i.e., an element in dispute. Kisor v. McDonough, 995 F.3d 1347, 1362-62 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Here, the service records exception applies regarding the 1983 Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) records that the Veteran submitted in July 2019. These service department records existed and had not been associated with the claims file when VA previously decided the claim. They also address a factual issue that was dispositive against the Veteran in the prior adjudication, namely a verified in-service stressor. Specifically, he has contended and continues to contend that his current mental health issues are primarily due to mistreatment by the military, including what he believes were false charges of drug possession and distribution during active service. The 1983 CID records confirm that the Army did accuse him of various drug-related offenses during service. Therefore, the Board will reconsider the service connection claim for PTSD. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1). The Veteran submitted additional evidence after the December 2019 Statement of the Case (SOC). Since this was duplicative of evidence that the Veteran previously had submitted and that the AOJ considered in the SOC, a waiver is not required. Neither the Veteran nor his representative has raised any duty to notify or duty to assist issues regarding the claim denied herein. Moreover, neither the Veteran nor his representative identified any prejudice in the conduct of the Board hearing. The Board has thoroughly reviewed all evidence in the claims file. Consistent with the law, the analysis below focuses on the most salient and relevant evidence and on what this evidence shows, or fails to show, on the claim, and the Board's reasons for rejecting evidence favorable to the appellant. See Timberlake v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 122 (2000). The appellant must not assume the Board has overlooked evidence not explicitly discussed herein. Pertinent regulations for consideration were provided in the SOC and are not repeated here in full. 1. Entitlement to service connection for PTSD is denied. The Veteran seeks entitlement to service connection for PTSD. He contends that he has a current PTSD diagnosis that is related to various alleged in-service stressors, including mistreatment by the military regarding the circumstances of his discharge and mistreatment (including personal assaults and verbal harassment) by fellow servicemembers. Entitlement to service connection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence establishing a diagnosis of the disorder in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a); (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred; and (3) a link established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Under 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a), the diagnosis of a mental disorder must conform to the DSM-5. Effective August 4, 2014, VA amended the portion of the Schedule for Rating Disabilities dealing with mental disorders, including PTSD, to remove outdated references to the DSM-IV, and replace them with references to the DSM-5. See 79 Fed. Reg. 149, 45094 (Aug. 4, 2014). The provisions of the interim final rule apply to all applications for benefits that are received by VA or that were pending before the AOJ on or after August 4, 2014. VA adopted as final, without change, the interim final rule, effective March 19, 2015. See 80 Fed. Reg. 53, 14308 (March 19, 2015). Since the Veteran's petition to reopen currently on appeal was filed after August 4, 2014, the DSM-5 criteria apply. After a full review of the record, the appeal is denied. The weight of the most probative evidence does not show that the Veteran has had a current diagnosis of PTSD during the relevant appeal period. The Board affords great probative value to the January 2019 VA examination, which competently, credibly, and persuasively explained why the Veteran does not meet the DSM-5 criteria for a PTSD diagnosis. Specifically, the examiner found that the claimed stressor (regarding false accusations of selling and using drugs while in the military, resulting in the Veteran's non-honorable discharge) did not meet Criterion A (i.e., it did not involve exposure to actual or threatened a) death, b) serious injury, c) sexual violation). Nor did the Veteran meet Criterion C (persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic event(s), beginning after traumatic event(s) occurred). In contrast, the Board affords minimal probative value to the January 2019 letter by the Veteran's private treating provider, Dr. S.T., which noted that the Veteran was diagnosed with PTSD, chronic. Unlike the January 2019 VA examiner, this private clinician provided no basis for this conclusory diagnosis and failed to explain how the relevant DSM-5 criteria were met. The private clinician also did not specify the alleged stressor on which this diagnosis was based. During the appeal period, the Veteran's VA treating mental health providers acknowledged his private provider's diagnosis of PTSD; however, they notably did not endorse this diagnosis. See December 2018 VA mental health triage note; see also December 2018 VA mental health evaluation / record review. These findings were consistent with other VA outpatient mental health treatment records noting various non-PTSD psychiatric diagnoses based on clinical encounters with the Veteran and reviews of his extensive mental health history. See, e.g., March 2018 VA mental health note (noting diagnoses of anxiety disorder and paranoid characterological disorder by history and observation); January 2018 VA mental health note (noting DSM-5 diagnostic impressions of unspecified mood disorder and irritability and anger); January 2019 VA mental health physician / psychiatry note (noting DSM-5 diagnoses of unspecified psychosis, r/o [rule-out] schizophrenia, unspecified depressive disorder, r/o [rule-out] personality disorder). In summary, the private clinician's January 2019 conclusory PTSD diagnosis is an outlier when viewed in light of the totality of the medical evidence during the appeal period. The recognizes that "[m]ental health professionals are experts and are presumed to know the DSM requirements applicable to their practice and to have taken them into account in providing a PTSD diagnosis." See Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128, 140 (1997). However, this does not negate the Board's duty to weigh the probative value of conflicting medical evidence. The Board fully explained above why it has afforded more probative value to the January 2019 VA examiner's finding that the Veteran does not meet the DSM-5 criteria for a PTSD diagnosis than to the private clinician's January 2019 conclusory PTSD diagnosis. The Board recognizes the Veteran's contention that he has a current PTSD diagnosis. He is competent to describe observable psychiatric symptoms he experiences, such as feelings of anger, sadness, or irritability. However, as a lay person, he is not competent to self-diagnose PTSD because this requires specialized medical expertise, knowledge, and training. See Young v. McDonald, 766 F.3d 1348, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that "PTSD is not the type of medical condition that lay evidence . . . is competent and sufficient to identify."). In conclusion, service connection for PTSD is denied. As the evidence is not in approximate balance, the benefit-of-the-doubt doctrine does not apply. 