Citation Nr: 22046676 Decision Date: 08/17/22 Archive Date: 08/17/22 DOCKET NO. 16-08 129 DATE: August 17, 2022 ORDER Entitlement to an initial 100 percent rating for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from January 5, 2012, is granted. REMANDED Entitlement to service connection for multiple system atrophy (MSA) is remanded. FINDING OF FACT The most probative evidence of record shows that the Veteran's PTSD caused total occupational and social impairment at all times from January 5, 2012. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for an initial, 100 percent, rating for PTSD have been met at all times from January 5, 2012. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.7, 4.14, 4.130, Diagnostic Codes 9411. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran had active service with the United States Navy from March 1964 to December1967. The Veteran died in March 2019. The appellant in this case is the Veteran's surviving spouse. In May 2020, the regional office (RO) granted her March 2019 application for substitution. In June 2019, the appellant testified at a video hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. A transcript of the hearing is of record. In an October 2019 decision the Board denied the appeal. The Veteran appealed the October 2019 Board decision to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). In a December 2020 order, which incorporated the parties Joint Motion for Remand (JMR), the Court vacated and remanded the October 2019 Board decision. Characterization of the Issues on Appeal Initially, the Board finds that the PTSD issue is in appellate status as a claim for an increased rating for PTSD, rated as 50 percent disabling from January 5, 2012, and 100 percent disabling from July 18, 2014, and not a claim for an earlier effective date for the grant of a 100 percent rating for PTSD. See rating decisions dated in September 2013 and January 2015. The Board has reached this conclusion because a new review of the record on appeal reveals that in July 2014 the Veteran filed a writing with the RO that acted as a timely notice of disagreement as to the September 2013 rating decision that granted service connection for PTSD effective from January 5, 2012, and assigned a 50 percent rating since that time. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (a notice of disagreement is a communication expressing dissatisfaction or disagreement with an adjudicative determination and a desire to contest the result; it must be in terms which can reasonably be construed as disagreement and a desire for appellate review). The Board has also reached this conclusion because the record shows that the Veteran thereafter perfected his appeal as to the September 2013 rating decision by filing a VA Form 9, Appeal to Board of Veterans' Appeals, in March 2016 after the RO issued the January 2016 statement of the case. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.200, 20.302(c) (an appeal requires a notice of disagreement and a timely filed substantive appeal after issuance of a statement of the case). The Rating Claim The appellant contends, in substance, that the Veteran's PTSD met the criteria for a 100 percent rating at all times since he filed his initial claim of service connection for PTSD on January 5, 2012, because it caused him to be totally disabling since that time. Disability evaluations are determined by the application of a schedule of ratings which is based, as far as can practically be determined, on the average impairment of earning capacity. 38 U.S.C. § 1155; 38 C.F.R. § 4.1. Each service-connected disability is rated on the basis of specific criteria identified by a Diagnostic Code. 38 C.F.R. § 4.27. When rating the Veteran's service-connected disability, the entire medical history must be borne in mind. Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 589 (1991). Separate higher or lower compensable evaluations may be assigned for separate periods of time if such distinct periods are shown by the competent evidence of record during the appeal, a practice known as "staged" ratings. See Hart v. Mansfield, 21 Vet. App. 505 (2007); Fenderson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 119, 126 (1999). Regulations require that where there is a question as to which of two evaluations is to be applied, the higher evaluation will be assigned if the disability picture more nearly approximates the criteria required for that rating. Otherwise, the lower rating will be assigned. 38 C.F.R. § 4.7. In evaluating the evidence, the Board has been charged with the duty to assess the credibility and weight given to evidence. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F. 3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F. 3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Court has declared that in adjudicating a claim, the Board has the responsibility to do so. Bryan v. West, 13 Vet. App. 482, 488-89 (2000). In doing so, the Board is free to favor one medical opinion over another, provided it offers an adequate basis for doing so. Owens v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 429, 433 (1995). Except as otherwise provided by law, a claimant has the responsibility to present and support a claim for benefits under the laws administered by VA. VA shall consider all information and medical and lay evidence of record. Where there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, VA shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; see also Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (en banc). The Veteran's PTSD was rated as 50 percent disabling from January 5, 2012, and 100 percent disabling from July 18, 2014, under 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, Diagnostic Code 9411 (the General Rating Formula for Mental Disorders (General Formula)). See rating decisions dated in September 2013 and January 2015. The General Formula provides a 50 percent rating is warranted when the evidence shows occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and productivity due to such symptoms as: flattened affect; circumstantial, circumlocutory, or stereotyped speech; panic attacks more than once a week; difficulty in understanding complex commands; impairment of short- and long-term memory (e.g., retention of only highly learned material, forgetting to complete tasks); impaired judgment; impaired abstract thinking; disturbances of motivation and mood; difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships. A 70 percent rating is warranted when there is occupational and social impairment, with deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood, due to such symptoms as: suicidal ideation; obsessional rituals which interfere with routine activities; speech intermittently illogical, obscure, or irrelevant; near-continuous panic or depressive disorder affecting the ability to function independently, appropriately and effectively; impaired impulse control (such as unprovoked irritability