Citation Nr: 25008907
Decision Date: 07/08/25	Archive Date: 07/08/25

DOCKET NO. 20-26 718
DATE: July 8, 2025

REMANDED

Entitlement to special monthly compensation (SMC) based on aid and attendance/housebound is remanded.

REASONS FOR REMAND

The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Navy from May 1976 to May 1982.

This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from March 2017 and January 2018 rating decisions by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO).

In April 2024, the Board in pertinent part denied the Veteran's claim of entitlement to a disability rating more than 70 percent for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) to include anxiety and depression and also awarded entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) from December 9, 2016.  To the extent that the Board did not adjudicate whether entitlement to SMC based on aid and attendance/housebound status was warranted based on the Veteran's PTSD, the Veteran appealed this issue to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court).  In February 2025, counsel for the Veteran and the Secretary of VA filed a Joint Motion for Partial Remand (JMPR).  An Order of the Court dated February 2025 granted the motion, partially vacated the Board's April 2024 decision, and remanded the case to the Board.

SMC

The parties agreed in the February 2025 JMPR that partial vacatur and remand was warranted because the Board erred when it did not address whether the record reasonably raised the issue of entitlement to SMC based on the Veteran's PTSD.  In this regard, the parties noted that in the April 2024 decision, the Board granted the Veteran's claim of TDIU effective December 9, 2016, addressing the Veteran's service-connected PTSD and back impairment and the symptoms of those conditions causing impairment, and the parties agreed that the Board did not address whether the evidence of record reasonably raised the issue of entitlement to SMC based on whether the Veteran's PTSD alone could establish entitlement to TDIU and thus entitlement to SMC.  In particular, entitlement to TDIU based on a single disability may afford entitlement to SMC, which is a higher rate of compensation.  38 U.S.C. § 1114(s); see also Bradley v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 280, 293 (2008) (holding that TDIU premised on a single disability may satisfy the requirement for a single service-connected disability rated as total for establishing entitlement to SMC under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s)).  The parties further noted that in a January 2020, VA PTSD disability benefits questionnaire (DBQ), the examiner noted that Veteran experienced occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking and/or mood.  The examiner also reported that the Veteran "continues to exhibit multiple symptoms of PTSD to include anxiety, depression, suspiciousness, irritable behavior, anger issues, some problems with concentration/focus/memory, sleep issues, nightmares, flashbacks, social withdrawal, and inability to sustain relationships."

As discussed above, when a Veteran files a claim for an increased rating, they are presumed to be seeking the maximum benefit under any applicable theory, including TDIU.  See generally Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447 (2009).  In light of this principle, entitlement to SMC has been found to be an inferable issue anytime a Veteran is requesting increased benefits.  Akles v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 118 (1991).  In light of the record previously discussed, the Board finds that the Veteran has raised a claim for SMC as an inferred part of her TDIU and increased rating issues.  Accordingly, the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) must adjudicate a claim of SMC.

The matter is REMANDED for the following action:

Adjudicate the Veteran's claim of entitlement to SMC based on aid and attendance/housebound remanded herein.  If the benefit sought remains denied, issue an appropriate supplemental statement of the case and provide the Veteran and her agent with the requisite period of time to respond.  

 

 

T. Raymond

Veterans Law Judge

Board of Veterans' Appeals

Attorney for the Board	Arif Syed, Counsel

The Board's decision in this case is binding only with respect to the instant matter decided. This decision is not precedential and does not establish VA policies or interpretations of general applicability. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1303.