BVA9506093 DOCKET NO. 91-48 162 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Louisville, Kentucky THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD K. Keyes, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from July 1965 to July 1967. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a May 1990 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Louisville, Kentucky, which denied service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In July 1992, the Board remanded the case for further development. CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT ON APPEAL The veteran contends that the RO committed error in denying his claim for service-connection for PTSD. In a February 1995 statement of the veteran's representative, the Board is requested to remand the case a second time for a psychiatric evaluation "to once and for all ascertain whether the veteran is, in fact, suffering post-traumatic stress disorder residuals." DECISION OF THE BOARD The Board, in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104 (West 1991), has reviewed and considered all of the evidence and material of record in the veteran's claims file. Based on its review of the relevant evidence in this matter and for the following reasons and bases, it is the decision of the Board that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy. 2. A truck accident killing two men who served in the veteran's unit occurred in April 1966. 3. The veteran's statement that he was "real good friends" with the men who were killed in the truck accident is not corroborated by credible supporting evidence. 4. The veteran's learning of a truck accident in April 1966 which claimed the lives of two men who served in his unit is not a sufficiently severe stressful event to support a diagnosis of PTSD for the purposes of service connection under the criteria adopted by VA for determining the sufficiency of such stressors. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. New and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a claim for service connection for PTSD, and the claim has been reopened. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5108, 7105(c) (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.156, 20.302, 20.1103 (1994). 2. The determination of the sufficiency of the stressor in this case is a factual, not a medical, matter. West v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 70, 78-79 (1994); Swann v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 229, 233 (1993). 3. The requirements for service connection for PTSD have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A §§ 1110, 1154 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1994). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The veteran filed his first claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder including PTSD in January 1982. In May 1982, the RO denied the claim and notified the veteran the same month. The veteran did not appeal and the rating decision became final. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(c) (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.302, 20.1103 (1994). In November 1983, the veteran attempted to reopen his claim. The RO denied the veteran's claim on the grounds that the "evidence d[id] not present a new factual basis for service connection" since the May 1982 final denial of the claim. Although expressed in terminology used by VA in the 1980s, i.e., "d[id] not present a new factual basis," in effect, the RO denied the veteran's petition to reopen the May 1982 final denial of his claim on the grounds that no new and material evidence had been submitted. In February 1989, the veteran again sought to reopen his claim for service connection for PTSD. In support of his petition to reopen, the veteran submitted two statements, one dated February 1989 and the other October 1989, describing stressful events, or stressors, that he alleged to have experienced in service; private outpatient treatment reports from 1968-69 and 1976 and 1978; VAMC medical reports from 1982 to 1989 showing treatment for PTSD; a July 1989 VA psychological report reflecting a diagnosis of PTSD; and a July 1989 VA examination report also showing a diagnosis of PTSD. The RO reopened the claim for service connection for PTSD and assisted the veteran in developing facts pertinent to his claim by writing a letter to the United States Army and Joint Services Environmental Support Group (ESG) requesting supporting evidence of the traumatic events that the veteran alleged he experienced in service. The ESG replied in April 1990, stating that the veteran had not provided enough information about the stressful events for the ESG to confirm them. In May 1990, the RO denied the veteran's claim on the basis that the occurrence of the claimed stressors could not be verified. In July 1992, the Board remanded the case for additional development including another ESG report and a special VA psychiatric examination by two psychiatrists. To reopen a finally denied claim, a veteran must submit new and material evidence. