Citation Nr: 22040125 Decision Date: 07/13/22 Archive Date: 07/13/22 DOCKET NO. 18-20 816 DATE: July 13, 2022 ORDER An effective date earlier than October 31, 2012 for the award of service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is denied. REMANDED The issue of whether clear and unmistakable error (CUE) was committed in the May 2008 rating decision with regard to the denial of service connection for PTSD is remanded. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The claim for service connection for PTSD was previously denied in a May 2008 rating decision, which the Veteran did not appeal. 2. The Veteran filed a petition to reopen the claim for PTSD on October 31, 2012, which is the effective date of the award of service connection for PTSD. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The May 2008 rating decision is final with regard to the denial of service connection for PTSD. 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1103. 2. The effective date of October 31, 2012 for the award of service connection for PTSD is proper. 38 U.S.C. § 5110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.400. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty in the U.S. Army from October 1984 to May 1990. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an October 2016 rating decision of a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). The Veteran testified at a hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge in April 2022. A transcript of the hearing is in the claims file. Effective Dates Except as otherwise provided, the effective date of an evaluation and award of compensation based on an original claim, a claim reopened after final disallowance, or a claim for increase will be the date of receipt of the claim or the date entitlement arose, whichever is the later. 38 U.S.C. § 5110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.400. In claims for direct service connection, if the claim is received within one year after separation from active service, the effective date of the award is the day following separation or the date entitlement arose. 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(b)(2). Otherwise, it is the date of receipt of claim or the date entitlement arose, whichever is later. § 3.400. For reopened claims, the effective date is the date of the receipt of claim or date entitlement arose, whichever is later. § 3.400(r). With respect to the date of claim, a specific claim in the form prescribed by the VA Secretary must be filed in order for benefits to be paid to any individual under VA law. 38 U.S.C. §§ 501, 5101; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.151, 3.155, 3.160. Effective Date of Service Connection for PTSD The Veteran states that an earlier effective date of service connection for PTSD is warranted. In that regard, he states that he did not file a Notice of Disagreement (NOD) with the May 2008 rating decision, which originally denied service connection for PTSD, because of mental health issues that prevented him from opening and responding to mail. See December 2017 RO Hearing Transcript. He also states he was homeless off and on at the time of mailing of notice of that decision, and thus may not have received that notice. See id. He thus seeks an effective date that coincides with his original claim, which was filed in January 2007. For the following reasons, the Board finds that the current effective date of October 31, 2012 is proper, and that the criteria for an earlier effective date have not been met. The May 2008 rating decision denied service connection for PTSD. The Veteran was notified of that decision and his appellate rights in a May 2008 letter. See 38 U.S.C. § 5104; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.103, 19.25. Under VA's then applicable legacy appeal system, a determination on a claim by the agency of original jurisdiction of which the claimant is properly notified is final if no Notice of Disagreement (NOD) is filed within the prescribed time period, or an appeal is not perfected pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.302. 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1103; see 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.200, 20.201, 20.302 (setting forth requirements and timeframe for initiating and perfecting an appeal under VA's legacy appeal system). Under the legacy appeal system applicable here, VA law provides that a claimant, or his or her representative, shall file a NOD with a determination by the agency of original jurisdiction within one year from the date that the agency mails notice of the determination to him or her. 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (b)(1); 38 C.F.R. § 20.302(a). The date of mailing the letter of notification of the determination will be presumed to be the same as the date of that letter for purposes of determining whether an appeal has been timely filed. Id. Here, the Veteran did not file a NOD with the May 2008 rating decision, either within a year of that decision or later. Accordingly, the May 2008 rating decision is final. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1103. The Board notes that the Veteran never filed a request for an extension of the time limit for filing the NOD. In that regard, time limits within which claimants or beneficiaries are required to act to perfect a claim or challenge an adverse VA decision may be extended for good cause shown. 