Citation Nr: 22048949 Decision Date: 08/27/22 Archive Date: 08/27/22 DOCKET NO. 16-54 480 DATE: August 27, 2022 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death is granted. Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), for accrued benefits purposes, is denied. Entitlement to dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC) pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1151 is dismissed. The issue of entitlement to an increased disability rating for diabetes mellitus, type I, for accrued benefits purposes, is dismissed. The issue of entitlement to an increased disability rating for peripheral neuropathy, right lower extremity, for accrued benefits purposes, is dismissed. The issue of entitlement to an increased disability rating for peripheral neuropathy, left lower extremity, for accrued benefits purposes, is dismissed. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Resolving reasonable doubt in the appellant's favor, the Veteran's service-connected acquired psychiatric disorder, diagnosed as dysthymic disorder, caused or contributed substantially or materially to his cause of death due to suicide. 2. The claim of entitlement to DIC under 38 U.S.C. § 1151 is moot. 3. The medical evidence of record indicates that the Veteran did not have a current qualifying diagnosis of PTSD for VA compensation purposes. 4. During the April 5, 2021, hearing, prior to the promulgation of a decision in the appeal, the appellant withdrew the appeal as to the claims of entitlement to increased disability ratings for diabetes mellitus, type I; for peripheral neuropathy, right lower extremity; and for peripheral neuropathy, left lower extremity. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria for service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death are met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1310, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.5, 3.102, 3.303, 3.312. 2. The claim of entitlement to DIC benefits pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1151 is dismissed. 38 U.S.C. § 1151; 38 C.F.R. § 3.361. 3. The criteria for entitlement to service connection for PTSD have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1154, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304. 4. The criteria for dismissal of the issues of entitlement to increased disability ratings for diabetes mellitus, type I; for peripheral neuropathy, right lower extremity; and for peripheral neuropathy, left lower extremity have been met. 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 19.55. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran had active military service from January 1999 to January 2010, including service in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Veteran died in October 2015, and the appellant is his surviving spouse. The Board thanks the Veteran's family for his service. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals on appeal from March 2013, June 2013, and February 2016 rating decisions of a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) / Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ). In April 2021, the appellant testified at a Board videoconference hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge. The Board notes that the AOJ determined that the appellant was eligible to substitute for the Veteran as a claimant in September 2016. The appellant had declined to substitute for the Veteran in August 2016 correspondence from his representative (stating that the appellant "elects ... to have his claim treated as an independent claim for DIC benefits and accrued benefits due his late spouse.... He does not want to be substituted for the late [Veteran]."). The AOJ's September 2016 statement of the case adjudicated the matters arising from the Veteran's claims pending at the time of his death under a characterization of "accrued benefits" claims. The Board preserves that characterization in this appellate decision. REFERRED During the April 2021 Board hearing, the appellant's representative argued that the Veteran's 2012 claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD, with the submission of records from a psychiatric hospitalization, "should've been interpreted by the VA as a request for an increased mental health rating of at least 70%" for the Veteran's established service-connected mental health disorder. The appellant's representative proceeded to argue that the Veteran's impairment met the criteria for a higher rating for his service-connected psychiatric disorder. The appeal currently before the Board does not include any AOJ determination regarding the disability rating assignment for the Veteran's service-connected dysthymic disorder, and the Board has no jurisdiction to review that disability rating at this time. The appellant's contention is essentially an assertion that the Veteran raised a claim of entitlement to an increased rating for dysthymic disorder that continues to await initial AOJ adjudication. The matter of responding to the appellant's assertion that a pending unadjudicated claim of entitlement to an increased rating for dysthymic disorder was raised by the Veteran in June 2012 (in the claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD) and/or October 2012 (in the submission of private psychiatric hospitalization records), is hereby REFERRED to the AOJ for appropriate action. 1. Entitlement to service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death is granted. To establish service connection for the cause of a veteran's death, the evidence must show that disability incurred in or aggravated by service either caused or contributed substantially or materially to the cause of death. 