Citation Nr: 25003953 Decision Date: 03/24/25 Archive Date: 03/24/25 DOCKET NO. 20-15 574 DATE: March 24, 2025 ORDER Service connection for residuals of a stroke is granted. Service connection for obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The evidence is at least in?equipoise?as to whether the Veteran's residuals of a stroke is secondary to the service connected hypertension. 2. The evidence weighs against a finding that OSA began during active service or for many years thereafter, and OSA is not otherwise shown to be related to service or a service-connected disability. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. With reasonable doubt given in favor of the Veteran, the criteria for service connection for residuals of a stroke have been met.? 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107;?38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.310.? 2. The criteria for service connection for OSA have not been met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.310. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Marine Corps from September 1988 to September 1992. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an August 2017 rating decision issued by a Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO). In November 2023, the Board, in pertinent part, denied the Veteran's claims for service connection for sleep apnea and residuals of a stroke. The Veteran appealed that decision to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). Pursuant to a November 2024 Joint Motion for Remand (JMR), in December 2024 the Court vacated the Board's decision and remanded the appeal to the Board for readjudication?consistent?with the?JMR. Finally, it is valuable to note that the Veteran has already been found to be 100 percent disabled by VA and is receiving a 100 percent disability, effective May 9, 2017. Service Connection Service connection may be established for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by service.??38?U.S.C. § 1131;?38?C.F.R. §?3.303.? Service connection means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred coincident with service, or if preexisting service, was aggravated therein.??38?C.F.R. §?3.303(a). Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service.? 38?C.F.R §?3.303(d).??????? To establish service connection for a disability, there must be competent evidence of the following: (1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship or "nexus" between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service.? Horn v.? Shinseki, 25?Vet. App.?231, 236 (2010);?Shedden?v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004);?Gutierrez v.?Principi, 19?Vet. App.?1, 5 (2004) (citing Hickson v.?West, 12?Vet. App.?247, 253 (1999)).? In many cases, medical evidence is required to meet the requirement that the evidence be "competent."? However, when a disability may be diagnosed by its unique and readily identifiable features, the presence of the disorder is not a determination "medical in nature" and is capable of lay observation.? Barr v. Nicholson, 21?Vet. App.?303, 309 (2007).??????? Service connection for certain chronic diseases?may be presumed to have been incurred in service by showing that the disease manifested itself to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year from the date of separation from service. 38?U.S.C. §§?1101, 1112;?38?C.F.R. §§?3.307(a)(3), 3.309(a).? Such a chronic disease is presumed under the law to have had its onset in service even though there is no evidence of that disease during the period of service.??38?C.F.R. §§?3.307(a). When a chronic disease is shown in service, sufficient to permit a finding of service connection, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote, are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes.??38?C.F.R. §?3.303 (b).? To be "shown in service," the disease identity must be established, and the diagnosis must not be subject to legitimate question.??Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2013);?see also 38?C.F.R. §?3.303(b).? There is no "nexus" requirement for compensation for a chronic disease which was shown in service, so long as there is an absence of intercurrent causes to explain post-service manifestations of the chronic disease.? Walker, 708 F.3d at 1336.??????? Service connection may also be granted on a secondary basis for a condition that is not directly caused by the?Veteran's service.? 38?C.F.R. §?3.310.? In order to prevail under a theory of secondary service connection, the evidence must demonstrate an etiological relationship between (1) a service-connected disability or disabilities and (2) the condition said to be proximately due to the service-connected disability or disabilities.? Buckley v. West, 12?Vet. App.?76, 84 (1998); see also?Wallin?v. West, 11?Vet. App.?509, 512 (1998).? In addition, secondary service connection may also be found in certain instances when a service-connected disability aggravates another condition. ?See Allen v. Brown,?7?Vet. App.?439 (1995);?38?C.F.R. §?3.310 (b); see also Spicer v. McDonough, No. 2022-1239 (Fed. Cir. March 8, 2023) (invalidating the requirement of "proximate cause" and instead held a "but for" causation or aggravation is enough to show entitlement to secondary service connection).?????? Next, the Board notes that the Court in Joyner v. McDonald, 766 F.3d 1393, 1395 (Fed. Cir. 2014) held, in part, that the Board needs to always consider 38 U.S.C. §1117 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.317 in cases where the Veteran has served in the Persian Gulf, since August 2, 1990. See also 38 C.F.R. §3.320. In this case, the Veteran is a qualifying "Persian Gulf veteran" as defined by law. 