Citation NR: 9610760 Decision Date: 04/15/96 Archive Date: 04/25/96 DOCKET NO. 94-04 765 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Jackson, Mississippi THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 2. Entitlement to service connection for rheumatoid arthritis. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL Appellant ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD P. M. Lynch, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from September 1974 to June 1976, from March to August 1988 and from January to April 1991. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) on appeal from a November 1993 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Jackson, Mississippi, which denied entitlement to service connection for PTSD and rheumatoid arthritis. CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT ON APPEAL The veteran contends that the RO committed error in denying his claims for service connection for PTSD and rheumatoid arthritis. The veteran maintains that these disorders were incurred during or as a result of his active service. DECISION OF THE BOARD The Board, in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104 (West 1991 &. Supp. 1995), has reviewed and considered all of the evidence and material of record in the veteran’s claims file. Based on its review of the relevant evidence in this matter and for the following reasons and bases, it is the decision of the Board that the veteran’s claims for service connection for PTSD and rheumatoid arthritis are not well grounded. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy. 2. The occurrence of the veteran’s claimed inservice stressors is not corroborated by credible supporting evidence. 3. The current diagnosis of PTSD has not been linked by medical evidence to any corroborated inservice stressors. 4. Even if corroborated by credible supporting evidence, the veteran’s described inservice stressors are not sufficiently severe stressful events to support a diagnosis of PTSD for the purposes of service connection under the criteria adopted by VA for determining the sufficiency of such stressors. 5. The veteran has presented no competent evidence of rheumatoid arthritis during service or within one year following his discharge from service. 6. The veteran has presented no competent evidence of a nexus between any current rheumatoid arthritis and his active service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The claim for service connection for PTSD is not well grounded and there is no statutory duty to assist the veteran in developing facts pertinent to this claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1995). 2. The claim for service connection for rheumatoid arthritis is not well-grounded and there is no statutory duty to assist the veteran in developing facts pertinent to this claim. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5107(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1995). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. General In making a claim for service connection, the veteran has the burden of submitting evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claim is well- grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991 &. Supp. 1995). A well-grounded claim is “a plausible claim, one which is meritorious on its own or capable of substantiation.” See Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 78, 81 (1990). Establishing a well-grounded claim for service connection for a particular disability requires more than an allegation that the particular disability had its onset in service. It requires evidence relevant to the requirements for service connection and of sufficient weight to make the claim plausible and capable of substantiation. See Tirpak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 609, 610 (1992); Murphy v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 78, 81 (1990). The kind of evidence needed to make a claim well-grounded depends upon the types of issues presented by a claim. Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 91, 92-93 (1993). For some factual issues, competent lay evidence may be sufficient. However, where the claim involves issues of medical fact, such as medical causation or medical diagnoses, competent medical evidence is required. Id. at 93. Direct service connection may be established for a disability resulting from diseases or injuries which are clearly present in service or for a disease diagnosed after discharge from service, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110, 1131 (West 1991 &. Supp. 1995); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a), (b), (d) (1995). Establishing direct service connection for a disability which has not been clearly shown in service requires the existence of a current disability and a relationship or connection between that disability and a disease contracted or an injury sustained during service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110, 1131 (West 1991 &. Supp. 1995); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (1995); Cuevas v. Principi, 3 Vet.App. 542, 548 (1992); Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 141, 143 (1992). In addition, when arthritis becomes manifest to a degree of 10 percent within one year from the date of termination of service, such disease shall be presumed to have been incurred in service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113, 1137 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); 38 C.F.R. § 3.309 (1995). II. PTSD Service connection for PTSD requires (1) medical evidence establishing a clear diagnosis of the condition; (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed inservice stressor actually occurred; and (3) a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed inservice stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1995). With regard to the second criterion, the evidence necessary to establish that the claimed stressor actually occurred varies depending on whether it can be determined that the veteran “engaged in combat with the enemy.” 