BVA9508552 DOCKET NO. 92-01 926 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in White River Junction, Vermont THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disorder, to include post-traumatic stress disorder. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: The American Legion WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD D. B. Weiss, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran had active military service from January 1959 to November 1960. The initial issue for appellate review was whether new and material evidence had been submitted to reopen a claim for service connection for a psychiatric disorder, including post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). However, a November 1991 rating decision determined that additional evidence submitted was both new and material, but did not provide a basis to allow the claim. Thus, as the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) is in accord with this determination, the issue is as stated on the title page of this decision. CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT ON APPEAL In his initial claim in 1979, the veteran asserted that a disorder involving his "nerves" had begun in 1959-1960. In September 1991, the veteran asserted that depression should be service-connected. In April 1992, the representative argued, in essence, that because the veteran was mentally sound at service entrance, but had an emotional instability reaction by separation, the claim should be granted. The representative posited in January 1994 that the allegations of stressors during a covert action should be accepted as true because only a person who actually had experienced the event described could report such allegations. In February 1995, the representative asserted that the failure to obtain morning reports might constitute a failure in performance of the duty to assist. DECISION OF THE BOARD The Board, in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104 (West 1991), has reviewed and considered all of the evidence and material of record in the veteran's claims file. Based on its review of the relevant evidence in this matter, and for the following reasons and bases, it is the decision of the Board that the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim for service connection for an psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. An acquired psychiatric disorder was not manifested in service. 2. The veteran did not engage in combat. 3. It is not shown that during service the veteran was subjected to a stressor. 4. Any current acquired psychiatric disorder is not shown to be related to service or to any incident therein. CONCLUSION OF LAW An acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, was not incurred or aggravated in peacetime service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131, 5107 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.304 (1994). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Initially, the Board notes that the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 have been met, in that the claim is well grounded and adequately developed. Service connection may be granted for disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active peacetime service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1131. Where a veteran served for 90 days or more during peacetime, and a psychosis develops to a degree of 10 percent or more within one year from date of service separation, it will be presumed to have been incurred in service, even though there is no evidence of such disease in service. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (1994). Service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence establishing a clear diagnosis of the condition, credible supporting evidence that the claimed inservice stressor actually occurred, and a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed inservice stressor. If the claimed stressor is related to combat, service department evidence that the veteran engaged in combat or that the veteran was awarded the Purple heart, Combat Infantryman Badge, or similar combat citation will be accepted, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, as conclusive evidence of a claimed inservice stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). With a chronic disease shown as such in service (or within an applicable presumptive period), subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date are service connected unless clearly attributable to intercurrent cause. For the showing of chronic disease in service, a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time, as distinguished from merely isolated findings or a diagnosis including the word "chronic," is required. Continuity of symptomatology is required only where the condition noted during service (or in the presumptive period) is not, in fact, shown to be chronic or where the diagnosis of chronicity may be legitimately questioned. When the fact of chronicity in service is not adequately supported, then a showing of continuity after discharge is required to support the claim. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Congenital or developmental defects such as personality disorders are not diseases or injuries within the meaning of the applicable legislation. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c). At service entrance examination in November 1958, the psychiatric diagnosis was normal and there was no pertinent history. In October 1960, the veteran inflicted multiple superficial cuts on both of his wrists while intoxicated. A statement of [redacted] taken the next day indicates that Mr. [redacted] was awakened in the night by a noise, he observed the veteran in the hall with bloodied wrists, and he went to the hospital with the veteran. The veteran made statements to the effect that he was doing the cutting for the good of the outfit, feeling that it would bring attention to the outfit, the awful working conditions, and the way the company was being run. A statement of witness [redacted] taken at that time revealed the veteran to have been crying, and saying he was not getting any time off and was very displeased with the company. While enroute to the hospital, according to witness [redacted], the veteran asserted that the next time he might do better at killing himself and maybe it would get some good out of the company for the men. Witness [redacted] recalled the veteran to have asserted that he had attempted to get "something straight (sic) in the company, now maybe the boys will get some action and the he would rather die than live in the hell hole he was in." At psychiatric evaluation in October 1960, the veteran gave no history of depressed feelings, but revealed feelings of tension and dissatisfaction with his assignment. He added that he had a previous similar episode 9 months before and had a history of inflicting superficial cuts on himself as a youngster whenever he felt angry with his mother. On psychiatric examination, he was said to be tense and volatile but polite and cooperative during the interview. He discussed his tendencies and problems freely. He stated that he wanted to return to his duty assignment but ventilated considerable feelings of resentment about it. No significant disorder of affect, thought, sensorium, orientation, memory, or intellect was seen. It was the examining psychiatrist's opinion that the veteran had followed a lifelong tendency in his suicidal gestures and had no serious psychiatric disorder. In a tense situation, he could not be relied upon to not repeat these unacceptable acts. The diagnosis was emotional instability reaction, chronic, moderate to severe. This was said to have not been incurred in the line of duty and to have existed prior to service. Separation was recommended. At service separation examination in October 1960, the psychiatric diagnosis was normal. The veteran gave a history of having had depression or excessive worry. In June 1974, S. Eppley, M.D., advised that he had treated the veteran for anxiety reaction since October 1966. The records of Dr. Eppley, dated beginning in February 1965, have been received and they reflect intermittent impressions of and treatment for anxiety reaction beginning in October 1966. In July 1979, Dr. Eppley added that he had prescribed medicine for anxiety and depression in April 1971 and seen the veteran in this regard several times thereafter. J. Cohen, M.D., provided a psychiatric evaluation for disability determination, and in March 1982, Dr. Cohen reported in pertinent part that the veteran had a conversion reaction, chronic, severe, related to low back syndrome, and to an underlying personality problem. In June 1983, A. Wright, M.D., noted that the veteran was first seen at her agency, Franklin Grand Isle Mental Health Service, in July 1981. The assessment in August 1981 had been that the veteran had an emotional, fragile personality, and this was characterized by his dependency needs and some emotional fragility. His depressive symptoms were seen as secondary to his loss of function due to back pain. Antidepressant medication and treatment toward helping him express his feelings was instituted, which continued to the time of the June 1983 statement. Dr. Wright noted that the 1983 assessment was essentially the same as in 1981, although more data supporting the assessment had been obtained since 1981. The diagnosis was adjustment disorder with depressed mood, and it was noted that the veteran could not cope with his pain or the concomitant change in his role identity, causing depressed feelings. A psychiatric review form completed in February 1985 indicated that the diagnoses were adjustment disorder with depressed mood secondary to low back pain, and conversion disorder. Dr. Eppley noted in December 1986 that based on "subjective information alone," provided by the "claimant or his/her family," the veteran had limitation of activity with severe depression. Dr. Eppley had noticed a change in the veteran's behavior as a result of pain. In June 1987, Dr. Wright advised that the veteran participated in family events in spite of pain, was dealing better psychologically with chronic pain, and made fewer suicidal statements. Psychiatric review for continuation of Social Security disability benefits in August 1987 revealed remarks that the veteran's claim had been initially allowed in March 1985 as disabled secondary to diminished work stress tolerance with diagnosis of chronic adjustment reaction with depressed mood secondary to pain. Review of evidence and statements from the treating psychiatrist showed chronic depression secondary to chronic pain, ongoing suicide risk, and marginal functioning with little tolerance for external stress. Evidence indicated no medical improvement relative to the severity of the veteran's condition, and that he would not be able to sustain work secondary to marked diminished stress tolerance. The diagnosis was ongoing adjustment disorder with depressed mood secondary to chronic pain. In October 1991, A. Wright, M.D., advised that the veteran's diagnoses were major depressive disorder, recurrent, and post- traumatic stress disorder, chronic, delayed. Dr. Wright also discussed the veteran's back pain having a psychological component. She felt that the 2 mental health diagnoses were related to his military experience because the veteran reported being stressed by his job as a military police officer (MP), which required him to break up fights and to be threatening and violent. He reportedly developed a pattern of dissociating when he knew he was going to have to deal with such an event. His partners reportedly commented on his getting "carried away," and after one such incident, involving a friend, he "woke up in a padded cell." He told Dr. Wright that at that time he gave a history of anger at his parents rather than telling the real story, for which he did not have any recall (due to being dissociated), so that he could get out of the military. He added that hearing of the violent things he has done in