Citation Nr: A25035986 Decision Date: 04/18/25 Archive Date: 04/18/25 DOCKET NO. 210907-162111 DATE: April 18, 2025 ORDER Entitlement to service connection for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is denied. FINDING OF FACT The Veteran does not have a corroborated in-service stressor event to support a diagnosis of PTSD. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for PTSD are not met. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 5107; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.303, 3.304, 4.125(a). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Marine Corps from June 1980 to September 1984 with an honorable discharge. The present appeal comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a September 2020 initial rating decision for entitlement to service connection for PTSD. The Veteran appealed that decision by filing a VA Form 10182 Decision Review Request: Board Appeal (Notice of Disagreement) on September 7, 2021. He selected the Evidence docket. Therefore, consideration may only be given to the evidence of record at the time of the September 2020 agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on appeal, as well as any evidence submitted by the Veteran or his representative with, or within 90 days from receipt of, the VA Form 10182, which would be December 6, 2021. 38 C.F.R. § 20.303. If evidence was submitted either (1) during the period after the AOJ issued the decision on appeal and prior to the date the Board received the VA Form 10182, or (2) more than 90 days following the date the Board received the VA Form 10182, the Board did not consider it in its decision. 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.300, 20.303, 20.801. If the Veteran would like VA to consider any evidence that was submitted that the Board could not consider, the Veteran may file a Supplemental Claim (VA Form 20-0995) and submit or identify this evidence. 38 C.F.R. § 3.2501. If the evidence is new and relevant, VA will issue another decision on the claim, considering the new evidence in addition to the evidence previously considered. Id. Specific instructions for filing a Supplemental Claim are included with this decision. Entitlement to service connection for PTSD. The Veteran seeks service connection for PTSD. Specifically, the Veteran contends, through his representative, that his PTSD was caused by or related to witnessing the Beirut bombings and a helicopter crash in-service. See March 2022 Appellate Brief (VSO IHP; Post remand Brief; Attorney Brief). Following a review of the evidence, the Board finds the record lacks any evidence verifying or corroborating the Veteran's reported in-service stressors. Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active service. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 5107; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. The three-element test for service connection requires evidence of: (1) a current disability; (2) in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the current disability and the in-service disease or injury. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In addition to the general requirements for service connection, service connection for PTSD requires (1) a current medical diagnosis of PTSD (presumed to include the adequacy of the PTSD symptomatology and the sufficiency of a claimed in-service stressor in accordance with DSM-V), (2) credible supporting evidence that the in-service stressor occurred, and (3) a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptoms and an in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). A diagnosis of PTSD must be established in accordance with 38 C.F.R. § 4.125(a), which provides that all psychiatric diagnoses must conform to the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-V). 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The evidence required to establish a claimed in-service stressor depends on the nature of both the stressor and the Veteran's service. If the evidence establishes that the Veteran engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to such combat, the Veteran's lay statements alone may establish occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, as long as the claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of the Veteran's service. 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Even without combat participation, if the Veteran's claimed stressor is related to "fear of hostile military or terrorist activity," and a VA psychiatrist or psychologist, or contract equivalent, confirms that the Veteran's symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided the claimed stressor is consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the Veteran's service, the Veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of the claimed in-service stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). "Fear of hostile military or terrorist activity" means that a Veteran experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or circumstance that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of the Veteran or others, such as from an actual or potential improvised explosive device; vehicle explosive device; incoming artillery, rocket, or mortar fire; grenade; small arms fire, including suspected sniper fire; or attack upon friendly military aircraft, and the veteran's response to the event or circumstance involved a psychological or psycho-physiological state of fear, helplessness, or horror. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f)(3). If the claimed stressor does not involve either combat or the fear of hostile military or terrorist activity, then the Veteran's claimed stressors must be corroborated by evidence other than the claimant's own testimony or the diagnosis of PTSD itself. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1996). The occurrence of an event alleged as the stressor upon which a PTSD diagnosis is based, as opposed to the sufficiency of the alleged event to cause PTSD, is an adjudicative determination, not a medical determination. VA is responsible for determining whether the evidence persuasively favors one side or another. 38 C.F.R. § 4.3. When there is an approximate or nearly equal balance of positive and negative evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given to the Veteran and the claim will be granted on the merits. 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (b). When the evidence persuasively favors against the claims of the Veteran, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is inapplicable and the claim will be denied on its merits. 