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 1991 &. Supp. 1995). The United States Court of Veterans Appeals (Court) has held that “[w]here it is determined, through recognized military citations or other supportive evidence, that the veteran was engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressors are related to such combat, the veteran’s lay testimony regarding claimed stressors must be accepted as conclusive as to their actual occurrence and no further development for corroborative evidence will be required, provided that the veteran’s testimony is found to be ‘satisfactory,’ e.g., credible, and ‘consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships of [combat] service.’” Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 91, 98 (1993); 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 1991 &. Supp. 1995); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(d), (f) (1995). However, where VA determines from the evidence that the veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy or where the veteran, even if he did engage in combat, is claiming stressors not related to combat, his lay testimony alone is not enough to establish that the stressors actually occurred. Rather, his testimony must be corroborated by “credible supporting evidence” and must not be contradicted by service records. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1995); Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 283, 289 (1994); Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98. Thus, establishing service connection for PTSD requires more evidence than medical reports showing a current diagnosis of the disorder. Although medical examiners may base a diagnosis of PTSD on a veteran’s own account of the occurrence of stressful experiences in service, the law requires more than the statement of a noncombat veteran to show that alleged stressful events actually did occur. The law requires credible supporting evidence to corroborate the veteran’s account of events in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1995); Doran, 6 Vet.App. at 289; Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98. In addition to requiring that an alleged stressful event be corroborated, the law requires that a stressful event be of sufficient gravity or severity to warrant service connection for PTSD, and this legal requirement may sometimes be at odds with the medical findings of an individual doctor. See West v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 70, 78-79 (1994) (noting that a significant diagnostic feature of PTSD requires that the sufficiency of the stressor be clinically established but not holding that this matter is purely a medical question in every case); Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98-99, quoting VA Manual M21-1, Part VI, 7.46(b)(1) (Dec. 21, 1992); see Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 614, 616-18 (1992) (affirming a Board decision which noted that whether an alleged event is a stressor is a question of fact for the Board to decide involving factors as much historical as psychological); see also Swann v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 229, 233 (1993) (holding that veteran’s descriptions of experiences in service “are not beyond the ordinary, i.e., they would not, in and of themselves, evoke symptoms in ‘almost everyone.’”); Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. at 193 (noting that service in a combat zone is stressful in some degree to all who are there, whatever their duties and experiences). For example, some doctors may find military service in or near a combat zone sufficiently stressful to support a diagnosis of PTSD. However, a veteran’s presence in or near a combat zone alone, without more, is not considered a sufficiently stressful event under the law to warrant service connection for PTSD. Wood, 1 Vet.App. at 192-93, reconsideration denied, 1 Vet.App. 406, 407 (1991). With regard to a current diagnosis of PTSD, the Board notes that, although the medical evidence is conflicting -- May and June 1993 VA examinations which do not reflect clear diagnoses of PTSD and an April 1993 diagnosis of the disorder contained in a VA outpatient treatment note-- the Board concludes that conflicting medical evidence of a current diagnosis should not prevent a claim from being established as well grounded, but rather such conflicts should be resolved or reconciled when the claim is considered on the merits. However, the veteran does not contend, nor does the evidence show, that he engaged in combat with the enemy. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 1991 &. Supp. 1995); 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1995). The veteran’s DD-214 shows that he served as a storekeeper. He was issued the Rifle Marksman Badge, the National Defense Service Medal, the Naval Reserve Meritorious Service Medal, the Overseas Service Ribbon, the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, the Navy “E” Ribbon, the Southwest Asia Service Medal and the Navy Achievement Medal X, none of which denotes participation in combat with the enemy. See, generally, Manual of Military Decorations & Awards, Report No. DoD 1348.33-M, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) (July 1990). Although he was not directly involved in combat, the veteran has testified that he was in life threatening situations on several occasions. He alleged that he was stationed aboard a barge that escorted oil tankers through the Gulf. In this capacity he allegedly witnessed, from a distance of 1500 yards, a tanker that was under attack by Iraqis. He stated that he could see gunfire and that the tanker itself was on fire. He also testified that he could hear the distress call from the captain of the ship that was under attack. The veteran stated that his ship was placed on full alert and that his job was to make sure that everything, i.e., hatches, was secured in case there was an attack. He reportedly heard that three people were injured and that one died on the oil tanker as a result of this incident. The veteran’s ship was not attacked and none of the people on his ship were injured. The veteran further stated that he was stationed only a few hours from the combat zone while serving in Saudi Arabia. He indicated that he was under constant threat of scud attacks and that there was a direct hit on barracks only one to two hours from where he was located. Several reservists were reportedly killed. And finally, the veteran testified that he saw helicopters landing with wounded at a nearby hospital. Significantly, however, he has not provided any corroborating evidence with respect to his claimed inservice stressors. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1995); Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 283, 289 (1994); Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98. Because the veteran has offered no credible supporting evidence to corroborate the claimed stressors, the Board concludes that these events did not occur for the purpose of establishing service connection for PTSD. In any event, no medical evidence has been presented or secured in this case to link the current diagnosis of PTSD to these claimed inservice stressors. Rather, the Board notes that there is no evidence that the veteran actually described any inservice stressors to the one examiner who diagnosed him as having PTSD in April 1993. There were no descriptions of any stressors noted in the record and the examiner did not link any current symptomatology to any claimed inservice stressor. Even assuming that the veteran had described the inservice stressors to the examiner, the diagnosis of PTSD would be based on unsubstantiated history provided by the veteran. The Board is not required to accept a veteran’s uncorroborated account of his military experiences or the opinions of psychiatrists and psychologists that are based on such an uncorroborated history provided by the veteran. See Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 190, 192 (1991). Because there is no medical evidence linking a current diagnosis of PTSD to a stressor supported by credible supporting evidence, the Board concludes that the claim for service connection for PTSD is not well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991 &. Supp. 1995). Even assuming that the veteran’s above described stressors were true, the Board finds that these stressors were not sufficiently grave events to support a diagnosis of PTSD for the purposes of service connection. The Board observes that, although the Court has noted that a significant diagnostic feature of PTSD requires that the sufficiency of the stressor be clinically established, the Court has not held that this matter is purely a medical question in every case. West v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 70, 78-79 (1994); Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98-99, quoting Manual M21-1, Part VI, 7.46(b)(1) (Dec. 21, 1992); see Wilson, 2 Vet.App. at 617 (whether an alleged event is a stressor is a question of fact for the Board to decide involving factors as much historical as psychological factors); see also Swann, 5 Vet.App. at 233 (holding that veteran’s descriptions of experiences in service “are not beyond the ordinary, i.e., they would not, in and of themselves, evoke symptoms in ‘almost everyone.’”); Wood, 1 Vet.App. at 193 (service in a combat zone is stressful in some degree to all who are there, whatever their duties and experiences). In reaching this determination, the Board looks to the essentials of a diagnosis of PTSD that have been accepted by the VA and to the holdings of the Court. In Zarycki, the Court noted that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-III-R (3rd ed. 1987) (DSM-III-R) “has been adopted by the VA for rating psychiatric conditions such as PTSD” and that “[a]ccording to DSM-III-R, the ‘essential feature’ of PTSD is ‘a psychologically distressing event that is outside the range of usual human experience.’” Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98, citing DSM-III-R at 247; see 38 C.F.R. § 4.125 (1993). The Court observed that the “DSM-III-R notes in this context that the ‘most common traumata’ include a threat to one’s life, a threat to the lives of one’s friends, or seeing another person who has recently been seriously injured or killed as the result of an accident or physical violence.” Id. The Court also noted the guidelines of VA’s Manual M21-1 regarding the essentials of a diagnosis of PTSD for VA purposes which state, “The person has experienced an event that is outside the range of usual human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone, e.g., serious threat to one’s life or physical integrity; serious threat or harm to one’s children, spouse, or other close relatives and friends; sudden destruction of one’s home or community; or seeing another person seriously injured or killed as the result of an accident or physical violence.” Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 98-99, citing Manual M21-1, Part VI, para. 7.46(b)(1) (Dec. 21, 1992). In Duran, the Court noted that while the DSM-III-R recognizes that seeing another person who has recently been seriously injured or killed could be a sufficient stressor to support a PTSD diagnosis, the M21-1 requires actually having witnessed the injury or death. Duran, 7 Vet.App. at 222. The Court held in Duran that, although a life-threatening stressor certainly supports a diagnosis of PTSD, such a stressor is not a required element of a PTSD diagnosis. Id. at 223. In this case, seeing helicopters landing with wounded at a nearby hospital does not fit into either the DSM-III-R’s or the M21-1’s examples of either seeing a person who has recently been seriously injured or killed or having witnessed the death of a person. To the contrary, the veteran testified: “On several occasions I could see them in the helicopters land. Stretchers taken, I assume they were wounded, I really don’t know because I wasn’t that close, you know, to see the person on the stretcher.” Seeing men on stretchers taken off a helicopter from a distance is not an event that is outside the range of usual human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone. More importantly, the veteran has testified that he did not actually know whether or not the men were wounded. The Board further finds that witnessing, from a distance of 1500 yards, a tanker that was under attack by Iraqis, learning that three men had been injured and that one man had been killed, being under constant threat of scud attacks and being situated one to two hours from a location where there was a direct hit killing several reservists, do not constitute events that are outside the range of usual human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone. These incidents contrast sharply in emotional and psychological intensity, severity, and gravity to the kinds of stressful events that the DSM-III-R and the M21-1 have provided as examples of psychologically stressful occurrences that could support a diagnosis of PTSD. In support of this finding, the Board notes first that death itself is not an event “outside the range of usual human experience” but most certainly is a part of human experience. Having heard that someone was injured or killed, particularly someone with whom you are not acquainted, is not “an event outside the range of usual human experience” in the sense of it being an extremely uncommon, rare, or infrequent occurrence. In addition, the Court has found, without resorting to medical evidence or opinion, that certain experiences at least as stressful as, if not more stressful than, the ones in this case were insufficient to support a diagnosis of PTSD for service connection purposes. In Swann, the Court observed that a veteran’s accounts of having experienced two mortar attacks at air bases where he served in Vietnam and of having observed decaying flesh fall little by little from a Viet Cong corpse hanging in a tree, even if true, did not portray situations where the veteran was exposed to more than an ordinary stressful environment. Swann, 5 Vet.App. at 233. In Wood, the Court noted that service in a combat zone was stressful in some degree to all who are there whatever their duties and responsibilities, and in Zarycki, the Court made clear that mere service in a combat zone, was not in itself sufficiently stressful to support a diagnosis of PTSD. Wood, 1 Vet.App. at 193; Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 99. Here, the veteran has testified that he was not even stationed in a combat zone, but rather, a few hours away from the combat zone. He has not portrayed a situation where he was exposed to more than an ordinary stressful environment. The Board concludes that in this case the question of the sufficiency of the stressors is factual in nature, and not a medical question, and therefore it may be resolved by the Board by applying the criteria adopted by the VA for this purpose from the DSM-III-R and by referring to cases where the Court has found, without recourse to medical evidence, that certain events do not constitute sufficient stressors to support a diagnosis of PTSD for the purposes of service connection. See West, 7 Vet.App. at 78-79; see, e.g., Swann, 5 Vet.App. at 233; Wood, 1 Vet.App. at 193; Zarycki, 6 Vet.App. at 99. Considering the foregoing, the Board concludes that the veteran’s claim for service connection for PTSD is not well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991 &. Supp. 1995). The veteran did not engage in combat and no credible supporting evidence has been presented or secured to corroborate the occurrence of the stressors that he claims to have experienced in service. No medical evidence has been presented or secured to link the current diagnosis of PTSD to these claimed inservice stressors. Even if corroborating evidence with respect to the stressors was secured, the stressors described by the veteran were not sufficiently grave events to support a diagnosis of PTSD for the purposes of service connection. Therefore, a remand is not required to take steps to verify the veteran’s exposure to these stressors, including a request for information from the United States Army and Joint Services Environmental Support Group. A remand would serve no useful