Citation Nr: 23049335 Decision Date: 09/07/23 Archive Date: 09/07/23 DOCKET NO. 20-00 767 DATE: September 7, 2023 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), for substitution purposes, is denied. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran had not been diagnosed with PTSD at any point during the course of the appeal. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for PTSD, for substitution purposes, are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303. . REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty from October 1968 to November 1970, to include service in the Republic of Vietnam. He died in June 2021. The appellant is his surviving spouse. In February 2023, the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ) entered a determination in which the appellant was found to be a proper substitute claimant. Prior to his death, a Board hearing was requested by the Veteran. In August 2023, the Board sent notice to the appellant to determine whether she still wanted a Board hearing. As the appellant did not respond to the notice within 30 days, the Board assumes that she does not wish to have a hearing. Entitlement to service connection for PTSD The current issue on appeal is entitlement to service connection for PTSD due to the Veteran's service in Vietnam. Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. The three-element test for service connection requires evidence of: (1) a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the current disability and the in-service disease or injury. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166 -67 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Further, service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125 (a) (i.e., in accordance with DSM-V; a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor occurred. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f). If VA determines that a veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy, or that the Veteran did engage in combat with the enemy but the claimed stressor is unrelated to such combat, the Veteran's lay testimony, by itself, will not be enough to establish the occurrence of the reported stressor. Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1996). Instead, the record must contain credible supporting evidence that corroborates a veteran's testimony or statements. Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997). This credible supporting evidence cannot consist solely of after-the fact medical nexus evidence. Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389, 394-95 (1996). Based on the evidence of record, the Board finds that the probative evidence of record does not show a diagnosis of PTSD under the DSM criteria. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.304. Importantly, after examining the Veteran and reviewing the claims file, the July 2017 VA examiner clearly found that the Veteran did not meet the criteria for PTSD. Moreover, VA clinical records continue to also show no diagnosis of PTSD; and all PTSD screenings were negative. There is no medical evidence of record showing a diagnosis of PTSD. Further, while the Veteran was competent to describe his psychiatric symptoms, he was not competent to diagnosis PTSD and attribute these symptoms to such diagnosis. In this case, the Veteran has not been identified as mental health professional with specialized knowledge to make such diagnosis under the DSM criteria. Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Kahana v. Shinseki, 24. Vet. App. 428 (2011). Consequently, the Board gives more probative weight to the VA examination. Moreover, the Veteran was already service-connected for generalized anxiety disorder, which is evaluated under the same rating criteria as PTSD. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.130, General Rating Formula for Mental Disorders. In this case, the Veteran never asserted that he experienced manifestations of PTSD that were separate and distinct from the manifestations of his service-connected psychiatric condition. As such, it appears that the Veteran's psychiatric symptoms were already contemplated in his rating for generalized anxiety disorder. Importantly, evaluation of the same disability or the same manifestations of disability under multiple diagnoses (i.e., pyramiding) is to be avoided. 38 C.F.R. § 4.14. To award a separate evaluation under the diagnosis of PTSD would constitute pyramiding. In sum, the evidence of record does not show that the Veteran had a diagnosis of PTSD, and he had not had a diagnosis at any time during the pendency of the claim or recent to the filing of the claim. Romanowsky v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 289, 294 (2013); McClain v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 319, 321 (2007). Accordingly, the evidence persuasively weighs against findings that service connection for PTSD is warranted. As the evidence persuasively weighs against the Veteran's claim, the benefit-of-the-doubt standard of proof does not apply. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b). John R. Doolittle, II Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board J.N. Moats, Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.