38 U.S.C. § 1310; 38 C.F.R. § 3.312. For a service-connected disability to be the cause of death, it must singly or with some other condition be the immediate or underlying cause or be etiologically related. For a service-connected disability to constitute a contributory cause, it is not sufficient to show that it causally shared in producing death, but it must be shown that there was a causal connection. Id. VA regulations address service connection for mental unsoundness in suicide and provide that in order for suicide to constitute willful misconduct, the act of self-destruction must be intentional. However, it is observed that a person of unsound mind is incapable of forming an intent (mens rea, or guilty mind, which is an essential element of crime or willful misconduct). 38 C.F.R. § 3.302(a). Regulations further provide that: (1) whether a person, at the time of suicide, was so unsound mentally that he or she did not realize the consequence of such an act, or was unable to resist such impulse is a question to be determined in each individual case, based on all available lay and medical evidence pertaining to his or her mental condition at the time of suicide; (2) the act of suicide or a bona fide attempt is considered to be evidence of mental unsoundness; therefore, where no reasonable adequate motive for suicide is shown by the evidence, the act will be considered to have resulted from mental unsoundness; and (3) a reasonable adequate motive for suicide may be established by affirmative evidence showing circumstances which could lead a rational person to self-destruction. 38 C.F.R. § 3.302(b). In this case, the evidence reflects that the Veteran died in October 2015. The Veteran's death certificate documented the cause of death was a gunshot wound to head, which was a self-inflicted injury. As noted above, the act of suicide is considered to be evidence of mental unsoundness. A September 2011 VA examiner identified that a symptom associated with the Veteran's now service-connected dysthymic disorder was "suicidal ideation with a past history of suicidal behavior." The September 2011 VA examination report further indicates that the Veteran's now-service-connected psychiatric disorder's symptoms included "anhedonia, low self-esteem, hopelessness...." The Board notes that the September 2011 VA examination report suggests that the Veteran's "suicidal ideation" was associated with the mood disorder diagnosis of dysthymic disorder, and perhaps the Veteran's "suicidal behavior" was associated with a "[s]uperimposed ... characterological disorder of a borderline personality." The Board finds that the evidence does not persuasively distinguish any portion of the Veteran's suicidal symptoms as clearly separate from his service-connected mental health pathology. The Board finds that the Veteran's suicidal symptomatology is reasonably attributed to his service-connected mental health disorder in this competent evidence. A December 2012 VA mental health examination report discusses the Veteran's history of "suicide attempt by aspirin overdose and with alcohol intoxication" in 2009, associated at that time with diagnoses including "Adjustment Disorder with Depressed Mood." The report furthermore discusses the Veteran's more recent history of a June 2012 psychiatric hospitalization "with a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, Severe, with Suicidal Ideation...." The private medical documentation of the June 2021 psychiatric hospitalization is of record. The Board finds that the Veteran's suicidal symptomatology is reasonably attributed to his service-connected mental health impairment in this competent evidence. The Board finds that the evidence reasonably indicates that the Veteran's now-service-connected acquired psychiatric disorder, diagnosed as dysthymic disorder, caused or contributed substantially or materially to his cause of death due to suicide. As discussed, the record reflects a history of suicidal ideation and suicidal behavior which supports a finding that the Veteran's decision to take his life was due to mental unsoundness. In this case, there is no indication of a reasonable, adequate motive for suicide shown by the evidence. To the contrary, the lay and medical evidence supports a finding that the Veteran took his own life due to mental unsoundness. Thus, given the evidence outlined above, and with resolution of reasonable doubt in the appellant's favor, the Board concludes that service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death is warranted. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.102, Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53-56 (1990). 2. Entitlement to DIC pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1151 is dismissed. When a Veteran suffers additional disability or death as the result of training, hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or an examination by VA, disability compensation shall be awarded in the same manner as if such additional disability or death were service connected. See 38 U.S.C. § 1151; 38 C.F.R. § 3.358(a). That is, § 1151 provides an alternate basis for an award of DIC and does not provide any additional benefit for the appellant in this case. In light of the grant of service connection for the cause of the Veteran's death under 38 U.S.C. § 1310 in the present case, the claim of entitlement to DIC under 38 U.S.C. § 1151 is moot, and the claim is dismissed. 3. Entitlement to service connection for PTSD, for accrued benefits purposes, is denied. Service connection may be granted for disability due to disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304. Service connection may also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303; see also Combee v. Brown, 34 F.3d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1994). To substantiate a claim of service connection, there must be evidence of: (1) a current disability; (2) a disease, injury, or event in service; and (3) a nexus or causal relationship between the claimed disability and the disease, injury, or event in service. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Certain chronic diseases (including psychoses) will be presumed related to service if they were noted as chronic in service; or, if they manifested to a compensable degree within a presumptive period following separation from service (1 year for psychoses); or, if continuity of the same symptomatology has existed since service, with no intervening cause. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137; Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 258 (2015); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303(b), 3.307, 3.309(a). Notwithstanding the lack of evidence of disease or injury during service, service connection may still be granted if all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disability was incurred in service. See 38 U.S.C. § 1113(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d); Cosman v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 503 (1992). Service connection is limited to those cases where disease or injury has resulted in a disability. In the absence of proof of a present disability for which service connection is sought, there is no valid claim of service connection. Brammer v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 223 (1992). The requirement of having a current disability is met when a claimant has a disability at the time a claim for VA disability compensation is filed or during the pendency of that claim. McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007). A disability under 38 U.S.C. § 1110 refers to functional impairment of earning capacity. Saunders v. Wilkie, 886 F.3d 1356 (2018). 38 U.S.C. § 1154(a) requires that the VA give due consideration to all pertinent medical and lay evidence in evaluating a claim to disability benefits. Lay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). When analyzing lay evidence, the Board should assess the evidence and determine whether the disability claimed is of the type for which lay evidence is competent. See Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed.Cir.2009); Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428 (2011). However, competent medical evidence is necessary where the determinative question is one requiring medical knowledge. Competent medical evidence means evidence provided by a person who is qualified through education, training, or experience to offer medical diagnoses, statements, or opinions. Competent medical evidence may also mean statements conveying sound medical principles found in medical treatises. It would also include statements contained in authoritative writings such as medical and scientific articles and research reports or analyses. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(1). Competent lay evidence means any evidence not requiring that the proponent have specialized education, training, or experience. Lay evidence is competent if it is provided by a person who has knowledge of facts or circumstances and conveys matters that can be observed and described by a lay person. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given to the claimant. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.102. When all of the evidence is assembled, VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence supports the claim or is in approximate balance, with the appellant prevailing in either event, or whether the evidence weighs persuasively against the claim, in which case the claim is denied. Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 55 (1990). Although the Board has an obligation to provide reasons and bases supporting its decision, there is no need to discuss every piece of evidence of record in detail. See Gonzales v. West, 218 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Hence, the Board will summarize the relevant evidence as appropriate and the Board's analysis will focus specifically on what the evidence shows, or fails to show, as to the claims. In addition to the general criteria for service connection, service connection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence diagnosing PTSD in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a), i.e., a diagnosis conforming to specified diagnostic criteria (currently the DSM-5, previously the DSM-IV); (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor actually occurred; and (3) medical evidence of a link, or causal nexus, between current symptomatology and the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Significantly, the Veteran previously established his entitlement to service connection for mental health impairment under the diagnosis of dysthymic disorder. The Veteran and the appellant have contended that he furthermore incurred PTSD while on active duty service. However, while the Veteran was diagnosed with psychiatric pathologies, the evidence of record does not indicate that he additionally had a qualifying current diagnosis of PTSD from any time during the pendency of the claim on appeal. The beginning date of the pendency of this PTSD claim on appeal is the date of the Veteran's June 2012 claim first raising the question of entitlement to service connection for PTSD. The Board has reviewed the evidence of record for indication of a diagnosis of PTSD during the pendency of this claim. The Board finds that the evidence from the pendency of the claim on appeal does not show a qualifying diagnosis of PTSD. The Board notes that a December 2012 VA PTSD compensation examination report shows that the Veteran's mental health was evaluated with several diagnoses identified, but the examining psychologist specifically determined that the Veteran did not have PTSD. The December 2021 VA examiner