Citation Nr: 9917155 Decision Date: 06/22/99 Archive Date: 06/29/99 DOCKET NO. 95-23 026 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Roanoke, Virginia THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for malignant fibrous histiocytoma of the left calf. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Virginia Department of Veterans Affairs INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from May 11, 1954, to December 21, 1962, and from December 28, 1962, to January 14, 1974. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an August 1994 decision by which service connection for a malignant fibrous histiocytoma of the left calf was denied. This issue was before the Board in February 1998 when it was remanded for additional development. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The veteran did not serve in the Republic of Vietnam. 2. No competent medical evidence has been presented that links malignant fibrous histiocytoma of the left calf to the veteran's period of military service. CONCLUSION OF LAW The claim of service connection for malignant fibrous histiocytoma is not well grounded. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1116, 1131, 5107 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307, 3.309 (1998). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Service connection is warranted where the evidence of record establishes that a particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred in the line of duty in the active military service or, if pre-existing such service, was aggravated thereby. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1110, 1131 (West 1991); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (1998). Service connection is also warranted where the evidence shows that a chronic disability or disorder has been caused or aggravated by an already service-connected disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310 (1998); Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995). When disease is shown as chronic in service, or within a presumptive period so as to permit a finding of service connection, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date are service connected unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (1998). A person who submits a claim for VA benefits has the burden of submitting evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and impartial individual that the claim is well grounded. Only if the claimant meets this burden does VA have the duty to assist him in developing the facts pertinent to his claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a) (West 1991); Epps v. Gober, 126 F.3d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1997). If the claimant does not meet this initial burden, the appeal must fail because, in the absence of evidence sufficient to make the claim well grounded, the Board does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. Boeck v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 14, 17 (1993). A well-grounded claim is a plausible claim, one which is meritorious on its own or capable of substantiation. Such a claim need not be conclusive, but only possible, to satisfy the initial burden of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a). To be well grounded, however, a claim must be accompanied by evidence that suggests more than a purely speculative basis for granting entitlement to the requested benefits. Dixon v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 261, 262-63 (1992). Evidentiary assertions accompanying a claim for VA benefits must be accepted as true for purposes of determining whether the claim is well grounded, unless the evidentiary assertion is inherently incredible or the fact asserted is beyond the competence of the person making the assertion. Espiritu v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 492 (1992). Where the determinative issue involves medical causation or a medical diagnosis, competent medical evidence to the effect that the claim is plausible or possible is required. Murphy, 1 Vet. App. at 81. A claimant cannot meet this burden merely by presenting lay testimony, because lay persons are not competent to offer medical opinions. Espiritu, 2 Vet. App. at 495. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (known as the United States Court of Veterans Appeals prior to March 1, 1999) has held that competent evidence pertaining to each of three elements must be submitted in order make a claim of service connection well grounded. There must be competent (medical) evidence of a current disability; competent (lay or medical) evidence of incurrence or aggravation of disease or injury in service; and competent (medical) evidence of a nexus, or link, between the in-service injury or disease and the current disability. This third element may be established by the use of statutory presumptions. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1112 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309 (1998); Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (table). When a malignant tumor is shown to a compensable degree within one year of the veteran's separation from service, it may be presumed to have been incurred in or aggravated by such service. §§ 3.307(a)(3), 3.309. Additionally, VA laws and regulations provide that a veteran who, during active military, naval, or air service, served in the Republic of Vietnam during the period beginning on January 9, 1962, and ending on May 7, 1975, and has a disease listed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e), shall be presumed to have been exposed to an herbicide agent, unless there is affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116(a)(3) (West Supp. 1998); 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) (1998). The last date on which such a veteran shall be presumed to have been exposed to an herbicide agent shall be the last date on which he or she served in the Republic of Vietnam during the period beginning on January 9, 1962, and ending on May 7, 1975. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) (1998). "Service in the Republic of Vietnam" includes service in the waters offshore and service in other locations if the conditions of service involved duty or visitation in the Republic of Vietnam. Id. If a veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service, served in the Republic of Vietnam during the period beginning on January 9, 1962, and ending on May 7, 1975, the following diseases shall be service-connected if the requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 1116 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) are met, even though there is no record of such disease during service, provided further that the rebuttable presumption provisions of 38 U.S.C.A. § 1113 and 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(d) are also satisfied: chloracne or other acneform disease consistent with chloracne; Hodgkin's disease; multiple myeloma; non-Hodgkin's lymphoma; acute and subacute peripheral neuropathy; porphyria cutanea tarda; prostate cancer; respiratory cancers (cancer of the lung, bronchus, larynx, or trachea); and soft-tissue sarcomas (other than osteosarcoma, chondrosarcoma, Kaposi's sarcoma, or mesothelioma). 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) (1998). Malignant fibrous histiocytoma is a soft-tissue sarcoma within the meaning of the regulation. Id. The diseases listed at 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(e) shall have become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more at any time after service, except that chloracne or other acneform disease consistent with chloracne, porphyria cutanea tarda, subacute peripheral neuropathy shall have become manifest to a degree of 10 percent or more within a year, and respiratory cancers within 30 years, after the last date on which the veteran was exposed to an herbicide agent during active military, naval, or air service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(ii) (1998). In the veteran's case, there is no evidence that he served in the Republic of Vietnam as such service is defined by § 3.307(a)(6)(iii). Consequently, although he was diagnosed with malignant fibrous histiocytoma (soft-tissue sarcoma) in 1989, the presumption of § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) does not aid him in the prosecution of his appeal. Additionally, since the sarcoma was not shown within a year of service, the presumption of § 3.307(a)(3) is not helpful to the veteran. The result is that service connection may be granted, but only on the presentation of evidence showing a link between the soft-tissue sarcoma that was diagnosed many years after service and the veteran's period of service. As noted above, the malignant fibrous histiocytoma was not demonstrated until 1989, many years after the veteran's separation from service. Furthermore, no competent medical evidence has been presented that links this disability to the veteran's period of military service. The veteran has indicated that physicians have indicated that a relationship indeed exists between the sarcoma and his exposure to certain chemicals during his submarine service; however, he has not presented such evidence. Consequently, absent the presentation of medical nexus evidence, his claim of service connection may not be considered well grounded. It has also been contended on the veteran's behalf that the Board should determine whether the RO complied with M21-1, Part III, 1.03(a) (Change 50) (Feb. 23, 1996) and M21-1, Part VI, 2.10(f) (Change 48) (Aug. 5, 1996). The provisions of M21-1 Part VI, 2.10(f) provide that "the duty to assist will prevail while development is undertaken." A careful reading of this provision clearly shows the initiation of this "development" is predicated on the claim being "potentially plausible on a factual basis." Essentially, "potentially plausible on a factual basis" means the claim is well grounded. Epps, supra. Consequently, development is undertaken pursuant to M21-1 Part VI, 2.10(f) only after the veteran has presented a well-grounded claim. As the veteran has not done so here, M21-1 Part VI, 2.10(f) is not applicable to his case. M21-1 Part III, 1.03(a) provides that "[b]efore a decision is made about a claim being well-grounded, it will be fully developed." However, only when a claim is well grounded does VA have an obligation to assist the claimant in "developing the facts pertinent to the claim." Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69, 77-74 (1995) (emphasis added) (referring to evidentiary development required by the duty to assist under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a)); Epps, supra; Beausoleil v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 459, 465 (1996). In contrast to the evidentiary development referred to in 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a), the provisions of M21-1, Part III, 1.03(a) refer to development of the claim. The requirement to fully develop a claim - as compared to development of the evidence underlying the claim - merely demands that VA ensure that the veteran has not filed a defective or incomplete application. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103 (West 1991); Robinette, 8 Vet. App. at 78. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1(p), 3.160(a) (1997)(defining a claim as an application for VA benefits); see also M21-1, Part III, 1.01(a) (discussing development of pertinent facts "concerning a well-grounded claim"); M21-1, Part VI, 2.10(f) (discussed, supra); compare M21-1, Part III, 2.01(c) (during initial screening stage of claims processing, the RO shall review all applications and evidence immediately to determine if "a claim" is incomplete and requires "further development"). Indeed, M21-1, Part III, 1.03(a) relies upon Grottveit v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 91 (1993), in which the Court stated that, "[i]f the claim is not well grounded, the claimant cannot invoke the VA's duty to assist [under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a)] in the [evidentiary] development of the claim." Grottveit at 93, citing 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(a). Therefore, until a veteran has submitted a well-grounded claim, VA is under no duty to assist the veteran in establishing the evidentiary elements of his claim. In other words, the requirement to "fully develop" a claim pursuant to M21-1, Part III, 1.03(a) is not identical to the duty to assist which arises after a well-grounded claim has been submitted; instead, it appears to merely reiterate the duty to inform under 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103. Consequently, ensuring that a claim is "fully developed" under M21-1 Part III, 1.03(a) means that, where the veteran's application for benefits is incomplete, VA shall notify the veteran of the evidence necessary to complete the application. Id. at 80. This was done following the Board's February 1998 remand. Therefore, the Board finds that the RO complied with 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103 and 1.03(a). ORDER Service connection for malignant fibrous histiocytoma is denied. MARK F. HALSEY Member, Board of Veterans' Appeals