Citation Nr: 9816775	
Decision Date: 05/29/98    Archive Date: 06/03/98

DOCKET NO.  95-17 162	)	DATE
	)
	)

On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Houston, 
Texas


THE ISSUES

1.  Entitlement to service connection for a skin disorder 
secondary to herbicide exposure.  

2.  Entitlement to service connection for an acquired 
psychiatric disorder, to include post-traumatic stress 
disorder.  


REPRESENTATION

Appellant represented by:	AMVETS


WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL

Appellant



INTRODUCTION

The veteran had active service from January 1971 to December 
1972.  

Throughout his appeal, the veteran has limited his claim of 
service connection for a skin disorder, stating that the 
disorder occurred as a result of exposure to Agent Orange or 
herbicides.  In a statement prepared in September 1997, the 
representative alleged that the issue of service connection 
for a skin disorder on a direct basis should be addressed.  
In view of the veteran’s arguments, the Board of Veterans' 
Appeals (Board) will limit its consideration to the issue as 
developed and certified for appeal, that is, entitlement to 
service connection for a skin disorder as a result of 
herbicide exposure, which is not intertwined with a claim of 
direct service connection.  See Harris v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. 
App. 180 (1991).  The issue of service connection for a skin 
disorder on a direct basis is referred to the regional office 
(RO) for development.  

The issue of entitlement to service connection for an 
acquired psychiatric disorder, to include post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) is addressed in the remand section 
that follows the decision below.  


CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT ON APPEAL

The veteran alleges that he initially experienced a skin 
disorder in service that has continued to the present.  He 
contends that he was exposed to chemicals in service which 
may have included Agent Orange.  


DECISION OF THE BOARD

The Board, in accordance with the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. 
§ 7104 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998), has reviewed and considered 
all of the evidence and material of record in the veteran's 
claims file.  Based on its review of the relevant evidence in 
this matter, and for the following reasons and bases, it is 
the decision of the Board that the veteran has not met the 
initial burden of submitting sufficient evidence to justify a 
belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claim of 
service connection for a skin disorder secondary to herbicide 
exposure is well grounded.  


FINDING OF FACT

Competent evidence of a skin disorder related to exposure to 
herbicides has not been presented.  


CONCLUSION OF LAW

The veteran’s claim of service connection for a skin disorder 
due to herbicide exposure is not well-grounded.  38 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5107 (West 1991).  


REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION

The threshold question that must be resolved with regard to a 
claim is whether the veteran has presented evidence that the 
claim is well-grounded.  38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; Murphy v. 
Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 78, 81 (1990).  A well-grounded claim 
is a plausible claim, or a claim that appears to be 
meritorious.  Murphy, 1 Vet. App. at 81.  An allegation that 
a disorder is service-connected is not sufficient; the 
veteran must submit evidence in support of the claim that 
would “justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual 
that the claim is plausible.”  See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a); 
Tirpak v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 609, 611 (1992).  The 
quality and quantity of the evidence required to meet this 
statutory burden of necessity will depend upon the issue 
presented by the claim.  See Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 
91, 92-93 (1993).  In order for a claim to be well-grounded, 
there must be competent evidence that the veteran currently 
has the claimed disability. See Rabideau v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. 
App. 141, 143 (1992).  There must also be evidence of 
incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury in service.  
See Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995).  The 
veteran must also submit evidence of a nexus between the in-
service disease or injury and the current disability.  Id.  
If the determinative issue is one of medical etiology or a 
medical diagnosis, competent medical evidence must be 
submitted to make the claim well-grounded.  See Grottveit v. 
Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91, 93 (1993).  A lay person is not 
competent to make a medical diagnosis or to relate a medical 
disorder to a specific cause.  See Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 
Vet. App. 492, 494 (1992).  However, where the issue does not 
require medical expertise, lay testimony may be sufficient.  
See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469 (1994).  

If the veteran fails to submit evidence in support of a 
plausible claim, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is 
under no duty to assist the veteran in the development of his 
claim.  See Grottveit at 93.  Furthermore, a claim that is 
not well-grounded must be denied because it does not present 
a question of law or fact over which the Board has 
jurisdiction.  See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7105(d)(5) (West 1991); See 
also Edenfield v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 384 (1995), Beausoleil 
v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 459 (1996).

