Citation Nr: 25005271 Decision Date: 04/17/25 Archive Date: 04/17/25 DOCKET NO. 24-00 263 DATE: April 17, 2025 ORDER The motion to reverse or revise the March 2013 Board decision on the basis of clear and unmistakable error (CUE) is warranted, and service connection for obstructive sleep apnea is granted. FINDING OF FACT With respect to the Board's March 2013 denial of service connection for sleep apnea, although the correct facts, as they were known at the time of the March 2013 decision were before the Board, the statutory or regulatory provisions then extant in March 2013 were not correctly applied by the Board, and the failure to apply those laws and regulations manifestly changed the outcome of the Board's decision. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria to reverse or revise the March 2013 Board decision on the basis of clear and unmistakable error (CUE) have been met. 38 U.S.C. § 7111; 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Army from June 1988 to December 1991, from August 1992 to August 1995, from February 2003 to March 2004, from March 2006 to April 2007, and from June 2007 to April 2008, with service in Iraq and Kuwait. This matter comes before the Board of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) as an original action on the June 2022 motion by the Veteran to revise or reverse, on the basis of clear and unmistakable error in a March 2013 Board decision. The motion to reverse or revise the March 2013 Board decision on the basis of clear and unmistakable error (CUE). The Veteran asserts that there is CUE in the March 2013 Board decision that denied service connection for sleep apnea. Specifically, the Veteran asserts that the March 2013 Board erred in denying service connection for sleep apnea by ignoring and/or misapplying the presumption of soundness as the Board noted that the Veteran more likely than not had sleep apnea prior to his tour in Desert Storm and impermissibly shifting the burden onto the Veteran. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7111, a prior Board decision may be reversed or revised on the grounds of CUE. Motions for review of prior Board decisions on the grounds of CUE are adjudicated pursuant to the Board's Rules of Practice at 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1400-1411. The motion alleging CUE in a prior Board decision must set forth clearly and specifically the alleged CUE, or errors of fact or law in the Board decision, the legal or factual basis for such allegations, and why the result would have been different but for the alleged error. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1404(b). The determination of whether a prior Board decision was based on CUE must be based on the record and the law that existed when that decision was made. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(b)(1). CUE is a very specific and rare kind of error. It is the kind of error, of fact or law, that when called to the attention of later reviewers compels the conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifestly different but for the error. Generally, either the correct facts, as they were known at the time, were not before the Board, or the statutory and regulatory provisions extant at the time were incorrectly applied. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a); see also Fugo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 40, 43 (1993). To warrant revision of a Board decision on the grounds of CUE, there must have been an error in the Board's adjudication of the appeal that, had it not been made, would have manifestly changed the outcome when it was made. If it is not absolutely clear that a different result would have ensued, the error complained of cannot be CUE. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(c); see also Bustos v. West, 179 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (expressly holding that in order to prove the existence of CUE, a claimant must show that an error occurred that was outcome-determinative, that is, an error that would manifestly have changed the outcome of the prior decision). Examples of situations that are not CUE include a new medical diagnosis that "corrects" an earlier diagnosis considered in a Board decision; the Secretary's failure to fulfill the duty to assist; and disagreement as to how the facts were weighed or evaluated. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(d). CUE does not include the otherwise correct application of a statute or regulation where, subsequent to the Board decision, there has been a change in the interpretation of the statute or regulation. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(e). As a threshold matter, the Board finds that the arguments advanced by the appellant allege CUE with the requisite specificity in light of the Board's duty to read the Veteran's submissions sympathetically. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1404(b); see Andrews v. Nicholson, 421 F.3d 1278, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Further the manifestly changed outcome may be inferred from the pleadings, even though not explicitly stated. See Canady v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 393, 401-02 (2006). In its March 2013 decision, the Board denied service connection for sleep apnea because it was not incurred or aggravated by active military service. In making this determination, the Board noted that the Veteran reported first experiencing sleep apnea symptoms while in active service and submitted several lay statements that corroborated the Veteran's statements. However, a VA medical examiner opined that that the disorder is not related to any incident of active service. The VA medical examiner opined that the Veteran had sleep apnea prior to his deployment. The Board notes that the Veteran's May 1988 enlistment examination is silent for a sleep apnea condition. At the time of the March 2013 Board decision, a veteran is presumed to have been sound upon entry into the military, except as to conditions noted at the time of the acceptance, examination, or enrollment, or where clear and unmistakable evidence demonstrates that the condition existed before acceptance and enrollment and was not aggravated by such service. 38 U.S.C. § 1111; Wagner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The presumption of soundness applies only when a disease or injury not noted upon entry to service manifests in service, and a question arises as to whether it preexisted service. Gilbert v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 48, 55 (2012), aff'd 749 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Only conditions recorded in examination reports are to be considered "noted" upon entry. 38 U.S.C. § 1111; 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b). In this case, the Veteran's sleep apnea was not noted upon entry into service. Thus, the Board finds that the presumption of soundness applies. Accordingly, [o]nce the presumption of soundness applies, the burden of proof remains with the Secretary on both the preexistence and the aggravation prong; it never shifts back to the claimant. In particular, even when there is clear and unmistakable evidence of preexistence, the claimant need not produce any evidence of aggravation in order to prevail under the aggravation prong of the presumption of soundness... the burden is not on the claimant to show that his disability increased in severity; rather, it is on VA to establish by clear and unmistakable evidence that it did not or that any increase was due to the natural progress of the disease. Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 231, 235 (2012) (emphasis added). This burden must be met by "affirmative evidence" demonstrating that there was no aggravation. See id. The burden is not met by finding "that the record contains insufficient evidence of aggravation." See id. To date, the Board notes that VA has not submitted evidence that amounts to clear and unmistakable evidence that the Veteran's sleep apnea pre-existed and was not aggravated during service, particularly in light of the Veteran's normal enlistment examination coupled with his competent, credible lay statements that his symptoms began in service. In fact, other than finding that the Veteran's sleep apnea disability bean prior to his deployment in December 1990, the March 2013 Board did not address more specifically when the Veteran's symptoms began. Regarding the second prong, the Board noted that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the Veteran experienced a worsening of his sleep apnea symptoms while he was stationed in Iraq during his third period of service. This impermissibly shifts the burden to the claimant to show that his disability increased in severity. Therefore, the presumption of soundness has not been rebutted. The Board acknowledges the VA medical opinion determining that the Veteran's sleep apnea was pre-existing. However, the Veteran has a current sleep apnea diagnosis that was not noted on the enlistment examination, his service treatment records show that he was treated and preliminarily diagnosed for sleep apnea in March 2008 (The Veteran's last period of service ended in April 2008), and the Veteran has consistently maintained that his sleep apnea occurred in service. Accordingly, the evidence of record does not meet VA's clear and unmistakable burden of proof, and the presumption of soundness is not rebutted. The error was undebatable based on the evidence then of record, namely the Report of Medical Examination upon entrance into service, does not note any sleep apnea symptoms. The Board further finds that but for the error, service connection for sleep apnea would have been granted. If the March 2013 Board applied the presumption of soundness, the burden should have shifted to VA to rebut the presumption by clear and unmistakable evidence both that the disorder existed prior to service and that the disorder was not aggravated by service. The disorder was not noted during medical evaluation upon entrance into service but during service, the disorder became so severe as to result in the Veteran's separation from service. Thus, if the Board applied the correct law, that is, 38 U.S.C. § 1111, the evidence of record would not have rebutted the presumption of soundness. Absent this clear error, service connection for obstructive sleep apnea would have been granted. In light of the foregoing, the Veteran's motion to revise the March 2013 Board decision to reflect a grant of service connection for obstructive sleep apnea is granted. STEVEN D. REISS Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board Leigh, Sara The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.