Citation Nr: 22049337 Decision Date: 08/30/22 Archive Date: 08/30/22 DOCKET NO. 16-00 303A DATE: August 30, 2022 ORDER Entitlement to revision of a June 1986 rating decision that denied service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on the basis of clear and unmistakable error (CUE) is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. A June 1986 rating decision denied service connection for PTSD and did not perfect his appeal of that decision to the Board; it thus became final. 2. The correct facts, as known at the time, were before the adjudicator in June 1986 and it made a reasonable determination that the criteria for service connection for PTSD were not met in accordance with the statutory and regulatory provisions extant at that time. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for revision of a June 1986 rating decision denying entitlement to service connection for PTSD based on CUE have not been met. 38 U.S.C. § 5109A (2018); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.103, 3.104, 3.105(a) (2022). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served honorably on active duty in the United States Air Force from April 1967 to November 1970, to include in the Republic of Vietnam. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a July 2013 rating decision of a VA Regional Office (RO) that determined that a June 1986 rating decision denying service connection for PTSD did not contain CUE. The Veteran submitted a notice of disagreement to the July 2013 denial and was issued a statement of the case in December 2015. The Veteran then perfected his appeal and elected to appear and testify before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge (VLJ) at a hearing conducted in July 2021. A transcript of the hearing is included in the claim file. Whether a June 1986 decision denying service connection for PTSD contains CUE By way of procedural background, the Veteran originally applied for service connection for PTSD in July 1985. This claim was initially decided in a June 1986 rating decision that denied his claim. The Veteran submitted a notice of disagreement to that denial later that month, and VA issued him a statement of the case in August 1986. The Veteran testified at the July 2021 Board hearing that he personally went into the RO's offices in August 1986 with paperwork to file a substantive appeal to that decision but that he was ridiculed by VA staff and was not offered help or assistance. He did not testify that he submitted the substantive appeal in the form of a VA Form 9 at that time. The Veteran next submitted a claim for service connection for PTSD on April 23, 2008. His claim was initially denied in a June 2009 rating decision, but VA ultimately granted this claim in a January 2011 rating decision in which it assigned an effective date of April 23, 2008. It granted him an initial 50 percent disability rating. The Veteran was notified of this decision later in January 2011. Although he submitted a notice of disagreement in March 2011 to the initial rating assigned of 50 percent, he did not submit any written disagreement with the effective date assigned by that decision within a year of his notification of the January 2011 decision. He was ultimately granted an increased rating to 70 percent for his PTSD in a March 2012 rating decision. The Veteran's representative then submitted correspondence in July 2012 that characterized itself as a disagreement with the June 1986 rating decision on the basis of CUE. This correspondence requested revision of that decision to reflect a grant of service connection for PTSD. A VA RO then issued the July 2013 decision that denied revision of that rating decision on the basis of CUE. It is this July 2013 decision that is the subject of the current appeal to the Board. Once a decision becomes final, it may only be revised by a showing of CUE. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 3.105. CUE is a very specific and rare kind of "error." It is the kind of error, of fact or of law, that when called to the attention of later reviewers compels the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the error. Fugo v. Brown,6 Vet. App. 40, 43-44 (1993). The error must be of a type that is outcome-determinative, and subsequently developed evidence may not be considered in determining whether an error existed in the prior decision. See Porter v. Brown,5 Vet. App. 233, 235-36 (1993). Where evidence establishes CUE, the prior decision will be reversed or amended. 38C.F.R. §3.105(a). For the purpose of authorizing benefits, the rating or other adjudicatory decision which constitutes a reversal of a prior decision on the grounds of CUE has the same effect as if the corrected decision had been made on the date of the reversed decision. Id. CUE is established when the following conditions are met: (1) either (a) the correct facts in the record were not before the adjudicator, or (b) the statutory or regulatory provisions in existence at the time were incorrectly applied; (2) the alleged error must be "undebatable," not merely "a disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated"; and (3) the commission of the alleged error must have "manifestly changed the outcome" of the decision being attacked on the basis of CUE at the time that decision was rendered. Evans v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 180, 185 (2014), aff'd, 642 