Pertinent law and regulations provide that entitlement to 
service connection may be allowed for a disability which is 
incurred in or aggravated by the veteran's period of active 
service.  38 U.S.C.A. § 1110 (West 1991).  Entitlement to 
service connection for a limited number of diseases, 
including chloracne, may be granted if the veteran was 
exposed to an herbicide agent and otherwise meets the 
pertinent criteria.  38 U.S.C.A. § 1116 (West 1991); 38 
C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (1997); see also 59 Fed. Reg. 341-46 
(Jan. 4, 1994).  

At his personal hearing, the veteran testified that he had 
been exposed to Agent Orange in service as a result of 
loading and unloading chemicals and barrels from ships.  
Transcript (T.) at 22, 27.  He reported that he had not been 
informed by a physician of the etiology for his skin 
discoloration or rashes.  T. at 24.  





Factual Background

Service medical records show that when the veteran was 
examined for entry into service, a history of acne was noted.  
During service, the veteran was treated in October 1971 for 
vitiligo.  At that time, a two-month history of a depigmented 
area at the base of the scrotum and over the perianal area 
with slight pruritus was noted.  A separate October 1971 
entry reflects a finding of a “crotch rash.”  No 
abnormalities of the skin were found on examination in 
December 1972 for separation from service.  

Subsequent to service, private medical records reflect 
intermittent references to skin disorders, including an 
irritation on the penis in 1975 and 1981, a small lesion on 
the penis in 1985, and vitiligo in 1987.  Though nearly 
illegible, a November 1982 entry appears to record a finding 
of a rash on the thighs.  

On VA Agent Orange examination in October 1993, the veteran 
reported that vitiligo had begun in 1973 and had affected his 
hands, eyes, axilla, abdomen, groin, legs, feet, and 
genitalia.  Examination revealed vitiligo on various areas of 
the body.  The diagnostic assessments included vitiligo, 
etiology unknown.  

VA outpatient reports dated in 1994 and 1995 reflect 
intermittent complaints and findings of vitiligo, tinea 
pedis, tinea cruris, acne, comedones, folliculitis, and 
axilla eczema.  

On VA dermatology examination in September 1996, the veteran 
reported a history of a skin rash in 1973.  He also reported 
the presence of pimples and blackheads on the face and neck 
that began as a teenager.  He reported that while in service, 
he did not mix Agent Orange and was not sprayed with Agent 
Orange.  He stated that he walked around barrels of Agent 
Orange in the compound where he performed guard duty and that 
he smelled spillage from the barrels.  On examination, 
vitiligo involving the groin, buttocks, lower shins, hands, 
fingers, axillae, and periorbital areas was found.  Multiple 
black comedones on his cheeks and the back of his neck were 
also noted.  Multiple superficial scars in his face and cheek 
and temple area, sequelae of acne, were recorded.  The 
examiner concluded that with respect to skin discoloration, 
skin condition, and chloracne, the disorders that the veteran 
described and those which were present were vitiligo, not 
related to Agent Orange; and acne with comedone production, 
which the examiner “did not think” had any relation to 
Agent Orange.  


Analysis

The evidence of record shows that the veteran has received 
treatment for a variety of skin disorders since service.  
Most recently, diagnoses of vitiligo and acne were made.  
While the veteran asserts that his current skin disorders are 
related to herbicide exposure, the Board must point out that 
none of the disorders for which the veteran has received 
treatment are among those associated with exposure to 
herbicides.  See 38 C.F.R. § 3.309.  When examined most 
recently by the VA, the examiner specifically concluded that 
vitiligo was not due to herbicide exposure and “did not 
think” that the veteran’s acne was so related.  The Board 
stresses that the evidence fails to establish the presence of 
chloracne, particularly within the time frame required to 
trigger any potential presumptive grant of service 
connection.  See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116.  Importantly, neither of 
the current disorders is accorded a presumption of service 
connection based upon herbicide exposure.  