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5108 (West 1991). Evidence is new when not merely cumulative of other evidence on the record. Material evidence is relevant to and probative of the issue at hand and of sufficient weight and significance that there is a reasonable possibility that, when viewed in the context of all of the evidence, both old and new, the additional evidence will change the disposition of the claim. Vecina v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 519, 522 (1994); Mintz v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 277, 280 (1994); Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 171, 174 (1991); see Manio v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 140, 145 (1991). In determining whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen a finally denied claim, consideration must be given to all of the evidence submitted since the last final denial on the merits rather than limited to evidence received since the most recent denial of reopening. Glynn v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 523, 528-29 (1994). In addition, evidence is presumed credible for the purposes of reopening unless it is inherently false or untrue. Duran v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 216, 220 (1994); Justus v. Principi, 3 Vet.App. 510, 513 (1992). The Board concludes that the evidence submitted in this case since the last final denial on the merits in January 1982 was new and material, and the claim was properly reopened. In this regard, the Board notes that the veteran presented medical evidence of a current diagnosis of PTSD and described stressful events in service that, if true, created a reasonable possibility of changing the outcome of the case. Service connection for PTSD requires (1) medical evidence establishing a clear diagnosis of the condition; (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed inservice stressor actually occurred; and (3) a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed inservice stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1994). With regard to the second criterion, the evidence necessary to establish that the claimed stressor actually occurred varies depending on whether it can be determined that the veteran "engaged in combat with the enemy." 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 1991). The United States Court of Veterans Appeals (Court) has held that "[w]here it is determined, through recognized military citations or other supportive evidence, that the veteran was engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressors are related to such combat, the veteran's lay testimony regarding claimed stressors must be accepted as conclusive as to their actual occurrence and no further development for corroborative evidence will be required, provided that the veteran's testimony is found to be 'satisfactory,' e.g., credible, and 'consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of [combat] service.'" Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 91, 98 (1993); 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d), (f) (1994). However, where VA determines from the evidence that the veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy or where the veteran, even if he did engage in combat, is claiming stressors not related to combat, his lay testimony alone is not enough to establish that the stressors actually occurred. Rather, his testimony must be corroborated by "credible supporting evidence" and must not be contradicted by service records. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1994); Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 283, 289 (1994); Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98. The first issue confronting the Board with regard to the reopened claim for service connection for PTSD is whether the veteran "engaged in combat with the enemy." 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 1991). In this case, the evidence does not show that the veteran received awards or decorations denoting participation in combat with the enemy. The awards he received were Sharpshooter Badge with Rifle Bar, Overseas Bar (1) (Vietnam), Good Conduct Medal, the National Defense Service Medal, the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal Ribbon with Device (1960), and the Vietnam Service Medal with either one or two Bronze Stars (the service personnel records conflict with the DD 214 regarding the number of Bronze Stars. The Board observes that Device (1960) affixed to the Vietnam Campaign Medal indicates that the veteran served in Vietnam in the 1960s. In addition, the Board observes that the bronze stars awarded in conjunction with the Vietnam Service Medal are bronze service stars, as distinguished from the Bronze Star medal, a decoration which may indicate participation in combat. Bronze service stars are appurtenances which denote participation in a specific event, such as certain campaign periods. The veteran's service in Vietnam from February 1966 to February 1967 overlapped two campaign periods, namely the Vietnam Counteroffensive Campaign (Dec. 25, 1965, to June 30, 1966) and the Vietnam Counteroffensive Phase II (July 1, 1966, to May 31, 1967). Manual of Military Decorations & Awards, Report No. DoD 1348.33-M, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), pp. 6-5, 6-6, 10-1, A-6, App. F (July 1990). In addition to the lack of evidence of combat awards, evidence in the claims file reflects that the veteran served in a combat support unit, rather than a combat unit. Service personnel records show that he served in the Republic of Vietnam from February 1966 to February 1967 and his principal duty while there was that of "supply handler." The veteran was assigned to the 14th Aviation Battalion from March 4, 1966, until March 10, 1966, when he was assigned to the 256th Transportation Detachment, the higher headquarters of which was the 18th Aviation Company. Evidence from the ESG reveals that the parent units of the 18th Aviation Company during 1966 and 1967 were the 14th Aviation Battalion, until September 1966, and then the 223rd Combat Support Aviation Battalion. The 256th Transportation Detachment was assigned to the 18th in 1965 "to help with the maintenance program by providing direct field maintenance support." The general mission of the 18th Aviation Company was "to provide logistical