F.App'x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The CUE arguments that the Veteran's representative has presented are relatively simple. He has argued that the June 1986 rating decision erred by failing to properly consider an August 1986 examination report from private physician Dr. S.G. as well as the opinion from examining VA psychiatrist Dr. E.K. from February 1986. More specifically, the representative argued in his July 2012 correspondence that the report from Dr. S.G. confirmed that the Veteran was suffering from chronic and severe PTSD based on his stressor that was "clearly [the Veteran's] service in Vietnam." The July 2012 arguments also contend that Dr. E.K.'s report also supported his claim in that it mentioned reports that the Veteran had seen people killed, barracks destroyed, and much in the way of mutilated children while serving in Vietnam that resulted in generalized anxiety disorder with post-traumatic stress disorder features. The representative contended that this evidence and VA's documentation of the Veteran's service in Vietnam represented records proving that the Veteran was stationed at a base that was repeatedly attacked and that, in light of the medical opinions, it was CUE to deny the original claim for service connection in 1986. While the Board is sympathetic to the arguments presented by the Veteran and his representative, it is bound by the statutes and regulations governing the revision of decisions on the basis of CUE. The criteria for such a revision are significantly heightened compared to a situation where the Board were to consider the merits of an argument in the first instance on appeal from a denial by a VA RO that decided a traditional claim for service connection for PTSD. As noted above, a CUE is a very specific and rare kind of error that requires a determination that, based on the facts and law in effect at the time of the challenged decision, no reasonable person could find that the challenged decision was correctly decided. For the reasons explained below, the Board does not find that this high burden has been met. As an initial matter, in determining whether the June 1986 rating decision is subject to a CUE revision, the Board must first determine whether it became final. Here, the record reflects that the Veteran did submit a notice of disagreement to that decision. He was issued the August 1986 statement of the case (SOC) referenced above. As explained above, although the Veteran has credibly stated he initially attempted to bring in appeals forms to a local VA office regarding the SOC, there is no evidence that he actually submitted a substantive appeal to VA after he received the August 1986 SOC. As such, the underlying June 1986 rating decision became final. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.104, 19.52, 20.1103. Similarly, although the SOC appears to have been based on slightly different grounds in its recitation of the facts of the claim, it is not a decision in and of itself subject to CUE and is merely a summary of the law and evidence concerning the claim. As the Board finds that the June 1986 rating decision became final, it can proceed to address the arguments presented by the Veteran and his representative regarding whether there was an undebatable error of fact or law that resulted in a denial of service connection for PTSD. In doing so, it is necessary to first describe the legal standard applicable to the June 1986 rating decision. The general law regarding service connection has not substantially changed since the time of the Veteran's July 1985 claim for service connection for PTSD. Then, as now, service connection was established when the facts established that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred coincident with service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (1986). Service connection could also be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence established that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (1986). Turning to the evidence of record at the time of the 1986 decision, the Board notes that the Veteran's service treatment and personnel records do not include any contemporaneous evidence that the Veteran ever reported any psychological symptoms or received any medical care for any such symptoms at any point during service. On the contrary, a clinical psychiatric evaluation conducted on the Veteran at the time of his separation from active duty was noted to be normal. In a report of medical history form completed at that time, he also reportedly denied psychological symptoms and indicated he was in good health. A review of the Veteran's personnel records indicates that, although he was stationed in the Republic of Vietnam, his duties appear to have been as a clerk and were administrative in nature. There was no evidence that the Veteran was a combat veteran from those records. As the Veteran's representative stated in the July 2012 CUE claim, the record did contain the two medical examination reports from Drs. S.G. and E.K. Although Dr. E.K. in March 2016 raised questions about the diagnosis of PTSD at that time, Dr. S.G., in his August 1985 psychiatric report appears to have conclusively diagnosed the Veteran with this disability and attributed it to service. At the VA medical examination with Dr. E.K., the Veteran reported general stressors relating to the attacks conducted on his base as well as the distress