anger, which he cannot recall, had made him very afraid of being angry. A Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) psychiatric consultation requested in September 1991 revealed the veteran's history of having attempted suicide by slashing wrists with the conscious wish that this would lead to an investigation of MP activities. The veteran reported that since then he had had recurrent depression and suicidal ideation, but no attempts. He also described severe anxiety, nightmares about events in Germany, intrusive memories, irritability, and occasional violence toward objects. He denied flashbacks and startle response. It was noted that a pituitary tumor had recently been seen on "MRI." At VA outpatient treatment in November 1991, the veteran gave a history of having volunteered to be an MP because he had always been bashful and thought that such a job would force him to talk. He was happy with his stateside MP post but unhappy with his next post, in Germany, where he was expected to batter arrestees to instill respect for the military. However, he feared rejection and being beaten himself, he said, so he joined in. On one such occasion, reportedly, at the sight of the victim's blood, he "blacked out." He seemed to have dissociated and when he "came to" he had no recollection of the events after seeing the blood. Several similar episodes followed, one on New Year's Eve, 1959. He had several times battered prisoners in a blind rage and had been told to "take it easy" to avoid killing anyone. Particularly traumatic was an off-duty incident where he and a friend met at a bar, a fight broke out, and the other MPs arrived and battered his friend, although he was not involved in the fight. The next thing the veteran recalled, he woke up having cut his wrists. He recalled that after service he had several dissociative incidents of "superhuman strength" involving breaking a door down, destroying a suitcase, and manually moving a car. He said these incidents did not always involve rage and could involve back pain, and they did not involve alcohol abuse. The examiner felt that clearly the veteran experienced events in Germany as traumatic, and there were various symptoms consistent with PTSD; however, the veteran's unusual medication regime, prescribed privately, and his neuropsychological condition, as well as his self reported social avoidance prior to service, complicated diagnosis. The examiner could not rule out PTSD or diagnose it. At his personal hearing in January 1992, the veteran testified that he broke down under the stresses of service, causing a neuropsychiatric disorder which persisted to the present. He described such stresses as being an MP, required to fight, beat others, etc. (transcript of hearing at pages 1-2 or t. 1-2.) He had not sought psychiatric treatment after discharge, until 1981. (t. 4.) He testified that he and a friend had met in a bar in Germany when he was in service, when a fight broke out. This prompted some on-duty MPs to come to the scene, and the veteran advised them that his friend was not involved in the fight. Nonetheless, his friend was tripped by the MPs, and his hands were broken by them. (t. at 6-7.) This caused the veteran to attempt suicide, and he woke up 2 days after the attempt without any recollection of what had happened. The only way he knew what had transpired was by the statements of others. Other such incidents had occurred in service in which he could not recall what happened afterward, which incidents he described. (t. 9- 10.) In March 1992, Dr. Wright advised that in her opinion, the service diagnosis of emotional instability was directly related to events in service, which were also related to the current mental disorders. She felt that the veteran's fearful suppression of anger was directly related to, if not the cause of, his depressive symptoms. She added, "there is no basis on which anyone can say that what occurred in the service was an extension of his behavior in civilian life." Dr. Eppley advised in September 1992 that he primarily provided the veteran's general care and that he received treatment elsewhere for bipolar disorder. In October 1992 Dr. Wright noted the veteran's history of not reporting the violence of the MPs during mental health evaluation after his suicide attempt because he could not betray his company. He veteran had guilt over his behavior in Germany. He had privately related, with shaking and tearing, an event which had occurred in service prior to the events which precipitated his discharge, and which he had been told to never tell anyone. Due to the private nature of this event, Dr. Wright did not relate it. On examination, there was no hint of a thought disorder, current or past. The veteran complained of memory loss, which was not noted on mental status examination. Dr. Wright opined that the memory difficulty was because the veteran dissociated whenever he had any stress whatsoever, including with recollection of trauma. In November 1992, [redacted], the veteran's pastor, advised that he had noted the veteran to be depressed over the years. The veteran had advised him of the horrors he endured in the service. Reverend [redacted] was convinced that the veteran's emotional problems had these traumas as their origin, although the Reverend noted that his training in counseling and psychology was limited. In December 1992, the veteran underwent VA mental disorders examination, whereat he reported that in 1980, he had a back injury and had been unemployed since then. He was noted to have been "given" diagnoses of major depression with adjustment disorder with depressed mood, as well as conversion reaction secondary to low back pain, by Dr. Wright, without evidence of a personality disorder. The veteran's history of a suicide attempt in service was noted. The veteran also reported a stressful incident of July or August 1960, he had been officially forbidden to ever repeat, although he permitted the examiner to dictate it for the record: The veteran had reportedly been assigned to traffic