airlift for movement of supplies and personnel in the combat zone and to provide tactical airlift of combat units and air resupply of units engaged in combat operations." Given the lack of evidence of combat awards or decorations and given the evidence from the ESG and in the veteran's service personnel records reflecting that he served in a combat support unit rather than a combat unit, the Board concludes that the veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy. In reaching this conclusion, the Board observes that it may be possible that a veteran, who was assigned to a combat support unit in Vietnam as opposed to a combat unit, and, who did not receive combat awards or decorations, nevertheless "engaged in combat with the enemy" or experienced a combat-related stressor. However, unless other service department evidence can be developed to show such engagement or experience, the veteran must provide evidence to corroborate his statements that the stressor he claims to have experienced in service actually did occur. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1994); Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98; Swann, 5 Vet.App. at 232-33; Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 190, 192-93 (1991). The second issue which confronts the Board is whether any of the stressors that the veteran alleges to have experienced in service actually occurred. In February 1989, the veteran submitted a statement describing a stressful event that he claimed to have experienced in Vietnam. He stated that the unit to which he was assigned at the time of the event was the 14th Aviation Battalion, that the place where the event occurred was 25 miles outside Qui Nhon, and that date was April, May, or June 1966. The veteran stated that he "was supposed to go on a convoy down to Cam Ranh Bay to pick up supplies for [his] battalion" but that shortly before the convoy was scheduled to leave his commanding officer relieved him from duty on the convoy and reassigned him to guard duty at his base. Later that evening he was informed that "the convoy had been ambushed and everybody but one man was killed." The veteran stated that he had two good friends on the convoy who were killed, one of whom was named "Sheets" and the other, "Victor." In addition to the alleged "convoy" incident, the RO received evidence of other alleged stressors in May 1989. Medical evidence from a VAMC, showing diagnoses of and treatment for PTSD from January 1982 to July 1989, including several periods of hospitalization, reflect that the veteran provided various accounts to examiners of stressful events in service in addition to the convoy incident, such as reports of having experienced mortar attacks on numerous occasions, of having witnessed and participated in numerous deaths, of having been responsible for the death of a thirteen year old boy, of having destroyed entire Vietnamese villages, of having served as a door gunner in a helicopter gunship, of having been shot down three times, of having been awarded the Bronze Star and the Silver Star, of having dragged a buddy from a helicopter while under fire, of having witnessed the massacre and mutilation of numerous American soldiers, including his own squadron leader, a major whom the veteran stated was captured by the enemy and "skinned alive." Moreover, in October 1989, the veteran sent another statement to the RO regarding alleged stressors in service. This statement included a less detailed description of the convoy incident and a description of an attack by the North Vietnamese in which twenty- five gunships were blown up and fifteen men from the veteran's aviation unit were killed. In January 1990, the RO wrote to the ESG requesting supporting evidence of the claimed stressors during service. In April 1990, the RO received a reply from the ESG which showed that a person named "Sheets" was not killed in action during the veteran's tour; that more specific information concerning "Victor" was needed; that anecdotal incidents, such as being relieved from duty on a convoy that was eventually ambushed, are seldom found in combat records; that the base area locations of the 256th Transportation Detachment were Nha Trang and Dong Ba Thin; and that no documents were found indicating that either location was attacked during the veteran's tour. With regard to the latter, the ESG noted that "all U.S. installations in Vietnam were within enemy rocket range and most were within mortar range" and that "[i]t was uncommon for a veteran to have served in Vietnam without having been rocketed or mortared during the time he served there." In August 1992, following the remand by the Board in July 1992, the RO requested more detail from the veteran regarding the stressful experiences he underwent in service so that a second request for information could be sent to the ESG. The veteran did not reply, and in November 1992, the RO sent another request to the ESG with the information that it had. In its second report, the ESG provided a detailed unit history of the 18th Aviation Company from March 1966 to December 1966 and some historical information from 1967. In contrast to the numerous deaths the veteran alleged to have witnessed, the report showed that only four men from the unit died during 1966 and only one of those deaths was clearly the result of enemy action. The only event remotely resembling any of the accounts reported by the veteran was one which had some similarities to the veteran's February 1989 account of the ambushed convoy. The ESG report showed that on April 28, 1966, "a fatal truck accident occurring on the coastal road between Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay claimed the lives of" two men from the unit whose names were not "Sheets" and "Victor" but whose surnames were "Sanks" and "Victory". The report reflects that the cause of the accident had not yet been determined but there were "indications that mechanical failure may have resulted in the 2 ½ ton truck overturning." Because the occurrence of all of the alleged stressors, other than the convoy incident, are not corroborated by credible supporting evidence, the Board concludes that they did not actually occur for the purposes of establishing service connection for PTSD. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1994); Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98; Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 614, 618 (1992). With regard to the occurrence of the convoy incident, the Board notes that the ESG report shows that on April 28, 1966, a truck accident occurred on the coastal road between Nha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay, claiming the lives of two men from the unit whose surnames were "Sanks" and "Victory" and that one of the base area locations of the 256th Transportation Detachment, the unit to which the veteran was assigned, was Nha Trang. The ESG account of a truck accident is similar to the veteran's account of the ambushed convoy in that the accident occurred in April 1966; the truck was headed towards Cam Ranh Bay; and the names of the two men killed bear some resemblance to the names "Sheets" and "Victor", the names of the men that the veteran alleged were his friends who were killed in the convoy incident. The ESG report differs from the veteran's account of the stressor in that there is no corroboration of the veteran's involvement in the incident, including whether the veteran was assigned to go to Cam Ranh Bay with these men and then reassigned to guard duty at the last minute; only two men were killed rather than "everybody [involved in the convoy] but one man"; and the men were killed in an accident not ambushed by the enemy. Moreover, the veteran's allegations about his near participation in this event and the implications that the event resulted in the deaths of many men as the result of an ambush by the enemy were not verified by credible supporting evidence. Therefore, the Board concludes that these parts of the alleged stressor did not actually occur for the purposes of establishing service connection for PTSD. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1994); Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98; Wilson, 2 Vet.App. at 618. The occurrence of the stressor, therefore, is limited in this case to the truck accident as described in the ESG report, not an incident regarding an ambushed convoy. The occurrence of the truck accident having been established, the next issue confronting the Board is whether this stressor was a sufficiently grave event to support a diagnosis of PTSD for the purposes of service connection. The Board observes that, although the Court has noted that a significant diagnostic feature of PTSD requires that the sufficiency of the stressor be clinically established, the Court has not held that this matter is purely a medical question in every case. West v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 70, 78-79 (1994); Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98-99, quoting Manual M21-1, Part VI, 7.46(b)(1) (Dec. 21, 1992); see Wilson, 2 Vet.App. at 617 (whether an alleged event is a stressor is a question of fact for the Board to decide involving factors as much historical as psychological factors); see also Swann, 5 Vet.App. at 233 (holding that veteran's descriptions of experiences in service "are not beyond the ordinary, i.e., they would not, in and of themselves, evoke symptoms in 'almost everyone.'"); Wood, 1 Vet.App. at 193 (service in a combat zone is stressful in some degree to all who are there, whatever their duties and experiences). Thus, the Board must decide in this case whether the sufficiency of the stressor is purely a medical question requiring medical evidence for its resolution or whether it is predominantly a factual matter which the Board may resolve by assessing the credibility of the evidence and weighing the evidence against the criteria adopted by VA for such determinations. Manual M21-1, Part VI, para. 7.46(b)(1) (Dec. 21, 1992). To resolve this matter, the Board looks to the essentials of a diagnosis of PTSD that have been accepted by the VA and to the holdings of the Court. In Zarycki, the Court noted that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-III-R (3rd ed. 1987) (DSM-III-R) "has been adopted by the VA for rating psychiatric conditions such as PTSD" and that "[a]ccording to DSM-III-R, the 'essential feature' of PTSD is 'a psychologically distressing event that is outside the range of usual human experience.'" Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98, citing DSM-III-R at 247; see 38 C.F.R. § 4.125 (1993). The Court observed that the "DSM-III-R notes in this context that the 'most common traumata' include a threat to one's life, a threat to the lives of one's friends, or seeing another person who has recently been seriously injured or killed as the result of an accident or physical violence." Id. The Court also noted the guidelines of VA's Manual M21-1 regarding the essentials of a diagnosis of PTSD for VA purposes which state, "The person has experienced an event that is outside the range of usual human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone, e.g., serious threat to one's life or physical integrity; serious threat or harm to one's children, spouse, or other close relatives and friends; sudden destruction of one's home or community; or seeing another person seriously injured or killed as the result of an accident or physical violence." Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98-99, citing Manual M21-1, Part VI, para. 7.46(b)(1) (Dec. 21, 1992). In Duran, the Court noted that while the DSM-III-R recognizes that seeing another person who has recently been seriously injured or killed could be a sufficient stressor to support a PTSD diagnosis, the M21-1 requires actually having witnessed the injury or death. Duran, 7 Vet.App. at 222. The Court held in Duran that, although a life-threatening stressor certainly supports a diagnosis of PTSD, such a stressor is not a required element of a PTSD diagnosis. Id. at 223. In this case, the truck accident was neither a life-threatening event for the veteran nor an event which he had witnessed because he was not at the scene at the time. Moreover, he has not alleged having seen the bodies of the two men at any time after they were killed. Cf. Duran, 7 Vet.App. at 219, 221-22 (where a veteran opened his veteran-brother's coffin and could not tell whether it was his brother because the body looked like "smashed meat", such an event was outside the range of usual human experience). Therefore, the veteran's experience of the truck accident does not fit into either the DSM-III-R's or the M21-1's examples of either seeing a person who has recently been killed or having witnessed the death of a person. Thus, the question confronting the Board is whether learning of the deaths of two men, whom the veteran described as "a couple of real good friends," in a truck accident constitutes "an event that is outside the range of usual human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone." The Board observes that, if it were shown by credible supporting evidence that the veteran actually had a close friendship with two men in his unit who were killed while carrying out a duty to which the veteran himself had been assigned originally but from which he was relieved at the last moment, the question of the sufficiency of the stressor might fall within the realm of a medical question requiring medical evidence for its resolution. However, in this case, corroborating evidence of certain factual matters, i.e., of the close friendship and of the reassignment of duty at the last minute, is required because the veteran's credibility is shown by the evidence to be questionable. Wilson, 2 Vet.App. at 617 (Board properly denied claim for service connection for PTSD where there was a current diagnosis but corroborating evidence, not of the occurrence of the alleged stressor, which was an explosion, but of the veteran's proximity to it, was lacking); Justus, 3 Vet.App. at 513 (credibility of evidence is presumed only for the limited purpose of reopening); cf. Harvey v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 390, 394 (1994) (where a factual, not a medical, matter was in dispute, the Board was required to assess the credibility of appellant's account of the facts). For example, although the veteran claimed that the men were his "real good" friends, the veteran did not remember the names of the men correctly or refer to them by their full names. Moreover, the veteran's credibility is questionable in general because of his exaggeration of the details of this incident and of the decorations he received in service and because of the other horrific accounts he provided of casualties in his unit, such as that of the major who was "skinned alive" by the enemy, which accounts were not corroborated by the detailed unit history of the 18th Aviation Company provided by the ESG. Therefore, in the absence of evidence to corroborate the veteran's allegation that the two men were his friends, the Board finds that the men who died in the truck accident are not shown by the evidence to have been close friends of the veteran and that the truck accident was not an example of having experienced a "serious threat or harm to one's . . . friends." M21-1, Part VI, para. 7.46(b)(1) (Dec. 21, 1992); Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98; Wilson, 2 Vet.App. at 618. Thus, the question becomes whether the veteran's learning of a truck accident which resulted in the deaths of two men who served in the same company with him constitutes "an event that is outside the range of usual human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone." The Board finds that it does not. In support of this finding, the Board notes first that death itself is not an event "outside the range of usual human experience" but most certainly is a part of human experience. Second, having known someone or worked with someone who was killed in an motor vehicle accident is not "an event outside the range of usual human experience" in the sense of it being an extremely uncommon, rare, or infrequent occurrence. In the unit history of the 18th Aviation Company, the commanding officer wrote with regard to the two men killed in the truck accident that "[d]uring April, the 18th was saddened by the deaths of two members . . . of the unit. . . . The entire unit mourns the loss of these . . . fine young servicemen." Thus, this event, contrary to being "outside the range of usual human experience," was within the range of experience of an entire unit of men and women. Most significantly, however, learning of the loss of two men who served in the same unit in a truck accident contrasts sharply in emotional and psychological intensity, severity, and gravity to the kinds of stressful events that the DSM-III-R and the M21-1 have provided as examples of psychologically stressful occurrences that could support a diagnosis of PTSD. In addition, the Board notes that, not only is the experience of learning of the death of two men who served in the same company not the kind of severely stressful experience