purpose in this case because the events do not meet the criteria which VA has adopted from the DSM-III-R and against which the sufficiency of stressors in individual cases must be weighed in determining whether service connection for PTSD may be granted. See Soyini v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 540, 546 (1991) (strict adherence to requirements in the law does not dictate an unquestioning, blind adherence in the face of overwhelming evidence in support of the result in a particular case; such adherence would result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 426, 430 (1994) (remands which would only result in unnecessarily imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the veteran are to be avoided); cf. Brady v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 203, 207 (1993) (a remand is unnecessary even where there is error on the part of VA, where such error was not ultimately prejudicial to the veteran’s claim). Where the veteran has not met this burden, the VA has no duty to assist him in developing facts pertinent to his claim including no duty to provide him with another medical examination. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991 &. Supp. 1995); Rabideau, 2 Vet.App. at 144 (where the claim was not well-grounded, VA was under no duty to provide the veteran with an examination). Although where a claim is not well- grounded VA does not have a statutory duty to assist a claimant in developing facts pertinent to the claim, VA may be obligated under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) to advise a claimant of evidence needed to complete his application. This obligation depends on the particular facts of the case and the extent to which the Secretary has advised the claimant of the evidence necessary to be submitted with a VA benefits claim. Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 69 (1995). Here, the RO fulfilled its obligation under section 5103(a) in a May 1993 letter to the veteran and in the January 1994 statement of the case. Unlike the situation in Robinette, he has not put VA on notice of the existence of any specific, particular piece of evidence that, if submitted, could make his claim well-grounded. Although the RO did not specifically state that it denied the veteran’s claim on the basis that it was not well-grounded, the Board concludes that this error was harmless. See Edenfield v. Brown, No. 92-1263 (U.S. Vet.App. Nov. 1, 1995) (en banc) (remedy for deciding on the merits a claim that is not well-grounded should be affirmance, on the basis of nonprejudicial error, of the decision by agency of original jurisdiction). Accordingly, the Board must deny the veteran’s claim for service connection for PTSD as not well- grounded. Edenfield, No. 92-1263, slip op. at 9 (disallowance of a claim as not well-grounded amounts to a disallowance of the claim on the merits based on insufficiency of evidence). III. Rheumatoid arthritis The three elements of a “well grounded” claim for direct service connection are: (1) evidence of a current disability as provided by a medical diagnosis; (2) evidence of incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in service as provided by either lay or medical evidence, as the situation dictates; and, (3) a nexus, or link, between the in-service disease or injury and the current disability as provided by competent medical evidence. See Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 498 (1995); see also 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 1991 &. Supp. 1995); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (1995); Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 465, 470 (1994); Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 492, 494-95 (1992). The Board has carefully reviewed the evidence of record to determine if there is a well-grounded claim. Concerning the first criterion, it is unclear as to whether the veteran currently has rheumatoid arthritis. Recent VA outpatient treatment records dated in 1992 showed complaints of morning stiffness, a positive rheumatoid factor and elevated sedimentation rate. On VA examination in May 1993, the sedimentation rate was normal. The examiner diagnosed only possible early rheumatoid arthritis. In a statement dated in July 1993, the examiner stated that the veteran had only three of the seven diagnostic criteria for rheumatoid arthritis. Given the foregoing findings, the VA examiner indicated that it was not possible to be more definite at that point in time. However, a remand is not required to obtain a more certain medical diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis because the second and third issues presented in this case are entirely unsupported. As noted above lay or medical evidence, as the situation dictates, may be sufficient to support the second element in this case, i.e., whether rheumatoid arthritis was incurred in service. See Caluza, 7 Vet.App. 498; Layno, 6 Vet.App. at 469, citing Dixon v. Derwinski, 3 Vet.App. 261, 263 (1992); Garlejo v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 619, 620 (1992). The veteran’s service medical records contain no complaints or objective medical findings pertaining to rheumatoid arthritis. The Board is cognizant of the veteran’s testimony to the effect that he experienced stiff and painful joints during service, and that these symptoms were indicative of rheumatoid arthritis. However, while competent to show the veteran’s recollection of feelings he experienced, his statements are not cognizable to establish the onset of a chronic disability during service. Lay evidence