patrol in northern Germany, and believed that he was whisked off to Africa on a secret mission. Specifically, he was sent to pick up a man from the 24th Division MP Unit, who had no rank, but called him by name and said "come with me." They drove to a plane, and the veteran was told that whatever happened on the mission did not happen and that if it was repeated, then that would be too bad for the veteran and his family. Two other GI's who he took to be Privates First Class, were on the plane and they were ordered to not talk to each other. No names were exchanged. They were required to strip entirely, including removal of their dog tags, and to exchange their weapons for others, and all their belongings were put in duffel sacs. Presumably, although this is not stated in the dictation, they were given other clothes, and the veteran fell asleep on this plane and on a subsequent Swiss plane. There were about 120 men on this plane, and they were again ordered not to talk and told that their mission was secret. They were broken out into color-coded groups. On landing, in what appeared to be Africa, the veteran was given something to eat and then shown a picture of what appeared to be a fortress with a house inside. The men were told that their mission was to get someone out. The green army had to hold the perimeter, and the red army had to go in. At sunrise, they blew the gate, killed the guards, and then a human wave of "blacks" carrying spears and knives swarmed out onto the (veteran's) green army. Many blacks were slaughtered due to the mismatch of their weapons versus the military's. When the green army had to stop and reload, however, it too was slaughtered. The veteran saw his colleagues' butchered bodies. He himself was wounded in the knee and was one of 8 of the 120 to survive. He felt the mission was accomplished when 2 men in black hooded clothes removed 2 people from the fortress into the woods. The 8 survivors returned to the plane and waited for the return of one of the black-hooded men, who said, "it's all taken care of." The veteran took this to mean that the 2 individuals removed from the fortress were killed. This covert raid had taken place over a 3 day period. The veteran had not repeated this story before except to Dr. Wright and to his reverend, out of loyalty to the military and fear. In addition to this stressor, the veteran described his previously mentioned stressors as a MP, with dissociated episodes and the incident involving his friend in the bar. The veteran reported that he had slit his wrists in despair after this incident. The veteran complained of what were said to be "classic" PTSD symptoms, including recurrent and intrusive thoughts, nightmares of events in Africa, numbing feelings, not trusting others, and making efforts to avoid remembering events from service. He had some psychogenic amnesia and autonomic arousal symptoms such as difficulty sleeping and startle response. He was vigilant and became quite irritable and temperamental at times. If the event described [in Africa] took place, then, in the doctor's opinion, the veteran clearly filled the criteria for PTSD. It was later noted that the examiner felt that the PTSD symptoms were real, even if the event described could not be corroborated. On examination, the veteran was noted to be cooperative but to become overwhelmed with anxiety and tearful. He was said to be quite convincing in his retelling of the incidents in Africa. He was anxious and agitated with a depressed affect. There was no evidence of psychosis, delusions, or dissembling. Thought content, however, was "quite extraordinary" and "undocumented" in the medical record or claims file. It was noted that his prior complaints had involved mostly somatic reactions to his back. The veteran's symptoms were also consistent in part with depression and adjustment disorder with depressed mood. The diagnoses were PTSD, major depression, and history of alcohol abuse, not a current problem, by history. The National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) has provided a chronological record of the veteran's military service. It shows that the veteran was located in Europe as of November 1959, and that he was not removed from such location until November 1960. The NPRC was requested to provide any relevant morning reports from July 1, to September 30, 1960, but a search of these records failed to locate any entries or files pertaining to the veteran. It was added that morning reports generally contain the name, service number, and rank of a unit's members who experienced a change in duty status such as discharge, death, temporary duty, absence, return from absence, reassignment, period of hospitalization, etc. The Board notes specifically with respect to the contentions by the veteran's representative regarding the morning reports that the development requested was completed. The NPRC certified that there were no morning reports in which the veteran was mentioned. Hence, there was nothing to obtain and associate with the claims folder. The Board has reviewed the pertinent evidence. It essentially shows that a congenital or developmental disorder, chronic emotional instability reaction, was observed in service. This diagnosis was associated with his behavior of making multiple superficial cuts on his wrists, in an intoxicated state, following complaints of awful working conditions and of not getting any time off, and a statement that he would rather die than live in the hell hole he was living in. No acquired psychiatric disorder was diagnosed in service. The examining psychiatrist specifically found that chronic emotional instability reaction existed prior to service and was not incurred in the line of duty. It was not until nearly 6 years thereafter, in October 1966, that an acquired psychiatric disorder, anxiety reaction, was first diagnosed, by Dr. Eppley. In 1980, the veteran injured his back, causing inability to work, and thereafter, the pertinent diagnoses have included conversion reaction and/or adjustment disorder with