Citation Nr: 22048930 Decision Date: 08/27/22 Archive Date: 08/27/22 DOCKET NO. 20-01 987 DATE: August 27, 2022 ORDER The reduction of the rating for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from 70 percent to 50 percent disabling, effective April 1, 2018, was improper and is void ab initio. Entitlement to a rating in excess of 70 percent for PTSD is denied. Entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) is granted. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. On January 5, 2018, the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ) reduced the rating for PTSD without fully complying with applicable regulations; therefore, the rating reduction is void ab initio. 2. During the entire period on appeal, the Veteran's PTSD manifested at worst, occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas without total occupational and social impairment was not observed. 3. The Veteran is unable to secure or maintain a substantially gainful employment due to the combined effects of his service connected disabilities. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The January 2018 rating reduction for PTSD from 70 percent to 50 percent, effective April 1, 2018, was improper and is void ab initio. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.344, 4.14.14. 2. The criteria for a rating in excess of 70 percent for PTSD have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.14.14, 4.126, 4.130, Diagnostic Code 9411. 3. The criteria for a TDIU have been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.340, 3.341, 4.16. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty from October 1967 to October 1970, to include service in the Republic of Vietnam. The Veteran also served with the Army National Guard in December 1990. The matters come before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal of a January 2018 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). In February 2022, the Veteran and his spouse appeared before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge in a virtual hearing. The transcript is associated with the record. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has held that a claim for a TDIU, whether expressly raised by a veteran or reasonably raised by the record, is not a separate claim for benefits but is instead part of the adjudication of a claim for increased compensation. Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447 (2009). In this case, the Board finds that the issue of TDIU was raised by the Veteran in an Application for Increased Compensation Based on Unemployability (VA Form 21-8940). As such, the issue of entitlement to a TDIU is properly before the Board. 1. The reduction of the rating for PTSD from 70 percent to 50 percent disabling effective April 1, 2018, was improper and is void ab initio. The Veteran asserts that his PTSD did not improve and therefore, the reduction in his rating was not appropriate. By way of background, the Veteran has been service connected for PTSD since July 18, 2007. The disability was rated at 50 percent effective July 18, 2007, 70 percent from October 1, 2013, and then reduced to 50 percent rating effective April 1, 2018. In November 2016, the AOJ provided a correspondence to the Veteran proposing the reduction. The Veteran was given 60 days to provide medical evidence to show that the action should not be taken. The Veteran submitted private medical statements, but the AOJ deemed the statements insufficient to maintain the 70 percent rating, and the rating reduction to 50 percent disabling was effectuated in a January 2018 rating decision on appeal. The Veteran submitted a Notice of Disagreement in January 2019 and explicitly disagrees with the rating decision which found that the Veteran's PTSD manifested at severity more closely approximating the 50 percent, which warranted a reduction. In certain rating reduction cases, VA benefits recipients are to be afforded greater protections, as set forth in 38 C.F.R. § 3.344(a) and (b). However, these provisions do not apply in this case because the Veteran's 70 percent rating was in place for less than five years when the reduction took effect. Additionally, it is well established that VA cannot reduce a veteran's disability evaluation without first finding, inter alia, that an improvement has actually occurred in the veteran's service-connected disability and it has improved to the point that he or she is now better able to function under the ordinary conditions of life and work. See Murphy v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 510, 517 (2014); Brown v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 413, 421 (1993). Care must be taken to ensure that a change in an examiner's evaluation reflects an actual change in the Veteran's condition, and not merely a difference in the thoroughness of the examination or in descriptive terms, when viewed in relation to the prior disability history. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.2, 4.13; see also Brown, 5 Vet. App. at 420-22. Finally, in a rating reduction case, VA has the burden of establishing that the disability has improved. A rating reduction case focuses on the propriety of the reduction and is not the same as an increased rating issue. See Peyton v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 282, 286 (1991). Here, the Board finds that the reductions are void because the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.344 were not met. In this regard, the April 2018 rating decision did not find that the record demonstrated sustained improvement and the AOJ did not address whether any improvement in the disability actually reflected an improvement in the Veteran's ability to function under the ordinary conditions of life and work. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.2, 4.13; see also Brown, 5 Vet. App. at 420-22; Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 589 (1991). There also was no finding that the submitted evidence by the Veteran used as a basis of reduction was as complete as those upon which payment was authorized or continued. To that end, the AOJ relied on the findings contained in the December 2016 letter from the Veteran's private psychotherapist who explained some of his symptoms to include reporting an increase in dosage of medicine prescribed to treat the Veteran's PTSD and a September 2016 VA examination which found the Veteran's occupational and social impairment to be that occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and productivity. However, the Board notes that the evidence contradicts each other, as the December 2016 private opinion tends to say that the Veteran's symptoms worsened, while the September 2016 VA examination opines that the Veteran's symptoms improved. Therefore, the Board finds that the RO did not prove that the record demonstrated sustained improvement of the Veteran's PTSD. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.344(a). The Board emphasizes that the failure to consider and apply the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.344, if applicable, renders a rating decision void ab initio. Such an omission is error and not in accordance with the law. Greyzck v. West, 12 Vet. App. 288, 292 (1999). Accordingly, the 70 percent rating for the Veteran's PTSD must be restored. In this case, the Board notes that the AOJ relied on the results of the September 2016 VA examination and the December 2016 private psychotherapist correspondence but failed to consider the merits of the conflicting evidence with regards to whether any improvement in the disability noted in the September 2016 VA examination was sustainable, which was rebutted by the December 2016 private medical opinion, and not merely difference in the thoroughness of the examination or in descriptive terms. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.1, 4.2, 4.13; see also Brown, supra; Schafrath v. Derwinski, supra. Given the above, the Board finds that the reduction from 70 percent to 50 percent rating for the Veteran's service-connected PTSD, effective April 1, 2018, was improper. Accordingly, the 70 percent rating for PTSD is restored, effective April 1, 2018. Increased Rating 2. Entitlement to a rating in excess of 70 percent for PTSD is denied. The Veteran and his representative assert that his PTSD should be rated higher than currently contemplated. Specifically, during the February 2022 Board hearing, the Veteran's spouse testified that the Veteran snaps at people for no reason, struggles with coping with stressful circumstances and tends to isolate himself. Disability ratings are determined by applying the criteria set forth in the VA Schedule for Rating Disabilities (Rating Schedule) and are intended to represent the average impairment of earning capacity resulting from disability. 38 U.S.C. § 1155; 38 C.F.R. § 4.1. Separate diagnostic codes identify the various disabilities. Disabilities must be reviewed in relation to their history. 38 C.F.R. § 4.1. Other applicable, general policy considerations are: interpreting reports of examination in light of the whole recorded history, reconciling the various reports into a consistent picture so that the current rating may accurately reflect the elements of disability, 38 C.F.R. § 4.2; resolving any reasonable doubt regarding the degree of disability in favor of the claimant, 38 C.F.R. § 4.3; where there is a question as to which of two evaluations apply, assigning a higher of the two where the disability picture more nearly approximates the criteria for the next higher rating, 38 C.F.R. § 4.7; and, evaluating functional impairment on the basis of lack of usefulness, and the effects of the disability upon the person's ordinary activity, 38 C.F.R. § 4.10. See Schafrath v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 589 (1991). During the period on appeal, the Veteran's PTSD is rated 50 percent under Diagnostic Code 9411, which assigns ratings based upon the General Rating Formula for Mental Disorders. 38 C.F.R. § 4.130. A 70 percent rating is warranted where there is occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood, due to such symptoms as: suicidal ideation; obsessional rituals which interfere with routine activities; speech intermittently illogical, obscure, or irrelevant; near-continuous panic or depression affecting the ability to function independently, appropriately and effectively; neglect of personal appearance and hygiene; difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances (including work or a work like setting); inability to establish and maintain effective relationships). 38 C.F.R. § 4.130. Diagnostic Code 9411. A 100 percent rating is warranted for total occupational and social impairment, due to such symptoms as: gross impairment in thought processes or communication; persistent delusions or hallucinations; grossly inappropriate behavior; persistent danger of hurting self or others; inability to perform activities of daily living (including maintenance of minimal personal hygiene); disorientation to time or place; memory loss for names of close relatives, own occupation, or own name. Id. When evaluating the level of disability from a mental disorder, the rating agency will consider the extent of social impairment, but shall not assign an evaluation solely on the basis of social impairment. 38 C.F.R. § 4.126. The Court has held that the use of the phrase "such symptoms as," followed by a list of examples, provides guidance as to the severity of symptomatology contemplated for each rating. In particular, use of such terminology permits consideration of items listed as well as other symptoms and contemplates the effect of those symptoms on the claimant's social and work situation. Mauerhan v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 436 (2002). Further, when evaluating a mental disorder, the Board must consider the "frequency, severity, and duration of psychiatric symptoms, the length of remissions, and the Veteran's capacity for adjustment during periods of remission," and must also "assign an evaluation based on all the evidence of record that bears on occupational and social impairment rather than solely on the examiner's assessment of the level of disability at the moment of the examination." 