contemplated by the criteria and examples of the DSM-III-R, but also the Court has found, without resorting to medical evidence or opinion, that certain experiences at least as stressful as, if not more stressful than, the one in this case were insufficient to support a diagnosis of PTSD for service connection purposes. In Swann, the Court observed that a veteran's accounts of having experienced two mortar attacks at air bases where he served in Vietnam and of having observed decaying flesh fall little by little from a Viet Cong corpse hanging in a tree, even if true, did not portray situations where the veteran was exposed to more than an ordinary stressful environment. Swann, 5 Vet.App. at 233. In Wood, the Court noted that service in a combat zone was stressful in some degree to all who are there whatever their duties and responsibilities, and in Zarycki, the Court made clear that mere service in a combat zone was not in itself sufficiently stressful to support a diagnosis of PTSD. Wood, 1 Vet.App. at 193; Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 99. Because learning of the deaths of two fellow servicemembers in a truck accident does not compare in gravity and severity with the examples provided in the DSM-III-R or the M21-1 of the kinds of stressful experiences that would constitute "a psychologically distressing event that is outside the range of usual human experience" or with the kinds of stressful events which the Court has held are insufficient to support a diagnosis of PTSD, the Board finds that the stressor in this case is not sufficient to support a diagnosis of PTSD for the purpose of service connection. The Board concludes that in this case the question of the sufficiency of the stressor is factual in nature, and not a medical question, and therefore it may be resolved by the Board by applying the criteria adopted by the VA for this purpose from the DSM-III-R and by referring to cases where the Court has found, without recourse to medical evidence, that certain events do not constitute sufficient stressors to support a diagnosis of PTSD for the purposes of service connection. See West, 7 Vet.App. at 78-79; see, e.g., Swann, 5 Vet.App. at 233; Wood, 1 Vet.App. at 193; Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 99. In reaching this conclusion, the Board is not refuting the medical evidence in the claims file reflecting a current diagnosis of PTSD with its own unsubstantiated medical opinion. Colvin, 1 Vet.App. at 175. Rather, the Board notes that the diagnoses of PTSD were based in part on accounts provided to examiners by the veteran of his having experienced numerous and severely stressful events in military service, accounts which were not corroborated by the detailed history of the veteran's unit provided by the ESG. See Wood, 1 Vet.App. at 192; Wilson, 2 Vet.App. at 618 (VA adjudicators are not bound to accept a veteran's statements regarding his stressors for service connection purposes simply because treating medical providers have done so). With regard to the veteran's contention that a remand is required to obtain a more certain medical diagnosis of PTSD, the Board notes that a remand to obtain a medical opinion as to whether learning of the deaths of two fellow servicemen in a truck accident constitutes a sufficiently stressful event to support a diagnosis of PTSD would serve no useful purpose in this case because that event, regardless of the opinion of a particular psychiatrist, clearly does not meet the criteria which VA has adopted from the DSM-III-R and against which the sufficiency of stressors in individual cases must be weighed in determining whether service connection for PTSD may be granted. See Soyini v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 540, 546 (1991) (strict adherence to requirements in the law does not dictate an unquestioning, blind adherence in the face of overwhelming evidence in support of the result in a particular case; such adherence would result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 426, 430 (1994) (remands which would only result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran are to be avoided); cf. Brady v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 203, 207 (1993) (a remand is unnecessary even where there is error on the part of VA, where such error was not ultimately prejudicial to the veteran's claim). ORDER New and material evidence having been submitted, the claim for service connection for PTSD had been reopened. Service connection for PTSD is denied. JAN DONSBACH Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals The Board of Veterans' Appeals Administrative Procedures Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-271, § 6, 108 Stat. 740, ___ (1994), permits a proceeding instituted before the Board to be assigned to an individual member of the Board for a determination. This proceeding has been assigned to an individual member of the Board. NOTICE OF APPELLATE RIGHTS: Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7266 (West 1991), a decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals granting less than the complete benefit, or benefits, sought on appeal is appealable to the United States Court of Veterans Appeals within 120 days from the date of mailing of notice of the decision, provided that a Notice of Disagreement concerning an issue which was before the Board was filed with the agency of original jurisdiction on or after November 18, 1988. Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 402 (1988). The date which appears on the face of this decision constitutes the date of mailing and the copy of this decision which you have received is your notice of the action taken on your appeal by the Board of Veterans' Appeals.