with periods of violence); spatial disorientation; neglect of personal appearance and hygiene; difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances (including work or a work-like setting); inability to establish and maintain effective relationships. A 100 percent rating is warranted when the evidence shows total occupational and social impairment, due to such symptoms as: gross impairment in thought processes or communication; persistent delusions or hallucinations; grossly inappropriate behavior; persistent danger of hurting self or others; intermittent inability to perform activities of daily living (including maintenance of minimal personal hygiene); disorientation to time or place; memory loss for names of close relatives, own occupation, or own name. Id. Ratings are assigned according to the manifestation of particular symptoms. However, the use of the term "such as" in 38 C.F.R. § 4.130 demonstrates that the symptoms after that phrase are not intended to constitute an exhaustive list, but rather are to serve as examples of the type and degree of the symptoms, or their effects, that would justify a particular rating. Mauerhan v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 436 (2002). When determining the appropriate disability evaluation to assign, however, the Board's "primary consideration" is the Veteran's symptoms. Vazquez-Claudio v. Shinseki, 713 F.3d 112, 118 (Fed. Cir. 2013). Initially, the Board notes that this claim only covers the January 5, 2012, to July 18, 2014, time period. Moreover, while the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 5th Edition (2013) (DSM-5) was issued in 2013, the time period covered by the appeal is five years before the Court issued its' decision in Golden v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 221 (2018). Therefore, it is unclear whether the Board's adjudication of the claim can include a discussion of the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores found in the record. Nonetheless, with giving the appellant the benefit of doubt in this case, the Board finds that they below adjudication will include such a discussion. According to the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, 4th Edition (1994) (DSM IV), GAF is a scale reflecting the "psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness." There is no question that the GAF score and interpretations of the score are important considerations in rating a psychiatric disability. See, e.g., Richard v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 266, 267 (1996); Carpenter v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 240 (1995). However, the GAF scores assigned in a case, like an examiner's assessment of the severity of a condition, is not dispositive of the evaluation issue; rather, the GAF scores must be considered in light of the actual symptoms of the Veteran's disorder, which provide the primary basis for the rating assigned. See 38C.F.R.§4.126(a). Next, and as noted in the JMR, the Court has held that suicidal ideation generally rises to the level contemplated in a 70 percent evaluation. See Bankhead v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 10, 19 (2017) (stating the language of 38 C.F.R. § 4.130 "indicates that the presence of suicidal ideation alone, that is, a veteran's thoughts of his or his own death or thoughts of engaging in suicide-related behavior, may cause occupational and social impairment in most areas."). The Court has also held that, "it is the information in a medical opinion, and not the date the medical opinion was provided that is relevant when assigning an effective date." Tatum v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 139, 145 (2010) (discussing assignment of an effective date for a reduction in disability rating under Diagnostic Code 7528); see also Young v. McDonald, 766 F.3d 1348, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2014). (holding that a medical opinion can diagnose the presence of the condition and identify an earlier onset date based on preexisting symptoms). With the above criteria in mind, and as noted above, the current claim for a higher initial evaluation for PTSD has been pending since January 5, 2012. Therefore, the Board finds that when adjudicating the severity of the PTSD it may consider the entire record on appeal since that time including the results from the October 2014 private disability benefits questionnaire (DBQ). Id. In this regard, the October 2014 DBQ opined that the Veteran's PTSD caused the following adverse symptomatology: impaired impulse control; disturbances of motivation and mood; difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances; difficulty in adapting to work; inability to establish and maintain effective relationships; mild memory loss; impairment of short-and long-term memory; forgetting to complete tasks; chronic sleep impairment; near-continuous depression affecting the ability to function independently, appropriately and effectively; panic attacks (weekly or less often); a depressed mood; anxiety; and suspiciousness. Moreover, and as noted by the JMR, the October 2014 DBQ "opined that the 'objective findings on exam that support the Veteran's contention that functional impairment is due to the effects of a mental disorder include acuity and length of symptoms. Veteran has experienced significant PTSD symptoms for approximately 40 years. During that time, he was unable to maintain effective work or social relationships and struggled in his interpersonal relationships with his immediate family.'" The Board also notes that the October 2014 DBQ opined that the Veteran "... is currently socially isolated, experiencing significant depression and anxiety, and is unable to function in most areas of his life." Moreover, and as noted in the JMR, the Veteran's treatment records documented his having problems with suicidal ideation on several occasions. See, e.g., VA treatment records dated in April 2013; Also see Bankhead, supra. Therefore, when considering the frequency, severity, and duration of the Veteran's impairment to assess his disability picture and when resolving all reasonable doubt in his favor, the Board finds that the most probative evidence of record is the October 2014 DBQ that showed that his PTSD adverse symptomatology approximated the criteria for a 100 percent rating at all times from January 5, 2012, to July 18, 2014, because it showed that it caused total occupational and social impairment since that time. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 4.130; Owens, supra; Fenderson, supra; Tatum, supra; Young, supra, Lynch, supra. Therefore, the appeal is granted. REASONS FOR REMAND Entitlement to service connection for MSA is remanded. As to the claim of service connection for MSA the appellant claims, in substance, that it was caused by the Veteran's exposure to tactical herbicides, including Agent Orange, when his ship (i.e., the U.S.S. Hancock) sailed in the waters off the cost of the Republic of Vietnam from January 20, 1967, to July 17, 1967. In this regard, the Court vacated and remanded the October 2019 Board decision because, in substance, it adjudicated the claim without undertaking needed development to determine whether the U.S.S. Hancock ever sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Republic of Vietnam from January 20, 1967, to July 17, 1967. See Procopio v. Wilkie, 913 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (holding that service "in the Republic of Vietnam" does not require "a foot-on-land requirement" and includes the "12 nautical mile territorial sea" and these veterans can prevail themselves of the presumptions found at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309(e)). Therefore, the Board finds that a Remand is required to undertake this development. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(b); Forcier v. Nicholson,19 Vet. App. 414, 425 (2006) (holding that the duty to ensure compliance with the Court's order extends to the terms of the agreement struck by the parties that forms the basis of the joint motion to remand); cf. McBurney v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 136, 140 (2009) (Board has a duty on remand to ensure compliance with the favorable terms stated in the joint motion for remand or explain why the terms will not be fulfilled). In this regard, when again adjudicating the claim the RO should be mindful of the fact that even though MSA is not a 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) presumptive disorder the Court in Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120 (2007) held that the availability of presumptive service connection for a disability based on exposure to herbicides does not preclude an appellant from establishing service connection with proof of direct causation. Next, the Board notes that in February 2021 the appellant filed a January 2021 medical opinion from Dr. Rupa L. Nanavati that attempts to establish a link between the Veteran's MSA and exposure to Agent Orange while on active duty. However the Board finds that this opinion, standing alone, is not adequate to adjudicate the claim because it is not supported by clinical evidence and it is based on an inaccurate factual premise (i.e., it assumes the Veteran had Agent orange exposure on active duty). See Bloom v. West, 13 Vet. App. 185, 187 (1999) (a medical opinion based on speculation, without supporting clinical data or other rationale, does not provide the required degree of medical certainty); Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458, 461 (1993) (a medical opinion based on an inaccurate factual premise is not probative). Nonetheless, the Board finds that the letter is enough to trigger VA's duty to obtain a medical opinion as to the relationship, if any, between the MSA the Veteran had prior to his death and his military service. See McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 84-86 (2006). Therefore, the Board finds that a Remand to obtain this medical opinion is also required. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d). While the appeal is in Remand status, any outstanding VA and private treatment records, including from Dr. Nanavati, should be obtained and associated with the claims file. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(b). This issue is REMANDED for the following actions: 1. To comply with the JMR, take all needed steps to determine whether the U.S.S. Hancock ever sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Republic of Vietnam from January 20, 1967, to July 17, 1967. 2. After obtaining all needed authorizations from the appellant, associate with the claims file any outstanding private treatment records including from Dr. Nanavati. If possible, the appellant or her representative should submit and new pertinent evidence the Board/VA does not have (if any). Any help with the above would be appreciated. 3. Obtain and associate with the claims file any outstanding VA treatment records (if any). 4. After undertaking the above development to the extent possible, obtain a medical opinion from a suitably-qualified medical professional to address the claim of service connection for MSA. The claims folder should be made available to and reviewed by the examiner. Following consideration of the evidence of record (both lay and medical), the examiner is asked to address the following: a. Provide an opinion as to whether it is at least as likely as not (50 percent or greater probability) that MSA had its onset directly during the Veteran's service or is otherwise related to any event or injury during service. If the above development verified that the Veteran's ship sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Republic of Vietnam from January 20, 1967, to July 17, 1967, the above opinion must presume that he was exposed to tactical herbicides while on active duty. b. Provide an opinion as to whether it is at least as likely as not (50 percent or greater probability) that MSA manifested in the first post-service year. In providing answers to the above questions the examiner should consider and discuss the service treatment records. In providing answers to the above question the examiner should consider and discuss the competent lay claims regarding observable symptomatology and events. In providing answers to the above question the examiner should not rely solely on negative evidence. In providing answers to the above question the examiner should be mindful of the fact that the availability of presumptive service connection for a disability based on exposure to herbicides does not preclude an appellant from establishing service connection with proof of direct causation. In providing answers to the above question the examiner is advised that the term "at least as likely as not" does not mean within the realm of medical possibility, but rather that the medical evidence both for and against a conclusion is so evenly divided that it is as medically sound to find in favor of conclusion as it is to find against it. In answering all questions, please articulate the reasoning underpinning your conclusions. That is, (1) identify what facts and information--whether found in the record or outside the record--support your opinion, and (2) explain how that evidence justifies your opinion. If the examiner cannot respond to an inquiry without resort to speculation as to any of the above claims he or she should so state, and must further explain why it is not feasible to provide a medical opinion, indicating whether the need to speculate is caused by a deficiency in the state of general medical knowledge (i.e. no one could respond given medical science and the known facts) or by a deficiency in the record or in the examiner (i.e. additional facts are required, or the examiner does not have the needed knowledge or training). John J. Crowley Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board N.T. Werner, Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.