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(e). In this regard, he has service in Southwest Asia in support of the first Persian Gulf War. Therefore, the Board finds that it is also required to consider 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.317 and 3.320 in this claim. Service connection and the laws and regulations surrounding presumptive service connection for Southwest Asia service and Persian Gulf War claims have become increasingly complex. First the Board notes service connection may be established on a presumptive basis for a Veteran with qualifying service who exhibits objective indications of a qualifying chronic disability provided that it became manifest either during active service in the Southwest Asia theater of operations during the Persian Gulf War, or to a degree of 10 percent or more not later than December 31, 2026, and which by history, physical examination, and laboratory tests cannot be attributed to any known clinical diagnosis. 38?U.S.C. §?1117; 38?C.F.R. §?3.317(a)(1). To fulfill the requirement of chronicity for the presumption of service connection, the illness must have persisted for a period of six months. 38?C.F.R. §?3.317(a)(4). A qualifying chronic disability means a chronic disability resulting from any of the following (or any combination of the following): an undiagnosed illness, a medically unexplained chronic multi symptom illness (such as chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, and irritable bowel syndrome) that is defined by a cluster of signs or symptoms, or any diagnosed illness that the Secretary determines warrants a presumption of service-connection. 38?U.S.C. §?1117; 38?C.F.R. §?3.317. "Objective indications" include both "signs," in the medical sense of objective evidence perceptible to a physician, and other, non-medical indicators that are capable of independent verification. 38?C.F.R. §?3.317(a)(3). Signs or symptoms that may be a manifestation of an undiagnosed illness ora chronic multi symptom illness include the following: fatigue, unexplained rashes or other dermatological signs or symptoms, headache, muscle pain, joint pain, neurological signs and symptoms, neuropsychological signs or symptoms, signs or symptoms involving the upper or lower respiratory system, sleep disturbances, gastrointestinal signs or symptoms, cardiovascular signs or symptoms, abnormal weight loss, menstrual disorders. See 38?U.S.C. §?1117; 38?C.F.R. §?3.317(b). The term medically unexplained chronic multi symptom illness means a diagnosed illness without conclusive pathophysiology or etiology, that is characterized by overlapping symptoms and signs and has features such as fatigue, pain, disability out of proportion to physical findings, and inconsistent demonstration of laboratory abnormalities. 38?C.F.R. §?3.317(a)(2)(ii). The Board notes that, effective July 13, 2010, VA amended its adjudication regulations governing presumptions for Persian Gulf War veterans under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317(a)(2)(i)(B) to clarify that chronic fatigue syndrome, fibromyalgia, and irritable bowel syndrome are examples of medically unexplained chronic multi symptom illnesses and are not an exclusive list of such illnesses. See 75 Fed. Reg. 61997 (Oct 7, 2010). A second type of presumption is available for Veterans with qualifying service under 38 C.F.R. § 3.320, from August 5, 2021, when VA regulations were amended to establish presumptive service connection for three chronic respiratory health conditions, i.e., asthma, rhinitis, and sinusitis, to include rhinosinusitis, in association with presumed exposures to fine, particulate matter. See 75 Fed. Reg. 42724 (Aug. 5, 2021). The listed diseases shall be service connected if manifested to any degree within 10 years from the date of separation from military service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.320(a)(1) (2021). On September 1, 2023, VA issued a final rule revising 38 C.F.R. § 3.320, with an effective date of October 31, 2023, and among other things, removed the 10-year manifestation requirements for asthma, rhinitis, and sinusitis (to include rhinosinusitis). See 88 Fed. Reg. 169, 60336 (Sep. 1, 2023). Additionally, effective April 26, 2022, VA issued a final rule revising 38 C.F.R. § 3.320 to also establish presumptive service connection for Veteran's with qualifying period of military service for nine rare respiratory cancers in association with presumed exposure to fine particulate matter. See 87 Fed. Reg. 24421 (Apr. 26, 2022). These cancers are presumed as due to exposure to fine particulate matter if manifested to any degree at any time following