Citation Nr: 9832803 Decision Date: 11/04/98 Archive Date: 11/17/98 DOCKET NO. 97-14 383 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Petersburg, Florida THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for post-traumatic stress disorder. ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD W. Yates, Associate Counsel INTRODUCTION The appellant served on active duty from August 1995 to February 1996. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a November 1996 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Cleveland, Ohio. That rating decision, in pertinent part, denied the appellant’s claim for service connection for post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The appellant’s claims file was subsequently transferred to the RO in St. Petersburg, Florida, pursuant to her change in residence. The Board notes that the veteran has pursued this appeal without the assistance of a representative. While the veteran is free to proceed in this manner, the Board reminds her that assistance, and representation, is available from any number of accredited veterans’ service organizations and her state’s veterans’ department. REMAND The appellant contends, in essence, that she is entitled to service connection for PTSD. Specifically, the appellant alleges that while on active duty at Travis, A.F.B., California, in October 1995, she was “sexually assaulted, robbed, and possibly raped.” Service connection may be granted for a disability resulting from disease or injury incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(16), 1110 (West 1991). Service connection for PTSD requires: (1) medical evidence establishing a clear diagnosis of the condition; (2) credible supporting evidence that the claimed inservice stressor actually occurred; and (3) a link, established by medical evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed inservice stressor. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1998); see also VA ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE MANUAL M21-1 (MANUAL M21-1), Part VI, 11.38 (Aug. 26, 1996) (reiterating the three PTSD service- connection requirements set forth in regulation § 3.304(f) and specifically requiring “credible supporting evidence that the claimed inservice stressor actually occurred”). The MANUAL M21-1 provisions in paragraph 11.38 are substantive rules which are “the equivalent of [VA] [r]egulations”. See Hayes v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 60, 67 (1993) (citing Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 308, 313 (1991)). The regulations governing service connection for PTSD differ from those governing service connection for other conditions because they require evidence of an inservice stressor rather than evidence of “incurrence or aggravation” of a disease or injury in service or within a post-service presumptive period. The case law allows a physician’s opinion of causal nexus, in certain circumstances, to establish inservice or presumptive-period incurrence or aggravation, even when the examination on which the opinion was based was made many years after service. See e.g., ZN v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 183 (1994). However, because the requirements in § 3.304(f), including a “link, established by medical evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed inservice stressor” and “credible supporting evidence that the claimed inservice stressor actually occurred,” indicate that something more than medical nexus is required, the Court held in Moreau, that “credible supporting evidence of the actual occurrence of an inservice stressor cannot consist solely of after-the- fact medical nexus evidence.” The Board notes that there is medical evidence of record that contains a diagnosis of PTSD, linking that disorder to an event reported by the claimant to have occurred in service. For purposes of determining whether a claim is well grounded, lay evidentiary assertions must be presumed to be credible. Thus, under the current law and case law, this claim must be regarded as “well grounded.” 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995). The Board further notes that no presumption of credibility attaches to a review on the merits of the claimant’s evidentiary assertions. King v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 19, 21 (1993). Regarding non-combat stressors, the United States Court of Veterans Appeals (Court) has held that “credible supporting evidence” means that the veteran’s testimony, by itself, cannot, as a matter of law, establish the occurrence of a non-combat stressor; nor can credible supporting evidence of the actual occurrence of an in-service stressor consist solely of after-the-fact medical nexus evidence. See Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997); Moreau v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389 (1996); and Dizoglio v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 163, 166 (1996). The VA Adjudication Manual M21-1 (M21-1) provides that the required “credible supporting evidence” of a non- combat stressor “may be obtained from” service records or “other sources.” M21-1, part VI, formerly 7.46. Specific claims based upon personal assault, M21-1, part III, 5.14(c), provides an extensive list of alternative sources competent to provide credible evidence that may support the conclusion that the event occurred. Included among the sources are statements from confidants, such as fellow service members. After a thorough review of the veteran’s claims file, the Board finds that the VA has a duty to assist in