alone will not support a finding on medical questions requiring special expertise or special knowledge, such as diagnosis or causation of a disease. See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 492 (1992); Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 91 (1993). In addition, there is no medical evidence of record demonstrating that rheumatoid arthritis was initially manifest during the year following the veteran’s discharge from service. The presumption in 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995), if there were evidence to support its application, could have been used as a basis to find the incurrence of this disability in service. However, there is no post-service medical evidence of record showing the presence of rheumatoid arthritis dated within the first post- service year. Rather, the first post-service medical evidence showing rheumatoid arthritis was dated in September 1992, nearly 16 months following his discharge from service. With respect to the third criterion, as noted above, despite the lack of evidence of the claimed disability in service, service connection may be warranted for any disease diagnosed after discharge, when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d) (1995). Although the veteran has presented medical evidence of current rheumatoid arthritis, the record lacks evidence of a nexus, or link, between this condition and his active service. There are no medical opinions contained in any of the veteran’s post service medical records relating his current disorder to any symptoms or findings during his active service. See Grottveit at 93. Without competent medical evidence establishing such a nexus, or link, his claim for service connection is not well-grounded. See Grivois v. Brown, 6 Vet.App. 136 (1994). Considering the foregoing, the Board concludes that the veteran has not submitted evidence sufficient to render the claim well-grounded. See Caluza, 7 Vet.App. 498. Where the veteran has not met this burden, the VA has no duty to assist him in developing facts pertinent to his claim including no duty to provide him with another medical examination. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); Rabideau, 2 Vet.App. at 144 (where the claim was not well-grounded, VA was under no duty to provide the veteran with an examination). Although where a claim is not well-grounded VA does not have a statutory duty to assist a claimant in developing facts pertinent to the claim, VA may be obligated under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) to advise a claimant of evidence needed to complete his application. This obligation depends on the particular facts of the case and the extent to which the Secretary has advised the claimant of the evidence necessary to be submitted with a VA benefits claim. Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet.App. 69 (1995). Here, the RO fulfilled its obligation under section 5103(a) in the January 1994 statement of the case in which it informed the veteran that his claim was denied because rheumatoid arthritis was not diagnosed during service or manifested to a compensable degree with one year following service. Unlike the situation in Robinette, he has not put VA on notice of the existence of any specific, particular piece of evidence that, if submitted, could make his claim well-grounded. Although the RO did not specifically state that it denied the veteran’s claim on the basis that it was not well-grounded, the Board concludes that this error was harmless. See Edenfield v. Brown, No. 92-1263 (U.S. Vet.App. Nov. 1, 1995) (en banc) (remedy for deciding on the merits a claim that is not well-grounded should be affirmance, on the basis of nonprejudicial error, of the decision by agency of original jurisdiction). Accordingly, the Board must deny the veteran’s claim for service connection for rheumatoid arthritis as not well-grounded. Edenfield, No. 92-1263, slip op. at 9 (disallowance of a claim as not well-grounded amounts to a disallowance of the claim on the merits based on insufficiency of evidence). (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) ORDER Because it is not well grounded, the claim for service connection for PTSD is denied. Because it is not well grounded, the claim for service connection for rheumatoid arthritis is denied. BETTINA S. CALLAWAY Member, Board of Veterans’ Appeals The Board of Veterans’ Appeals Administrative Procedures Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-271, § 6, 108 Stat. 740, 741 (1994), permits a proceeding instituted before the Board to be assigned to an individual member of the Board for a determination. This proceeding has been assigned to an individual member of the Board. NOTICE OF APPELLATE RIGHTS: Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7266 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995), a decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals granting less than the complete benefit, or benefits, sought on appeal is appealable to the United States Court of Veterans Appeals within 120 days from the date of mailing of notice of the decision, provided that a Notice of Disagreement concerning an issue which was before the Board was filed with the agency of original jurisdiction on or after November 18, 1988. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 402, 102 Stat. 4105, 4122 (1988). The date which appears on the face of this decision constitutes the date of mailing and the copy of this decision which you have received is your notice of the action taken on your appeal by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. - 2 -