separation from a qualifying period of military service: squamous cell carcinoma of the larynx, squamous cell carcinoma of the trachea, adenocarcinoma of the trachea, salivary gland-type tumors of the trachea, adenosquamous carcinoma of the lung, large cell carcinoma of the lung, salivary gland-type tumors of the lung, sarcomatoid carcinoma of the lung, typical and atypical carcinoid of the lung. 38 C.F.R. § 3.320(a)(3). Finally, on August 10, 2022, President Biden signed the Sergeant First Class (SFC) Heath Robinson Honoring our Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics Act of 2022, also known as the PACT Act, into law. See Pub. L. 117-168. The PACT Act establishes additional presumptions of in-service exposure to burn pit and other environmental hazards for qualifying service in the Persian Gulf. Relevant to Southwest Asia claims, the PACT Act, among other things, added more than 20 burn pit and other toxic exposure presumptive conditions for Gulf War era and post-9/11 Veterans including brain cancer, gastrointestinal cancer of any type, glioblastoma, head cancer of any type, kidney cancer, lymphatic cancer of any type, lymphoma of any type, melanoma, neck cancer of any type, pancreatic cancer, reproductive cancer of any type, and respiratory (breathing-related) cancer of any type, as well as asthma that was diagnosed after service, chronic bronchitis, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), chronic rhinitis, chronic sinusitis, constrictive bronchiolitis or obliterative bronchiolitis, emphysema, granulomatous disease, interstitial lung disease (ILD), pleuritis, pulmonary fibrosis, and sarcoidosis. Importantly, under the PACT Act, VA must provide the Veteran with a medical examination that considers service connection for a claimed disability as due to a toxic exposure in situations where there is (a) evidence of a disability, (b) evidence of participation in a toxic exposure risk activity (TERA), and (c) not enough evidence to establish service connection for the disability. 38 U.S.C. § 1168(a). However, no examination is required if the Secretary has determined there is no indication of an association between the claimed disability and a TERA. 38U.S.C. § 1168(b). Tellingly, while the PACT Act amendment is not effective until October 1, 2026, in an Executive Decision Memorandum (EDM) dated September 20, 2022, VA adopted the Office of General Counsel's interpretation of the PACT Act and VA has, in substance, added the above conditions to the list of presumptive disorders due to burn pit and other toxic exposure without waiting for the 2026 phase-in date. Except as otherwise provided by law, a claimant has the responsibility to present and support a claim for benefits under the laws administered by VA.? VA shall consider all information and medical and lay evidence of record.? Where there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, VA shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.? 38?U.S.C. §?5107; 38?C.F.R. §?3.102; see also Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (en banc).???? 1. Entitlement to service connection for residuals of a stroke. The Veteran contends his stroke is related to his active service and/or a service connected disability. The service treatment records contain no complaints, history, injury, or findings consistent with a stroke. After service, in January 2017, the Veteran reported having a mild stroke. In a July 2017 VA examination for hypertension, the examiner found it significant to hypertension that the Veteran had a history of silent transient ischemic attack (TIA), in a January 2017 stroke. Accordingly, as the VA examiner's notation on examination that the Veteran's history of hypertension appeared to have been significant in the Veteran's subsequent 2017 stroke, it suggests the Veteran's stroke may have been causally related to his service connected hypertension. In light of?the?evidence of record,?the?Board?cannot conclude that?the?evidence weighs against?granting?service?connection?for a stroke on a?secondary basis. The Board?therefore finds that?the?evidence is in relative equipoise?as?to whether the Veteran's stroke is due to or?the?result of a?service-connected hypertension. Thus, secondary?service connection is warranted. See?38?C.F.R. §?3.310.? As?the?Board?has?granted?secondary service connection?it need not?address?direct or presumptive service connection, or any other theories for?service?connection, in this matter. 