Overall, the veteran has failed to provide evidence of the 
existence of a skin disorder which, for VA purposes, may be 
presumptively associated with herbicide exposure.  In 
addition, no evidence has been presented which tends to 
establish a relationship between those disorders present and 
the veteran’s claimed exposure to herbicides.  In this 
regard, the Board stresses that the veteran repeatedly has 
been informed of the basis for the denial of his claim, that 
is, that no relationship between his skin disorders and 
herbicide exposure has been shown, and he has provided no 
evidence to the contrary.  Further, at his personal hearing, 
the veteran stated that physicians had not provided him with 
a reason for the occurrence of his skin disorders.  T. at 24.  


In this case, therefore, a disability that may be considered 
the result of herbicide exposure has not been shown and there 
is no indication that evidence to the contrary exists.  In 
view of the applicable law and the evidence of record, the 
Board must conclude that the veteran has not presented 
evidence to establish that his claim is well-grounded.  38 
U.S.C.A. § 5107(a).  Since a well-grounded claim has not been 
submitted, the VA is not obligated by statute to assist the 
veteran in the development of facts pertinent to his claim.  
38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a).

Although where claims are not well grounded the VA does not 
have a statutory duty to assist the veteran in developing 
facts pertinent to the claim, the VA may be obligated under 
38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) to advise a veteran of evidence needed 
to complete the application.  This obligation depends upon 
the particular facts of the case and the extent to which the 
Secretary of the VA has advised the veteran of the evidence 
necessary to be submitted with a VA benefits claim.  
Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69 (1995).

As indicated above, the Board concludes in this case that the 
RO fulfilled the obligation under section 5103(a) in the 
April 1995 statement of the case in which the veteran was 
informed that the reason for the denial of the claim was that 
the evidence did not provide any nexus between any current 
skin disorder and herbicide exposure.  Furthermore, by this 
decision, the Board is informing the veteran of the evidence 
which is lacking and that is necessary to make the claim well 
grounded.


ORDER

Entitlement to service connection for a skin disorder 
secondary to herbicide exposure is denied.


REMAND

Service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence 
establishing a clear diagnosis of the condition, credible 
supporting evidence of an in-service stressor(s), and a link 
established by medical evidence between the in-service 
stressor(s) and the current PTSD. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) 
(1997).  In this case, Vet Center records contain a diagnosis 
of PTSD, and note that the veteran’s accounts of his combat 
experience are logical and consistent.  On VA examination in 
September 1996, however, the diagnosis was anxiety disorder, 
not otherwise specified, with PTSD symptoms (provisional).  
The examiner commented that the diagnostic criteria for PTSD 
were not met and that the diagnosis was provisional in light 
of the lack of documented validation of combat stressor 
exposure.  

The Board notes that other than the veteran's own statements, 
there is no evidence regarding the claimed in-service 
stressors in the claims file.  The question of whether the 
veteran was exposed to a stressor in service is a factual 
determination and VA adjudicators are not bound to accept 
such statements simply because treating medical providers 
have done so.  Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997); 
Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389 (1996); Wood v. Derwinski, 1 
Vet. App. 190 (1991) (affirmed on reconsideration, 1 Vet. 
App. 406 (1991)); Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 614 
(1992).  While a diagnosis of PTSD has been rendered in this 
case, critical elements of this diagnosis, most fundamentally 
those concerning the existence of a stressor or stressors, 
appear to be based wholly upon statements of history provided 
to the examiner by the veteran.

The United States Court of Veterans Appeals (Court) in 
Zarycki v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 91 (1993), set forth the 
framework for establishing the presence of a recognizable 
stressor which is the essential prerequisite to support the 
diagnosis of PTSD.  The Court noted that the evidence 
necessary to establish the existence of the recognizable 
stressor during service will vary depending on whether or not 
the veteran was “engaged in combat with the enemy” under 38 
U.S.C.A. § 1154(b) (West 1991) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (1997).  
Whether a veteran "engaged in combat with the enemy" must be 
determined through recognized military citations or other 
service department evidence.  In other words, the claimant's 
bare assertions that he "engaged in combat with the enemy" 
are not sufficient, by themselves, to establish this fact.  
The record must first contain recognized military citations 
or other supportive evidence to establish that he "engaged in 
combat with the enemy."  If the determination with respect to 
this step is affirmative, then (and only then), a second step 
requires that the veteran's lay testimony regarding claimed 
stressors must be accepted as conclusive as to their actual 
occurrence and no further development or corroborative 
evidence will be required, provided that the veteran's 
testimony is found to be "satisfactory," e.g., credible, and 
"consistent with the circumstances, conditions, or hardships 
of such service."  Zarycki at 98.  