38 U.S.C. § 5107; Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990); Lynch v. McDonough, 21 F.4th 776 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The Veteran has been diagnosed with PTSD based on the DSM-V criteria. In support of his claim, the Veteran provided a letter from his primary doctor at Charleston VAMC, M.B.H., M.D., received on September 30, 2021, providing that the Veteran meets the DSM-V criteria for PTSD. See Medical Treatment Record - Government Facility. There are no other psychological diagnoses of record during evidentiary window on appeal. Recharacterization of the Veteran's claim under Clemons v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 1 (2009) is not warranted. Therefore, the remaining question is whether the Veteran's diagnosed PTSD was caused by or is related to an in-service stressor(s) supported by credible evidence verifying the occurrence of the claimed stressor(s). The Veteran has asserted his PTSD is due to two claimed in-service stressors: (1) witnessing the aftermath of the Beirut bombings and (2) witnessing a helicopter crash. For the foregoing reasons, the Board finds there is no credible supporting evidence that the Veteran's claimed in-service stressor occurred, and entitlement to service connection for PTSD must be denied. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The evidence does not support a finding that the Veteran is a combat veteran for VA compensation purposes. He does not contend otherwise. Thus, the Veteran's lay statements alone are insufficient to verify the occurrence of his claimed in-service stressors based on combat participation. 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). The first claimed stressor regarding witnessing the aftermath of the Beirut bombings is vague in nature as his statements do not confirm whether the Veteran was physically in Beirut witnessing the aftermath or witnessed the events from afar. Indeed, he provided very little information with respect to this stressor or any other stressor event. His initial claim for benefits merely noted PTSD caused by an in-service event. His statement in support of his claim for PTSD (VA Form 21-0781a) simply indicated that he had an "illness within a year of discharge" and identified current symptoms and socio-economic problems. It was not until VA received the May 2021 letter from Dr. M.B.H. that reference was made to the "Beirut bombing." There were no other details provided in that statement. The Veteran's military personnel records (MPRs) indicate the Veteran was stationed in Panama at the time of the October 1983 Beirut bombings. See September 2013 Military Personnel Record. The Veteran's MPRs do not show that he had service in Beirut, nor has he provided a unit number at the time he recalls witnessing the aftermath of the bombings. Indeed, while Dr. M.B.H. seems to confirm that the Veteran's symptoms are related to the claimed stressor, there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Dr. M.B.H. provides no explanation for his finding much less indicate with any level of specificity that the Veteran experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or circumstance that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of the Veteran or others. The claimed stressor ("seeing the aftermath of the Beirut bombing") is not consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of the Veteran's service based on the evidence for consideration at the time of this decision. In regard to the second claimed stressor, witnessing a helicopter crash, the Board is unable to verify the events of the claimed stressor. The Veteran's representative and VAMC doctor assert the Veteran witnessed a helicopter crash. However, the Veteran has not provided any further details regarding the crash such as the date, location, circumstances, or any other identifying details which would allow VA to attempt to verify the stressor. Thus, as the Veteran did not participate in combat nor does the evidence support that either of the claimed stressors are related to fear of hostile military or terrorist activity consistent with the places, types, and circumstances of his service, his claimed stressors must be corroborated by evidence other than his own testimony. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f); Dizoglio. In this regard, VA is unable to verify the Veteran's claimed in-service stressors based on the evidence for consideration at the time of this decision, and the Veteran has not provided evidence other than his own limited testimony that these stressors occurred. Consideration has been given to the Veteran's argument, through his representative, that a remand is warranted for a VA examination and to obtain unit records to corroborate the Veteran's claimed stressors. The Board has the duty to remand issues when necessary to correct a pre-decisional duty to assist error where the issues cannot be granted in full. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(f); 38 C.F.R. § 20.802(a). Prior to the September 2020 rating decision on appeal, the Veteran submitted the VA 21-0781a wherein he provided a single date of an incident occurring on October 10, 1981. The statement did not provide any further details regarding the incident. No other information regarding stressor event(s) were provided prior to the September 2020 rating decision on appeal. Additionally, there was no evidence of a PTSD, or any other psychological diagnosis, prior to the rating decision on appeal. As there was no evidence of a current diagnosis or sufficient evidence identifying a verifiable in-service stressor prior to the rating decision on appeal, the Board finds there is no evidence of a pre-decisional duty to assist error by the AOJ in the rating decision on appeal. To the extent the Veteran argues, through his representative, that a remand is warranted under McLendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79 (2006) based on the Veteran's behavioral changes in 1986, the Board notes that such behavioral changes occurred during a period of service not eligible for compensation benefits as the Veteran's service from September 1984 to February 1990 has been characterized as dishonorable based on a bad conduct discharge. See November 1994 Administrative Decision; September 2020 Discharge / Retirement or ETS. Entitlement to service connection for PTSD must be based on an event incurred during a period of active service in which the Veteran was discharged for conditions other than dishonorable. Thus, the Board finds the evidence is neither evenly balanced nor approximately so with regard to whether service connection for PTSD is warranted. The evidence persuasively weighs against the Veteran's claim for service connection for PTSD as the claimed in-service stressors are not supported by credible evidence verifying the occurrence of the stressors. The benefit of the doubt doctrine is not for application, and the claim is denied. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b); see also Lynch. The Veteran is reminded that if he would like VA to consider any evidence that was submitted that the Board could not consider, the Veteran may file a Supplemental Claim (VA Form 20-0995) and submit or identify this evidence as provided above. 38 C.F.R. § 3.2501. MICHAEL A. HERMAN Veterans Law Judge Board of Veterans' Appeals Attorney for the Board Michelle B., Associate Attorney The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.