2. Entitlement to service connection for OSA. The Veteran seeks service connection for OSA.?? In a February 2025 statement in support of his claim, the Veteran stated that he struggled with sleep problems since leaving service many years ago. In the alternative, he claims service connection for OSA as secondary to the service connected posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The Veteran's service treatment records were silent for complaints, diagnosis, or treatment for sleep apnea or sleep problems generally.?? Additionally, there is no evidence contemporaneous with service showing complaints or findings consistent with impaired sleep or a diagnosis of OSA.??? After service, VA treatment records show that a sleep study in January 2017 revealed OSA. At that time, the Veteran reported a history of many years of sleep problems. The Board notes that the first documented evidence of OSA is approximately 25 years after the Veteran's discharge from active duty service, further providing evidence against chronicity after service. Based on the above, the Board must conclude that OSA did not have its onset during service and has not been continuous since that time.? Owens v. Brown, 7?Vet. App.?429, 433 (1995).? In so noting, the Board recognizes that the mere absence of medical records is not dispositive as to the question of continuity; the lay evidence must be considered as well.? See Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d at1335.? If, however, it is determined based on reliable evidence, that there was an extended period of time after service without any manifestations of the claimed condition, then that tends to weigh against a finding of a connection between the disability and service.? See Maxson v. Gober, 230 F.3d 1330, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000).? To the extent the Veteran asserted continuity of symptomatology from service, the Board finds such statements inconsistent with the overall record, to include the service treatment records and post-service treatment records, which fail to document any related complaints until approximately 25 years after discharge from service.? See Mense v. Derwinski, 1?Vet. App.?354, 356 (1991) (normal medical findings at the time of separation from service, as well as the absence of any medical records of a diagnosis or treatment for many years after service is probative evidence against the claim); see also Owens, supra.??? Importantly, while in connection with the current appeal in February 2025, the Veteran reported onset of sleep problems since leaving service, he did not report sleep problems in service and there is no competent, credible or probative evidence to suggest a diagnosis for the disability during service. Here, the Board declines to draw inferences that are tenuous and suspect, based on lay reports (i.e., not a diagnosis) made more than 20 years after service. See Cartwright v. Derwinski, 2?Vet. App.?24, 25 (1991) (pecuniary interest may affect the credibility of testimony); see also Caluza v. Brown, 7?Vet. App.?498, 510-511 (1995) (credibility can be generally evaluated by a showing of interest, bias, or inconsistent statements, and the demeanor of the witness, facial plausibility of the testimony, and the consistency of the testimony). Put simply, the most competent, credible and probative evidence does not warrant a finding that the current OSA was present in and since service. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence to warrant a finding of presumptive service connection for a chronic disease under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 and § 3.307, nor is there evidence demonstrating continuity of symptomatology since service, where the first medical evidence of OSA appears in 2017, more than 20 years after active duty. To the extent in January 2017, when he was diagnosed with OSA, the Veteran reported a history of sleep problems for many years, many years could be any number of years between 1992 and 2017 and does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that many years equates to sometime between 1988 to 1993. Moreover, the Board finds there is no presumption available for the Veteran's OSA under the current law and regulations governing Southwest Asia claims. It is important for the Veteran to understand that OSA is not one of the presumptive diseases listed under 38 C.F.R. § 3.317, nor is there evidence of an undiagnosed illness or a medically unexplained chronic multi symptom illness associated with this condition, and the condition is not presumed under § 3.320 for exposure to fine particulate matter, and also not one of the newly listed presumptive diseases found to be associated with burn pit and other environmental exposures in Southwest Asia under the PACT Act. As such, the Board finds a presumption of service connection for OSA, based on the Veteran's presumed exposure in Southwest Asia, are not for application in this claim. See e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 3.317, 3.320. Furthermore, the Board finds that there is no competent and credible evidence of a nexus between the Veteran's OSA and service and/or a service connected disability. The only evidence of record in support of such a nexus is the Veteran's lay opinion. The Veteran has not submitted any competent medical evidence that supports his claim. His assertions thus represent the only evidence linking his disabilities to service and these assertions may not be considered competent evidence of a nexus. The Board has considered the statements from the Veteran asserting that OSA was caused or aggravated by service and/or a service connected disorder. Although the Veteran believes that he developed OSA in service, or as secondary to a service-connected disability, including PTSD and/or hypertension, and he is certainly competent to report as to the observable symptoms he experiences and their history, he cannot self-diagnose because of the medically complex nature of such diagnoses. Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465 (1994); Buchanan, 451 F.3d at 1336; See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (lay persons not competent to diagnose cancer). The ultimate questions in this case are related to an internal medical process which extends beyond an immediately observable cause and effect relationship. There simply is no competent evidence that associates the Veteran's OSA with service and/or a service connected disability. In support of his claim, the Veteran submitted a May 2015 web article regarding OSA and PTSD that noted that a study found Veterans with PTSD screened as high risk for OSA at much higher rates than those seen in community studies and may not show all classic predictors of OSA. The web article also indicated that hypertension was one of multiple comorbidities for OSA. Thus, those with PTSD should be screened for OSA. Although the May 2015 article discussed a study that supported a co-existence between OSA and the service connected PTSD and/or hypertension,?correlation?is not the same as causation. In any event, the Board observes in this regard that a medical article or treatise "can provide important support when combined with an opinion of a medical professional" if the medical article or treatise evidence discusses generic relationships with a degree of certainty such that, under the facts of a specific case, there is at least "plausible causality" based upon objective facts rather than on an unsubstantiated lay medical opinion. Mattern v. West, 12 Vet. App. 222, 228 (1999); see also Sacks v. West, 11 Vet. App. 314 (1998). The medical article submitted by the Veteran in this case was not accompanied by the opinion of any medical expert linking his OSA to active service or to his service-connected PTSD and/or hypertension. Thus, the medical article submitted by the Veteran is insufficient to establish the medical nexus opinion required for causation. See Sacks, 11 Vet. App. at 317 (citing Beausoleil v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 459, 463 (1996)); see also Libertine v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 521, 523 (1996). No medical professional has suggested that the Veteran suffered from OSA that was incurred in or aggravated by his active duty service and/or a service connected disability, and the Veteran has not presented, identified, or even alluded to the existence of any such medical evidence or opinion. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (c)(4)(i); cf. Duenas v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 512, 517 (2004), citing Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 345 F.3d 1334, 1355-57 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting that a medical examination conducted in connection with claim development could not aid in substantiating a claim when the record does not already contain evidence of an in-service event, injury, or disease). The Veteran's general contention that the OSA was the result of service and/or a service connected disability is a conclusory generalized statement which is insufficient to trigger VA's duty to provide an examination. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has found there are four elements to review to determine if a medical examination is necessary: (1) competent evidence of a current disability, and (2) evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service or establishing certain diseases manifesting during an applicable presumptive period for which the claimant qualifies, and (3) an indication that the disability or persistent or recurrent symptoms of a disability may be associated with the Veteran's service or with another service-connected disability, but (4) insufficient competent medical evidence on file for the Secretary to make a decision on the claim. 38?U.S.C. §?5103A(d)(2); 38?C.F.R. §?3.159(c)(4)(i); see also McLendon v. Nicholson, 20?Vet. App.?79 (2006). Here, the Board notes that there is competent evidence of a current disability. However, there is no indication that the Veteran's OSA is associated with the Veteran's service or a service connected disability to warrant a finding of service-connection in this claim. Importantly, there is no evidence establishing that an event, injury, or disease occurred in service or manifested during an applicable presumptive period for which the claimant qualifies. Therefore, in the absence of an in-service incurrence for OSA, or any nexus to service or a service connected disability, to include PTSD and/or hypertension, the claim for service connection must be denied. For the reasons set forth above, the Board finds that the most probative evidence weighs against a finding that the Veteran's OSA is related to service or his service-connected PTSD or hypertension.? Thus, service connection for OSA is denied.? As such, the benefit of the doubt rule does not apply.? See 38?U.S.C. §?5107; 38?C.F.R. §?3.102; Lynch, 1?Vet. App.?at 55-56.? John J. Crowley Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board Azizi, T. The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.