In this case, the record does not contain evidence that would 
indicate on its face that the veteran “engaged in combat 
with the enemy.”  In an elaboration and clarification of 
Zarycki, the Court noted in Moreau that since Zarycki, as 
well as Doran v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 283 (1994) and West v. 
Brown, 7 Vet. App. 70 (1994), changes in VA AJUDICATION 
PROCEDURE MANUAL M21-1 (MANUAL M-21-1) had rendered certain 
portions of those decisions no longer operative insofar as 
they were grounded in subsequently revised manual provisions.  
Further, the Court had held in Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 
163, 166 (1996) that as a matter of law, “if the claimed 
stressor is not combat-related, [the] appellant’s lay 
testimony regarding the in-service stressors is insufficient 
to establish the occurrence of the stressor.”

In Moreau, the Court, citing the MANUAL M21-1 Part VI, para. 
7.46 (Oct. 11, 1995) (now para. 11.38) held that “credible 
supporting evidence” of a noncombat stressor “may be 
obtained from” service records or “other sources.”  The 
Court, however, also held that while the MANUAL M21-1 
provisions did not expressly state whether the veteran’s 
testimony standing alone could constitute credible evidence 
of the actual occurrence of a noncombat stressor, the Court’s 
holding in Dizoglio mandated that the veteran’s testimony by 
itself could not constitute “credible supporting evidence” 
of the actual existence of the noncombat stressor as a matter 
of law.  Further, the Court held in Moreau, that the fact 
that a medical opinion was provided relating PTSD to events 
the veteran described in service could not constitute 
“credible supporting evidence” of the existence of the 
claimed noncombat stressor as a matter of law.

In addition, the Board points out that VA has adopted the 
fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM- 
IV) in amending 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.125 & 4.126 (1997).  See 61 
Fed.Reg. 52695-52702 (1996).  The provisions of Manual M21-1 
refer to the third revised edition of the DSM.  See e.g., 
Manual M21-1, Part VI, § 11.38 (1996) (same PTSD criteria as 
DSM-III-R).  In Cohen, the Court took judicial notice of the 
effect of the shift in diagnostic criteria, which essentially 
changed from an objective standard, i.e., “would evoke...in 
almost anyone,” in assessing whether a stressor is 
sufficient to trigger PTSD, to a subjective one.  The 
criteria now require exposure to a traumatic event and 
response involving intense fear, helplessness, or horror.  A 
more susceptible individual may have PTSD based on exposure 
to a stressor that would not necessarily have the same effect 
on “almost everyone.”  The sufficiency of a stressor, 
accordingly, is now a clinical determination for the 
examining mental health professional.  

In this case, although the RO contacted the United States 
Army and Joint Services Environmental Support Group (ESG) for 
verification of the veteran’s claimed stressors, the ESG 
responded that the veteran should provide the most specific 
possible date, type, and location of the incident claimed as 
the stressor, the numbers and full names of the casualties, 
unit designations to the company level, and other units 
involved.  The ESG also suggested that the RO obtain in-
service daily morning reports, which verify daily personnel 
actions.  

The veteran provided information regarding his claimed in-
service stressors in statements received in March and June 
1994.  In a statement received in July 1994, the veteran 
reported that his mind went “blank” with respect to names 
and dates.  He provided further details of the locations of 
his assignments and claimed stressors in a statement received 
in May 1996 and at his videoconference hearing in January 
1998.  In this regard, the veteran is cautioned that the VA's 
duty to assist is not a one-way street.  If a veteran desires 
help, especially in verifying stressors, he must provide the 
factual data necessary to conduct the required search.  Wood, 
1 Vet. App. at 193.

