Citation Nr: 22048879 Decision Date: 08/26/22 Archive Date: 08/26/22 DOCKET NO. 16-58 236 DATE: August 26, 2022 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is granted. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran's PTSD is due to a stressor related to his fear of hostile military or terrorist activity during his active service in Korea. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for entitlement to service connection for PTSD have been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304(f). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from December 1982 to August 1992. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a rating decision by a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). In February 2022, the Veteran testified at a hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. A transcript of the hearing is associated with the claims file. The Board notes that the Veteran's claim was initially denied in an April 2013 rating decision. However, because the Veteran submitted new and material evidence (i.e., a March 2014 private treatment record documenting a PTSD diagnosis) within one year of the April 2013 rating decision, that decision remained pending until VA adjudicated the claim. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(b). Therefore, the April 2013 rating decision did not become final, and because there is no prior denial, new and material evidence is not required. Entitlement to service connection for PTSD. The Veteran contends that he has been diagnosed with PTSD, which he asserts is related to his active duty service in Korea. Specifically, the Veteran asserts that he was stationed along the DMZ at Camp Casey, South Korea, between January 1992 and August 1992. During that time, he reports that he served as a Recovery Supervisor and that his duties entailed supervising and conducting recovery missions (i.e., recovering wrecked track and wheel and light/heavy vehicles, broken equipment etc.,) and providing similar support to various Camps in the surrounding area and on the DMZ. He stated that he was also assigned to "railhead duty" which consisted of securing equipment arrival at Camp Casey, guarding the railhead, and loading/offloading vehicles and equipment. He stated that he feared for his life on the recovery missions and that being on railhead duty was terrifying because he was most vulnerable while offloading/loading equipment from the trains. He further stated that he was exposed to continuous propaganda coming from loudspeakers from the North and constant threats and violence by rioters and hostile Koreans. See, e.g., May 2015 Notice of Disagreement; November 2016 VA Form 9; March 2022 Correspondence from Veteran; March 2014 and 2022 Statements in Support of Claim for PTSD; and February 2022 Board Hearing Transcript, pp., 21-22. After a review of the evidence of record, the Board concludes that the Veteran has been diagnosed with PTSD that has been linked to his fear of hostile military or terrorist activity. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. The three-element test for service connection requires evidence of: (1) a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the current disability and the in-service disease or injury. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166 -67 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In addition to the criteria set forth above, service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a); a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The requirements for establishing an in-service stressor are delineated in 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f)(1)-(5). In pertinent part, the regulation provides that if a stressor claimed by a veteran is related to the veteran's fear of hostile military or terrorist activity and a VA psychiatrist or psychologist, or a psychiatrist or psychologist with whom VA has contracted, confirms that the claimed stressor is adequate to support a diagnosis of PTSD and that the veteran's symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran's service, the veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). Considering this standard, the Board finds that the Veteran has provided credible evidence of an in-service stressor that is related to the Veteran's fear of hostile military or terrorist activity. The Board notes that the Veteran's service personnel and treatment records document that the Veteran served in Korea from at least February 19, 1992, to August 7, 1992. These records also confirm his service at Camp Casey, which is located approximately 10 miles from the DMZ. The Veteran's Evaluation Report from this period of time (from January 1992 to June 1992) shows that he was stationed at Camp Casey and that his Principal Duty Title was Recovery Supervisor. His daily duties and scope were noted as follows: "Supervised a recovery operation team in recovery missions. Railhead upload and download. Squad leader of...personnel, care, and maintain over 1 million dollars of tools and equipment." The Veteran has consistently reported that his location and duties placed him in close proximity to the Korean DMZ and that he was fearful for his life in these situations. The Veteran has also submitted a lay statement from his former wife who was married to him while he was stationed in Korea. See March 2014 Statement from L.S. (states that the Veteran was not allowed to come home on emergency leave for their son's medical condition because he was stationed at the DMZ with the 2nd Infantry Division and noting that it was a very dangerous and stressful assignment for the Veteran). The Board finds credible the Veteran's reports that he served along the Korean DMZ and that he feared hostile military activity from North Koreans. As these reports are consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the veteran's service, the Board finds that credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor(s) occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Further, the Board finds probative that the June 2022 and August 2014 VA psychiatrists each provided a diagnosis of PTSD that was due to fear of hostile military activity in Korea. The June 2022 VA examiner expressly opined that the Veteran's PTSD met the full DSM diagnostic criteria and that it was as likely as not that PTSD was due to his in-service stressors, namely, serving at Camp Casey with duties that placed him in close proximity to the DMZ and fearful for his life. As the VA examiners reviewed the Veteran's claims file and provided the opinions based upon interview of the Veteran and his medical history, the Board finds that the opinions warrant significant probative weight. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008). Notably, there are no medical opinions of record to the contrary. Considering this, the Board finds the evidence is in approximate balance and that the Veteran is diagnosed with PTSD, and that this diagnosis is at least as likely as not related to a stressor related to the Veteran's fear of hostile military or terrorist activity, which is consistent with the circumstances of his active service in Korea. As such, the Board concludes that all the criteria for service connection for PTSD have been ment, and the claim is granted. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102; 3.304(f); Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021). JONATHAN B. KRAMER Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board H. Hoeft The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.