determined that "No," the Veteran did -not- "have a diagnosis of PTSD that conforms to DSM-IV criteria based on today's evaluation," and that instead the "Veteran has another Axis I and/or II diagnosis." The VA examiner provided a thoroughly detailed clinical assessment and explanation to this effect. (The Board notes that, unfortunately, further examination of the Veteran to consider the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria is impossible at this time. Neither the Veteran's nor the appellant's presentation of the claim have contended that application of the DSM-5 would result in a diagnosis of PTSD to contradict the medical evidence of record that applies the DSM-IV. No evidence of record otherwise suggests that application of the more recent diagnostic criteria would result in a diagnosis of PTSD.) The Board notes that the private medical documentation associated with the Veteran's June 2012 psychiatric hospitalization suggests a diagnosis of PTSD, included in a list of ten "Secondary Diagnosis" items after the "Primary Diagnosis" of "Major depressive affective disorder, recurrent episode, severe, without psychotic behavior." In this June 2012 record set, references to "PTSD" or "possibly PTSD" or "possibly has PTSD symptoms" or "Rule out PTSD" are included amongst other diagnoses and observations concerning the Veteran and his history. However, none of the references to PTSD in the records demonstrate a qualifying diagnosis conforming to the required specified PTSD diagnostic criteria to qualify for VA compensation purposes. The December 2012 VA PTSD examination report specifically contemplates and discusses the Veteran's June 2012 hospitalization, noting that "In June of 2012, the Veteran was admitted to a civilian psychiatric hospital for three days, with a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, Severe, with Suicidal Ideation, again concurrent with alcohol intoxication." The December 2012 VA examiner presents a detailed report of the Veteran's mental health impairments with attention to diagnostic identifications, and directly explains that while the Veteran had a number of diagnosed mental health disorders, he did not have impairment meeting the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. In particular, "Criterion F" for a diagnosis of PTSD was not met because, although the Veteran had significant impairment of his mental health associated with other diagnoses, the Veteran did not have "clinically significant distress or impairment" associated specifically with a PTSD pathology. To be clear, the evidence makes it plain that the Veteran suffered from significant distress and impairment of his mental health; such impairment was simply attributed to diagnoses other than PTSD, including service-connected impairment. Whereas the December 2012 VA PTSD examination report presents a clear and detailed basis, informed by the pertinent information, for the medical determination that the Veteran's mental health impairment did not include a qualifying diagnosis of PTSD, the June 2012 private medical records' references to PTSD are essentially conclusory, unaccompanied by any discussion of the required specified PTSD diagnostic criteria. The Board finds the December 2012 VA examiner's finding that the Veteran's mental health impairments did not include a qualifying diagnosis of PTSD to be persuasive and more probative than the contrary suggestions of record. The Board finds that the evidence weighs persuasively against finding that the Veteran had a qualifying current diagnosis of PTSD. Therefore, given the evidence of record, the Board is unable to find that the criteria for entitlement to service connection for PTSD have been met. 4. The issue of entitlement to an increased disability rating for diabetes mellitus, type I, for accrued benefits purposes, is dismissed. 5. The issue of entitlement to an increased disability rating for peripheral neuropathy, right lower extremity, for accrued benefits purposes, is dismissed. 6. The issue of entitlement to an increased disability rating for peripheral neuropathy, left lower extremity, for accrued benefits purposes, is dismissed. At the April 2021 Board hearing, the appellant and his representative requested to withdraw the issues of entitlement to increased disability ratings for the Veteran's (1) diabetes mellitus, type I; (2) peripheral neuropathy, right lower extremity; and (3) peripheral neuropathy, left lower extremity. The appellant and his representative confirmed that the appellant had discussed the matter with his representative, and he was advised of the consequences of withdrawing the claims. An appeal may be withdrawn as to any or all issues involved in the appeal at any time before the Board promulgates a decision. 38 C.F.R. § 20.204. Withdrawal may be made by the appellant or by his or her authorized representative. 38 C.F.R. § 20.204. The Board finds that the appellant's withdrawal of these claims was explicit, unambiguous, and done with a full understanding of the consequences of such action. The appellant and the representative confirmed that they had had an opportunity to discuss the withdrawals. Additionally, the undersigned specifically discussed consequences of withdrawal with the appellant. Given these circumstances, the Board finds that the appellant met the requirements necessary for an effective oral withdrawal. See Acree v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Accordingly, the Board does not have jurisdiction to review these issues, and they are dismissed. See Hanson v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 29 (1996) (holding that when a claim is withdrawn, it ceases to exist). M. C. GRAHAM Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board Barone, Alexander The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.