the development of facts pertinent to her claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a). The duty to assist the veteran in obtaining and developing available facts and evidence to support her claim is neither optional nor discretionary. Littke v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 90(1990). The Court also has held, however, that the duty to assist does not require the VA to go on endless “fishing expeditions” in order to find evidence which might possibly support a claim while the claimant waits in a passive role. See Gobber v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 470, 472 (1992). The Board recognizes that the pursuit of this claim involves difficult matters for the appellant; however, there remain aspects of the record that require further development. Specifically, it appears that there are additional avenues open for obtaining verification of the alleged sexual assault in service, and these avenues must be investigated. The record in this case shows that the correspondence from the RO did not mention all of the types of collateral evidence now listed in the revised version of M21-1, part III, 5.14(c). Thus, considerations of both due process and substantive evidentiary matters require that the appellant be properly informed of all of the types of collateral evidence now mentioned in M21-1, part III, 5.14(c). The United States Court of Veterans Appeals (Court) has also held that, when the medical evidence is inadequate, VA must supplement the record by seeking an advisory opinion or ordering another medical examination. Halstead v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 213 (1992) and Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171 (1991). After reviewing the veteran’s claims file, the Board concludes that an additional medical examination of the veteran is necessary to make an informed determination in this matter. The report of VA special psychological evaluation, dated December 1997, noted the following findings: The veteran’s history, presentation on interview, and testing, are not indicative of post-traumatic stress disorder. A fundamental problem with the veteran’s claim for post-traumatic stress disorder is that her stressor statement which is vague leaves many unanswered questions. While the veteran refers to the rape, which she does believe happened in 1995, upon examination no such assault is actually recalled by the veteran. She assumes a rape may have happen while she was ‘passed out.’ The veteran does endorse PTSD symptoms on a self-report instrument, but given that more subtle testing does not support the diagnosis of PTSD, the Impact of Event Scale scores do not stand alone. It is possible that this very distressed woman is seeking to explain her symptoms and extreme emotional difficulties, particularly related to her hospitalization at Travis Air Force Base, by claiming to have post- traumatic stress disorder. Finally, the veteran does not meet the DSM-IV criteria in addition to the vague traumatic event for PTSD. The veteran is not found to suffer disability from post-traumatic stress disorder incurred during her military service. The report concluded with a diagnosis of bipolar disorder. A subsequent VA examination, performed in January 1998, noted, upon review of the December 1997 examination, that the “findings were consistent with post traumatic stress disorder. I did not see any rationale for the diagnosis of bipolar disorder.” Thus, clarification of the veteran’s current psychiatric status is needed to make an informed decision in this matter. Accordingly, if after the development indicated herein, the RO concludes that the record establishes the existence of such a stressor or stressors, then and only then, the case should be referred for a medical examination to determine: (1) the sufficiency of the stressor; (2) whether the remaining elements required to support the diagnosis of PTSD have been met; and (3) whether there is a link between a currently diagnosed PTSD and a recognized stressor or stressors in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1998). In light of the foregoing, and recognizing the VA's duty to assist the appellant in the development of facts pertinent to her claim under the provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (1998), the case should be remanded to the RO for the following actions: 1. The RO should request from the veteran a comprehensive statement of potential alternative sources for supporting evidence regarding the alleged October 1995 rape. The RO’s inquiry should include possible sources listed in M21-1, part III, 5.14(c)(5). The veteran should be advised that this information is vitally necessary to obtain supportive evidence of the stressful event and that she must be as specific as possible because without such details an adequate search for verifying information cannot be conducted. The veteran should be told that the information is necessary to obtain supportive evidence of the stressful events and that failure to respond may result in adverse action. 2. The RO should attempt to secure any additional service medical records and the official service personnel file that may exist pertaining to this veteran from the service department or the appropriate depository of records. 3. Thereafter, the RO should request any supporting evidence from alternative sources identified by the veteran. A field examiner should be utilized if a personal interview is deemed necessary to obtain any supporting evidence or if specific records or statements sought cannot otherwise be provided. 