of seeing enemy attacks on barracks and mutilated bodies. He also reported one incident relating to his teaching of local children in which a janitor was killed. VA sent the Veteran correspondence in May 1986 asking for more information regarding this incident with the janitor so that a stressor might be verified, but no response appears in the claim file. The Veteran's representative contended in July 2012 that the lack of verification regarding the janitor incident is irrelevant considering the reports of significant stress in the medical statements from both Dr. S.G. and Dr. E.K. He contends that this evidence confirms the significant stress that the Veteran experienced while stationed in the Republic of Vietnam and the repeated attacks on the base at which he was stationed. At the hearing, the Veteran went into significant detail about the circumstances of his stress while serving in Vietnam. The Board has no reason now to find that he was anything other than sincere at the hearing. Unfortunately, in a CUE analysis, the Board may only consider evidence of record at the time of the challenged decision and may not consider this new testimony when determining whether the June 1986 decision contains CUE. The Board notes that, although that evidence that was of record in June 1986 did include post-service medical records regarding the Veteran's experiences in Vietnam, those reports came directly from the Veteran himself and appear to have been only repeated by the examiners in their examination reports. They do not represent independent evidence regarding the circumstances of the Veteran's service in Vietnam. Put more simply, the record at the time of the Veteran's denial of service connection in June 1986 included service treatment and personnel records that were devoid of any reports of stress, psychological symptoms, or psychiatric care relating to any period of service, to include while he was stationed in the Republic of Vietnam. Instead, they include normal psychiatric findings and evidence of primarily administrative work. The only competent evidence of record at that time that suggests that the Veteran did undergo any stressors stems directly from the Veteran's own reports to his examining clinicians and to VA itself many years after service. The Board now has no reason to doubt the credibility of the Veteran's statements regarding what occurred in Vietnam and the significant stress and fear that he experienced as a result of his service. However, to succeed on his claim, the Board must find that the only reasonable reading of the evidence of record at the time of the 1986 decision was that he had experienced an in-service event or incident that caused his PTSD. The Board now finds that, in light of the lack of any in-service evidence and the affirmative reports at separation of a normal psychological evaluation, that a reasonable reviewer of the record could determine that the criteria for service connection were not met and that there was insufficient evidence of any in-service stressor, event, or injury. As such, it is not undebatable that the Veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD would have been granted. In the end, the arguments presented by the Veteran and his representative appear to ask the Board to reweigh the evidence of record. Any such reweighing cannot be CUE. In finding that the criteria to revise the 1986 decision have not been met, the Board in no way intends to minimize the frustration that the Veteran has felt during this process, and specifically regarding how he was treated at the time of the 1986 adjudication. The Board also sympathizes with his statements at the hearing in which he stated that because there appeared to be doubt in the record at the time of the 1986 decision, any such reasonable doubt should have been resolved in his favor and the claim should have been granted. Unfortunately, for the reasons explained above, the existence of doubt in the record regarding whether a claim should be approved or denied does not rise to the standard required to revise the 1986 decision on the basis of CUE. Similarly, the Board recognizes that his claim was ultimately granted based on evidence largely identical to the evidence that was of record in 1986. No specific stressor has since been confirmed. However, it appears that that grant was largely issued in accordance with the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3), which was not made effective until July 2010. That provision allows for a veteran's lay statements alone to establish the occurrence of a claimed in-service stressor relating to the veteran's fear of hostile military or terrorist activity. This regulation was not in effect at the time of the Veteran's June 1986 denial. As explained above, the Board may only consider the law in effect at that time in evaluating a CUE claim and cannot consider this subsequent liberalizing regulation. Ultimately, the Board finds that a reasonable person could have applied the law in effect at the time of the June 1986 decision to the facts of record and determined that the criteria for service connection for PTSD were not met. As such, the Board must find that the criteria to revise that final decision on the basis of CUE have not been met. The appeal is denied. E. I. VELEZ Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board Whitelaw, Braden The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.