depressed mood, secondary to low back pain. From October 1991, Dr. Wright diagnosed PTSD as well, based on the veteran's reports of stressors in service. In November 1991, a VA physician noted that the veteran clearly experienced traumatic events in Germany, but the physician was unable to affirm the diagnosis of PTSD. In March 1992, Dr. Wright specifically disagreed with the service finding of emotional instability reaction as existing prior to service, but did not address the veteran's reports that he had cut himself as a youngster when angry with his mother. In September 1992, Dr. Eppley advised that the veteran has a psychosis, bipolar disorder, although this is not a clearly established diagnosis. Dr. Eppley is not a psychiatrist and bipolar disorder is not consistently shown as a diagnosis elsewhere in the record. VA examination in December 1992 produced the opinion that the veteran's PTSD symptoms are real, whether the reported event in Africa can be corroborated or not. Based on the evidence discussed above, it is clear that service connection for a disorder asserted to have begun in service and continued since service cannot be granted. An acquired psychiatric disorder was not shown in service, and was first shown years after service. Thus, continuity and chronicity of symptomatology is not shown, as required by VA regulation, to permit service connection for anxiety reaction, conversion reaction, adjustment disorder with depressed mood, or major depression. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b). Service connection for a psychosis may not be presumed because such disorder was not manifested to a compensable degree within one year after separation. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (1994). However, in this case, all of the evidence, including that pertinent to service, does not establish that the above-named diseases were incurred in service, but, rather, that they developed years after service. The testimony, Reverend [redacted]'s statement, and the statement by Dr. Wright that the veteran's depression symptoms are due to fear of expressing anger which goes back to service, are not as probative of the veteran's actual mental state in and after service as the contemporaneous records, which show no acquired psychiatric disorder until October 1966. Dr. Wright's assertion that there is no basis to conclude that the inservice behavior was an extension of a preservice personality disorder appears to be made in the absence of any knowledge of the bases which do exist: the veteran's own contemporaneous history of preservice cutting of himself in anger, and the informed opinion of the examining psychiatrist at that time based on all of the evidence that the disorder shown had existed prior to service. The Board is unwilling to substitute Dr. Wright's opinion for the examining psychiatrist's in the absence of an objective reason for so doing. Dr. Wright ignores her own assessment in 1981 and 1983 that the veteran has an emotionally fragile personality. Dr. Cohen also reported that the veteran had an underlying personality problem. The Board will now address the claim for service connection for PTSD. The United States Court of Veterans Appeals (Court) has held that [U]nder 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b), 38 C.F.R. § 3.304, and the applicable MANUAL M21-1 provisions, the evidence necessary to establish the occurrence of a recognizable stressor during service to support a claim of entitlement to service connection for PTSD will vary depending on whether or not the veteran was "engaged in combat with the enemy." Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 91, 98 (1993). Essentially, if the veteran is shown to have engaged in combat with the enemy, then the threshold requirement of having experienced a stressor in service which is capable of supporting a diagnosis of PTSD is presumed to be met. Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 91 (1993); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). Here, the veteran is not shown to have been in combat with the enemy, as during the time period in question, the United States was not at war and the veteran has not identified an "enemy". Therefore, no presumption of a stressor in service is accorded to the veteran. [P]ursuant to both the [American Psychiatric Association's DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL HEALTH DISORDERS-III-R (3d ed., rev. 1987) (DSM- III-R)] and [VA's] MANUAL M21-1 provisions, for purposes of supporting a diagnosis of PTSD, the facts must establish that the veteran was exposed to a sufficient stressor which is defined as "an event that is outside the range of usual human experience." . . . [A] stressor must consist of an event during such service "that is outside of the range of usual human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone," such as experiencing an immediate threat to one's life or witnessing another person being seriously injured or killed. Id. It is the distressing event, rather than the mere presence in a "combat zone," which may constitute a valid stressor for purposes of supporting a diagnosis of PTSD. Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 91, 99 (1993). Moreover, even if a stressor of sufficient magnitude as to be markedly distressing to almost anyone is alleged, the Board must make its own factual findings based on all of the evidence as to whether such stressor in fact occurred. In a case involving a Vietnam veteran, the Court noted that "'Contrary to the contentions of the appellant, the [Board is] not bound to accept his uncorroborated account of his Vietnam experiences . . .' in the face of objective evidence which indicates that those experiences did not take place." Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 614, 618 (1992) (quoting Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 190, 192 (1991), reconsideration denied per curiam, 1 Vet.App. 406 (1991)). Further: Just because a physician or other health professional accepted [an] appellant's description of his Vietnam experiences as credible and diagnosed appellant as suffering from PTSD does not mean the [Board is] required to grant service connection for PTSD. "The [Board] has the duty to assess the credibility and weight to be given the evidence." Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 614, 618 (1992) (quoting Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 190, 193 (1991), reconsideration denied per curiam, 1 Vet.App. 406 (1991)). The Court has held that in a case where a veteran alleges non- combat stressors, those service records which are available must support, ie., must not contradict, the veteran's lay testimony regarding the non-combat-related stressors. The Court concluded that lay testimony regarding in-service stressors was insufficient, standing alone, to establish the stressors, which must be corroborated by credible supporting evidence to be established. When there is nothing inconsistent, although also nothing is supportive, in the service records, the Board has an obligation to assess the credibility and probative value of the other evidence. Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 283 (1994), appeal dismissed, No. 94-7070 (Fed. Cir. May 6, 1994); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f). First, the Board will address the alleged stressors pertinent to the veteran's duties as an MP. In essence, this job is claimed to have been a stressor because the veteran was required to batter arrestees, and in one instance he witnessed a friend being tripped and having his hands broken. The Board finds that with regard to the allegations pertinent to the veteran's MP job, the requirement of credible supporting evidence is not met. The veteran's testimony considering these stressors has been considered, and the Board notes that the veteran did not provide the name of the friend who allegedly was mistreated by other MPs. Further, his statements about his suicide attempt in service are contradictory. He testified that he tried to kill himself because he "went over the edge" due to this incident, and he could not remember anything after the MPs broke his friend's hands. (t. 9.) However, he also has stated that he tried to kill himself to with the conscious wish to draw attention to the abuses by the MPs. Such whistle-blowing is hardly the act of someone who had "blacked out" and acted in a dissociated state. Moreover, when he "came to," he did not report the MP's abuses or the event involving his friend, which supposedly caused him to slash his wrists, because he allegedly felt too loyal to the company. Alternately, he desired so greatly to be discharged, that he lied to get out of service. The claimed silence out of loyalty to the company is incredible, in light of the veteran's purported wish to direct negative attention of the acts on this same company, and in light of his having loudly protested the company's working conditions and management at the time he slashed his wrists. The contemporaneous records show instead that the veteran tried to kill himself in an intoxicated state concomitant with making these loud complaints. He reported to the examining psychiatrist that he had cut himself as a youth when angry with his mother. While the Board observes that the veteran has since contradicted this history, it determines that the contemporaneous records of the veteran's feelings and thoughts are more probative than his current explanations. Thus, the alleged stressors involving his MP job do not support the current diagnosis of PTSD. Regarding the event alleged to have occurred in Africa, the Board finds this "stressor story" totally incredible. The veteran's service records are inconsistent with this report. See Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 283 (1994). The NPRC has advised that absence for regular duty would have been noted in the morning reports, and it was not, during the relevant time period. Further, the veteran's chronological service record reflects no departure from his job duties in Germany in the relevant time period. The Board acknowledges the veteran's testimony that the event in Africa was covert, and, thus, might not be detailed in the service records in the same manner as a regular duty assignment. However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the veteran was trained in covert operations, qualified to participate in in covert operations or actually participated in covert operations. In summary, there is no credible stressor in service for the diagnosis of PTSD and that entity may not be service connected. Wilson, supra. Therefore, although the Board appreciates that the diagnoses at this time include PTSD, the Board is unable to find that a stressor in service is related to such PTSD. ORDER Service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, is denied. GEORGE R. SENYK Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals The Board of Veterans' Appeals Administrative Procedures Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-271, § 6, 108 Stat. 740, ___ (1994), permits a proceeding instituted before the Board to be assigned to an individual member of the Board for a determination. This proceeding has been assigned to an individual member of the Board. NOTICE OF APPELLATE RIGHTS: Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7266 (West 1991), a decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals granting less than the complete benefit, or benefits, sought on appeal is appealable to the United States Court of Veterans Appeals within 120 days from the date of mailing of notice of the decision, provided that a Notice of Disagreement concerning an issue which was before the Board was filed with the agency of original jurisdiction on or after November 18, 1988. Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 402 (1988). The date which appears on the face of this decision constitutes the date of mailing and the copy of this decision which you have received is your notice of the action taken on your appeal by the Board of Veterans' Appeals.