The Board also observes that at his videoconference hearing, 
the veteran reported that he once sought treatment at the VA 
Hospital in Houston, TX in approximately 1973.  An attempt to 
procure any associated records is appropriate.  In addition, 
in light of the Court decisions outlined above, the Board 
determines that an additional VA psychiatric examination is 
warranted after attempted verification of the appellant’s 
alleged in-service stressors by the RO.  West, 7 Vet. App. at 
77-8.  

Accordingly, this case is REMANDED to the RO for the 
following:

1.  Although the veteran already 
submitted a statement regarding his 
claimed stressors, the RO should provide 
the veteran with an opportunity to submit 
another statement with as much detail as 
possible regarding any and all stressful 
events to which he was allegedly exposed 
in service.  He should be asked to 
provide specific details about the events 
such as precise dates, places and 
identifying information such as names, 
ranks and units of assignment of any 
individuals involved in those events.  In 
particular, the veteran should be asked 
to provide any additional information 
relating to his references to “dead 
buddies” and “mid-air conflicts,” 
noted in his statement received in March 
1994; and bombing at the airport when he 
arrived at Bien Hoa; guard duty in 
towers, “bunkers” and fox holes; 
“recons” to the “outer camp of the 
perimeter;” guard duty aboard US ships, 
and exposure to enemy fire en route from 
Saigon to “Ving Jau” or “Vung Tao” 
noted in statements received in June 1994 
and May 1996.  He should be advised that 
the information is vitally necessary to 
obtain supportive evidence of the 
stressful events and that he must be as 
specific as possible because without such 
details an adequate search for verifying 
information cannot be conducted.  He 
should be informed of the probative value 
of any lay statements from persons with 
knowledge of the alleged stressful 
events.  The RO should attempt to assist 
the veteran in obtaining such statements.  
In this respect, the Board takes the 
opportunity to inform the veteran that 
the Court has held that asking the 
veteran to provide the underlying facts, 
i.e., the names of individuals involved, 
the dates, and the places where the 
claimed events occurred, does not 
constitute an impossible or onerous task.  
Wood, 1 Vet. App. at 193.  This 
information is vital to the claim.  All 
attempts by the RO to fulfill this 
request should be documented. 

2.  The RO should attempt to obtain 
additional information for submission to 
the ESG, consistent with its February 
1995 letter to the RO.  Such information 
should include a request to the National 
Archives and Records Administration for 
pertinent morning reports for a three-
month period, verifying daily personnel 
actions.  All attempts by the RO to 
fulfill this request should be 
documented.

3.  Regardless of additional information 
provided by the veteran, the RO should 
review the file and prepare a summary of 
all of the claimed stressors already 
reported in previous statements and 
examination reports, including those 
detailed above and added to the record 
since its last request.  This summary and 
all associated documents, including his 
service personnel records and the names 
of the ships to which the veteran was 
assigned, should be sent to the ESG, 7798 
Cissna Road, Springfield, VA 22150.  The 
ESG should be requested to provide any 
information available which might 
corroborate the veteran's alleged 
stressors.  Further, the ESG should also 
be asked to supply a ship’s log from the 
ships upon which the veteran served for 
the periods when the veteran was on 
board.  If the ESG is unable to provide 
the ship’s log, the RO should request 
direction from them as to alternate 
search possibilities.  The RO must carry 
out all action required by the ESG for an 
appropriate search, as well as any 
additional action or follow-up suggested 
by the ESG.  All attempts by the RO to 
fulfill this request should be 
documented.

4.  The RO should contact the veteran and 
ask that he provide any additional 
information regarding treatment for an 
acquired psychiatric disorder, to include 
PTSD.  After any necessary authorization 
is obtained, copies of any post-service 
treatment records not already of record 
should be obtained, including any records 
of treatment in approximately 1973 at the 
Houston VA hospital.  The veteran should 
be informed that he may also supply other 
evidence, such as lay statements, in 
support of his claim.  All attempts by 
the RO to fulfill this request should be 
documented.  