38 C.F.R. § 4.126(a). The Board acknowledges that psychiatric examinations frequently include assignment of a global assessment of functioning (GAF) score. The American Psychiatric Association has released the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th Ed.) (DSM-5), and 38 C.F.R. § 4.130 has been revised to refer to the DSM-5. The DSM-5 does not contain information regarding GAF scores. Effective August 4, 2014, VA amended the portion of its Schedule for Rating Disabilities dealing with mental disorders to remove outdated references to the DSM-IV and replace them with references to the DSM-5. See 79 Fed. Reg. 45,093, 45,094 (Aug. 4, 2014). VA adopted as final, without change, the interim final rule and clarified that the provisions of the final rule did not apply to claims that were pending before the Board, this Court, or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on August 4, 2014, even if such claims were subsequently remanded to the agency of original jurisdiction. See 80 Fed. Reg. 14,308 (Mar. 19, 2015). In Golden v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 221 (2018), the Court held that given that the DSM-5 abandoned the GAF scale and that VA has formally adopted the DSM-5, the Board errs when it uses GAF scores to assign a psychiatric rating in cases where the DSM-5 applies. This appeal was certified to the Board in July 2020. As such, the DSM-5 applies, and the GAF scores will not be considered. After the effectuation of this decision, the Veteran will be rated at 70 percent effective October 1, 2013 under 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, Diagnostic Code 9411. Based on a review of the evidence of record, the Board finds that a rating in excess of 70 percent is not warranted. Turning to the evidence of record, during the December 2014 VA examination, the Veteran's PTSD was found to manifest in occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school. The examiner endorsed the following symptoms: depressed mood, anxiety, suspiciousness, panic attacks more than once a week, chronic sleep impairment, mild memory loss, such as forgetting names, directions or recent events, circumstantial, circumlocutory or stereotyped speech, speech intermittently illogical, obscure, or irrelevant, impaired judgment, impaired abstract thinking, disturbances of motivation and mood, difficulty in establishing maintaining effective work and social relationships, difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances, including work or a worklike setting, inability to establish and maintain effective relationships, obsessional rituals which interfere with routine activities, and neglect of personal appearance and hygiene. The examiner observed the general appearance to be adequate, with psychomotor exhibiting agitation and fidgetiness, with restlessness and tensity. Posture was rigid secondary to pain evident during interview, and the movement was careful stiff standing/sitting/shifting to moderate pain. The Veteran's language/speech were spontaneous and normal rate tone volume. The Veteran's attitude was cooperative and attentive, but in acute distress. The Veteran's level of consciousness was hyper-alert, with depressed, anxious, and dysphoric mood. The Veteran's affect was normal and congruent with situation, mood, and content. The Veteran's state was observed to be sad, anxious, and distrustful. Thought process was circular, rational, circumstantial, vague, tangential, with loose associations and irrational beliefs being evidence. However, the thought process was also normal and reality based. The Veteran was oriented to person, place, time, and situation. With regards to employment, the examiner noted no changes. In the September 2016 VA examination, the Veteran's PTSD was found to manifest in occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and productivity. The examiner endorsed the following symptoms: depressed mood, suspiciousness, chronic sleep impairment, mild memory loss, such as forgetting names, directions or recent events, disturbances of motivation and mood. The examiner noted that the Veteran is retired now. The Veteran was last provided a VA examination in September 2021. During the examination, the Veteran's occupational and social impairment was found to manifest in occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking and/or mood. The examiner endorsed the following symptoms: depressed mood, anxiety, suspiciousness, near-continuous panic or depression affecting the ability to function independently, appropriately and effectively, chronic sleep impairment, mild memory loss, such as forgetting names, directions or recent events, impairment of short- and long-term memory, for example, retention of only highly learned material, while forgetting to complete tasks, flattened affect, difficulty in understanding complex commands, impaired judgment, impaired abstract thinking, disturbances of motivation and mood, difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships, and difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances, including work or a work like setting. The examiner reported additional symptoms to include aggression during sleep and irritability. Occupational history remained unchanged. The Board finds that the criteria for a 100 percent rating under the General Rating Formula are not met. In this regard, the evidence does not show that the Veteran has total occupational and social impairment. Total social impairment was not demonstrated as the Veteran maintained a relationship