Citation Nr: 22042413 Decision Date: 07/26/22 Archive Date: 07/26/22 DOCKET NO. 07-34 953 DATE: July 26, 2022 ORDER Entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) is granted. Entitlement to special monthly compensation (SMC) based on statutory housebound status under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s) for the period beginning June 28, 2018, and no earlier, is granted. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The Veteran's service-connected posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) renders him unable to obtain and maintain substantially gainful employment. 2. From June 28, 2018, the Veteran's service-connected PTSD alone supported entitlement to TDIU, and he had additional service-connected disabilities independently ratable as at least 60 percent disabling. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The criteria to establish entitlement to TDIU have been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5103, 5103A, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159, 3.340, 3.341, 4.1, 4.15, 4.16, 4.18, 4.19, 4.25. 2. From June 28, 2018, and no earlier, the criteria for SMC at the housebound rate were met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1114 (s), 5103, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.350. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran had active service from February 1981 to December 1983. This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a July 2007 rating decision by the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ) that denied service connection for PTSD. The Veteran appealed that decision, and in June 2012, service connection for PTSD was granted, effective July 18, 2005 (the date of receipt of the Veteran's claim for service connection). The AOJ assigned a 70 percent evaluation, and the Veteran appealed the rating assigned. As noted by the Board in June 2018, the issue of entitlement to TDIU was raised in the course of the PTSD rating claim, and the issue of entitlement to TDIU for the entire PTSD rating period is before the Board. When the appeal was most recently before the Board in December 2020, TDIU was denied. The Veteran appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). In February 2022, the Court granted the parties' Joint Motion for Remand (JMR), vacating the March 2019 decision and remanding the matter to the Board for action consistent with the terms of the JMR. Total disability will be considered to exist when there is present any impairment of mind or body which is sufficient to render it impossible for the average person to follow a substantially gainful occupation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.340. If the total rating is based on a disability or combination of disabilities for which the Schedule for Rating Disabilities provides an evaluation of less than 100 percent, it must be determined that the service-connected disabilities are sufficient to produce unemployability without regard to advancing age. 38 C.F.R. § 3.341. In evaluating total disability, full consideration must be given to unusual physical or mental effects in individual cases, to peculiar effects of occupational activities, to defects in physical or mental endowment preventing the usual amount of success in overcoming the handicap of disability and to the effects of combinations of disability. 38 C.F.R. § 4.15. If the schedular rating is less than total, a total disability evaluation may be assigned based on individual unemployability if a Veteran is unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a result of service-connected disability, provided that he has one service-connected disability rated at 60 percent or higher; or two or more service-connected disabilities, with one disability rated at 40 percent or higher and the combined rating is 70 percent or higher. 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). The Veteran's PTSD has been evaluated as 70 percent disabling from July 18, 2005; thus, he meets the objective criteria under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 for consideration of TDIU. "Substantially gainful employment" is employment "which is ordinarily followed by the nondisabled to earn their livelihood with earnings common to the particular occupation in the community where the veteran resides." Moore v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 356, 358 (1991). "Marginal employment shall not be considered substantially gainful employment." 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). Additionally, employment "in a protected environment" is not sufficient to establish substantially gainful occupation. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a). Although the meaning of "employment in a protected environment" is not clear from the plain language, such employment frequently involves accommodations for the employee. See Cantrell v. Shulkin, 28 Vet. App. 382, 390-391 (2017). In determining whether a veteran can secure, follow, and maintain a substantially gainful occupation, the Court in Ray v. Wilkie directed the Board to consider the following factors: (1) the Veteran's occupational history, education, skill, and training; (2) whether the Veteran has the physical ability (both exertional and non-exertional) to perform the type of activities required by the occupation at issue; and (3) whether the Veteran has the mental ability to perform the activities required by the occupation at issue. See Ray v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 58, 73 (2019). VA vocational rehabilitation records indicate that the Veteran completed a high school education. Records obtained from the United States Postal Service ( USPS ) reflect that, as early as 2009, the Veteran used significant amounts of leave, to include leave without pay (LWOP). Notably, USPS has indicated that records prior to that date are not available; however, the Veteran has consistently reported that his use of significant amounts of leave due to his PTSD began as early as 2005. In a 2012 certification for the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Veteran's VA psychiatrist indicated that the Veteran had been under treatment since 2005, and that he experienced problems with anger, irritability, and impulse control. She also indicated that he had sleep disturbance and difficulty dealing with the public. She noted that his condition was chronic, and that he experienced episodes of exacerbation. She indicated that it was necessary for the Veteran to be absent from work during flare-ups of his condition. An undated statement by a USPS FMLA coordinator indicates that the author was in that position from 2001 to 2011, and that he processed FMLA certifications for the Veteran. He noted that the Veteran used a significant amount of his