38 C.F.R. § 3.109(b). Where an extension is requested after expiration of a time limit, the action required of the claimant or beneficiary must be taken concurrent with or prior to the filing of a request for extension of the time limit, and good cause must be shown as to why the required action could not have been taken during the original time period and could not have been taken sooner than it was. Id. Extensions of time limits for good cause shown under section 3.109(b) are applicable to NOD's. Mason v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 44, 54 (1995) ("[T]he time for filing an NOD may be extended, or an NOD may be filed out of time, only when, as required by 38 C.F.R. § 3.109 (b), such an extension, or acceptance of an untimely NOD, has been requested and good cause for it has been shown"). Here, the Veteran did not file a NOD "concurrent with or prior to the filing of a request for extension of the time limit" for filing it. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.109(b). Rather, he has never filed a NOD. Accordingly, an extension cannot be granted as a matter of law. See id. The Board further finds that equitable tolling is not warranted. Equitable tolling has only been applied when circumstances preclude a timely filing despite the exercise of due diligence such as (1) a mental illness rendering one incapable of handling one's own affairs or other extraordinary circumstances beyond one's control; (2) reliance on the incorrect statement of a VA official; or (3) a misfiling at the regional office or the Board. Bove v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 136, 140 (2011). There is a three-part test to determine whether equitable tolling is warranted based on extraordinary circumstances: (1) the extraordinary circumstance must be beyond the appellant's control; (2) the appellant must demonstrate that the untimely filing was a direct result of the extraordinary circumstance; and (3) the appellant must exercise due diligence during the requested tolling period (i.e., during the period of extraordinary circumstances). Checo v. Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014); McCreary v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 324, 332 (2005), adhered to on reconsideration, 20 Vet. App. 86 (2006). The application of the equitable tolling doctrine is not limited to a fixed set of factual patterns but is decided on a case-by-case basis. See Mapu v. Nicholson, 397 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Sneed v. Shinseki, 737 F.3d 719, 726 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The claimant is "obligated not only to state the specific extraordinary circumstances" that prevented a timely filing, "but also to produce any evidence supporting [the] right for equitable tolling." McCreary, 19 Vet. App. at 332; see also Palomer v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 245, 251 (2015) (per curiam order). Here, in a November 2013 statement, the Veteran wrote that he had a "mental incapacity" from 2006 to 2010 that "prevented [him] from [participating] with the follow up requests made by the VA." He stated that he was in a severe depressed state, and was living out of a garage. He added that at times he was homeless and on the street. He further wrote that most of the time he was hearing voices and talking back to them. He stated that he never opened any mail as he was afraid that any "bad news" would lead him to take his own life. A November 2013 letter from the Veteran's treating psychiatrist at VA states that the Veteran was under his care for PTSD between 2006 and 2010, and that during that time the Veteran was often extremely depressed. The psychiatrist added that the Veteran's statement that he did not open letters he received from VA between 2006 and 2008 because he was afraid that a denial of his claim would lead him to take his own life "is entirely consistent with [the psychiatrist's] impression" of the Veteran's state of depression at that time. A September 2013 letter from another VA treating psychiatrist states that from 2006 to 2008 the Veteran was suffering from significant depression, and that he was admitted for inpatient hospitalization from May 11, 2007 to May 16, 2007. The psychiatrist also noted that the Veteran did not appear for multiple appointments between June and August of 2007, and that his chart noted that the Veteran reported feeling too depressed as a reason for some of the cancelled appointments. The psychiatrist added that there were also "no shows" in 2008 and 2009, mostly in the summer months. A November 2013 letter from the same psychiatrist states that a review of the Veteran's records indicates that he was suffering from depression that "prohibited him from participating in many situations." The psychiatrist noted that there was documentation that the Veteran was not getting out of his apartment to come to appointments due to his depression, and also not paying bills, "etc." At the December 2017 RO hearing, the Veteran, through his representative, stated that his "main contention" is that the May 2008 rating decision was not appealed on time "due to a lot of extenuating circumstance[s,]" such as being psychiatrically admitted, not getting mail, and similar issues. The Board finds that equitable tolling is not warranted. The Veteran has never filed a NOD with the May 2008 rating decision. Thus, he clearly has not demonstrated due diligence in attempting to appeal that decision during the requested tolling period. Indeed, the letters written by psychiatrists on the Veteran's behalf, and his own statements, are meant to show that he was incapacitated from 2006 to 2010. But he did not file a request to reopen the claim for PTSD until October 31, 2012, more than two years after the possible tolling period. That fact alone is dispositive of the matter. See Checo, 748 F.3d at 1379. Accordingly, the Veteran has not demonstrated that it is appropriate to apply the equitable tolling doctrine in this case. The Board also finds that the evidence does not show extraordinary circumstances beyond