with his wife. The record does not establish, and the Veteran has not alleged, gross impairment in thought processes or communication, persistent delusions or hallucinations, grossly inappropriate behavior, persistent danger of hurting self or others, intermittent inability to perform activities of daily living (including maintenance of minimal personal hygiene), disorientation to time or place or memory loss for names of close relatives, own occupation, or own name. In this regard, there was no evidence of perceptual disturbances such as hallucinations, mania or psychosis found on mental status examination. The Veteran's thought processes were found to not be impaired and his thought content was not found to include delusions or psychosis. The Veteran denied suicidal ideation and actively denied suicide attempts. There is otherwise no indication that he is in persistent danger of hurting himself or others. He has been found to have appropriate hygiene and appearance and he has not alleged being unable to maintain minimal personal hygiene. Additionally, the Veteran's PTSD symptoms are not similar in severity, frequency, or duration as found necessary for the assignment of a 100 percent rating for this appeal period. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, Diagnostic Code 9411. In assessing the severity of the major depressive disorder, the Board has considered the competent lay assertions regarding symptoms experienced and observed. See, e.g., Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 470 (1994) and Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993). However, the criteria needed to support higher ratings as the required medical findings that are within the province of trained medical professionals. See Jones v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 134, 137-138 (1994). As such, the lay assertions are not considered more persuasive than the objective medical findings which, as indicated above, do not support assignment of any higher rating pursuant to any applicable criteria at any point pertinent to this appeal. The Board notes the contentions of the Veteran that his PTSD is more severe than currently shown on examination; and the Board observes that the Veteran, while competent to report his observable symptoms, he is not competent to report that his mental health symptoms are of sufficient severity to warrant a higher rating under VA's tables for rating such disabilities because such an opinion requires medical expertise which he has not been shown to have. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370 (2002). Despite the foregoing, the Board acknowledges the Veteran and his representative's reports of the Veteran's symptoms. However, even after considering such contentions as to the effects of the disability on his daily life, the Board finds that the criteria for higher 100 percent rating is not met. The Rating Schedule contemplates such impairment under the ordinary conditions of daily life. 38 C.F.R. § 4.10; see also Martinak v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 447, 455 (2007). This argument is therefore without merit. The Board has considered whether staged ratings under Hart v. Mansfield, supra is appropriate; however, the Board finds that his symptomatology has been stable throughout the period on appeal. Therefore, assigning a staged ratings is not warranted. Neither the Veteran nor his representative has raised any other issues, nor have any other issues been reasonably raised by the record. See Doucette v. Shulkin, 28 Vet. App. 366 (2017) (confirming that the Board is not required to address issues unless they are specifically raised by the claimant or reasonably raised by the evidence of record). In this case, the Board finds that a rating in excess of 70 percent for PTSD is not warranted. Accordingly, the appeal is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. TDIU The Veteran asserts that he is unable to obtain and maintain gainful employment as a result of his service connected disabilities, to include his PTSD. During his February 2022 Board hearing, the Veteran testified that he was short-tempered, that he had difficulty adapting to stressful circumstances and that he had difficulty sleeping. In an August 2016 statement, the Veteran indicated that he stopped working because he was missing too many days of work due to his PTSD. A TDIU claim was inferred as a part of the Veteran's current appeal of a higher rating for PTSD. See Rice v. Shinseki, supra. As such, a Rice TDIU claim is limited to whether the veteran is unemployable due to the underlying service-connected disability on appeal, which, in this case, is the Veteran's PTSD. See Id, at 454-455 (holding that when a request for TDIU is raised during the administrative appeal of the initial rating assigned for the underlying disability, it is not a separate claim for benefits, but rather is part of the adjudication of the claim for increased compensation for that underlying disability). Where the schedular rating is less than total, a total disability rating for compensation purposes may be assigned when the disabled person is unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-connected disabilities, provided that, if there is only one such disability, this disability shall be ratable at 60 percent or more, or if there are two or more disabilities, there shall be at least one ratable at 40 percent or more, and sufficient additional disability to bring the combined rating to 70 percent or more. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). In this case, as of the effectuation of this decision, the Veteran is eligible for a TDIU on a schedular basis. Specifically, the Veteran is service connected for PTSD (rated at 50 percent from July 18, 2007, and 70 percent from October 1, 2013), right knee traumatic arthritis with strain (rated at 10 percent from March 23, 2002), and left knee osteoarthritis with strain associated with right knee traumatic arthritis with strain (rated at 10 percent effective July 18, 2007) with a combined rating is 80 percent effective October 1, 2013. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). Therefore, the remaining question is whether due to the Veteran's service connected disabilities, the Veteran is unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation due to his service connected disabilities. Consideration may be given to a veteran's level of education, special training, and previous work experience in arriving at whether a TDIU rating is warranted, but the Veteran's age or the impairment caused by non-service connected disabilities may not be considered in such a determination. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.341, 4.16, 4.19. In the present case, the Veteran submitted three Applications for Increased Compensation Based on Unemployability (VA 21-8940) forms; however, the June 2016 form is inclusive of the previous two forms. Therefore, the Board will only provide summary of the information provided in the June 2016 VA 21-8940 form. The Veteran reported that due to his PTSD, he was prevented from securing or following any substantially gainful position. He received treatment form June 2007 to March 2016. The Veteran reported that his disability affected full-time employment as of February 2006, and the Veteran last worked full time in March 2006, becoming too disabled to work in March 2010. The most earned in one year was $59,488.00 a year in 2005. The Veteran's occupation was an electrical contractor. The Veteran reported to being employed from January 2004 December 2007 as an electrical contractor. He lost no time from illness. In the past 12 months, his earned income was $0.00. He reported to leaving his last job because of his disability, and did not receive or except to receive disability retirement benefits or worker's compensation benefits. The Veteran did not try to obtain employment since becoming too disabled to work. The Veteran reported to completing up to two years of college level education. Before becoming too disabled to work, the Veteran also worked in hotel, motel, and restaurant management but also remarked that he could not remember where he had stored everything. In October 2016, the Veteran reported in a statement in support of claim form that he had been self-employed from 1978 to 2009. A Social Security Administration disability report indicates that the Veteran was a self-employed electrical contractor beginning in 1978. Turning to the evidence of record and as noted above, the VA examiners providing the Veteran with PTSD examinations generally remarked that the Veteran was unemployed at the time of the examination. During the March 2012 VA examination for the lower legs, the VA examiner opined that the functional impact of the Veteran's lower legs resulting in the Veteran receiving social security disability at age 62 due to painful knees. The Veteran's September 2021 VA examiner provided that the functional impact of the Veteran's knee and lower leg concerns impacted the Veteran with zero to one week work time lost in 12 months, and that the Veteran is limited in running, kneeling, crawling, squatting, prolonged standing, walking and high impact activities. These restrictions limited work duties and decrease work productivity, but the examiner did not otherwise opined that the disabilities prevented the Veteran from maintaining the obtaining gainful employment. Also of record is a November 2009 determination by the Social Security Administration finding that the Veteran became disabled. However, the Board also notes that the determination was mostly based on osteoarthritic concerns. In the November 2009 Disability Report, the Veteran claimed that the Veteran's back, knee, shoulder, legs, PTSD, prostate, sleep apnea, heart, and hypertension limited his ability to work. The Veteran is currently only service connected for PTSD, right knee traumatic arthritis with strain, and left knee osteoarthritis with strain associated with right knee traumatic arthritis with strain. The examiner found that the Veteran is able to occasionally lift 20 pounds, frequently lift 10 pounds, stand or and/or walk for a total of at least two hours in an eight-hour workday, sit for a total of about six hours in an eight hour workday, and push-and pull being limited in the lower extremities. The Veteran could occasionally climb ramps and stairs but not ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He could occasionally balance, stoop, and crouch, but not kneel or crawl. The Veteran had no communicative limitations and no environmental limitations. The examiner also noted that the Veteran can walk maybe 400 or 500 feet before needing to rest for 10 to 15 minutes. While this finding is not binding on the Board, it is relevant to the issue of the Veteran's employability. The Board finds that it is clear from the record that during the pendency of the appeal, Veteran was unable obtain and maintain gainful employment due to pain, weakness, instability, and limitation of motion as well as the psychological difficulties caused by his service-connected disabilities. There is no opinion that tends to assert that the Veteran is able to obtain and maintain gainful employment in another field. The Veteran himself has offered his (admittedly subjective) assessment that the effects of his disability, including pain and psychological impairments prevent him from engaging in any form of employment. The Board finds that the evidence generally supports that finding and awards the benefit of the doubt to the Veteran. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102; Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (en banc);. Accordingly, entitlement to TDIU is granted. KRISTY L. ZADORA Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board A.J. Kim, Associate Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.