Citation Nr: A25035012 Decision Date: 04/16/25 Archive Date: 04/16/25 DOCKET NO. 240729-468182 DATE: April 16, 2025 ORDER The appeal for entitlement to financial assistance for an automobile or other conveyance and adaptive equipment, for accrued benefits purposes only, is dismissed. FINDING OF FACT Eligibility for an automobile or other conveyance and adaptive equipment, is a non-periodic, personal benefit that does not survive the Veteran's death. CONCLUSION OF LAW Due to the death of the Veteran, the Board has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the appeal for financial assistance for an automobile or other conveyance and adaptive equipment. 38 U.S.C. §§ 3902, 5121, 5121A, 7104(a); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.808, 3.1000, 3.1010(a), 20.1302. REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Air Force from June 1965 to September 1968. Unfortunately, the Veteran passed away in October 2020. The appellant is the Veteran's surviving spouse and has been properly substituted as the claimant in this appeal. The rating decision on appeal was issued in April 2024 and constitutes an initial decision; therefore, the modernized review system, also known as the Appeals Modernization Act (AMA), applies. In the July 2024 VA Form 10182, Decision Review Request: Board Appeal (Notice of Disagreement), the appellant elected the Direct Review docket. Therefore, the Board may only consider the evidence of record at the time of the April 2024 agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.301. Any evidence submitted after the AOJ decision on appeal cannot be considered by the Board. 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.300, 20.301, 20.801. Financial Assistance for an Automobile or Other Conveyance and Adaptive Equipment On the appellant's July 2024 VA Form 10182 Board appeal, she identified an April 2024 rating decision noting that entitlement to an allowance for an automobile or other conveyance equipment was established for accrued benefits, however, she had not received any monetary benefit. In correspondence submitted with her VA Form 10182, she argued that while she did not expect the vehicle, she was eligible for the monetary value that was owed to her late husband. Although entitlement to automobile or other conveyance and adaptive equipment or for adaptive equipment, for accrued benefits purposes only, was awarded in a February 2024 Board decision, and the April 2024 rating decision implemented the findings from the February 2024 Board decision, the allowance of the monetary benefit the appellant is seeking is not allowed by law. A claimant can be found eligible for substitution or accrued benefits only for claims for periodic monetary benefits, and not for claims for personal benefits administered through the Veterans Health Administration. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5121(a), 5121A; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1000, 3.1010. Subject to minor exceptions not relevant here, the statute qualifies accrued benefits as those due and unpaid periodic monetary benefits arising under all laws administered by the Secretary to which an individual was entitled at death under existing ratings or decisions or those based on evidence in the file at the date of death. 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a); see Nolan v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 340, 348 (2006) (explaining that periodic monetary benefits include retroactive awards of disability compensation benefits because even though the actual payment of retroactive benefits is made in a one-time lump-sum payment... the benefits that the claimant had been entitled to receive during his or her lifetime would have been paid monthly). However, nonrecurring reimbursements, such as the benefit sought in this case, are not payable to a substitute or on an accrued basis. See Pappalardo v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 63 (1993) (one-time payment for assistance for specially adapted housing does not qualify as periodic monetary benefit and is not payable as accrued benefit after Veteran's death). When analyzing 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a), the key word is periodic. Unless a payment is one that a Veteran would have received in regular intervals during his or her lifetime, a substituted claimant may not recover that benefit. Relying on Pappalardo, the Court later held that financial assistance for an automobile or other conveyance is not capable of being claimed as an accrued benefit, because "such benefits cannot be determined with any certainty, and, hence, the benefits cannot be considered periodic." Gillis v. West, 11 Vet. App. 441, 442 (1998). (Continued on the next page) ? While the Board is sympathetic to the appellant, it is bound by the statutory scheme created by Congress and is not permitted to award payments other than as authorized by Congress. Smith v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 429, 432-33 (1992); citing Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 426 (1990) ("[N]o equities, no matter how compelling, can create a right to payment out of the United States Treasury which has not been provided for by Congress"). Because of the limitation under the law on payment of accrued benefits, regardless of substitution, there is no relief that can be ultimately afforded by the Board on this claim. As payment of the benefit sought is barred as a matter of law, dismissal of the appeal is warranted. Ann K. Minami Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board S. Lutgens-Staley, Associate Counsel The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.