2. Entitlement to service connection for an adjustment disorder is granted. The Veteran seeks entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disability other than PTSD, to include an adjustment disorder. He contends that his current mental health issues are related to various alleged in-service stressors, including mistreatment by the military regarding the circumstances of his discharge. Service connection requires evidence of three elements: (1) a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship or nexus between the current disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during active service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004). After a full review of the record, the evidence summarized below is in approximate balance that the Veteran's current adjustment disorder was incurred in and is etiologically related to active service: Current DSM-5 diagnosis: see January 2019 VA examination (diagnosing adjustment disorder) In-service event: Service department records show that the Veteran received a general discharge in December 1983 due to failing an Army drug rehabilitation program after positive urinalyses. The Army later acknowledged that the positive urinalyses did not meet all scientific or legal requirements for use in disciplinary or administrative actions. Accordingly, in August 1986, the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) directed that all references to the positive urinalyses be deleted from the Veteran's military records. ABCMR further directed that the Veteran's consequent discharge was improper and should be voided: "Since the applicant's enlistment would not have expired until 27 July 1986, and since there is good reason to conclude that, but for the unsupportable urinalysis, and the declaration that he was a rehabilitation failure, he would have remained on active duty to complete that enlistment, it appears appropriate and proper to void his current discharge, to grant his full active duty credit through his scheduled ETS and to issue him an Honorable Discharge Certificate, effective the date of his scheduled ETS." See August 1986 ABCMR Proceedings (received May 2000, labeled Third Party Correspondence); see also undated letter from Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (Subject: Correction of Military Records, Positive Urinalysis Tests During the Period August 27, 1982 through October 31, 1983) (received May 2000, labeled Third Party Correspondence). Nexus: January 2019 VA examiner's favorable findings (competently, credibly, and persuasively opining that the Veteran's military-related stressor involving accusations of using drugs while in the military, resulting in an initial non-honorable discharge, is likely a cause of 30 percent of his impairment; "While he reports joining the military with the best intentions and effort, the reason for his [non-honorable] discharge and sequela....led to difficulty readjusting."); see also PTSD DBQ completed by that examiner with diagnoses including Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Disturbance of Emotions and Conduct and comment "Stressors: military experiences, homelessness, no social support, legal issues" and statement that "military related stress . . . contributed to Adjustment Disorder." The Board affords great probative value to the January 2019 VA examiner's favorable findings summarized above. They are consistent with voluminous lay and medical evidence consistently documenting the Veteran's persistent preoccupation with the circumstances of his original, wrongful general discharge in the context of mental health complaints and treatment (as well as prior VA and Social Security Administration disability claims) since as early as the 1990s. See, e.g., SSA disability claim forms and psychological evaluations from early-to-mid 1990s; non-VA mental health treatment records from early 1990s through early 2000s; March 2004 VA examination; July 2004 SSA Disability Hearing Officer's Decision, including summary of May 2004 SSA hearing testimony; several VA outpatient mental health treatment records since 2004. Affording the benefit of the doubt to the Veteran, the evidence is in approximate balance that his current adjustment disorder was incurred in and is etiologically related to active service. Therefore, entitlement to service connection for an adjustment disorder is granted. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Lynch v. McDonough, 999 F.3d 1391, 1395 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Finally, this grant does not include entitlement to service connection for the Veteran's diagnoses of personality disorders during the appeal period. See, e.g., January 2019 VA examination; December 2018 VA mental health triage note. Personality disorders are considered "congenital or developmental defects," which are not diseases or injuries for VA compensation purposes. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c); see also Johnson v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 448, 450 (1992); Conley v. Peake, 543 F.3d 1301, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Therefore, as a matter of law, the Veteran is not entitled to service connection for a personality disorder. The 2019 VA examiner found that the Veteran's diagnosed paranoid personality disorder "is the main cause of his symptoms and impairment in functioning. His military related stressor is likely a cause of 30% of his impairment with the other 70% being related to his personality characteristics, drug abuse history, and head injuries." The examiner also differentiated the symptoms and impairment due to the personality disorder versus the adjustment disorder. When assigning a rating for the adjustment disorder, the RO should ensure it is based on the service-connected condition only. MICHELLE L. KANE Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board R. Janofsky, Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.