accrued leave due to his condition. A September 2018 brief by the Veteran's attorney sets out the days and months, by calendar year, that the Veteran was off from work due to his PTSD. He noted that records prior to 2009 had not been retained, but that the Veteran took time off prior to 2009 due to his PTSD. He indicated that, from 2009 to 2017, the Veteran took an average of 2.9 months off per year due to his PTSD. In a February 2016 vocational assessment, J.M.S., MS, CRC, CCM, LPC, QRP indicated that the Veteran had worked as a machine clerk operator for USPS since 1986. She noted that he had continued to work despite his ongoing psychiatric condition and inability to get along with his peers and supervisors. She indicated that her review of the record reflected excessive absenteeism from work since 2005 due to the Veteran's psychiatric disorder. She noted that he had been absent from work for six months in 2014, and for two to three months per year prior to that. She concluded, given the permanency of the Veteran's psychiatric, emotional, and behavioral difficulties, that he would be considered vocationally disabled since July 2005 and would not be able to perform any substantially gainful occupation within the general labor market. She noted that, while the Veteran had been able to retain his USPS position, he would not have been able to do so without an unusual number of accommodations such as unscheduled breaks when he experienced irritability, inability to cope with work stressors, or to deal with auditory hallucinations. She considered the Veteran's frequency of time off and extended lengths of his absences from work, and concluded that he would most likely have been terminated from a similar job with a private employer, noting that government agencies generally provided greater work accommodations and more lenient absences from work. In January 2017, a private psychologist, J.H.P., Psy.D. indicated that she had reviewed the Veteran's records. She indicated that the Veteran had experienced significant psychological distress since 2005, and that he was only able to maintain his employment with USPS with significant accommodations. She noted that the Veteran experienced extreme difficulty working with others due to his auditory hallucinations, anger, irritability, hypervigilance, and flashbacks. She pointed out that due to these symptoms, he had been allowed to take extended periods of time off from work and extra breaks throughout the workday. She stated that, given the fact that the Veteran had missed a considerable amount of work while on psychotropic medication, it was evident that he would not be able to maintain employment on any level without his medication. She further stated that the Veteran had been allotted vocational accommodations since 2005 and that his ability to work has remained limited. She opined that the Veteran would be unable to hold his job without these considerable accommodations. She supported these conclusions with recitation to pertinent evidence in the claims file. The responsibility for making the ultimate TDIU determination is placed on the adjudicator and not a medical clinician. See Geib v. Shinseki, 733 F.3d 1350, 1354 (2013). Here, the record reflects that the Veteran was afforded significant accommodations in his workplace, and if not for such accommodations, he would not have been able to maintain his employment. Thus, the Board concludes that the Veteran's employment with USPS may be considered employment in a protected environment. Given this conclusion, and after consideration of the entire medical and lay evidence of record, the Board finds there is competent and credible evidence that if not for significant accommodations, the Veteran's PTSD would prevent him from performing the type of activities required by his occupation with USPS. See Ray, 31 Vet. App. at 73. As a result, the evidence shows he is unable to secure and follow substantially gainful employment; thus, resolving all doubt in the Veteran's favor, the criteria for TDIU have been met from July 18, 2005. SMC VA has a 'well-established' duty to maximize a claimant's benefits. See Buie v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 242, 250 (2011); AB v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 35, 38 (1993); see also Bradley v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 280 (2008). This duty to maximize benefits requires VA to assess all of a claimant's disabilities to determine whether any combination of disabilities establishes entitlement to SMC pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 1114. See Bradley, 22 Vet. App. 280, 294 (2008). SMC is payable at the housebound rate where the Veteran has a single service-connected disability rated as 100 percent and, in addition: (1) has service-connected disability or disabilities independently ratable at 60 percent, separate and distinct from the 100 percent service-connected disability, and involving different anatomical segments or bodily systems, or (2) is permanently housebound by reason of service-connected disability or disabilities. 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s); 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(i). Subsection 1114(s) requires that a disabled Veteran whose disability level is determined by the ratings schedule must have at least one disability that is rated at 100 percent in order to qualify for the special monthly compensation provided by that statute. Under the law, subsection 1114(s) benefits are not available to a Veteran whose 100 percent disability rating is based on multiple disabilities, none of which is rated at 100 percent disabling. The Court has held that although TDIU may satisfy the "rated as total" element of section 1114(s), TDIU based on multiple underlying disabilities cannot satisfy the section 1114(s) requirement of "a service-connected disability" because that requirement must be met by a single disability. Buie v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 242, 250 (2010). In this case, the record establishes that the Veteran's PTSD alone rendered him unemployable, and the award of TDIU satisfies the "rated as total" element of subsection 1114(s). Moreover, for the period beginning June 28, 2018, the Veteran had additional disabilities whose combined evaluation was at least 60 percent. Thus, from June 28, 2018, the award of SMC at the housebound rate is warranted. The Board additionally observes that prior to June 28, 2018, the Veteran's additional disabilities were independently rated as less than 60 percent disabling. Thus, entitlement to SMC at the statutory housebound (s) rate is not applicable prior to June 28, 2018. DONNIE R. HACHEY Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board J. Barone, Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.