the Veteran's control during the requested tolling period. In that regard, for example, an April 2009 VA psychiatric treatment record states that he had "felt very good" for most of 2008. He related that he had had a well-paying job, but got rear-ended in a motor vehicle accident just before Christmas, and was experiencing a lot of pain and feeling more depressed. The April 2009 record is dated within the one-year appeal period following notice of the May 2008 rating decision. It does not show that there were extraordinary circumstances at that time that prevented him from filing a NOD. He was more depressed after having been injured in a car accident, but there is no indication that he could not file a NOD at that time. Moreover, the VA treatment records show that he was generally showing up for outpatient appointments from June 2008 through May 2009, which roughly corresponds with the one-year period for appealing the May 2008 rating decision. His ability to show up for outpatient appointments weighs against a finding of extraordinary circumstances causing him to be unable to file a NOD with the May 2008 rating decision. Be that as it may, as the Veteran has not demonstrated due diligence, as discussed above, equitable tolling is not warranted, regardless of whether the other elements in the equitable tolling doctrine are met. See Checo, 748 F.3d at 1379 The Board has also considered the Veteran's December 2017 RO hearing testimony suggesting that he may not have received notice of the May 2008 rating decision due to temporary homelessness. Such an assertion is not a basis for vitiating the finality of that decision. More specifically, there is a presumption of regularity in the administrative process whereby it is assumed that government officials "have properly discharged their official duties." United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926); Romero v. Tran, 33 Vet. App. 252, 254 (2021). The presumption may only be rebutted by "clear evidence to the contrary." Romero, 33 Vet. App. at 254; Schoolman v. West, 12 Vet. App. 307 (1999). The presumption of regularity applies to mailing of notice of appellate rights. Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001). If notice is sent to the claimant's last known address of record, it will be presumed that VA properly discharged its official duties. Boyd v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 63, 71-72 (August 2014) (citing Clarke v. Nicholson, 21 Vet.App. 130, 133 (2007)). Clear evidence to the contrary includes "clear evidence that VA did not follow its regular mailing practices or that its practices were not regular." Boyd, 27 Vet. App. at 72 (quoting Crain v. Principi, 17 Vet.App. 182, 186 (2003)). The mere assertion that the notice was not received does not by itself constitute clear evidence rebutting the presumption. Id. However, the presumption of regularity may be rebutted where there is evidence that (1) VA used an incorrect address on the mailing in question or (2) the mailing was returned as undeliverable and "there were other possible and plausible addresses available to VA" at the time. Id. at 72. Importantly, "the onus is on the claimant to have a reliable address for receiving notice and to keep the Secretary informed of the address." Id. (citing Hyson v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 262, 265 (1993) (holding that "[i]n the normal course of events, it is the burden of the veteran to keep . . . VA apprised of his whereabouts.")). It is not VA's responsibility to try to locate a claimant whose whereabouts cannot be determined. Lamb v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 227, 232 (2008). Here, the May 2008 letter was sent to the Veteran's correct mailing address. He does not state that he did not receive it because it was incorrectly mailed or mailed to the wrong address. Rather, he states he may not have received it because of temporary homelessness. That is not a basis for rebutting the presumption of regularity. See Boyd, 27 Vet. App. at 71-72; Lamb, 22 Vet. App. at 232. In sum, for the reasons discussed above, there is no basis in the law or the evidence for finding the May 2008 decision to be nonfinal, or for extending or equitably tolling the time limit for appealing it. The Veteran's petition to reopen the claim for PTSD was received by VA on October 31, 2012, which is the current effective date of service connection. The Board finds that that effective date is proper as a matter of law. 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(r). As no claim was filed between the May 2008 rating decision and the October 31, 2012 claim to reopen, the criteria for an earlier effective date have not been met. See id. REASONS FOR REMAND Whether CUE was committed in the May 2008 rating decision with regard to the denial of service connection for PTSD is remanded. At the April 2022 Board hearing, the Veteran argued that CUE was committed in the May 2008 rating decision in its denial of service connection for PTSD. A finding of CUE in that decision would be an entirely distinct basis for potentially establishing an earlier effective date of service connection for PTSD. As the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) has not had an opportunity to address that theory, the matter is remanded for the AOJ to consider it in the first instance. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 392 (1993). The matters are REMANDED for the following action: Review and adjudicate the Veteran's motion to revise or reverse the May 2008 rating decision on the basis of CUE with regard to its denial of service connection for PTSD. P.M. DILORENZO Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board J. Rutkin, Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.