4. The RO then should review the file and prepare a summary including all associated documents and then make a specific determination, in accordance with the provisions of 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f), with respect to whether the veteran was exposed to a stressor, or stressors, in service, and, if so, the nature of the specific stressor or stressors established by the record. In reaching this determination, the RO should address any credibility questions raised by the record. 5. After the foregoing development has been completed to the extent possible, the RO should arrange for the veteran to undergo a VA psychiatric examination by a board of two psychiatrists (preferably, who have not previously examined the veteran), to determine the nature and extent of any and all psychiatric disorders which may be present. The veteran must be advised of the consequences of failing to report for the examination. A single, collaborative opinion, if possible, is requested. The examiners must consider the diagnostic criteria of the Fourth Edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). All indicated studies, tests and evaluations deemed necessary should be performed, but should include psychological testing, including PTSD sub scales. The RO must provide to the examiners the summary of any stressors described above, and the examiners must be instructed that only these events may be considered for the purpose of determining whether exposure to an inservice stressor has resulted in the current psychiatric symptoms. The examiners must also determine whether the diagnostic criteria to support the diagnosis of PTSD have been satisfied. If the PTSD diagnosis is deemed appropriate, the examiners should comment upon the link between the current symptomatology and one or more of the in- service stressors found to be established by the RO. The examiners should be asked to comment on the significance of any evidence that is indicative of behavioral changes (see M21-1, part III, 5.14(c)). Similarly, if a diagnosis of PTSD is rejected, the examiners should clearly explain why. If more than one diagnosis is rendered, the examiners should distinguish, to the extent possible, symptomatology attributable to each; assign a Global Assessment of Functioning Scale score for each disorder diagnosed; and explain what each score represents. The report of examination should include the complete rationale for all opinions expressed. Since it is important "that each disability be viewed in relation to its history[,]" 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (1998), the claims file must be made available to and reviewed by the examiners prior and at all times pertinent to the examination. 6. Following completion of the above actions, the RO must review the claims folder and ensure that all of the foregoing development has been conducted and completed in full. If any development is incomplete, appropriate corrective action is to be implemented. Specific attention is directed to the supplemental examination report. If the examination report does not include fully detailed descriptions of pathology and all test reports, special studies or adequate responses to the specific opinions requested, the report must be returned for corrective action. 38 C.F.R. § 4.2 (1998) ("if the [examination] report does not contain sufficient detail, it is incumbent upon the rating board to return the report as inadequate for evaluation purposes."). Ardison v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 405, 407 (1994); Abernathy v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 461, 464 (1992); and Green v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 121, 124 (1991). 7. Subsequently, the RO should readjudicate the issue on appeal. Following completion of these actions and, if the decision remains unfavorable, the veteran and his representative should be provided with a supplemental statement of the case and afforded a reasonable period of time in which to respond. Thereafter, in accordance with the current appellate procedures, the case should be returned to the Board for completion of appellate review. The purpose of this REMAND is to obtain additional medical evidence and to ensure that the appellant is afforded due process of law. No opinion, either legal or factual, is intimated as to the merits of the appellant's claim by this REMAND. The veteran is not required to undertake any additional action until he receives further notification from VA. This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment by the RO. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals or by the United States Court of Veterans Appeals for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See The Veterans’ Benefits Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-446, § 302, 108 Stat. 4645, 4658 (1994), 38 U.S.C.A. § 5101 (West Supp. 1998) (Historical and Statutory Notes). In addition, VBA’s ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE MANUAL, M21-1, Part IV, directs the ROs to provide expeditious handling of all cases that have been remanded by the Board and the Court. See M21-1, Part IV, paras. 8.44-8.45 and 38.02-38.03. BETTINA S. CALLAWAY Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252 (West 1991), only a decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals is appealable to the United States Court of Veterans Appeals. This remand is in the nature of a preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the Board on the merits of your appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (1998). - 2 -