5.  Following the above, the RO must make 
a specific determination, based upon the 
complete record, with respect to whether 
the veteran was engaged in combat and 
whether a claimed stressor was related to 
such combat or the nature of the specific 
stressor or stressors otherwise.  If the 
RO determines that the record establishes 
the existence of a stressor or stressors, 
the RO must specify the in-service 
stressor or stressors that have been 
established by the record.  In reaching 
this determination, the RO should address 
any credibility questions raised by the 
record.

6.  The RO should schedule a special VA 
psychiatric examination to determine the 
nature of any existing psychiatric 
disorders.  The entire claims folder and 
a separate copy of this remand MUST be 
reviewed by the examiner in conjunction 
with the examination.  In determining 
whether the veteran has PTSD due to an 
in-service stressor, the examiner is 
hereby notified that in circumstances in 
which verification of the occurrence of 
the stressor is required (i.e., the 
veteran did not engage in combat, or the 
alleged stressor was not combat related), 
only the verified history detailed in the 
reports provided by the RO may be relied 
upon.  The examination report should 
reflect review of pertinent material in 
the claims folder.  All necessary studies 
or tests, to include psychological 
testing and evaluation with PTSD sub-
scales, should be accomplished.  If a 
diagnosis of PTSD is deemed appropriate, 
the examiner should specify the credible 
"stressors" that caused the disorder, the 
evidence relied upon to establish the 
existence of the stressor(s), and 
indicate how the veteran otherwise meets 
the diagnostic criteria for PTSD.  If 
additional psychiatric disorders are 
identified, the examiner should reconcile 
the diagnoses and should specify which 
symptoms are associated with each of the 
disorder(s).  If certain symptomatology 
cannot be disassociated from one disorder 
or another, it should be so specified.  
The report of the examination should 
include a complete rationale for all 
opinions expressed.  

7.  The RO should review the claims file 
to ensure that all of the foregoing 
development has been completed in full.  
In particular, the RO should review the 
psychiatric examination report to ensure 
that any diagnosis of PTSD was based on 
the verified stressor.  The RO should 
implement corrective procedures as to any 
Board remand request with which there has 
not been full compliance.  

8.  After undertaking any development 
deemed appropriate in addition to that 
specified above, the RO should 
readjudicate the issue of entitlement to 
service connection for an acquired 
psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD, in 
light of the law cited above.  If the 
benefit sought on appeal remains denied, 
the veteran and his representative should 
be furnished a supplemental statement of 
the case which contains any additional 
applicable laws and regulations and 
provided the opportunity to respond 
thereto.

The case should then be returned to the Board, if in order, 
after compliance with customary appellate procedures.  No 
action is required of the veteran until he is so informed.  
The Board intimates no opinion as to the ultimate decision 
warranted in this case, pending completion of the requested 
development.  

This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment by the RO.  
The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the 
Board or by the Court for additional development or other 
appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner.  
See The Veterans’ Benefits Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-446, § 302, 108 Stat. 4645, 4658 (1994), 38 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5101 (West Supp. 1998) (Historical and Statutory Notes).  
In addition, VBA’s ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE MANUAL, M21-1, Part 
IV, directs the ROs to provide expeditious handling of all 
cases that have been remanded by the Board and the Court.  
See M21-1, Part IV, paras. 8.44-8.45 and 38.02-38.03.



		
	Catherine M. Flatley
	Acting Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals

NOTICE OF APPELLATE RIGHTS:  Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7266 (West 
1991 & Supp. 1998), a decision of the Board of Veterans’ 
Appeals granting less than the complete benefit, or benefits, 
sought on appeal is appealable to the United States Court of 
Veterans Appeals within 120 days from the date of mailing of 
notice of the decision, provided that a Notice of 
Disagreement concerning an issue which was before the Board 
was filed with the agency of original jurisdiction on or 
after November 18, 1988.  Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. 
L. No. 100-687, § 402, 102 Stat. 4105, 4122 (1988).  The date 
that appears on the face of this decision constitutes the 
date of mailing and the copy of this decision that you have 
received is your notice of the action taken on your appeal by 
the Board of Veterans’ Appeals.  Appellate rights do not 
attach to those issues addressed in the remand portion of the 
Board’s decision, because a remand is in the nature of a 
preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the 
Board on the merits of your appeal.  38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) 
(1997).



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